VERNACULAR and LATIN LITERARY DISCOURSES of the MUSLIM OTHER in MEDIEVAL GERMANY

Jerold C. Frakes

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PREFACE

This book takes as its objects of literary analysis Hrotsvit von Gandersheim's "Pelagius," the *Ludus de Antichristo*, Wolfram von Eschenbach's epics *Parzival* and *Willehalm*, and several lyrics by Walther von der Vogelweide. That is, works by medieval Germany's most important dramatist (Hrotsvit),[1] its most important epic poet (Wolfram), and its most important lyricist (Walther). Their work is here linked through the focus on their representation of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, a topic of burning relevance in the texts' tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and indeed even now in the twenty-first century. The discourse of the Muslim Other is a focal topic that has received much attention from a broad range of medievalists in a variety of subfields in recent decades, although there has surprisingly been little focus by medievalists in German studies. As will become clear in the course of this study, prevailing tendencies in recent research on the medieval European discourses of the Muslim Other (generally focused on England, France, and Spain) prove inadequate in accounting for the representation of Islam in medieval Germany, demonstrating clearly that in what is sometimes (now rarely) mistakenly imagined as a single discursive mode of representing the Muslim Other or even a single linear developmental tradition of that discourse during the European Middle Ages, there is in fact little uniformity. It is precisely this "local" diversity within a larger and generally cohesive discursive corpus that is the focus here. The study attempts to add a missing (medieval German) piece to the puzzle.

★   ★   ★

Several basic issues need to be clarified at the outset. We live in a time when there are many cultures and large segments of the population—by no means all—that advocate and aspire to some practice of tolerance of racial, cultural, and religious difference. In some places the state itself is conceived as a secular guarantor of such practices. Those who share such ecumenical practices customarily react with disappointment if not

outrage when confronted with intolerance of such difference. While limited exceptional status might be granted to court society in Friedrich II's Hohenstaufen Sicily and to some periods and locales in pre-Almohadic Muslim Spain, such tolerance quite simply did not exist in the cultures and period treated by this book, except perhaps as the undocumented practice of unknown individuals. There was no secular state per se to be found: *cuius regio eius religio* [the ruler's religion is the state's religion],[2] and the ruler was conceived as the defender of the faith—whichever one that happened to be. Even those medieval thinkers and writers who are sometimes credited by modern scholars as "progressive" were not so by any modern standards. To expect that of them and to be disappointed or outraged when they fail to satisfy our expectations says more about us than it does about them. At the same time, however, there is obviously no reason for students and scholars of earlier historical periods simply and tacitly to ignore or condone the denigration, physical abuse, cultural erasure, or outright slaughter of individuals or entire communities because of their actual or perceived racial, cultural, or religious differences, as has routinely happened in many times and places, including the European Middle Ages.

I seem then to advocate as a proper response to such practices neither moral outrage nor relativistic indifference. What *is* one then to think, to take a pertinent medieval German example, of Wolfram von Eschenbach's depiction of a caricatured Islam, in which Muḥammad is among the Muslim gods worshiped in the form of wooden idols; Muslim knights are almost without exception black-skinned or have horn-like carapaces instead of skin; a Muslim queen's black skin fills her chivalric Christian champion alternately with physical disgust and disfiguring lust; the offspring of mixed Christian-Muslim marriages are black-and-white striped or spotted; Muslim knights are of a nobility unsurpassed—even by Christian knights—except for the fact that at the very moment of their deaths they are snatched directly into Hell either by Satan's demons or indeed by their own gods. The cultural, religious, and racial bigotry inherent in such commonplaces of western European Christian views of Muslims during the high Middle Ages is both obvious and familiar, since so many clichés have in one form or another survived in modern modes of bigotry. Do we have no right to be outraged? Why is our outrage justified when our contemporaries voice, *mutatis mutandis*, similar idiocies about Muslims (or Inuits, Hindus, Blacks, or Jews), but not when Wolfram does so? Is it really simply a matter of chronology: could Wolfram not have known anything about, and thus not be held responsible for his errors concerning, Muslims? In fact the Qur'ān was available in a (contentious) Latin paraphrase even before Wolfram's lifetime, by which time there had already been a century of contact between Crusaders and Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean littoral and more than four centuries of

Christian-Muslim contact in Iberia. Many thousands of Crusaders who had had direct and long-term contact with individual Muslims and their communities had returned to their central and northwestern European homelands and some of them could have pointed out to Wolfram that, for instance, unlike his literary Muslims, actual Muslims were not all black-skinned and there was not a single idolator among them. But we in fact know nothing about Wolfram's experience with "actual Islam," and even if we did, we know that then as now bigotry rarely responds to empirical evidence, and we must view Wolfram's bigotry not as his own invention but rather, in its cultural context, as a single reiteration of a recurring mode of Euro-Christian responses to the Other, in this case the Muslim Other. In fact it would be useful even at this point to acknowledge that the supposed discrepancy assumed in the previous sentence—between the literary Muslim and the actual Muslim—skews the issue, for, as is treated at some length in chapter two and taken as a fundamental principle of the remaining analysis, it is not after all a matter of Wolfram "getting it wrong" in making his Muslim characters black and idolatrous: his representation of Muslims is not an inaccurate misrepresentation of "actual" Muslims, but rather ultimately a representation, image, and invention that had a life of its own beyond any corroborative value of "actual" Muslims as guarantors of accuracy.

Such an "established pattern" of verbal behavior, which some decades ago Edward Said, following Michel Foucault, termed a *discourse,* was indeed a long-term mode of thinking, writing, and conceiving of the Muslim Other that we find in a variety of related forms—so it may initially seem—almost wherever we look in medieval European texts: in Crusader sermons, in courtly romance, in political lyric, geographical treatises, and maps, in England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Byzantium, and so on. We must, however, guard against reenacting the same forcible straight-jacketing of those practicioners of this discourse that Said found in the Muslim Other as conceived by Europeans: while the basic components of the medieval discourse of the Muslim Other from various periods, locales, and textual genres are recurringly familiar, they neither are in fact always the same, nor do the same words used in different temporal, geographical, and textual contexts necessarily mean the same things. As with most cultural phenomena, the constructed Muslim Other, that is, the discourse of the Muslim Other, in medieval Christendom is complex; when we consider its thousands of iterations from Iceland to Armenia, from Novgorod to Portugal, over the course of almost a millennium, perhaps we would be tempted to say that the discourse of the Muslim Other is not just maddeningly complex, but even hopelessly confused.

While such issues have undergone extensive examination in recent decades especially in medieval English and French studies, the medieval

literature of the German-speaking lands has thus far not been comprehensively studied, although much serious work—on which this study builds—has in fact already been done. The present study seeks to contribute to that larger ongoing interrogation of German materials. It is intended neither to draw up a list of images of medieval Christian bigotry directed against Muslims, which would at most simply tempt the "enlightened" among us to be outraged, nor to enable any facile identification of the bigotry of that period with that of our own. While such discourses of the deformed and defamed Other have been employed to justify a broad range of concrete actions in the world, including military, political, diplomatic, propagandistic, and missionizing projects, those actions and their contexts are not the same from century to century and state to state. It is those local contextualizations of this evolving discourse in an ever-changing geopolitical and intellectual mosaic that is ultimately the point, for it is at those specific sites that practical appeal is made to the discourse and that the discourse then, dialectically, functions to "explain" and justify the praxis. It is at that juncture that twenty-first century politics connects—through multiply refracted offsets—intellectually, politically, and practically to the medieval period and its modes of representing Muslims as the ultimate Other.

The issues treated in this study are for obvious reasons relevant to contemporary political discussions and geopolitical events, and are thus sensitive, for many, even explosive. Whenever the post- and anticolonialist rhetoric directed against Crusaders and their anti-Muslim ideological descendents—whether in the following pages or in contemporary discussions—threatens to become too strident or self-righteous, however, we would do well to remember that only four centuries before the Crusaders began their centuries-long depredations in Muslim territories in the eastern Mediterranean, the Arab conquest itself swept north out of the Arabian peninsula, east into Mesopotamia and Persia, west across north Africa, and then north into Spain and Portugal, subduing all cultures and ethnicities in its path and turning all اهل الكتاب *ahl ul-kitāb* [people of the book] (especially Christian and Jews) who did not convert to Islam, into ذمى *dhimmi*, that is, tolerated and tax-paying religious aliens. At the time of the Muslim conquest, statistically most of the conquered territories west of the historical Parthian/Persian culture—Syro-Palestine, Asia Minor, and north Africa from Egypt to the west—were peopled predominantly by a multi-cultural mosaic of Christians. While the Arab conquest did not have as its purpose or method the eradication of conquered peoples, and it was in many if not most places the case that the language and culture of the administration immediately after the conquest was the same as before the conquest, there is likewise no question but that gradual and sometimes not so gradual Islamization and linguistic

Arabization was the rule. For instance, in St. Augustine's Hippo, west of Carthage, Christianity was the dominant religion and Latin the language of high culture (while cities were still bilingual in Latin and Punic, and Berber still dominated the countryside) in the centuries before the late seventh-century conquest, while Islam and Arabic systematically and inevitably took over those functions within generations of the conquest (although Berber has persisted up to the present in many areas).

In the course of the century or two following the sweeping Islamic conquest, most Christians in this vast territory, which comprised essentially the extent of the non-European Roman Empire (at its peak), directly converted to Islam or, less directly, in the course of a lifetime simply experienced the withering of their own religious devotion as their community of believers disappeared so that their own offspring in the next generation converted almost by default. The foundational churches of Christian practice around the eastern Mediterranean littoral, dating from the earliest period of the establishment of the religion, withered—even if they were not militantly, actively, and deliberately eradicated—or reduced to vestigial remnants. Language, religion, and cultural traditions were radically transformed and in many cases extinguished—not overnight, of course, but within a relatively brief span of time nonetheless.

Obviously, as just indicated, the Muslim conquest did not explode onto uninhabited territory, but rather moved north, east, and west into territories that had at one time or another been components of the Byzantine, Persian/Parthian, Roman, Medean, Macedonian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Phoenician, and Egyptian empires. The Muslim conquest was thus not the first imperial conquest of these territories, nor were the Crusades the last imperial conquest attempted there. One must keep this longer view of successive waves of conquest and colonization in mind when treating the Crusades as an example of a premodern military conquest and colonization motivated at least in part by religious doctrine. Joshua Prawer has indeed astutely noted that since Christians viewed the Holy Lands as their own to be ruled and possessed: "In the eyes of the West, to use a very modern expression, the Crusade was actually a movement of decolonization!"[3]

The common tendency to tally scores in contests of "whose cultural annihilation was worse?" in the history of colonialism is either naive or disingenuously in the service of contemporary political projects. It is nonetheless salutary to keep in mind that in the centuries immediately following the rise of Islam, historical Muslim culture was no less militaristic and colonialist than were the Crusaders some time later—or than had been the Romans, Assyrians, and so on, some time earlier. The Muslim conquest was, however—and this is of essential historical *and* ethical importance—in most respects also clearly and demonstrably less

bigoted and certainly less destructive of life, lives, and local cultures, certainly than was the Crusader project. The primary distinction of enduring historical value between the Muslim conquest and the Crusades was, however, ultimately that Muslim colonialization was/has been vastly more enduring.

But while that is the background hum of the present analysis, it is in fact the subject for a different book, not the present one, which is instead indirectly concerned with that later European attempt to conquer Muslim territories in Syro-Palestine and elsewhere through the Crusades, and most directly with the discourse of the Muslim Other that arose in, around, and out of that conflict, specifically in a single subset of European literature of the period: the literature of medieval Germany. The analysis and acknowledgment of racial and religious bigotry does not constitute nor is it intended as a condemnation of Christian or German culture; furthermore, it is neither a defense of Islam, nor yet an apology for the colonial ventures of either party. It is instead a study of literary and political discourse, in which there is, one might hope, significance not just for the period of time under scrutiny—although that would be enough in itself—but also for other times and places where similar (never identical) conditions obtain. While I make no pretense of objectivity, I likewise have no interest in arguing a propagandistic case. As will become clear in the course of the study, the medieval European discourses of the Muslim Other are by no means irrelevant or without connection to the corresponding twenty-first century discourses. There is much to be learned from the constructions of those medieval discourses, and not just by medievalists.

Notes

1. Albeit in a time when drama was all but unknown, and Hrotsvit's accomplishment as dramatist is admittedly limited.

2. This and all other transcriptions and translations in the present study are my own. For the convenience of the Anglophone reader, all primary texts are provided with an immediately following English translation; such translations, whether inset or not, are identified as translations via enclosure in square brackets. Citations from non-English scholarship are included in the main text in English translation, while their originals follow, generally in the footnotes; citations that occur in the footnotes alone place the translation first.

3. Joshua Prawer, "The Roots of Medieval Colonialism," in *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, ed. Vladimir P. Goss (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1986), p. 24 [23–38].

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project has had a long gestation period, during which a number of other book projects on quite different topics were completed; it has been largely reconceived twice along the way. It was twice supported by Alexander von Humboldt fellowships at the Freie Universität Berlin, under the sponsorship of Professor Dr. Ekkehart Krippendorff (Politologie 1993) and Professor Dr. Peter Schäfer (Judaistik 1997–1998), to both of whom I again tender my sincere thanks. Various versions of several chapters have formed the basis of lectures at UCLA, Boston University, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi (Istanbul), Princeton University, Ohio State University, and conference papers at the German Studies Association (New Orleans) and the Modern Language Association Convention (Chicago). Critiques, discussions, and conversations that grew out of those presentations have been of inestimable aid in rethinking the argument over the course of a number of years. An early version of part of chapter four appeared in the Liberman Festschrift: *Germanic Studies in Honor of Anatoly Liberman*, ed. Kurt Gustav Goblirsch et al. (Odense: Odense University Press, 1997), 119–33. Paul Kaplan (SUNY Purchase) provided an informed and very welcome reading and critique of chapter four during a mutual sojourn in Venice as NEH fellows in 2006. A conversation with Sue Houchins (Bates College) about essential issues having to do with this project has been ongoing for fifteen years. I trust that the book's appearance will not end that conversation, but rather open it to a larger group of participants including the many colleagues whose scholarly work has educated me on these issues over the course of many years.

CHAPTER 1

LUDUS AS PRELUDE

Brian de Palma's flawed but bitingly insightful film *Redacted* (2006), based in part on an actual rape/murder in Al-Maḥmūdīya (Iraq) in 2006 by five U.S. Army soldiers, takes as its subject the war in Iraq, the media representation of the war in Iraq, various modalities of representation in multiple types of media, and ultimately the problem of representation in general. The video footage shot by the character Angel Salazar, a U.S. soldier whose squad staffs a checkpoint in Sāmarrā', Iraq (which he aspires to use in his application to film school after his tour of duty), purports to be "authentic," providing the viewer with the "real" story, the Truth of the war in Iraq, based on "actual events." He claims that his film will not be a "Hollywood action flick" and will have no "adrenalin-pumping soundtrack, no logical narrative to help make sense of it. Basically here, shit happens," he maintains. Later he claims about his film: "...this is about the truth, bro. This is about what's goin' down. This is about the truth, 24/7. This camera, it never lies." Angel and his comrades are the Hollywood caricatures of melting-pot stereotypes that have become standard in U.S.-made war films, most of whose names telegraph their narrative or even moral function: Angel as uneducated but ambitious, interested and engaged would-be cultural commentator on mainstream culture from the perspective of his own marginalized ethnic position ("that poor Latino film-maker that did not get into U.S.C."); the "intellectual" Gabe Blix who reads books while off-duty and whose masculinity is, as a direct consequence, incessantly questioned by his bullying macho comrades (he is, for instance, identified in the opening scene by the nickname "Don't-ask-don't-tell"); the no-nonsense master sergeant, James Sweet (once called Sweetness);[1] the conflicted and concerned Lawyer McCoy, who despite his best efforts, is unable to commit to moral action in an immoral environment; and the rural bigots, Rush and Flake (often called "Snowflake"), whose racism dialectically is

formed by and re-forms their interactions both on the base and beyond. Basal-level bigotry defines the squad's interactions with Iraqis (but not just with them), whom they generally refer to as "hajis,"[2] "sand niggers," "Johnny fuckin' Jihad," "motherfuckin' rag-heads," and "midget Ali Babas" (Iraqi children). They are also directly or indirectly compared to "cockroaches," "dark chocolate" (sexualized women), and "weeds." The essentializing of racial identity as determinative of (all) human interaction enables the culminating action in which several members of the squad participate at various levels of responsibility in various components of the serial rape of Farah, a fourteen-year-old Iraqi schoolgirl, and then the murder and burning of her and her family.

Angel's "documentary" footage purports to provide the viewer with a direct view of the "reality" of the war in Iraq, as opposed to the multiple other media sequences of, for instance, the biased distortions in the soldiers' home-made videos from YouTube, the officially sanctioned narrative of an onsite French documentary news crew, and the propaganda of al-Qaida videos, that are interspersed throughout de Palma's film. But, of course, there is nothing remotely "documentary" or "authentic" about the footage attributed to Angel, which is simply one part of the film shot by de Palma, just as, to state the obvious, the actors who play the roles of the caricatured squad members are not actual U.S. soldiers. As the screen-text disclaimer that opens the film indicates,

> This film is entirely fiction, inspired by an incident widely reported to have occurred in Iraq. While some of the events here depicted may resemble those of the reported incident, the characters are entirely fictional, and their words and actions should not be confused with those of real persons.

Then the words of the screen-text begin to be marked through, as if with a black pen ("fiction" / "may" / "some of" / "fictional" / "confused") thus at first subtly and then not so subtly changing the meaning of the text, even as it is still before us, before all meaning is lost in the disjointed jumble. Eventually all the words are elided except for the scattered letters of the title, which are assembled into the word "Redacted," after which the sound of a typewriter accompanies the letter-by-letter appearance of a new onscreen text: "visually documents imagined events before, during and after a 2006 rape and murder in Samarra." Hardly has this troublingly ambiguous disclaimer made us aware of the represented nature of what will follow, before various types of evidence begin to appear that further complicate our initial conception of the whole, toying with our notions of the authentic.

Salazar's view of his responsibility and involvement is initially naive, particularly in his insistence that his film will present the truth and that the camera "never lies," to which McCoy immediately replies with the cliché that the truth will be the first casualty of the war. Much later, just before entering Farah's family's house and recording on video Flake's offhand confession to having killed her family in another room of the house (thus explaining the gunshots audible off camera) and the rape of Farah, Salazar claims to McCoy that he is "a fly on the wall," simply recording what happens. McCoy responds that he is a "jackal rippin' meat off a fuckin' carcass." Later in the video of his psychological counseling session, Salazar admits to the counselor: "just 'cause you're watching it doesn't mean you're not a part of it…. That's what everyone does. They just watch, and they do nothing." A week later, however, he smilingly reports on camera (in a message intended for his mother) that he has some great footage that will "really" show what is happening in Iraq. He is then interrupted mid-sentence by his own on-camera abduction from the checkpoint itself.

The whole is thus a politically edgy film made for commercial release and based on fictionalized media reports. Besides Salazar's footage, de Palma's film includes, as noted above, a broad range of footage pur-portedly from other sources: YouTube videos from the Web sites "Just a Soldier's Wife" (posted by McCoy's wife, Judy) and "The Get Out of Iraq Campaign"; the local "ATV" news from Sāmarrā; embedded journalist video footage (also from an ATV reporter); the quasi-CNN reports of "CEN" (Central European News) newscasts; a French news documentary entitled "Barrage" [checkpoint]; a Web site of the insurgent group شهداء الحريّة *šuhadā' ul-ḥurrīyya* [martyrs of freedom]; a surveillance camera inside the camp gate; night-vision video shot by helmet-mounted video cameras of soldiers on patrol outside of camp; an online video chat; Army video of investigative interviews, Army video of a psychological counseling session; Rush and Flake's later self-interview using Salazar's camera; a home-movie video of McCoy's welcome home party. They are all also fictional and were made specifically for inclusion in this film, that is, they are simply fictive segments of de Palma's production. Even the photographic sequence added as a postscript to the film, explicitly identified onscreen as "Collateral Damage—Actual Photographs from the Iraq War" includes "fictional" photographs: at least one of them—of the pregnant woman shot by the squad at the checkpoint—is obviously a still from an earlier scene in *Redacted* itself, while another is a photograph of the character Farah, the raped, murdered, and burned Iraqi girl, on the floor of her house, in the room where she had been set afire (recogniz-able from a scene from the film)—a shot that is otherwise not itself in the film.

The viewer is repeatedly lashed with the question of what is "real" in the course of viewing this conflictual multimedia collage that constitutes *Redacted*. The wooden dialogue and amateurish acting of the cast (the film was shot in two weeks with a total budget of five million dollars), the macabre and romanticized "human interest" emplotting of the anti-American "story" filmed by French documentary crew, the recurring lack of prop continuity from one shot to the next—on all levels, the "authenticity" or "reality" of what the viewer sees is undermined or altogether denied: we recognize the "distortions" of the French TV news documentary (which is presented in *Redacted* in French, which for most of the film's audience presumably requires the added distorting filter of the included subtitles), the *šuhadāʾ ul-ḥurrīyya* propaganda videos, the narrow and personal propagandistic "slant" of the YouTube videos, but are less likely to acknowledge, at least on a conscious and ongoing, moment-to-moment basis, Angel's film as redacted, despite the fact that in an early filmed "interview" with Blix, he interrupts and engages in an (unsuccessful) attempt at some low-level directorial shaping of the scene and Blix's monotone delivery. The viewer is nonetheless well enough trained to yearn somehow for it to be "real," even though it is obvious that it is ultimately not Angel's film at all, but de Palma's, and that Angel, whose character dies in mid-film, is deeply involved in issues that are far beyond his ability to comprehend. As viewers we are in fact well trained and seek to decode the images, to filter out and resolve contradictions, to reevaluate the whole continuously, based on updated interpretative data, to insist on the integral comprehensibility of the hopelessly and very obviously fictive (fictionalized, fabricated, fraudulent) material that passes before our eyes. In this troubling and traumatizing film, de Palma offers another instance of the recurring cinematic insistence on one of the key issues in film-making and film-viewing: content is necessarily always a provisional construct. There can never be an identity of representation and represented; representation by definition is not the thing represented and can thus never be either authentic or inauthentic (false) with respect to *das Ding an sich*. Representation rather creates a new object, a new *interpretandum*, a new Authentic that is at best a refraction of the reality of which it is a representation.

To a critic who claimed never to have seen a woman who looked like the one represented in one of Matisse's paintings, the artist allegedly retorted: it is not a woman; it is a painting.[3] De Palma's *Redacted* is not the war in Iraq; it is a film that problematizes that war, every war, media discourse, racism, film-making technique, and the sociology of class in/ and the military. What it *actually* has to do with the *actual* war in Iraq is unclear and must ever remain so: does it get everything about the details

of military checkpoints laughably wrong, as some Internet blogs have claimed (e.g., gun placement at checkpoints; the kind of verbal inter-action plausible or even imaginable between officers and enlisted men, between soldiers and Iraqis, and among soldiers themselves), but still give a credible depiction of essential political issues, that is, sacrificing smaller truths for a larger Truth? What authority can decide such a complex issue?

To say that the relationship of the representation to the concrete reality ultimately represented is complex and never transparent is merely to state the banal, for this issue has motivated much if not most literary theory of most schools of thought during the past half century, proceeding initially in large part from Ferdinand de Saussure's disquisitions on the *signifié* and *signifiant*.[4] The milieu of *Redacted* in the massive East-West conflict of our time, and the fundamental geopolitical issues at the root of the film are indeed precisely those problematized by Edward Said thirty years ago in *Orientalism*, which has in the intervening decades spawned cottage indus-tries in some narrow sectors of academe.[5] Whether or not Brian de Palma knows Said's work, his film gets at the heart of the issue that Said, making explicit use of terminology and analytical modes borrowed from Michel Foucault, so insistently and compellingly brought to an academic audi-ence a generation ago.[6] In their own ways, Foucault, Said, and indeed de Palma deal with representations as cultural products of received discourse more than as replicas, mirrors, of *simulacra* of *das Ding an sich*, that is, as the results of inherited modes of narration and characterization, to give two examples from the realm of literary study, and inherited conceptions of national identity, religious valuation, relations with outsiders, to give three examples from the realm of political study. That is, they are deal-ing with *discourse*—established modes of talking/writing/thinking about particular things or issues, not with those things or issues themselves.

If the topic is the war in Iraq, then from the beginning of the invasion of Iraq up to the summer of 2010, those who follow media coverage in English have seen a parade of terms such as "shock and awe," "collateral damage," "rendition," "draw down," "surge," "tribal/sectarian violence," and "al-Qaida in Mesopotamia" that have become part of the discourse of war and especially this war, to which "haji" and "sand nigger," noted above (neither of which was invented in this war), would necessarily also have to be added. The discourse of such an international geopolitical conflict is, like all language use, in a constant state of evolution but at any given moment consists of inherited systems of grammar, syntax, and lexi-con, which also encompass embedded cultural values. Some users of the discourse are aware of the existence of such racial epithets as the last items in the list above, but do not use the epithet themselves, substituting other

words instead, such as "Iraqi," "local," "terrorist," or even "insurgent," each of which obviously has different meanings and affiliations within the larger semantic field.

This discourse of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as a subsystem of language use, determines what can be said about the subject. To take an illustrative example, in addition to its common meaning as a "religious school associated with a mosque," the Arabic word مدرسة *madrasa*, is also simply the standard unmarked word for any and every "school," which can be combined with a variety of other modifiers to designate *elementary* school, *middle* school, *secondary* school, *boarding* school, school *of thought*, school *for the handicapped*, *private* school, *agricultural* school, *vocational* school[7]—all of them مدارس *madāris* [schools] and some of them as "fundamentalist" as, for instance, any random Catholic elementary school in Chicago or welder's school in Seattle, some more so, some less so. If, however, most school children and other students at all levels and in all disciplines in Arabic-speaking countries and Arabic-influenced cultures attend a *madrasa*, and if that term has been integrated into the discourse of the East-West conflict as meaning "fundamentalist Islamic school" or even "terrorist training facility," then the political and propagandistic implications of the term's (mis)use are obvious. Significant also is the fact that the term obviously belongs to an elevated level of discourse when used in Engish: its use implies that one *knows* if not the Arabic language itself then at least more than the average non-Muslim Western citizen knows about Islamic culture, and thus its very use commands the respect accorded an expert, which then extends the range of the discourse.[8]

The representation of the focal crime in *Redacted* is multiple: Salazar's camera shows what seems to be a rape, although nothing that would constitute clear visual evidence (and require an X-rating) is visible. While the recording apparatus registers the sound of shots off camera, and Flake immediately appears and claims to have killed the other members of the family, the camera itself does not "witness" the shooting. Then Salazar leaves the house and thus his camera does not record the murder of Farah and burning of her corpse reported later in other sources. After this "eye-witness" record, the crime and/or evidence of the crime are represented multiple other times: ATV reports via an interview with Farah's father (who was, at the time of the crime, not at home but rather in U.S. military custody; thus his "testimony" can also only be second- or third-hand) on the crime; Salazar reports to an army official about his own psychological state, which could well be a response to involvement in a crime; McCoy reports very generally on the crime in an online video chat with his father; Salazar cheerfully records a message to his mother that he has important video of an event about which he cannot now give explicit details; ATV

reports the case again in introducing the *šuhadā' ul-ḥurrīyya* video, where the crime is again described, here as prelude to Salazar's onscreen decapitation; on the Web site "The Get Out of Iraq Campaign," a hooded man (McCoy) with an electronically distorted voice reports the general details of the crime; McCoy is interviewed by army investigators (who badger him and refuse to countenance his claim that a crime took place, since he was outside Farah's house at the time of the alleged crime's occurrence and thus directly witnessed nothing); CEN reports the charges in the case (including a video tour of the house and the smoke-blackened walls and blood-stained floors and an identity-card photograph of Flake); an indictment page of black–pen censored charges appears onscreen before the Army investigative interviews with Rush and Flake who report little if anything about the crime; on the home video recording of his welcome home party in a bar, McCoy agonizingly reports the crime in the most detail yet (except for the CEN report), at the end of which his guests in the bar spontaneously erupt in applause for McCoy whom they explicitly identify as a "war hero."

The film ends without the textual epilogue that constitutes resolution in many such films. That is, the viewer is not informed about what takes place in the future, that is, whether the fictional soldiers were brought to trial and if so, what verdicts were reached. Instead, the film ends with the photographs of "Collateral Damage," mentioned above. De Palma thus again refuses to provide any closure that might be construed as an answer, refuses to decode the multiplicity of types of "eye-witness" evidence and provide the viewer with the Truth that Salazar naively imagines is inherent in visually recorded evidence. All that remains to the viewer is the representations, visual and verbal, multiple, conflicting, confusing, without definitive meaning. This is not to suggest that de Palma opts for a denial of responsibility or a denial that the truth *can* be known or that it is necessarily only "relative." Instead the film insists that the truth is not simple, not often directly accessible, or the inevitable outcome of documentable and certifiable evidence, but is equally insistent that the truth is directly connected to moral action no matter how immoral the situation. Representation of the truth is not that truth but a distinct entity that may or may not relate to that truth.

★   ★   ★

Those readers puzzled by the inclusion of these ruminations on de Palma's film on the U.S. invasion of Iraq in a book that otherwise focuses on the discourses of the Muslim Other in medieval Germany deserve some clarification, for this brief analysis is indeed vitally relevant, although perhaps

not for reasons that might initially seem pertinent. It is not intended as an attempt (superficial or otherwise) to make a book about the distant and alien world of medieval literature "relevant" to twenty-first century readers. In fact, it is quite clear that de Palma's East and West in general and the United States and Iraq in particular are not *strictly* parallel to any of the conflictual antagonists of the medieval Crusades and related Christian-Muslim conflicts. The medieval Crusades are not the twenty-first century "crusade," whether constructed by one side or the other. Those who wish us to imagine that the Western anti-Muslim crusade began in the Middle Ages and has continued in the same mode unabated since that time—whether construed as a good or a bad thing—only distract us from the fact that most aspects of those Crusades and the present conflict are quite different. The inclusion of this brief consideration of de Palma's film should then function here first of all to remind us of those differences, even as we grapple with the cluster of pestering issues about why we are so easily misled into thinking of them as somehow the same.

A more essential and very concrete point needs to be made here, as well, however: the ruminations on de Palma's film also make explicitly clear that, not surprisingly, the modes of (ideological) representation employed by modern political film-makers and medieval authors are quite different indeed, and ultimately, that is the motivation for the inclusion of the chapter. Unlike de Palma, medieval authors only very rarely and even then, I think, inadvertently, engage in the kind of self-conscious questioning of the connection between experience and representation that is of primary relevance to (de Palma and) us in the present project. The film also makes obvious the troubled process of representation in the confrontation between the East and the West, specifically with Western military forays into Islamic territories. Made aware of our tentative and approximative abilities to come to terms with the modes of representations, then we come to a consideration of the medieval (especially medieval German) representations of an East-West conflict of a different order. De Palma's work does not derive from that medieval literary tradition, nor do the specifics of his filmic vision prepare us for the quite different aesthetics of, for instance, Wolfram von Eschenbach. Instead, this brief working through of de Palma's film makes us insistently aware of our own constructions of "reality" out of the fragments of represented experience with which the film-maker or medieval author provide us.

De Palma does not provide us with a model that we will find in Hrotsvit, Wolfram, or Walther, nor provide us a mode of interpreting them. Instead, his insistent focus on modes of representation and the moral consequences of representation lays bare the necessity for *us* to monitor *not* the medieval texts themselves, but rather *our own reading* of

those (and any other) texts and to pay constant attention to the mechanisms of our own construction of their "reality" out of the evidence that they present to us as twenty-first century readers. De Palma attempts to interrogate any and every assumption concerning the modes of visual representation as if identifiably "objective" or "subjective," while Hrotsvit, Wolfram, and Walther not only make no such attempts but would even seem, we might speculate, unlikely to comprehend such distinctions and the larger issues behind them. My brief consideration of de Palma here then suggests that the absence of such overt concerns in the medieval texts does not constitute evidence of the ultimate absence of the issues themselves.

To give but a single illustrative example of the problem at issue, the fact that Wolfram does not question the legitimacy of his depiction of Feirefiz—the offspring of a Christian father and a Muslim mother—as black-and-white striped does not give us license to imagine that that depiction is culturally or morally insignificant or irrelevant, or that we are thus relieved of any responsibility to interrogate that depiction and the larger system of representation in which it figures. The fact that he does not question that mode of representation is indeed part of the issue that should, indeed *must*, concern us. A de Palma-like interrogation of any and all modes of representation at various levels of cultural authority is then the point at issue for us as readers.

It is also for that reason that I so thoroughly excavate the scholarly interpretations of my predecessors, with many of whom I quite disagree—not to castigate them for having been born a century or even a few decades before the political and scholarly interests of the twenty-first century could condition their sensibilities, but rather to allow us to reflect on how such interests are always at work (on us, too). This "insight" is not news; but we do nonetheless need constantly to be reminded of it in the various fields and subfields in which we work. In the context of the study of the discourses of the Muslim Other in medieval Germany, de Palma's film is thus of burning relevance not as a *parallel* to any medieval author's practice or as supposed evidence for any identity of medieval and modern conception of Muslims, but as a spur to *our mode of inquiry* into issues of the representation of Muslims.

From these deliberately still only partially theorized ruminations on issues of contemporary modes of representation as problematized by de Palma's *Redacted*, the next chapter moves directly to an attempt to theorize the possibility of representing the cultural Other, especially in the focal issue of the present study: the Muslim Other in medieval Christian literature (especially in medieval Germany).

CHAPTER 2

DISCOURSES OF THE MUSLIM OTHER

Before proceeding to the material from Germany that is relevant to the construction of a discourse of the Muslim Other in the Middle Ages, it is first necessary to theorize such an analysis. While that might be accomplished in other subfields of medieval studies with a requisite bow and nod to the appropriate foundational texts, such is not quite the case in medieval German studies, where that theorization has not yet been comprehensively executed. Thus, in attempting to contribute to that ongoing process, the following pages will tread some familiar ground for many readers, but will ultimately, I hope, make possible more adequately contextualized readings of the literary texts from medieval Germany that form the object of the study in succeeding chapters.

The most frequently encountered Other in European literature of the High Middle Ages is, not surprisingly, the one constructed as the most threatening over the course of centuries: Muslims. This is also true with respect to the literary traditions of medieval Germany. The situation, historical and literary, of these traditions was, in terms of the present topic, peculiar in the extreme, for central Europeans rarely had opportunity or reason to deal with non-Europeans at any point in their lives, since they had virtually no contact with them: obviously none with Americans,[1] and practically none with Africans or Asians. The term "practically" is important here, of course, for central Europeans who participated in the Crusades often did have extensive contact—and not just across battles lines—with Asians (almost exclusively southwestern Asians: Turks, Kurds, Persians, Arabs) and Africans (primarily non-black North Africans, but also black Africans who lived along or near the Mediterranean littoral). This contact—between German-speaking Crusaders and Muslims—was nonetheless generally defined in terms of the military, political, and religious issues of the Crusades themselves. That particular *German* situation differs in quite significant ways from what could be said in general

about Western European contact with Muslims, which was certainly not restricted to Syro-Palestine and the battlefields of Egypt, but occurred also in Spain and southern France, Sicily and other islands throughout the Mediterranean, the remnants of the Byzantine Empire, and, during the central Middle Ages and especially at their end, the Balkans, when Turkish rule made significant inroads there, just around the time when Muslims (and Jews) were forcibly expelled from the Iberian peninsula at the other end of Europe. That contact in those places was clearly *not* primarily defined in terms of military conflict.

Islam as a cultural counterpart to the political and religious authority conceived (by moderns) as somehow "European" was thus not always and everywhere in actuality *non*-European in a geographical sense:[2] much of the Iberian peninsula was Muslim in some cultural (political, military) sense for half a millennium and partially so for longer; much of the Balkan peninsula has been so for a like period of time and still is. Despite their being in the ancient Roman province of Asia (minor), the trans-Bosphoric territories of the Byzantine Empire were generally imagined as somehow European—since "Greek"—at least until that empire collapsed and those territories came under Turkish rule and thus became no longer even problematically European.

This political situation of Christian-Muslim contact was represented in the literary texts of the medieval period throughout Europe, and not just in military chronicles of the Crusades themselves, but in a wide variety of other literary genres as well, although the most famous may be the epics, among which number the *Chanson de Roland*, *Poema de mio Cid*, and Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Willehalm*. It is surprising just how pervasive was the attention to this contact: for Muslims—or rather a kind of quasi- or pseudo-Muslim, as is problematized below, whom no Muslim of the time would have recognized as such—appear practically wherever one looks in the literature of the time, even in texts composed in the "backwoods" of central Europe, many hundreds of miles and many political boundaries from the nearest actual Muslim community. The virtual ubiquity of representations of Muslims—and thus the undeniable significance of those representations—in medieval Christian literature of Europe has long been widely recognized, and in recent decades issues surrounding the political conditions of that representation have begun to be studied in some depth.[3] The modes and methods of that study have not surprisingly been varied. Before proceeding, it would be useful here to problematize the method to be employed in the present study.

As acknowledged in the opening chapter, scholarly engagement with Edward Said's *Orientalism* has, over the course of the past three decades continued to inform, if not in fact to form, the subdiscipline of

postcolonial studies. While his perceptions have thus become a basic part of the theoretical undergirding of much, if not most, critical work in cultural studies of the early twenty-first century, such is not universally the case among medievalists. For this reason, I offer here somewhat more than the customary acknowledgment and citation of that foundational work's bibliographical data. In addition, however, since it has been in the focused critique by medievalists of Said's work during the past decade that the use of Said and postcolonial studies in medieval studies has been justified, more attention must be given to such post-Saidian theorizing here, for only by that means does such a project as the current one grow into its own theoretical legitimacy.

Proceeding from texts that deal with *modern* European imperialism, Said narrowed his focus to (primarily) nineteenth- and twentieth-century British and French imperialism in the Middle East and the texts produced by those Western powers about the cultures of that area. He proposed a conception of Orientalism that encompasses three levels: it comprises the academic study of the Orient (as distinguished from the Occident), a discourse based on the assumption that that distinction is normative, and, since the eighteenth century, the instrumentalization of that discourse by imperialism enabling the control of the Orient by the Occident.[4] His insight of enduring value has been that the "Orient" as there represented is not an ontological category, but rather a discursive one, that is, a construct that has a history and tradition of its own, not altogether without connection to the "actual" Orient, but existing as an independent discursive system.[5] Thus while Orientalism may well have this or that fact "right" or "wrong" about the Orient, ultimately the correspondence of Orientalist discourse to the "actual" Orient is simply beside the point of Orientalism itself. What is at issue is the internal consistency of the system as such. The factual inadequacy of that discursive system cannot be rectified simply by pointing out and correcting individual errors of accuracy, since in the context of a system of thought, individual errors are insignificant and even when corrected do not necessitate wholesale reform of the system as such. And as a system of thought that has developed over the course of generations and both formed and been formed by the academic study of the Orient, it provides the conceptual frameworks by means of which all discussion of the Orient may take place and indeed defines the very terms that can be used to discuss it. The political significance of Orientalism derives from its systematic permeation of Western socioeconomic and political institutions such that it has now become "fact" that has displaced the "actual" Orient and thus forms not just the object of academic study but also the basis of political, cultural, diplomatic, historical, and military engagement.

In order to realize the significance of Said's insight, it is essential to understand the cultural mechanisms that enabled the development of Orientalism. Said and most others who have studied similar issues have emplotted this development beginning in the period of the European expansion and imperial conquest of the world since the late fifteenth century. In one sense then, according to Said, the West constructed Orientalism because it *could* do so: interestingly in this period—as opposed to the rather different situation during the preceding centuries, when Islam was the dominant party—the West stood in a clearly dominant political, military, and economic position with respect to the Orient and, from that position of power and control, described, constructed, and defined the Orient *as subordinate* by means of what Said terms a "dynamic exchange" between hegemony and cultural production, that is, in this case, between political domination through naturalized political praxis and authors who write political essays, books of history, poems, novels, and plays:

> This evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called truthful texts (histories, philological analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e. openly imaginative) text. The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, *not* the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original.[6]

The analyst of Orientalism is not interested in reconstructing the "actual" Orient lurking behind a distorting façade of Orientalist discourse, but rather in the openly displayed and consistently constructed surface of that discourse itself.

> I do not think that this idea can be overemphasized. Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West. He is never concerned with the Orient except as the first cause of what he says. What he says and writes, by virtue of the fact that it is said or written, is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact. The principal product of this exteriority is of course representation.[7]

As Said points out, Foucault's notion of discursive formations accounts for precisely that kind of productive discursive tradition just suggested:

> There is a complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read, and this in

turn influences writers to take up subjects defined in advance by readers' experiences.... A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual...is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most important, such texts can create not only knowledge, but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it.[8]

Orientalism as "cultural discourse and exchange" circulates not truth but representations, not the thing itself, but its mediated form:

> The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such *real thing* as "the Orient."[9]

The point is then the "style, setting, figures of speech, narrative devices, history and social circumstances," *not* the accuracy of representation or fidelity to any actual "original." The representation (text, chart, map, photograph, film) in a certain way usurps the position of what is conventionally thought of as the "original" and thereafter exists as the object of study, the *interpretandum*:

> That Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, "there" in discourse about it. And these representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects, not upon a distant and amorphous Orient.[10]

It is this representation and its interpretation that constitutes and reproduces Orientalism and the "Orient" as object to be studied and known, and, as Said observes, to know is to dominate and have authority over that which is known.[11] Ironically, these learned codifications of the Orient thus usurp the position of the thing itself, so that the actual lands and cultures are then often viewed by Orientalists "in the field" as somehow imperfect, eroded or corrupted approximations of the *real*, that is, Orientalist object.[12] The Orient develops into a series of tropes, costumes in a play, as it were. This "Orient" is not inaccurate as such, since it is no

longer merely representation, but an independent object whose purpose does not include accuracy or identity with an actual Orient.[13]

Lest one be tempted to imagine Said's thesis as a veiled proposal of an international racist conspiracy, one should recall that he suggests nothing of the kind. Such discourses do not develop accidentally, of course, but neither do they come about as the result of the secret machinations of politicos, internationally coordinated over the course of centuries, who manipulate diplomats, explorers, journalists, ecclesiastics, professors, poets, and novelists. There is in fact nothing secret about it at all, nor are its practicioners—who count among their number some of the greatest creative minds of the Western cultural tradition—naive dupes, although few of them are consciously aware of the particular discursive nature of their representations.

In the decades since the publication of Said's ground-breaking book and in the course of its reception, the field has been well tilled and has borne much fruit, including myriad critiques, clarifications, course corrections, adjustments, and rebuttals (in which process Said himself also from time to time participated), which—as the citations of scholarly work in the pages to follow demonstrate—has also (inadvertently and in part at least unwillingly) fertilized the field of medieval studies. In the process of the reception of Said's work, there have been many misreadings, intentional or otherwise. In order to sharpen the focus concerning what Said's thesis does and does not claim, two types may be very briefly noted here, before proceeding to the issue of the use of Said's work in medieval studies, both having directly to do with Said's conception of the relation of Orientalist discourse and the actual Orient. Robert Young claims that

> ...on the one hand [Said] suggests that Orientalism merely consists of a representation that has nothing to do with the "'real' Orient," denying any correspondence between Orientalism and the Orient...while on the other hand he argues that its knowledge was put in the service of colonial conquest, occupation, and administration.... How then can Said argue that the "Orient" is just a representation, if he also wants to claim that "Orientalism" provided the necessary knowledge for actual colonial conquest?[14]

Young has here identified what is after all one of the key issues of Foucault's conception of discourse and of Said's thesis concerning Orientalism, but he misconstrues the dialectical nature of its postformulation interaction with the actual world of political and military engagement. Kathleen Davis, after citing Young approvingly, procedes:

> If we grant with Said that medieval Europe's system of representing Islam is purely antiempirical, based not on any experience with Islam but only

on a fully closed, self-generated tradition, then we privilege Europe as an absolutely self-constituting object...[15]

But Said, of course, never maintains that Orientalism is without empirical knowledge of the Orient; instead, he suggests that that knowledge is neither absolute nor determinative of the content of Orientalism and thus not functional as the verifying ground against which the accuracy of Orientalist discourse may be measured. To misconstrue this point is to misunderstand Said's entire project and construct a straw man. Futhermore, even if the premise were correct, that is, that Said claimed that Orientalism was strictly an invention of Europe, it would still not be the case that Europe is thus "privileged...as an absolutely self-constituting object" (a remarkably universal claim), for Europe need not be the object at all (and is rather predominantly the subject), and this single cultural moment would not in any case constitute Europe as "absolutely self-constituting." Said's subtle distinction between Orientalism's "making mistakes concerning the Orient" or constructing a generally nonempirical discourse of the Orient thus gets quite lost.

A second mode of engagement with Said's thesis raises the issue of its relevance for the present project, that is, for the field of medieval studies, for, as a result of his apparent construal of all premodern instances of Orientalism as uniform, monolithic, and unchanging, he has invited the charge that his method resembles that of Orientalists themselves in constructing a monolithic and never-changing Orient. Said's lack of expertise in ancient and medieval European studies indeed led him into some theoretical difficulties, for instance, his most famous premodern references to Aeschylus and Dante, in which his argument does indeed become troubled. Suzanne Conklin Akbari, for example, notes that Said's monolithic construct of "the West" conflates "a broad spectrum of Western views, ranging from antiquity to the late twentieth century, into a single discourse, Orientalism."[16] She points out that "[T]he binary opposition of East and West, fundamental to Said's theory, cannot be projected back onto a Middle Ages which seldom conceived the world as bipartite." John Tolan points out that "Said's Occident, bereft of its historical and cultural variety, shorn of the individual motivations of its writers (particularly the pre–nineteenth-century writers), risks becoming every bit as much a caricature as the inscrutable Orient of the nineteenth-century romantics."[17] James Clifford likewise suggests: "Indeed [Said's] critical manner sometimes appears to mimic the essentializing discourse it attacks."[18] Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz points out that Said's view of "uniformity of views among Europeans in the modern periods" is "unsustainable" for the Middle Ages, where there was more variety in the

Western Christian view of Islam over the course of that long period than is generally acknowledged.[19] Dennis Porter suggests that Said's inability to suggest alternatives to the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism derives first from a failure

> to historicize adequately the texts he cites and summarizes, finding always the same triumphant discourse where several are frequently in conflict. Second, because he does not distinguish the literary instance from more transparently ideological textual forms he does not acknowledge the semi-autonomous and overdetermined character of aesthetic artifacts. Finally, he fails to show how literary texts may in their play establish distance from the ideologies they seem to be reproducing.[20]

Thus, as Ananya Kabir and Deanne Williams point out concerning this larger issue of the use of postcolonial theory in the study of premodern culture,

> As postcolonial scholars have sought to dismantle the notions of modernity upon which colonialism was predicated, medievalists have, in turn, challenged the binaries of medieval and modern (or early modern) that bracket off the Middle Ages, and keep it as exotic and foreign—and also as domitable—as any orientalist fantasy. As critiques of colonialism work in tandem with critiques of modernity, medieval studies and postcolonial studies have sought to undermine a series of western myths of origin, history, identity, and temporality.[21]

The explicit use of modern cultural theorizations from cultural anthropology, feminism, race studies, and postcolonial studies may initially seem to some readers as exercises in a "presentism," that is, according to Thomas Hahn, "empowering the preoccupations and concerns of the early twenty-first century to distort the self-contained truth of the past."[22] As has already been suggested here, however, it is not merely possible to put contemporary theory to use in medieval studies: in the end it seems a responsibility to determine if and when, how and where, contemporary theory enables an enhanced understanding of fields other than those in which any given theoretical impulse develops.

It is necessary to treat at some length here the opposition to the use of postcolonial theory in premodern studies, since there has been a great deal of heavyweight scholarly opposition not just to the specifics of the claim but to the basic principle that Orientalism (whether or not grounded in Eurocentrism),[23] as a political praxis may be found at any time before the period of European capitalist "expansion," that is, conquest and colonialism beginning in the late fifteenth century, to be found even in work of

scholars whose work would suggest otherwise. Samir Amin, for instance, notes:

> The European culture that conquered the world fashioned itself in the course of a history that unfolded in two distinct time periods. Up to the Renaissance, Europe belonged to a regional tributary system that included Europeans and Arabs, Christians and Moslems. But the greater part of Europe at that time was located at the periphery of this regional system, whose center was situated around the eastern end of the Mediterranean basin. This Mediterranean system prefigures to some extent the subsequent capitalist world system. From the Renaissance on, the capitalist world system shifts its center toward the shores of the Atlantic, while the Mediterranean region becomes, in turn the periphery. The new European culture reconstructs itself around a myth that creates an opposition between an alleged European geographical continuity and the world to the south of the Mediterranean, which forms the new center/periphery boundary. The whole of Eurocentrism lies in this mythic construct.[24]

Obviously Amin is building a case for the necessary connection of capitalism to the globalization of the world economy that was set in motion by the exploitation of cheap colonial labor in the new Atlantic possessions of European imperial states in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. There is little to object to in his argument, except for the notion that the social formations that preceded capitalism's triumph are merely historical *prelude* that functioned only as inevitable preparation for the development of capitalism. Immanuel Wallerstein concurs with Amin and in great detail identifies and analyzes the confluence of material causes (in particular, economic contraction due to a lack of technological innovation, a lack of cultural motivation for technological innovation, and climatological decline) that led to the transformation of Europe's feudal mode of production into a global capitalist mode.[25] For Wallerstein, such factors are decisive, and he is uninterested in the discourse that enables the ideological justification and thus continued success of such projects. Amin, on the other hand, does attempt to extend his argument beyond the material and social relations to "consciousness":

> Things begin to change with the Renaissance because a new consciousness forms in the European mind. It does not matter that at this stage, and for a long time to come, this consciousness is not the one we have today: namely, that the basis for European superiority and for its conquest of the world lies in the capitalist mode of organization of its society. At the time of their ascent the Europeans did not understand their new reality in this way. One might say that they did not know that they were "building capitalism." At the time, Europeans attributed their superiority to other

things: to their "Europeanness," their Christian faith, or their rediscovered Greek ancestry—which is not by chance rediscovered at this point. Eurocentrism in its entirety had already developed. In other words, the appearance of the Eurocentric dimension of modern ideology preceded the crystallization of the other dimensions that define capitalism.[26]

The discourse of the Other that was available for deployment on new extra-European Others in the wake of the waves of capitalist colonialization thus, according to Wallerstein and Amin, differed in kind from what came before. The strict economic focus of Wallerstein and Amin, and thus their insistence on the radical transformation in material culture—while themselves vaguely gesturing toward "a new consciousness…in the European mind"—from the later medieval period to the early modern period does, however, sometimes mislead. Amin himself, for instance, claims that Dante's placing Muḥammad in Hell is not Eurocentric, as Said had claimed, but rather "mere banal provincialism," since for Amin, economic issues are necessarily determinative, and thus there can be no Eurocentrism before capitalism.[27]

Kathleen Biddick's query outlines both the essential issues and the positions of two further powerful voices in the development of postcolonial theory:

> How could Said, his brilliant grasp of spatial forms of Orientalist power notwithstanding, emplot the Middle Ages as the "adolescent" stage preparatory to a fully mature, "modern," imperialist Orientalism? Nor is he alone in the grip of this fiction. Consider, for example, Benedict Anderson's acclaimed book *Imagined Communities*, which directly addresses the question of temporality as a form of knowledge. Anderson imagines a sharp break between medieval (read religious) "apprehensions of time" and Enlightenment (read technological) temporalities capable of thinking the progress of a nation.[28]

That "sharp break" seems for many indeed to be an ideological boundary that prevents scholarly access through the same theoretical tools. As Jeffrey Jeremy Cohen points out regarding the conception that postcolonial theory is either the exclusive property of contemporary cultural studies or the result of political practices of the very recent past,

> One could go further and argue that postcolonial theory in practice has neglected the study of the "distant" past, which tends to function as a field of undifferentiated alterity against which modern regimes of power have arisen. This exclusionary model of temporality denies the possibility that traumas, exclusions, violences enacted centuries ago might still linger in

contemporary identity formations; it also closes off the possibility that this past could be multiple and valuable enough to contain (and be contained within) alternative presents and futures.[29]

As Cohen's evaluation indicates, there is more going on here and far more at stake than what some—modernists and medievalists, alike—have dismissed as an attempt by medievalists to jump on the bandwagon of a critical fad.[30] With specific reference to Homi Bhabha's work, Cohen notes:

"Bearing witness" would seem to be an activity one does in the present in order to address a recent past—thus the haunting of Bhabha's definition by the modern. Yet there is nothing especially recent about the "differential, often disadvantaged, histories of nations, races," social antagonism, and irreducible difference he describes. Indeed the temporal boundaries Bhabha draws seem especially arbitrary in that an important challenge offered by his essay is a rethinking of temporality itself from a postcolonial perspective.[31]

As Suzanne Conklin Akbari argues, the disjunction of postcolonial theory—which developed on the basis of modern political and cultural praxis—from medieval applications may have been inevitable, but need not block further investigation:

[Y]et this disjunction can be seen not as a moment of theory's inadequacy in the face of medieval culture but rather as a gap that reveals a site where medieval culture has participated in the generation of a norm taken for granted in the construction of a modern theoretical paradigm.[32]

As a quasi-test case, a brief sortie to ancient Athens and Aeschylus' Πέρσαι [Persians], the earliest extant European drama—to which Said intriguingly pointed as an early case of Orientalism—may be useful, for it will illustrate Said's failure adequately to historicize, his correct instincts despite that failure, the possibilities for the use of Said in premodern analysis, and the refutation of the economistic insistence on a strictly modern arena for an Orientalism grounded in Eurocentrism.[33] First Said's comment:

The dramatic immediacy of representation in *The Persians* obscures the fact that the audience is watching a highly artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient. My analysis of the Orientalist text therefore places emphasis on the evidence, which is by no means invisible, for such representations *as representations*, not as "natural" depictions of the Orient.[34]

Following Said's suggestion, classicist Edith Hall has comprehensively examined its provocative implications in Aeschylus' play.[35] The excessive, exotic non-Greekness of the staged Persians was multiply represented by Aeschylus: (1) in language use: caricatured exoticism; (2) in "national" character, that is caricatured "Asian" behavioral excess; (3) in ethnography: an emphasis on the perverse (from the Athenian point of view) dominance of women in positions of power); (4) in geopolitics: the Greek indifference to, for instance, geographical facts beyond the boundaries of the Greek world.

Beyond Hall's fine analysis, however, it is necessary to recall the situation of Aeschylus' play: it is set at the Persian royal court during Xerxes' military campaign against Greece (480 BCE); the court and the queen-mother await his return, fear the worst, and even summon up the ghost of Xerxes' father, Darius, for consultation. When Xerxes does return, it is in abject defeat, having lost a decisive naval battle to the combined Greek force off the island of Salamis. The ὕβρις *hubris* that brings about the hero's fall in this play is, however, not remote, mythologized, abstract, and universal, as is the case in *all* other extant Greek tragedy, but rather concrete, contemporary, and in the realm of the experience of the original Athenian audience: as the play expresses it, Xerxes' ἁμαρτία *hamartia* [error] consists in his lack of contentment with his proper place in the world (i.e., Asia), which has led him to yoke Asia to Europe with a bridged Hellespont, to invade Europe and defy the gods, to attempt to impose Persian rule and Asian despotism on Greek governmental systems (viewed as based on the freedom of the individual), and to sack and burn Athens. In general thus his *hubris* displayed all those traits that in the Greek tradition came to be essential features of Asian, specifically Persian, excess. Ultimately in fact, since Xerxes' *hamartia* is his *hubris,* which is by definition his Persian-ness, *being* Persian is itself a matter of *hubris* and *hamartia*. Xerxes suffers tragedy because he opposes (Greek) civilization, because he is unable to live up to (Greek) cultural standards, because he is opposed by the (Greek) gods. Such motives for tragedy may "work" somewhat less propagandistically when the tragic hero is a mythological demi-god/hero, and the values are not concretized as ethnically Greek versus Persian. In mythological tragedy it may be possible to view the abstract "laws" of the cosmos as universal; but in the case of the Aeschylus' "Persians," where the opposition between Greek and Persian is the defining issue, it becomes simply a matter of Xerxes failing because he cannot uphold these laws—because ultimately he cannot be Greek.

In addition, we are liable to miss one of the play's key issues for its original audience: eight years after the actual, historical Athenian defeat of Xerxes and the Persian army that has at times been estimated to have

numbered a million soldiers and whose explicit purpose was, according to Greek sources, to exterminate Greek culture and every single living Greek, one of the Athenian veterans of that battle, Aeschylus, wrote this play in which the vanquished Persians are depicted just as the news of the defeat reaches the Persian royal court. The Persian courtiers (chorus) wail and moan, the queen-mother wails and moans and mourns the death of hundreds of thousands of Persians and allies, but—in the midst of this catastrophe—most of all laments, time and again, that her son Xerxes, king of kings, is now clothed in rags. The Persians regularly babble away in nonsense syllables (i.e., the pseudo-"Persian" of the Athenian stage, not the actual Persian of the Persian royal court or the Athenian slave quarters), engage in necromancy to determine what political course to follow, are obsessed with external display (particularly of royal pomp), and in the end descend into the wildly irrational howl of grief that ends the play, without resolution, without catharsis, without hope. The play was staged eight years after the Persian defeat at the Battle of Salamis (just off the coast of the Athenian harbor), during a religio-dramatic festival (Dionysia) in Athens, before an audience composed largely of Athenian veterans of that same battle, whose victory had prepared the Aegean (and beyond) for the Delian League and the Athenian empire that followed close on its heels. They spent the day (actually several successive days of the festival) in the theater while their slaves milked their goats, baked their bread, mined their silver, made their fortunes, and enabled the male citizenry to carry on its "life of the mind." In 472 B.C.E. those slaves were mostly Persian war captives who had somehow managed to survive the Battle of Salamis. The Greeks from that time forth characterized this battle as the saving of (Greek) civilization from annihilation and from the triumph of the barbarians. Aeschylus's play won the prize in that year's Dionysia competition.

While Aeschylus and his contemporaries had no conception of Europe or a European culture as an identifiable entity against which non-Europeans could be constructed as a specifically non-European Other,[36] this play has resonated for two-and-a-half millennia through the formation and deployment of scores of discourses of Self and Other, taking its place, as Said suggests, in the "archive" of Orientalism.

The mode of Otherizing the Persians that is found in Aeschylus' play as excavated and articulated in Hall's analysis, noted above, differs from the pattern found by Said in the modern, primarily British and French, materials that he examined. She insistently historicizes the Aeschylean material, which demonstrates both important distinctions from the materials examined by Said and equally important similarities. Obviously the subjects (ancient Greeks versus modern British/French) and objects (ancient

Achaemenid Persians vs. modern Arabs) of these two encounters are quite different, but as Said seems to suggest, and as Hall compellingly demonstrates, the methods and ultimate political purposes of the two instances of Orientalism, while also distinct are nonetheless similar enough that they can reasonably and profitably be understood as cases from the same archive. For those schooled in the dominant and centuries-long discourse of the Greco-Persian conflict of antiquity, such a conclusion *now* seems quite unremarkable, indeed rather straightforward.

When one proceeds with such analysis as Hall's, postcolonial theory has much to offer in the understanding of premodern texts. Indeed the chronological and period specificity of post-colonial theory as it has been developed in modern studies is no reason to dismiss its relevance for the analysis of earlier periods but rather a motivation to understand the problematics in a larger historical context, which will inevitably lead to the adjustments and modifications necessary to treat a (potentially) more complex and necessarily less uniform corpus of material. The justification for this temporal restriction has generally combined economic and teleological claims and made the additional claim that once capitalism became the economic motor of colonialism, then colonialism transformed into a mode distinct from any and all imperialistic conquests that preceded it; and since this conquest was additionally in effect global in its reach, it differed from all earlier conquests. Neither claim is particularly compelling in principle, and the argument becomes further troubled as soon as one begins to examine the relevant evidence.

The academic periodization that distinguishes the medieval from the modern period is logistically often quite convenient, but its actual basis in history is quite tenuous. While there is no question that economic and intellectual life in, for instance, thirteenth-, as opposed to eighteenth-century London was quite different, the site, timetable, and even content of the transformation of the one to the other is more than merely difficult to plot, and identifying its geographical origin and spread is even more problematic: the Renaissance, for instance, had developed in northern Italy by the time of Francesco Petrarca in the early fourteenth century, but does not "arrive" in England for two-and-a-half more centuries, and while the *architectural* Baroque appeared in St. Petersburg almost immediately upon its early seventeenth-century emergence out of the swamps of the Neva delta, the *economic* Middle Ages arguably persist there until 1918 (and perhaps even thereafter). As has been compellingly argued by James Muldoon, the usual distinction drawn between the medieval and modern derives from the radical social and cultural change that came about as a result of the four nodes of Renaissance, Reformation, scientific revolution, and expansion of European society overseas, all of

which, he compellingly demonstrates, had already begun—and not just as "precursors"—in the Middle Ages.[37] The long centuries of the Crusades provide a lengthy and complex example of European expansion and international colonization, not just to Middle East, for the expansion of Europe was already going full force in multiple directions during the Middle Ages and ultimately also extended to areas along the geographical borders of Europe that had, according to Muldoon, not yet been culturally "Europeanized" according to the then developing norm.

At this point an informational footnote could be inserted, so as not to interrupt the argument, but the necessary point to be made ought not to be shunted off to a footnote: in the preceding sentences I use the term "Europe[an]" as a modern analytical term of convenience, not to be imagined as a projection onto medieval self-conceptions or self-descriptions. While the thirteenth-century Welsh, Tuscans and Bavarians, for instance—given enough coaching—*might* have conceded that they (and *not*, for instance, the inhabitants of Cathay) were "European," that term would not have embodied any significant political, ethnic, or cultural *identity* for them in a nexus of European versus non-European. Significantly, however—and this is a point that needs to be made again and again in confrontations with modernist exclusivity— essentially the same could have been said of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European expansionist cultures: while the Spanish and British in North America certainly recognized themselves as culturally and otherwise distinct from Native Americans and in some senses culturally allied across their national divides, they would not in general—and with no amount coaching—have readily admitted to any twenty-first century notions of pan-European cultural identity, including, for instance, the Irish, Sicilians, Lithuanians, and Saxons. The unmarked and automatic use of "Europe" and "Eurocentric" is thus no less problematic for the scholar of the seventeenth century than it is for the scholar of the thirteenth (although the specific issues relevant are distinct).

To return to the issue of European expansion, the campaigns along borders of geographical Europe, as problematized by Muldoon and J.R.S. Phillips, were also generally viewed at the time as Holy Wars, with the dual purpose of defending Christendom from non-Christians and converting them: in the Iberian peninsula, which until the late fifteenth-century was still partially Muslim; in Prussia and Lithuania, which retained their own religion(s) until the late fourteenth-century conversion of many city dwellers to Christianity that led over the course of the following century to the conversion of the entire populace; and in (Christian!) Ireland.[38]

The French, Spanish, Portuguese, and British colonization of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australia, beginning in the fifteenth-sixteenth

century, was thus only a continuation—albeit on a much larger scale—of the ongoing process of colonization that had been active along the borders of Europe for centuries. While we may view both phases as "European" colonization, we should do so with the proviso noted above, that is, that in neither case was there a uniform notion of European versus non-European culture that defined the process. The slave labor economy that came to characterize the economic exploitation of the American colonies was not presaged in the fifteenth-century Spanish sugar cane plantations in the Canary Islands but in fact was already in full operation there. It was indeed the experience in the Canaries that encouraged Spain to develop such American colonies. While the itinerary and global consequences of the voyages of Cristóbal Colón (Columbus) were obviously unprecedented, the practice in which they participated hardly marked the beginning of a new era, but rather the tactical modification of an old one: intra-European colonization had come to an end, that is, spreading the borders of what Muldoon argues was a specific "European" culture within the geographical confines of Europe (admittedly also a problematic concept). The typical definition of this specific "European" culture, as he notes, results from the conventional notion of the Catholic Church's integration of three cultural entities: the classical heritage, the Germanic/barbarian heritage, and the Christian heritage. This amalgamation was, however, not an invention of the early modern age of discovery, but rather first appeared in the Carolingian world, seven centuries before Colón, and spread outward and replaced or transformed intra-European cultures with which it came into contact. By the time of the First Crusade, it already dominated central Europe, northern Italy (to some extent), France, England, and northern Spain (excepting, in the latter three cases, the Celtic fringe).

Thus Muldoon's argument counters my guarded skepticism about an identifiable cultural unity "Europe" before the seventeenth century. I would like to retain (for tactical purposes) that conception of a lack of pan-European identity while simultaneously acknowledging the growing tendency (already during the earlier Middle Ages) toward the forging of a proto-western European cultural identity.

By the sixteenth century the direction and purpose of European expansion had been modified slightly, so that no longer were conquered [European] territories of non-Christians claimed, but rather any and all territories not already occupied by [Christian] Europeans were theoretically claim*able*. In each such case, there was an economic motivation, tied closely to the dominant religious one and also linked to the concomitant military industry: whether Urban II intentionally proclaimed the First Crusade to deflect younger disenfeofed sons from their petty internal European squabbles, so that they could win their own estates in Muslim

territories, that was in part the significant effect.[39] Wolfgang Spiewok thus notes that the thirteenth-century poet of *Reinfried von Braunschweig* acknowledged the motivation for the Crusades as a "thirst for adventure, battle, and glory," and comments that this identification of the basic motives is quite accurate.[40] Through Crusade the nobility could gain wealth and property, while peasants could free themselves from many of the strictures of servitude. Spiewok adds that beyond spiritual considerations, the papacy stood to extend and strengthen its own power in Europe and establish a papal-controlled colonization of the Eastern Mediterranean, which would also diminish the power of the rival eastern Church, although it also brought with it unforeseen consequences.[41] These motivations recurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, especially in Spain and southern Italy, as the Muslim (and in Spain, also the Jewish) presence was forcibly removed, and a generation of soldiers had no ready enemy. While there was certainly more involved than that as cause, they did indeed turn once more to colonization. This time it was external colonization, leading to voyages of discovery along the African coast and eventually to the Americas and Asia, again diverting the dispossessed from domestic "mischief" to foreign conquest and "enrichment."[42]

It is obvious that the global extent of the political, demographic, and economic transformation of the world that began with the modern colonial exploitation of the Canary Islands, the west African coast, India, Indonesia, and eventually the Americas had never been seen before. But one must keep in mind that ultimately the point at issue for Said's conception of Orientalism (and for the modified conception operative in the present analysis) is one of representational *discourse* as articulated above, that is, the "style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances" that constitute the comprehensive system of representation that dialectically both defines the Other and politically enables that definition and the consequent military, religious, and political dominance by the one culture of the other. Clearly ancient Greek "style" differs from that of medieval German or modern English, just as the syntax, morphology, vocabulary, and idiomatic usage of the languages differ, and as do the "historical and social circumstances" in their particulars. But otherwise in many ways those circumstances *as constructed* by the (proto-)Orientalist/ Eurocentric party (ancient Greek/modern British and French) in relation to the Otherized non-European party (Achaemenid Persian/modern Arab) are remarkably similar in purpose and indeed with some frequency with respect to translated terminological usage, since, after all, discursive traditions depend in large part on the textual traditions passed down through the centuries and function pedagogically to transmit the discourse to succeeding generations. Granted,

the differences both large and small (and thus the necessity of caution in analysis) are greater when dealing with earlier historical instances of Orientalism/Eurocentrism than they are when dealing with modern or synchronic instances, such as British versus Egyptian, French versus Maghrebian, Italian versus Ethiopian, Spanish versus Aztec, Russian versus Tatar, German versus Namibian Ovambo. Or, as this list of six-teenth- through twentieth-century European encounters with the Other is extended and the *complex variety of modes of encounters* then begins to demonstrate, modern Orientalism/Eurocentrism is perhaps no less com-plicated and problematic, no less demanding of varied and nuanced dif-ferentiation, than would be a diachronic extension of the mode of analysis back to treat encounters in earlier historical periods. Thus while it is clear that the economic motive and especially the global reach of modern colonialism distinguish it from earlier iterations, neither of those issues is necessarily determinative of the *discourse* employed for, say, medieval or modern European colonization of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine.

In the end it seems that the most compelling reason for the exclu-sion of premodern periods from consideration by the theoreticians of Orientalism and Eurocentrism has been a very practical and banal one: the indiviual scholar's own disciplinary limitations. While the disciplin-ary expertise of the architects of postcolonial theory has in general been located in modern studies, and while their disciplinary limitations have by no means resembled those of Hegel, whose utter ignorance of all lan-guages, cultures, and in large part also geographies beyond the borders of Europe enabled him to construct the extra-European world as essentially uniform, unchanging, barbaric, and thus without import for the onward march of the *Weltgeist*,[43] many postcolonial theorists have nonetheless imagined all premodern cultures as essentially monolithic and irrelevant to postcolonialism and thus thankfully beyond the pale of that which must be understood in order to treat the "history" of postcolonialism.

On the other hand, those whose expertise does lie in earlier periods (such as Edith Hall, Suzanne Conklin Akbari, and Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, among many others) and who have taken the opportunity to read widely in contemporary theory have over the course of the past two decades piece-by-piece disassembled the modernist myth of an exclusively mod-ern arena for the deployment of postcolonial theory. As is the case in modern studies, where much routine work on postcolonialism consists simply of mechanical applications of "Said, Bhabha, et co." to this or that writer or genre, with the predictable result that essentially wherever one looks, one finds "Orientalism," so also is some work in premodern post-colonialism strictly derivative and mechanical. While one might wish to respond that in the study of earlier periods much time has been lost and

much is to be made up for, that is, of course, not really the point. When a theoretically informed reader looks intelligently beyond the temporal bounds set by Said and his modernist colleagues, what one finds is in fact not an untouched stock of authors and texts to which one may ubiquitously and productively "apply" postcolonial theory, but rather recurring, distinct moments of stimulus that invite the rethinking of both those earlier texts *and* contemporary theory, which in fact yields quite complex readings and rereadings that come about via retheorization rather than any mechanical application, for the representational mode and historical circumstances of, for instance, Aeschylus, as Edith Hall compellingly demonstrates, are not those of Conrad or Lawrence. Neither are the Christian-Muslim relations of Kipling the same as those adumbrated in Dante's *Inferno*, nor are his those of the *Chanson de Roland* or Wolfram von Eschenbach's grail romance. But the temporally disparate instances are not without intrinsic interest (if for no other reason than their superficial similarity) or historical relation. This latter item is most significant, for in fact, as it is necessary to recall, the point here has to do with discourse, and a discourse by definition does not simply appear suddenly and without historical antecedent, but rather accretes as a complex agglomerate sediment of multiple historically overlaid modes of expression. As Fredric Jameson suggests, in a different context:

> We never really confront a text immediately, in all its freshness as a thing-in-itself. Rather, texts come before us as the always-already-read; we apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is brand-new—through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretive traditions.[44]

One thus writes about the Other using the "style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances" employed by one's contemporaries and immediate predecessors, who themselves learned this system of expression from their immediate and not so immediate textual forbears, in a tradition that extends step-by-step (sometimes skipping back and forth across periods, as texts often anti-historically permit) back to Lawrence and Conrad, Hegel and Marx, Cervantes, and Dante and the *Chanson de Roland*, and possibly even to Aeschylus. Said explains:

> My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were

naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism.[45]

The discourse of Orientalism/Eurocentrism was then not invented on an early September morning in 2001, or in 1798 (when Napoleon invaded Egypt), or 1492 (when Spanish ships arrived in the Caribbean and their royal proprietors offered their Iberian Muslim and Jewish subjects the "choice" of conversion, death, or exile from Spain), or 732 (when the first extant use of the word *europeenses* [Europeans] was recorded),[46] or even in 472 B.C.E. when Aeschylus' Πέρσαι won the dramatic competition at the Athenian Dionysia, for both the complexity and suppleness of the discourse as Aeschylus employs it makes clear that his audience was already intimately familiar with the discourse and its political usage. This discursive tradition of otherizing is complex and all else but uniform and unilinear, but its identity as a discursive tradition is nonetheless obvious to anyone who takes the time to take such a reading tour with frequent stops along the way.

One must further also acknowledge that at least in the European *literate* tradition this discourse and its attendant political praxis is always much older than the situation-dependent praxis that seeks legitimation in that discourse: it has, as far as the history of *extant* European *texts* is concerned, always existed and been available to represent the recurring confrontations over the course of the two thousand years prior to the Spanish arrival in the Caribbean. The discourse tradition used to represent those discrete situations over the course of time is, however, despite myriad local variations, in some significant sense one that is historically unified, and not accidentally so. As in any coherent literary tradition, specific modes of discourse within the tradition remain relatively intact over the course of time and grow even more normative the more often and more widely they are deployed.

As Hall demonstrated in her study of Aeschylus, there existed already in 472 B.C.E. a discourse fully formed and available for use in representing the denigrated Asian Other that in recent decades we have come to identify as Eurocentric. Once that discourse had been established, it was available for use by Aeschylus, Herodotus, and Xenophon—albeit already in radically differing modes—and subsequently by other Greek playwrights and historians, and came to be a fully developed tradition of discourse that enabled anyone cognizant of that discourse to represent the Other in terms that would be immediately comprehensible to others who knew that discourse and would also be recognized as participating in that tradition. This is, for instance, clearly the case in the Greco-Roman legends that developed around the figure of Alexander the Great and his

conquest of large sections of southwestern Asia. There we find the first
systematic deployment—after the Greco-Persian conflict of several cen-
turies prior—of Otherized representations of non-Europeans and also the
kernel of that peculiarly long-lived and malleable subgenre of such texts,
the exoticizing "Marvels of the East" tales, with their naked 500–year-old
Hindu philosophers, talking trees, rivers flowing with stones or even gold
nuggets instead of water, and nations of acephalous humans with mouths
and eyes in their chests.[47] Over the course of centuries and millennia,
this Otherizing discourse came to be "applied" by Romans, Byzantines,
Franks, Russians, Spaniards, Britons, Euro-Americans, Germans, and
Israelis to Carthaginians, Huns, Muslims, Tatars, Arawaks, Hindus,
African Americans, Turks, and Palestinians, among many others. In each
case the authors had an available and pointedly relevant discourse, and
one that they generally already knew well because they—as the poets and
historians of the (European) high culture—had themselves been schooled
in precisely that central tradition of texts. Once established, this discourse
provided a readymade paradigm (with myriad applicable details) for the
representation of the Other, and thus it spawned further examples of
itself, which spawned further examples of themselves, and so on.[48] Thus
despite necessary—and sometimes enormously complex—local modifi-
cations over the centuries, a cluster of related discourses of the Other has
remained available for use from the earliest European literary period up
to the present. While it has certainly not always been "applied" only by
Europeans to non-Europeans (the Romans, for instance, found the Celts
so alien as to be scarcely considered human), that application has made up
the majority of cases thus far studied in any depth, and convention in the
past several centuries seems to have confirmed this particular application
as the norm.

John Tolan provides an example of the durative power of such a
discourse in his broadly conceived historical analysis of the Christian
discourse of the Muslim Other, where he argues that after the initial
Christian development of a discourse on the Muslim Other, there was in
essence a centuries-long hiatus on further thinking:

> The thirteenth century saw the crystallization of European images of
> Islam that were to endure (with minor variations) into the seventeenth
> century—and in some respects into the twentieth.... From the fourteenth
> century to the twentieth, Western authors writing about Muslims, Arabs,
> Turks, or Orientals, referred to the fundamental texts and images created
> from the seventh century to the thirteenth.
>
> The ideological responses to Islam...were redeployed countless times
> in medieval and modern Europe. Europeans would not again expend the

same intellectual effort against Islam as did their forbears to explain, refute, convert. Rather, the intellectual weapons forged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were reused, anthologized, translated, published.... Little truly new was written about Islam between 1300 and the Enlightenment. There were occasional exceptions.... Yet for the most part, the humanists turned their back on Islam: Arab and Muslim culture were parts of the "Gothic" accretion that they wished to shed in order to return to a pure, antique wisdom. The old stereotypes of barbaric invaders, now couched in the vocabulary of humanism, flowed easily from their pens....[49]

While acknowledging the stark differences between the medieval period that forms the object of his analysis and the modern period examined by Said (including the fact that medieval Christians were in a position of distinct and undeniable military, economic and intellectual *inferiority* to Muslim culture), Tolan suggests his own work as a complement to Said's. In the same way that Said describes for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Tolan suggests that "from the seventh century to the thirteenth, anti-Muslim discourse by Christian authors is used to authorize and justify military action, legal segregation, and social repression of Muslims."[50]

That confrontation between Christendom and Islam proved to be one of the culturally most significant sites along the discursive tradition of two and a half millennia outlined above, beginning with Aeschylus—not just because of its continuing significance for contemporary geopolitics— even before the conquest of Arab-ruled Palestine by the Seljuk Turks in the course of the eleventh century, but especially thereafter, that political, military, religious, and ideological conflict between Christianity and Islam was one of the most common literary motivators across the spectrum of medieval Christian literature. As Lucy Pick suggests,

Said's colonial Orientalism may be a better model for understanding certain features of the Latin Middle Ages than he would have suspected. This was an important period of expansion and accumulation of territory and some of the areas expanded into Islamic Spain and the Levant of the Crusaders are traditional ground for finding Orientalists.[51]

For the purposes of concrete access to one mode of the medieval discourse of the Muslim Other, epic of the central Middle Ages may offer a tactical illustration. Lynn Tarte Ramey points out, the twelfth century brought a new genre into existence, the *chanson de geste*, and beginning around 1150, "there is a veritable explosion of texts which treat the Saracen and Christian relationship in a different context."[52] The ideological conflict between Christianity and Islam is one of the key narrative

motives in, to name only three of the more famous epics: the Old French *Chanson de Roland* and the Old Spanish *Poema de mio Cid* in the West, and the Armenian *David of Sassoun* in the East.[53] The specifics of that ideological conflict are, not incidentally, anything but uniform across these three texts, but even where it does not function as the primary motivator of the entire plot, Christian-Muslim relations are nonetheless all but ubiquitous as background, as a component of the basic Christian view of international politics, which was so often defined via crusade organizational strategies or simply a crusade "mentality."

The clichés of this mentality, as they are manifested in epic, are familiar. As David Blanks and Michael Frassetto point out, Christian culture developed its negative images of Islam from "a position of military and, perhaps, more importantly, cultural weakness": it was by debasing their more cultured and sophisticated enemy that the Christian self-image was enhanced.[54] Muslims are thus represented as polytheists who worship (generally) a trio of deities, which always includes Muḥammad, and otherwise also generally includes Jupiter, Apollo, or Tervagant/Termagant; this worship generally involves an undefined ritual cult that may also include idols carried by the Muslims wherever they go.[55] The hybridized religion depicted by medieval authors, with its quasi-"trinity" of deities, generally reflects the Christian notion that began to spread even from the earliest period of Islam's rise, that is, that it was no more than a fraudulent perversion of Christianity itself.[56]

This mode of the discourse of an Otherized Islam additionally includes the claim that Muslims ally themselves with demons, and sometimes directly with Satan, with whom, it is assumed, Muslims are always in league, whether explicitly acknowledged or not. The identity of Muslim characters is quite often reduced simply to their religion, which is manifested in their being designated often simply as "the heathen," even if the text has provided the individual characters with names, so that this quasi-religious designation comes to constitute their entire identity.[57] As is made clear in Wolfram von Eschenbach's orientalizing "prehistory" of the Parzival legend (*Parzival* I), in which the hero's father, Gahmuret, undertakes a tour of chivalric adventures in the Muslim world, Muslims live in the exotic luxury that is constructed via the clichés also known from (modern!) Orientalism. In Wolfram's *Willehalm*, Muslim men are sometimes beastial warriors, who fight with clubs and stakes (e.g., Rennewart), sometimes courtly and refined, but almost always fanatical, frenzied warriors who are characteristically described by means of images of wild animals—monkeys, snakes, or dogs. Essential to their characters is their congenital treachery. At death in battle these Muslim warriors by definition go directly to Hell—as the epic texts delight in

repeating—while Christian heroes just as consistently and just as immediately go directly to heaven. While Wolfram's *Willehalm* provides clear examples of this cliché, Wirnt's *Wigalois* offers an interesting metaphor to express the tenet: when the Muslim Rôaz and his wife Japhîte die, it is said that there are not two dead, but rather: *hie lâgen samet vieriu tôt: / zwô sêle und zwêne lîbe* [here lay four dead: two souls and two bodies].[58] Muslim women are predictably exotic, beautiful, erotic, seductive, sexually accessible to Christian men, and sexually aggressive in pursuing Christian men, but at the same time alien, potentially dangerous and physically repulsive, even as they are seductive.[59] Muslims of both sexes are represented as naive, nonintellectual devotees of Islam, rabidly willing to die for their faith in "holy war," *unless* they have an opportunity to gain a Christian marriage partner by converting and thus gaining access to European courtly society (which seems almost assumed as the ideal toward which all being aspires). Faced with such an opportunity, the Muslims convert immediately and without a second thought, abandoning faith, family, country, and in many cases even their names (as part of the ritual of baptism) in order to gain the desired Christian mate and entrée into the world of light (e.g., Arabel in *Willehalm* and Feirefîz in *Parzival*).[60] In *Wigalois*, the Christian hero preaches a brief catechistic sermon to the noble Muslim Adan, who converts on the spot, and later, even before he has been baptized by the bishop, just before going into battle on the side of the Christians against his countrymen, assures Wigalois that he can fight loyally by his side, *swie gar ich sî ein heiden* [although I am altogether a heathen].[61] Thus his character is so constructed by the Christian author that he participates in his own Otherizing, a common enough phenomenon in Orientalizing texts of a range of periods and traditions.

The Muslims of Christian epic are also constructed as anatomically remarkable: they are almost without exception black—not simply darker-skinned than Christian/Europeans, but black as night or as coal, which is never without moral valuation, associated as it is in such cases, often explicitly, with darkness, sin, the Devil, evil, Hell, dirt, excrement, such as, for example, with the Muslims of the *Chanson de Roland*, or the character Seyfrid in the Middle High German *Kudrun*.[62] As Geraldine Heng notes, in medieval texts "blackness is *not neutral*, but negatively valenced" and "a racializing discourse exists in which color is positioned instrumentally."[63] Thus morally depraved, as their skin color, an external sign of their inner nature, makes clear, it is not surprising that Muslims are also depicted as essentially deceitful and treacherous, oversexed, stupid, immoral, animalistic, and sometimes literally monstrous (with horns, tails, scales, etc.). In taking as my examples here the *Chanson de Roland*, its Middle High German adaptation, and Wolfram's *Willehalm*, I find a rare

concentration of such characteristics, but nothing atypical of the genre of epic.[64] Debra Strickland comments on this phenomenon:

> [T]here is good reason to believe that, gazing at the images of the Monstrous Races, Crusaders may have interpreted these as the contemporary Muslims that they would encounter in the East. This idea is not really as far-fetched as it might initially appear. In fact, the Saracens of the *chansons de geste* include a wide variety of monstrous types, whose appearance and behavior correspond quite closely to those of the Monstrous Races. Some carry rustic arms, such as a club or a hammer. Others live the life of a savage, going around naked or living in a cave. Several are Giants, some are Anthropophagi, one has a boar's head, and another has two mouths, two noses, and four arms. In *Fierarbras*, the Saracen named Agolafre has eyes behind his head and ears so large he uses them to shield himself from bad weather, much like the Panotii. In *Les Narbonnais*, the enlarged ears of the Saracens also function in battle as shields.[65]

Nonetheless, as Ramey points out, "the portraits of Saracens that emerge from the Middle Ages are conflicting and ambiguous"; for while Muslims are generally so represented in courtly *belles lettres* as essentially evil, "pre-programmed by their 'saracenness,'" they occasionally appear in a different guise:[66] they are courtly, noble, royal, intelligent, cultured, and sophisticated; they practice courtly love, yearn for the beloved, wear fine clothing, live in impressive castles, and ride exquisite horses. They are the "good" Muslims, as opposed to those other Muslims; they are not the "noble savages" of early modern Otherizing, but rather "noble heathens." Interestingly, however, even such ostensibly positive characters participate in the broader discourse of the Muslim Other, just as do the bestial polytheistic idolators of the *Chanson de Roland*. For these Muslims are noble and courtly only insofar as they have been narratively transformed into pseudo-Christian Europeans in material culture and values, for almost never can a literary Muslim *as* Muslim be such and remain such a noble character. It is thus necessary to recognize this dual nature of the representation of Muslims, but in the end the duality is collapsed by the necessity of metamorphosis: even "noble heathens" must convert or die; they may not continue as independent (literary) Muslims in European territory, not even in such "enlightened" characters as Sir Thomas Malory's Palomides or the noble and *formerly* Muslim characters of the Old French *Floire et Blancheflor* and *Aucassin et Nicolette*, for they are only temporarily or provisionally Muslim while preparing for conversion, or, in the case of Nicolette, already baptized before the beginning of the narrative. Otherwise the noble portion of their hybrid "noble heathen" identity is impossible.

When such modes of representing Muslims became part of a discourse of the Muslim Other, they did so independent of any and all corroboration by "actual" Muslims of any period or place. Crusaders, we might imagine, many of whom had encountered Muslims in their home territories and not just across battle lines, might well have disabused the *Roland* poet and Wolfram von Eschenbach of their unrealistic portrayals. But—to reconnect with the theoretical discussion begun earlier in this chapter—we must remind ourselves, realism as such has little to do with *any* literary modalities and genres in the medieval European literatures, and it certainly is antithetical to any Saidian conception of Orientalism or Foucauldian conception of discourse itself,[67] and it is precisely those conceptions that are of essential importance here. The represented Muslim in Christian epic consists *not* in fact of caricatures or distortions of "actual" Muslims, but rather of a series of discursive tropes divorced from any but a most remote and refracted origin in reality. Such a represented Muslim is thus not "inaccurate" per se since it is no longer merely a depiction or distortion of the "real," but an independent object whose cultural function does not include accuracy or identity with any actual Muslim.

In this context of the insistently discursive function of representation, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen points to an interesting example of the consciousness of the practice of representation of Muslims: in the fourteenth-century French *Grandes Chroniques*, Muslim soldiers are said to have donned black, horned masks that make them look like devils, banging drums and frightening the Christian soldiers. It seems almost as if we have here a medieval example of "blacking up": just as in the tradition of African American musicians putting on the black-face makeup, costume, and accent characteristic of the black-face minstrel performer (since their *actual* blackness was deemed inadequate for that role), here the Muslim characters deliberately play the role of the "Muslim" as constructed by the Christian discourse of the Muslim Other, in order to achieve the desired effect of that Muslim Other.[68]

It would be useful here to step back for a moment from the argument of these last pages, in order to recontextualize them: I sketched out rather a uniform image of the "medieval representation of Muslims," based particularly on a handful of epics, selecting, the reader will have noticed, pertinent bits of evidence from one text and then another in order to construct a composite. In doing so, I followed a long-standing scholarly practice in this subfield, including the pioneering and still useful studies by R. W. Southern and Norman Daniel, noted earlier. The resulting sketch is then not to be found in its entirety in any given text. While tactically quite useful, that sketch would nonetheless be grossly inaccurate if taken as in any way definitive of a fundamental model of

"medieval representations of Muslims." In general, recent scholarship has begun to move away from such composite and arguably reductive generalizations in order to focus on a more nuanced analysis of *individual* texts. For despite recurring clichés of Muslim representation, we must take into account that there is no strict uniformity across the spectrum of medieval Christian literature, whether in epic or other genres, in its representation of Muslims: the Middle High German version of the Roland epic is, for instance, more extreme in its denigrating Otherizing of Muslims than its Old French source,[69] which is itself more extreme than one finds, for instance, in any of the foundational Arthurian romances written by Chrétien de Troyes. Each iteration of Muslim otherizing is unique in the components included, their combination, their intra- and intertextual contexts, which are also dependent on time, place, language, and genre.[70]

That said—and it is a point not to be merely mentioned and then forgotten—there are commonalities in the discourses of the Muslim Other, and it is clear that many clichés familiar from modern Eurocentric bigotry are already present in medieval *belles lettres*: the Other, in this case, the Muslim, is in general a dark-skinned, irrational, and oversexed individual, whose potential for moral value often derives from his/her putatively innate desire to convert to Christianity and adopt European customs. Monstrous Muslim warriors and sexually available Muslim queens, just waiting for a handsome and maritally eligible Christian knight to wander by and save them from their Muslim existence, are not found on every page of medieval European epic—and rarely in other genres—but they appear often enough to condition readers' responses, and sometimes the entire narrative is based on the ideology that so constructs them. We must try to balance our readerly expectations between an insistence on specificity and generalized patterns.

Before proceeding further—especially since a certain terminological model is beginning, via the citation of the work of other scholars, to be established in these pages that needs some critique and contextualization—it might be useful to raise the volatile issue of naming, that is, how one might refer to the discursive representation of the Muslim Other (i.e., *not* an actual, historical Muslim). In his own scholarship on Christian-Muslim relations, Norman Daniel chose not to use the term "Muslim" to designate the people nor "Muḥammad" to designate what for medieval Christians was generally considered a Muslim "god," preferring instead the terms "Saracen" and "Mahon," respectively, terms that are indeed already components of that Christian-defined discourse. He thus explicitly distinguishes between, on the one hand, what we would term the discursive representation and, on the other, historical, cultural

reality and pointedly explains the distinction.[71] The terms are, however, precisely because of their histories of usage in this discursive tradition, quite troubled word choices.

"Saracen" derives, via Latin *saracenus*, from the Greek σαρακηνός *sarakenos* (likely related to Arabic شرقيون *sharqīyūna* [easterners]), which early designated a single tribe of Arabs from the Arabian peninsula and was later used in both Greek and Latin to designate the Arabs (and others) whose armies advanced the banner of Islam. After the term once came to be used to designate Muslims, that continued as its primary use in Latin and Greek throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages. It nonetheless later also became possible in Latin to use the term to refer to the entire Orient, and thus not a single people, or speakers of a single language, or indeed adherents of a single religion. It was at times also used to designate a variety of enemies of Catholic Christendom, including, for instance, even Hungarians and Normans, and, in the late Middle Ages, it was even used to designate ancient Roman ruins. Lynn Ramey suggests then that the medieval use of "*Saracen* can be interpreted as "pagan," a word that is used interchangeably with "Saracen" to describe a valiant warrior. At its essence, the term "Saracen" seems to hold the same place in the medieval imagination that "foreign," "exotic," or "outlandish" represents for us." Ramey also follows Norman's usage, since, as she explains, among the invaders of Spain were Arabs and Berbers, some of whom had not yet converted to Islam: "In many ways then, the medieval term Saracen to refer to this disparate group of peoples embodies a generalizing and therefore more accurate terminology appropriate for the period."[72] Jeffrey Jerome Cohen also opts for the same usage and comments: " 'Saracens' are the fantasy products of the Christian imaginary that, like all monsters, could take on an uncanny life and agency of their own."[73] He also suggests that one would do better to employ the medieval texts' conception and terminology and thus designate this particular Other as "Saracen," for that construct has very little to do with actual Muslims of this or any other period. Such a practice would then "mark the category from the start as produced through the passionate investment of occidental fantasies and desires, rather than as a historical marker of a simply misrecognized identity."[74] Few contemporary scholarly analyses in English of issues relevant to the topic now use anything but the term "Saracen." In German, a terminologically distinct but conceptually similar practice prevails, where the term *Heide* [heathen]—which has an immediately more negative connotation—predominates.[75] That Carl Lofmark adopts and routinely uses the English equivalent of that term, "heathen," to designate represented Muslims, even in the midst of analysis of the bigoted excesses of the *Kaiserchronik* and *Rolandslied*, may be more surprising but is not unique.[76]

I realize that I am swimming against a strong current here, but it seems to me worth pointing out that the scholarly use of *Saracen* or *heide/heathen* is quite problematic. However much we insist on *Saracens* as components of the medieval Christian discourse of the Muslim Other and thus as "fantasy products of the Christian imaginary" (Cohen), they are in terms of cultural identity never divorced—whether for the medieval or the modern audience—from an essential cultural connection to Islamic identity. It is thus also important to point out that the proportions of the previous paragraph became somewhat skewed: for while, as Ramey and others point out, the term *Saracen* may occasionally designate Normans or Hungarians or ancient Roman ruins, the fact remains that that usage, as compared with the use of the term to designate the representation of Muslims, is so rare as to be statistically insignificant. When the word *Saracen/heide* appears in a medieval text, its referent is almost without exception Muslim. In the end, when the object of analysis is a wide-ranging group of texts across multiple genres and language traditions and multiple centuries in which a group of characters generally worships Muḥammad, lives in (or originates in) "Araby," and militarily opposes Christendom in what is ubiquitously identified as religious warfare (among other characteristics), then the fact that the term *Saracen* is also (rarely) used in late medieval texts to designate Hungarians, Normans, and ancient Roman ruins seems at best tangentially relevant, since that group of characters generally designated *Saracen* is clearly *not* Hungarian, Norman, or ancient Roman but rather quite obviously ideologically freighted constructs of Muslims.

I thus see nothing compelling in Norman's reasoning that would legitimize the scholarly adoption of such terms of blatant opprobrium used by medieval authors to designate a despised religious, racial, and ethnic Other. I find Ramey's justification—that a term so imprecise as to designate *any* enemy of a vague and undefined Europe would some-how be appropriate for a non-homogeneous group of Arabs, Berbers, Turks, Kurds—no more compelling. Such ideologically freighted terms, whether *Saracen* or *heide*, used by our openly and adamantly nonbigoted colleagues, are not, however, by any means ideologically neutral, and employing them only seems to defer the inevitable political responsibilities that come with naming and serves to obstruct the historical continuity between the medieval Christian discourse of Islam and the discourse that enabled and still enables the political, military, and cultural consequences of the centuries-long use of that discourse. The politically progressive nature of the work by, for instance, Norman, Cohen, and Ramey[77] and the overt acknowledgment of their own naming practice embedded in that work makes clear their honesty, responsibility, and

good faith. But it still seems wrong to me: if *Saracen/heide* is legitimized for scholarly use about racist texts in which that is the primary *medieval* term of opprobrium employed, should we then—to return to the film treated in the previous chapter—in our scholarly work adopt the racial epithets used by the U.S. soldiers to designate each other *and* the Iraqi characters in de Palma's *Redacted*, for those characters are no less discursive constructs (albeit in a different mode), that is, no less *represented*, than the *Saracens* and *heiden* of medieval literature. A final example from a different subfield of cultural study may add some further perspective on the issue: I doubt, for instance, that scholars of the black experience in North America would even imagine adopting for their own scholarly usage the term that was until recent decades commonly used by whites to designate blacks, even or especially when analyzing texts in which that was the term of choice. As I indicated at the outset of the discussion of this topic, it is a ticklish issue, and I do not pretend to have the definitive answer. But, after all, in academe, as elsewhere, naming is never neutral: *Nomen est omen*.

★   ★   ★

The present volume explores the representation of Islam in key texts from medieval German-speaking territories. In chapter three the analysis thus turns to a consideration of two Latin texts from Germany that deal with the focal issues of the study: the tenth-century hagiographical legend, "Pelagius," by the Benedictine canoness Hrotsvit von Gandersheim and the twelfth-century allegorical drama, *Ludus de Antichristo*, which present two rather different conceptions and representations of Islam. There follows in chapter four a consideration of medieval European constructions of the cultural Other via intertwined conceptions of religion and race as categories of moral value. This problematization of race/religion is found in a broad range of medieval texts. Here the focus is restricted to the several modes of epic of medieval Germany, in particular, courtly and Crusader epic. The peculiarities of the medieval European conception of race/religion as ontological but nonbiological is treated as it defines literary representations of European Christians confronting the non-Christian Other along the liminal zones or borderlands that divide and join the multiple cultures on the two sides of this divide. As Lynn Ramey points out, "The space of the Orient has rightfully been labeled 'un espace ludique, un divertissement, une fuite hors du réel'" [a ludic space, a diversion/entertainment, a flight beyond the real].[78] This ludic or liminal space is, as Victor Turner's anthropological studies of liminalities have demonstrated, a territory in which nonnormative and antinomial

behavior is tolerated as a transition to a newly articulated system of individual behavioral norms:

> "Meaning" in culture tends to be *generated* at the interfaces between established cultural subsystems, though meanings are then institutionalized and consolidated at the centers of such systems. Liminality is a temporal interface whose properties partially invert those of the already consolidated order which constitutes any specific cultural "cosmos."[79]

Homi Bhabha has effectively breached the restrictive boundaries of Turner's conception of the liminal by suggesting that: "By reconceptualizing culture as a category of translation, as an analytic of "borderline" transformation, we might open up a range of questions that link the growing interdisciplinarity within the academy, with the global and the transnational nature of cultural transformations."[80] Such border sites are by nature unstable and subject to rapid change; in fact their existence is predicated on a process of constant movement and transformation. For all these reasons, then, the border is not to be understood as a line but as a strip or zone, an interval or interstitial space. This strand of cultural theory posits that it is within this space that the operating theater of the border-crosser or frontier runner is to be found, where new concepts and forms of existence are tested.

In the realm of theoretical or quasi-theoretical abstraction in which Bhabha's work operates, there is little that provides much purchase for interpretive "application" but much that is suggestive and thus quite useful in articulating complex issues having to do with liminality. At the beginning of *The Location of Culture*, in broaching what seems to be the same metaphorical, albeit hardly anthropologically demarcated, interstitial space as that problematized by Turner, Bhabha writes: "These 'in-between' spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood—singular or communal—that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself."[81] As Turner almost incidentally suggests, Bhabha, too, views this space as *necessarily* creative, but in the particular discourse context in which Bhabha operates—having to do with, among other things, the formation of political identities—the significance of the creativity spawned by the space bleeds over into specifically political issues; the doubly defined "marginals" recognized by Turner, become for Bhabha the practicioners in this nexus of creativity:

> It is in the emergence of the interstices—the overlap and displacement of domains of difference—that the intersubjective and collective experiences

of *nationness*, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated. How are subjects formed "in-between," or in excess of, the sum of the "parts" of difference (usually intoned as race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies of representation or empowerment come to be formulated in the competing claims of communities where, despite shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values, meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable?[82]

These liminal boundary zones function then as sites of cultural engagement that often result in transformative creativity. As Lynn Ramey comments on the Christian-Muslim cross-border engagement in medieval epic,

> The Orient, already the land of amorous encounter in the work of the troubadours and the later *chansons de geste*, becomes in romance a space where gender and race become fluid. In this space where resemblance and reality no longer coincide, the traveler is free to reinvent himself or herself at the most basic levels of race and gender. Lovers cast off and take on identities seemingly at will in order to achieve their goals.[83]

The particular mode of Christian-Saracen confrontation as represented in this cluster of related "courtly" genres depends fundamentally on the practice of what might best be called "mandatory metamorphosis" of the Other in order to render him/her acceptable, legitimate, and permanently representable. It is interesting and of paramount significance that what Ramey calls a reinvention of self can go in only a single direction: while Christian characters rarely seem to "go native" in Islamic territory, they do not either convert or identify permanently as Muslim. On the other hand, whatever the narrative function of any given Muslim character, especially in medieval European epic, that character's appearance in the narrative serves in a sense simply as a prelude to a radical transformation, for they are subject to a variety of inevitable (and generally immediate) Christian actions and reactions: they are converted, married, killed or expelled from the territory conceived as Christian European (whether in Europe, Africa or the Near East). Identities are thus in fact not assumed and/or cast off at will, as Ramey seems to suggest, but (in all but a statistically insignificant number of cases) unidirectionally and according to *very* restrictively prescribed rules. The relevance of liminal zones in Turner's or Bhabha's related senses is thus clear, but must be treated with some analytical care.

The plausibility of an enlightened progressive view of Muslims by the end of the twelfth century is the focus of chapter five, which examines

the scholarly construction of "tolerance," particularly as it is projected onto the works of Wolfram von Eschenbach, where a specific character and moment in the same genre are interrogated as they have been extracted and constructed by modern scholarship as an opportunity for theologico–political theorizing: in Wolfram von Eschenbach's Crusader epic *Willehalm*, the character Gyburc, like many other liminally enabled aristocratic Muslim women in the "back-story" of courtly romances, abandons homeland, language, name, parents, husband, children, and religion (before the beginning of the narrative) in order to undergo a metamorphosis such as is treated in chapter four. Just prior to the decisive battle between her new (Christian European) husband's forces and her former (Muslim) husband's forces (who has come to Europe to rescue her as a victim of an international kidnapping), this liminal mediatrix between the two cultures delivers a speech to the European troops in which she addresses quite a number of quasi-theological issues as they directly impinge on the geopolitics that define that moment of crisis. That speech has been systematically read by modern scholarship as an example of quasi-modern advocacy on the part of the medieval poet for the liberal political and theological tolerance of the Other. Placing that speech in the larger ideological context of the poem and the discourses of the Muslim Other offers an alternate and more plausible reading that complicates recent scholarly trends toward construing the thirteenth century as a period of "epistemic rupture" in Christian–Muslim relations.

In the sixth chapter attention turns to another literary genre that first flourished in the transformed and refertilized cultural ground of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: a type of lyric that in this social context has come to be designated "courtly lyric." With its general focus on various related constructed modes of eroticism, generally termed *amor courtois*, *minne*, "courtly love"—the core tradition of courtly lyric in the work of the *trobadors* of Provence, the *trouvéres* of northern France and the *Minnesänger* of the German-speaking lands—one might imagine (and many have insisted) that the discourse of the Islamic Other should be absent from courtly lyric. And indeed that is, in large part, the case. But here, as in so many other such instances, it is precisely at such cultural "seams" that underlying and thus fundamental structures of political praxis peek through, even if only momentarily and as fragments, to complicate the individual poems, the genre, and the discourses of the Muslim Other. These fragments, particularly in the works of Walther von der Vogelweide, are the focus of chapter six's interrogation of the modalities of representing the Islamic Other in a genre in which that issue is in part a matter of almost unaddressed assumption. The study concludes with a consideration of the range of evidence—and the range of conclusions

drawn on the basis of that evidence—examined in the study for a radical change in Christian-Muslim relations in the course of the century following the First Crusade. Since the work of Charles Homer Haskins more than eighty years ago and extending up to very recent studies, scholars have puzzled over the difference between the eleventh- and thirteenth-century representations of those relations. Not surprisingly, the German evidence bears directly on this issue, as is problematized here.

As noted above, the study of the discourse of the Muslim Other in the German tradition has lagged somewhat behind the study of this cluster of issues in some other European traditions. The present study does not thus pretend suddenly to fill that gap. In fact, even the book's title promises rather more than it can deliver. There is, for instance, attention only to Middle High German and Latin literature, excluding other literatures (such as Netherlandic, Yiddish, and Hebrew) of the medieval territories in which German dialects were spoken. Furthermore, while a great many Middle High German and Latin texts are mentioned here, relatively few, as just outlined, receive focused analysis. One might well ask why not more texts, or why these and not others? It is obviously not the case that the selected texts represent all Latin and vernacular literature in medieval Germany. There is no group of a half-dozen texts that could so represent that literature. But in fact the selections here analyzed do include texts composed by the most important lyric poet of medieval Germany, by arguably the most important epic poet of medieval Germany, and by the reinventor of drama in medieval Germany. The selected texts also represent a relatively broad range of literary genres: epic, lyric, drama, hagiographical legend, including both the secular and the religious, both courtly and monastic literature, written by male and female authors writing in both Middle High German and Latin, the two primary literary languages of Christian literature of the period and territory. One might again ask whether these particular texts provide a *comprehensive* picture of the discourse of the Muslim Other in medieval Germany. By no means, but then no single monographic analysis can take into account the dozens of relevant genres and hundreds of relevant texts. To give but one example of what has been omitted from consideration, the textual, pictorial, and conceptual information provided by medieval *mappaemundi*, where, one might well imagine, the political ideologies of the specific period and place of the maps' execution might find expression. Modern cartographical research in recent decades has indeed taught us much about the dialectically political functions of maps and mapping in general, which has fundamentally transformed the contemporary understanding of medieval maps. It is thus with reluctance that I omit a consideration of cartography from the present study.[84]

With all the conditions and restrictions and provisions noted in the previous paragraph, I would nonetheless contend that the analysis of the range of texts here considered provides—while certainly no comprehensive analysis—at least a broad enough evidential base to enable significant conclusions on which further work in the field might possibly build. And if nothing else, it does provide a *representative* analysis of a broad range of discursive practices with respect to Muslims in medieval Germany.

One final issue must be broached here, especially in light of recent work in allied fields. One of the most important points of impact in medieval studies from Bhabha's development of Turner's notions of creativity along cultural interstices and liminal zones is the new turn toward studies of the Other not just as *objects* of Euro-Christian representation, but as *subjects* who to some degree have cleared a space for themselves to "write back" against the crushing weight of the hegemonic discourse of their own Other. One of the most influential early explorations of this cluster of issues in contemporary cultural studies was Gayatri Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak."[85] In the field of medieval European studies, similarly conceived studies have indeed begun to appear and have had a salutary effect on scholarship—insofar as they are read by scholars of "mainstream" traditions—but there are likewise severe limitations on the possibility of such studies within those traditions. In one of the earliest examples of extant Yiddish life-writing, for instance, Glikl Haml sporadically provides a fascinating perspective on the life of a successful Jewish business-woman in late seventeenth-century central Europe, including much attention to the exigencies of Jewish life in a majority Christian culture. Likewise, in Elisheva' Baumgarten's study of medieval Jewish family life in majority Christian Europe, there are clear instances in the Hebrew texts of the Jewish seizure of cultural agency and rejection of Christian objectification.[86] However, since the present study focuses on the Muslim Other, there are far fewer possibilities for finding and exploring *Muslim* agency within or in direct confrontation with European Christian culture. In one of his early works of nonfiction, novelist Amin Malouf sharply reset the focus of scholarship on the Crusades with his ground-breaking *Les croisades vues par les Arabes*, which comprised a broad range of Arabic textual—including historiographical and philosophical—responses to the medieval Crusaders' invasions of Muslim territories.[87] More sweeping in its scope was Janet L. Abu-Lughod's re-orientation of medievalists' perspective of Europe in the world economic and cultural system in her pioneering study *Before European Hegemony*.[88] More recently in the work of Maria Rosa Menocal the specifically *European* locus of Arabic cultural agency has been been addressed for both a scholarly and

more popular reading public in her books *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History* and *The Ornament of the World*.[89]

But that still does not arrive at the home territory, as it were, of the present study, which I fear cannot in fact be reached while still maintaining any legitimate focus on Muslim *subjects* writing against the grain, insisting on and enacting their own cultural agency. The simple reason is that while there were Jewish communities in central Europe and Muslim communities in Spain, in which such agency may be sought and indeed found, there were no Muslim communities in any German-speaking territory to produce texts that might document their perceptions and constructions of the European Other or themselves as European constructs.[90] Thus one would be reduced to seeking evidence for Muslim agency through the mouths of Muslim or formerly Muslim characters in Christian-authored texts. That ground seems immediately unstable for any examination of an authentically Muslim-identified subject. While the terminology employed in traditional scholarship on Wolfram's *Willehalm* differs from that of this recent development in seeking the Muslim subject, the method in general seems familiar: scholars have long tried to imagine, for instance, Wolfram ventriloquizing advocacy for Muslim agency, for instance, through Arabel/Gyburc in his *Willehalm*.[91] The text itself, however, provides no evidence in favor of that argument, as I hope to demonstrate in chapter five.

Just as the analysis began with an analysis of *ludus* in Brian de Palma's "Redacted," let us now proceed to two further examples of the *ludus*. In this case of course, the texts are medieval and composed in Latin in German-speaking territory. While in each case one might initially consider their treatment of Islam as oblique, in fact in each case, the conception of Islam is essential to the functioning of the respective narratives. Their "witness" to and comment on Islam from their two rather different perspectives are interestingly still primarily conceived in terms of a biblical framework of religio-cultural identity, although in each case, historical circumstance has tempered that model. The first is a martyrological legend with obvious ludic elements, Hrotsvit von Gandersheim's tenth-century "Pelagius," while the second is a grandiose allegorical *ludus*, the anonymous mid-twelfth century *Ludus de Antichristo*. Their treatments of Islam are quite distinct from what is found in epic and lyric, and indeed the two texts themselves present rather a differently constructed view of Islam, clearly demonstrating the early existence of multiple modes of discourse of the Muslim Other in Germany *and* their already determinative power.

MUSLIMS IN HROTSVIT'S "PELAGIUS" AND THE *LUDUS DE ANTICHRISTO*

The present analysis of Hrotsvit von Gandersheim's tenth-century "Pelagius" and the anonymous mid-twelfth century *Ludus de Antichristo* interrogates the *modes of assumption* underlying the two texts with respect to the representation of Muslims, and articulates the essential function of that discourse within the two texts' narratives. The representation of Muslims, which may at first seem incidental, is in fact key to understanding how the two texts work in their rather different historical and *rezeptionsgeschichtliche* contexts.

The author of the "Passio Sancti Pelagii preciosissimi martiris," the tenth-century aristocratic Benedictine canoness, Hrotsvit von Gandersheim (Lower Saxony; ca. 935–1002) composed eight verse legends, six dramas in rhymed prose, two hexameter epics, and another short poem. Fidel Rädle has commented directly on the affinity of her dramas to the mode of legend, citing Friedrich Neumann's similar opinion: "in her texts, it is a matter less of dramas than of dialogue-legends in rhymed prose."[1] One could just as easily make the reverse argument: that is, that despite the formal distinction of metrical composition (in the legends) versus the rhymed prose composition of the dramas, the legends are in many respects quite dramatic, including the frequent and effective use of dialogue. This is especially the case with the dactylic hexameter verse legend, "Pelagius," which is the earliest extant textual witness of the martyrdom of St. Pelagius (ca. 912–925).[2] Hrotsvit almost certainly learned the story during the mid-950s, when the German emperor, Otto I, and عبد الرحمن الثالث ʿAbd ur-Raḥmān III (889–961; emir and caliph of Córdoba, 912–61) "were involved in an extended exchange of epistolary hostilities."[3] ʿAbd ur-Raḥmān was one of the most enlightened and culturally tolerant rulers of the age, about whom Mahmoud Makki

observes: "It is no exaggeration to say that he was one of the greatest statesmen to rule Spain in any era."[4] The caliph's ambassador to Otto I in 955–56 was the Mozarabic bishop Recemundus (ربيع بن زيد Rabī' ibn Zayd), who claimed to have witnessed Pelagius' martydom, a topic that would have immediately interested Hrotsvit, with her enthusiasm for what Maud McInerney astutely identifies as the "intersection of martyr-dom and sexual jeopardy."[5] In the *explicit* of her book of legends, Hrotsvit says concerning her source of the "Pelagius":

> Huius omnem materiam sicut et prioris opusculi sumsi ab antiquis libris sub certis auctorum nominibus conscriptis . excepta superius scripta passione sancti Pelagii . cuius seriem martirii quidam eiusdem in qua passus est indigena civitatis mihi exposuit . qui ipsum pulcherrimum virorum se vidisse et exitum rei attestatus est veraciter agnovisse. (Berschin 131)

> [I took all the subject matter of this previous little work from earlier books composed by known authors, with the exception of the passion of St. Pelagius (included above). A person native to the same city in which he died and who attests that he saw this most beautiful of men and truly knows the outcome of the matter, explained to me the range of evidence concerning him.]

The first five of Hrotsvit's legends, including "Pelagius," are dedicated to Gerberga II, most probably when she became abbess at Gandersheim in 959, thus providing a *terminus ad quem* for the composition of the text, still two years before the death of 'Abd ur-Raḥmān.[6]

As Enrico Cerulli has pointed out, one cannot but appreciate the intriguing international, intercultural, and geopolitical complexities involved in the skein of trans-Pyrenean relationships that enabled the composition of Hrotsvit's "Pelagius":[7] the ambassador of the caliph of Córdoba, the Mozarabic bishop Recemund/Rabī' ibn Zayd (author of an astronomical text in Arabic), serves as the catalyst, at the German court, for linking Liudprand of Cremona (the Greek-speaking author of the *Antapodosis*, a calumny of Byzantine culture based on his embassy to the Byzantine court of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus [in 949], which was dedicated to Recemundus), a martyrological report of Pelagius' death (by the Spanish priest Raguel), and the Saxon canoness Hrotsvit—all while on a diplomatic mission initiated by the German Otto I concerning Mediterranean pirates operating out of the port of Fraxinet in Provence. If nothing else, this tangled web of relationships and ethnic, religious, and political identities demonstrates the complexities in, and prohibits simplistic binary interpretations of, the Iberian situation of the period, for instance, in reducing them simply to "Christian-Muslim" relations.

While no evidence of any kind concerning the events surrounding the death of Pelagius has survived except through the Christian legends that led to his canonization, it seems that the historical Pelagius may have been sent as a Christian hostage to the court of ʿAbd ur-Raḥmān, where he may have been offered his freedom in exchange for conversion to Islam.[8] His refusal, or perhaps the mode of his refusal, apparently enraged the caliph, who apparently then had him killed (26 January 925). His relics were translated to Léon in 967 and to Oviedo in 985. In addition to Hrotsvit's poem, there also exist a Mozarabic liturgy in Pelagius' honor from the time of the translation of his relics to Léon and another text written as an eyewitness account by the Spanish priest Raguel.[9]

In Hrotsvit's version of the legend, the Iberian Muslims are identified as *perfida . . . Saracenorum gens indomitorum* [the perfidious tribe of wild Saracens] (24), while ʿAbd ur-Raḥmān is *ductor barbaricę gentis* [the leader of the barbaric tribe] (32) that *polluit* [pollutes] by paganism (39) and *barbarico ritu* [barbaric custom] (37–8). He forces Christians to bow to his golden idol or die (57).[10] The local *primi viri* [leading men] (concerning whose identity, see below) know of ʿAbd ur-Raḥmān's pederastic tendencies (204–06) and plead successfully for the boy's release from imprisonment, but the caliph has indeed become captivated by the boy's beauty and keeps him at court (231–2), makes erotic advances (238–49), and instead of receiving the desired kiss on the mouth is hit in the mouth by the boy (271–5).[11] The caliph then has him catapulted over the city wall (276–82), which does not harm him (289), and then beheaded and dumped into the Guadalquivir (296–8). His soul flies to Heaven (299–300), while his head and body are eventually bought by a monastery (350–7), where his head is "tested" in flames and remains unharmed while *iam splendidius puro radiaverat auro* [it now glows more brilliantly than pure gold] (404).

As McInerney indicates, it is as impossible to determine the geneology of influence among the three early texts concerning Pelagius' death as it is to determine their relations to the historical events of Pelagius' death. She then suggests that the "narrative imperatives" operative in the texts determine in large part the story itself: "the evidence suggests that the story as it was told and retold and finally institutionalized in the liturgy is motivated by generic concerns at least as much if not more than by historical veracity."[12] There is likewise no historical evidence either for or against the motif that the historical caliph was a same-sex sexual predator. Neither the fact that homoeroticism is a common motif in medieval Muslim love poetry, nor the fact that the motif of Muslim homosexuality is an anti-Muslim hagiographical commonplace in Christian literature provides any evidence for the case of Pelagius. The genre requirements of Spanish hagiography of the period include the motif of a (female)

virgin threatened by rape,[13] such that the literary conception of Pelagius as martyr would necessitate the inclusion of the motif, whether historically accurate or not. Pelagius' opponent, 'Abd ur-Raḥmān, then also by narrative necessity, becomes a depraved pederast, likewise whether historically accurate or not. The legend thus served both to prepare for Pelagius' canonization as a saint and to demonize Muslims as idolatrous, treacherous barbarians, ruled by murderous, sexually depraved tyrants.[14] The gold of the Muslim idols is surpassed by the martyr's indestructible head that shines more brightly than gold; the mere boy (who is nonetheless a *miles Christi*) defeats the leader of the militarily victorious Muslim army.

Perhaps not surprisingly in the multicultural social landscape of tenth-century Spain, as represented by the Saxon canoness in far-away Gandersheim, there are some questions about the ethnic identity of certain characters in the text.[15] McMillin, for instance, identifies the *viri … primi* [leading men] of the town who plead for mercy for Pelagius as Muslims, which thus allows her to suggest that Hrotsvit does not represent all Muslims as evil.[16] There is, however, no indication in the text of the ethnic or religious identity of these *viri primi*. The fact that the townsmen base their plea on their knowledge of the caliph's reputation as a pederast and thus suggestively praise Pelagius' beauty and sweet speech, is apparently understood by McMillin as evidence that the townsmen must share or at least condone the caliph's sexual practice, since they suggest to him that having seen the boy,

> … cuperes iuvenem tibimet coniungere talem
> Gradu milicię necnon assumere prime
> Corpore candidulo tibi quo serviret in aula (215–16)

> [You would desire to take such a youth into your service (or: … desire that the youth join with yourself) / and have him assume the rank of officer / that he might serve you at court with his shining body]

Problems arise, however, since these *viri primi* plead for Pelagius' release from prison *so that* he can become the caliph's lover, which at least complicates their putative positive image as Muslims but more than complicates their identification as Christian, since Christians presumably could not be imagined to function as the caliph's procurors.[17] Ultimately, however, the interest of the townsmen is in saving the boy's life by having him released from prison, and while clearly suggestive (especially in the use of *coniungere*), their words may simply propose that the caliph release such a fine and obviously strong-willed young man and take him into his service.

McMillin also identifies the local fishermen who take Pelagius' corpse to the local monastery as Muslims (341–5); Stottlemyer goes still further and designates them "Arab fishermen," which seems to strain the plausibility of the interplay of class and ethnicity in the Muslim world outside of the Arabian peninsula and especially in Muslim Spain, where members of the Arab ruling elite of this period were unlikely to be members of the laboring classes.[18] There is, however, some complicating textual evidence in the fishermen's realization that they might find interested buyers of the martyr's body among "Christians" (which McMillin and Stottlemyer construe as a group distinct from that to which the fishermen belong). It may well be that the problem arises from McMillin and Stottlemyer's overdependence on the text's English translation tradition: the word in question in Hrotsvit's text is *fideles* (343) [the faithful], which both Sister M. Gonsalva Wiegand and Katharina Wilson translate as "Christians,"[19] which is without question the correct religious marker in this particular context, but it at the same time quite obscures the multicultural context that is necessary for understanding the meaning of the word *fideles*. It is likely that actual tenth-century Iberian Muslims (especially Stottlemyer's posited Arabs) would designate Christians, as all other non-Muslims, as كفار *kuffār* "non-believers," or to use the relevant Latinate synonym, "infidels." When the fishermen refer to Christians as *fideles*, the mere possibility that the fishermen might be Muslim *logically* evaporates, since *fideles* would be quite inconceivable as a Muslim designation of a Christian. But, of course, it is again a matter not of the plausible practice of *actual tenth-century Muslims*, about which Hrotsvit could logistically know very little, but of her own ventriloquizing of them, such that her Muslim characters might indeed be so constructed that they were capable of designating themselves "infidels" and Christians *fideles*, a usage common in other Christian representations of Muslims. The question is then whether it is likely that even tenth-century Iberian *literary* Arabs/Muslims could be put to work as fisherman and refer to Christians as *fideles*. One might counter, however, that on the other hand it would be very problematic in a Christian hagiographical legend for *Christian* fishermen to *sell* the body of a saintly Christian to a monastery. In any case, the interpretive possibilities here are rich, multivalent, and contradictory almost to the point that one might question the (already troubled) plausibility of Hrotsvit's narrative.

From a twenty-first century perspective, the entire issue of the ethnic identity of the *primi viri* and the fishermen could be deferred as insignficiant, since the values of the multiethnic world of tenth-century urban Spain would not be tied strictly to ethnic identification as a guarantor of value. Such an attitude would, however, obviously *not* be legitimate from the perspective of a tenth-century Christian hagiographical tradition, as

the Pelagius texts make clear. Ultimately, the defining point of view is nonetheless neither ours nor any tenth-century Iberian one, but rather Hrotsvit's, who shares none of the tolerance of multiethnic tenth-century Iberia or of twenty-first century liberalism. Her central European, monastic, hagiographical perspective is quite obviously conditioned and manifested rather differently.

The behavior of the caliph in "Pelagius" in many ways parallels that of the anti-Christian Romans in early Christian legend, as represented in Hrotsvit's oeuvre by the persecution perpetrated by the anti-Christian emperors Diocletian and Hadrian. Interestingly, the Romans torture and kill female virgins as a mark of their depravity, while the caliph in "Pelagius" tortures a male virgin as the mark of specifically Muslim depravity. According to John Tolan, the collection of negative cultural descriptors in Hrotsvit's depiction of Islam is chronologically the first appearance of this concentrated discourse of the Muslim Other in a Latin author that was employed to justify resistance against Muslim political authority.[20] As Mark Jordan notes, Pelagius'

> death was powerful evidence in anti-Muslim polemic. It was an incite-ment to vengeance against the Muslim states. It was, in short, the exercise of patriotism by the Christian kingdoms of northern Iberia. The Christian kings of the north were not slow to realize this.[21]

And it is precisely in this political context that Hrotsvit is to be situated—as a powerful female ecclesiastic with direct and significant ties to the imperial Ottonian house: she was educated under Gerberga, niece of Emperor Otto I and abbess of the Benedictine abbey in Gandersheim. Among Hrotsvit's works is indeed an epic on the life of Otto.

This same tendency toward anti-Muslim polemic is also evident in another of Hrotsvit's works, despite the fact that no Muslim character appears in the text. In her play "Passio Sanctarum Virginum Agapis, Chionię, et Hirenę," generally referred to by the name of its villain, Dulcitius, that character, driven (temporarily but quite literally) insane by lust, makes love to pots and pans (which he mistakes for the virgins who are the objects of his lust), smearing himself with soot, which pro-vokes the virgins to deem him as black as an Ethiopian (Berschin, p. 168), which alone suffices for one of his fellow characters as an external sign of his internal possession by the devil (*a diabolo possidetur in mente*), while for another it functions as evidence that he is perhaps the devil himself (*Vel magis ipse diabolus*) or, despite the fact that his voice is that of Dulcitius, he is the image of the devil (*imago diaboli*), while for yet

others, he is a vile and detestable monster (*vile et detestabile monstrum*, p. 169).

The later cliché that Muslims are necessarily black is thus already indirectly attested here, so that even in this medieval play, albeit set in antiquity under Emperor Diocletian, the depraved sexual villain appears in a guise immediately recognizable to Hrotsvit's audience as the familiar tenth-century villainous Muslim. Indeed Hrotsvit provides a remarkably pertinent point of departure for an analysis of the discourses of the Muslim Other in medieval Germany. Unusually in that tradition, she has rather a close personal link to the subject matter, with, as one might nowadays say, only a few degrees of separation from the events of Pelagius' martyrdom. Unlike the authors of other texts to be considered in the present study, she might have been able—had she so desired—to consult with "authorities" on the facts of the case. Whether she did so or not is not of direct concern to us, because, as has become abundantly clear in the course of the preceding analysis, she presents a fully realized discourse of the Muslim Other in a cultural context not yet fully prepared to integrate it. While she obviously did not invent this discourse, in general or in Germany, what she does accomplish is a significant step toward codifying it for her Latin-literate readers, especially at the imperial court and its sponsored monasteries. This text is thus both more explosively relevant to Christian-Muslim relations and more effectively influential within the core territories of Ottonian rule than could have been any vernacular text at this particular period.

★   ★   ★

When one turns from the circumscribed pragmatism of Hrotsvit's hagiographical dramatic legend, written for a tenth-century (i.e., pre-Crusade) audience of aristocratic canonesses, to the cosmic stage of the twelfth-century *Ludus de Antichristo*, composed a decade after the disastrous Second Crusade, much has obviously changed both historically and politically, and much is likewise quite different in aesthetic terms. The *Ludus de Antichristo* was almost certainly written in Bavaria or Austria, most likely at the monastery at Tegernsee.[22] It is clear that the text is intimately connected to traditions of contemporaneous discourses of the Muslim Other.

The play is narratively quite simple: in the time just prior to the Last Judgment, the *imperator romanorum* [Roman emperor] subordinates all Christian states to his own, only to find the *rex* [*h*]*ierosolimorum* [king of Jerusalem] attacked by the *rex babilonię* [king of Babylon][23] (as representative of *gentilitas* [heathenism/paganism = Islam]), which causes the

summoning of the *imperator* for aid, in a clear parallel to the historical call for Crusade, especially the first Crusade.

Defensor ecclesiẹ   nostri miserere,
Quos uolunt inimici   Domini delere.
Venerunt gentes in   Dei hereditatem,
Obsidione tenent   sanctam civitatem.
Locum, in quo sancti   eius pedes steterunt,
Ritu spurcissimo   contaminare querunt. (129–34)[24]

[Defender of the Church, have mercy on us, whom the enemies of the Lord wish to destroy. The heathen have entered into the hereditary land of God; they besiege the holy city. They seek to contaminate with impure cult the place on which his holy feet stood.]

The defeat of the *gentilitas* and its subordination to the *imperator* as the representative of *ecclesia* [Church/Christianity] is a foregone conclusion. Thereafter the *imperator* yields his crown and power to God, and withdraws to take the less august title of *rex theotonicorum* [king of the Germans]. Then *antichristus* [Antichrist] usurps all earthly control, systematically subordinates all humans, until he is suddenly and utterly destroyed by a divine thunderbolt, and *ecclesia* welcomes humans back to the Christian fold.

Despite the simplicity of the plot, the play is dramatically quite complex (as the extensive stage directions make clear): these cosmic events are conceived and represented as a stately pageant enacted on a stage plotted as a theologico–political map by (generally) allegorically conceived characters through grand speeches, symmetry of position and procession, pantomimes, chants, and ceremonials. At the highest level of abstraction are the characters *ecclesia*, *sinagoga* [Judaism], and *gentilitas*, representing the three competing theological systems significant from the author's perspective. While the term *gentilitas* and its derivatives had designated the early opponents of Christianity, especially the Roman military and political authorities in the eastern Mediterranean of New Testament narrative, in this play it seems clearly a designator of Islam, since *gentilitas* is physically sited in the stage space of the King of Babylon. In the retinue of *ecclesia* are *misericordia* [compassion] and *iustitia* [justice]. Among other characters are the *rex francorum* [king of the Franks], *rex grecorum* [king of the Greeks = Byzantine emperor], and the *apostolicus* [pope].

Ultimately the play's conceptual foundation includes a sharp focus on concerns arising out of the investiture conflict that determined practically all papal–imperial interaction during the eleventh, twelfth, and early thirteenth centuries during which the popes and the German emperors struggled against each other for political supremacy. While Friedrich-

Wilhelm Wentzlaff-Eggebert is quite correct in pointing out that the primary theme of the play is "the Hohenstaufen conception of empire"[25] and that the Crusades play only a subordinate role, it is nonetheless important to notice precisely what comprises that subordinate role, that is, what assumptions are made by the author concerning his audience's underlying conception of the relationship between Christendom and Islam, for as Wentzlaff-Eggebert continues: "[the concept of Crusade] is an automatic precondition of the political milieu out of which the *Ludus* arises."[26] The duties of the *imperator* include being the *defensor ecclesiae* [defender of the faith] and defender of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which was historically established after the conquest of the city in 1099 at the culmination of the First Crusade, slightly more than half a century before the play's composition, and in peril at the time of composition, a decade after the failure of the Second Crusade, and only a generation before the final reconquest of the city by Islamic forces in 1187. There are, however, limits on the Hohenstaufen conception of empire, for as Gisela Vollmann-Profe suggests, the text is never reduced simply to Hohenstaufen imperial propaganda, and as Klaus Aichele points out, the German king, too (as all the other kings), is here depicted as a naive dupe of the Antichrist (257–83), fooled by the latter's healing of a lame man and a leper and "resurrecting" *quidam simulans se in prelio occisum* [one pretending to have been killed in battle; post–274].[27]

The *Ludus de Antichristo* is nonetheless an open advocate of the imperial position, with the Antichrist as the primary opponent not of Christ directly, as one might imagine that a strict theological position would require, but of the *imperator*, who here assumes some important (though ultimately inadequate) aspects of a christological position. In any case, there is a striking lack of focus on the dramatic and theological role of the Antichrist in the play and a shift of that importance to the *imperator* as the key political and theological figure. After the consolidation of all earthly power under the empire, the *rex babilonię* besieges Jerusalem and is ultimately defeated by the *imperator*.

Some of the characteristics of the Western Christian discourse of Islam that come to be standard components of the repertoire in the decades after the composition of the *Ludus* are assumed and others openly expressed in the play: *gentilitas* and the *rex babilonię*, as the play's first speakers, acknowledge at the outset their polytheism:

> Deorum immortalitas
> est omnibus colenda,
> eorum et pluralitas
> ubique metuenda.

Stulti sunt et uere fatui,
qui deum unum dicunt (1–6; cf. also 291–6)

[The immortality of the gods / is to be honored by all, / and their plural-
ity / is everywhere to be venerated. / Foolish and truly idiotic / are those
who say that there is only one God]

This attribution of polytheism to Islam is also expressed by *sinagoga*, who
prohibits Jews from worshipping *Jesum sicut deos Ismahel* [Jesus, as well as
the gods of Ishmael; 43]. Islam is characterized as *cultura idolorum . . . . ritus
simulacrorum* [a cult of idols . . . a religion of idols; 289–90). One cannot but
note just how peculiar an ideological construct this is: the condemnation
by *gentilitas* of monotheism might suggest that the group so represented
is to be identified as the Romans or Hellenistic Greeks known from the
New Testament, which would also accord well with the generally bibli-
cal frame of reference. But the use of *Ismahel* and *rex babilonię* make clear
that this seemingly disguised *gentilitas* is indeed a construct of Islam. As
already noted above, the amalgamation of early Christian antipathy to
Roman and later antipathy toward Islam is found with some frequency in
medieval Christian discourses of the Muslim Other.

Before attacking Christian Jerusalem, which prompts the counterat-
tack of the Christian *imperator*, the *rex babilonię* makes explicit his pur-
pose: *Nomen Christianum de terra deleamus* [let us obliterate the Christian
name/word from the earth; 122]. It seems an abstract but still reconizable
expression of the (western European) Christian construal of the eleventh-
century Seljuk conquest of Syro-Palestine and the First Crusade conse-
quent thereon, which ended with the Christian capture of Jerusalem (cf.
here the *imperator*'s capture of and entrance into the Temple, post-147).
Significantly and intriguingly, it is not the Christian powers that convert
the *rex babilonię* and *gentilitas*, whether forcibly or voluntarily, but rather
the Antichrist who does so: he addresses his representative, the *rex theot-
onicorum*: "Tunc committit sibi expeditioniem ad gentes dicens . . . Per te
disponimus has fieri credentes" [Then he entrusts the expedition against
the heathen to him, saying: . . . Through you I arrange/order that they
be converted; post-284–6]. Wolfgang Hempel can thus almost legiti-
mately observe that the *imperator* "leaves the pagans alone and does not
try to convert the other faiths."[28] The play does not, however, express
any Christian tolerance for Islam. It is indeed theologically and politically
convenient for twelfth-century Christian ideology that it is the Antichrist
and not any Christian instance of authority who accomplishes precisely
the conversion and consequent cultural extinction of Islam that was so
fervently desired by various historical representatives of contemporane-
ous Christendom. After their conversion, *rex babilonię* and *gentilitas* simply

disappear into the mass of Christians who were duped by the Antichrist, later to be rescued and redeemed by the divine triumph of the play's conclusion where *omnes* [all], presumably including the former Muslims, return to the faith (*omnibus redeuntibus ad fidem*) for the final call to eulogy. Thus all Islam is extinguished via conversion through the agency of the Antichrist and subsequent submersion into the mass of undifferentiated Christian penitents redeemed from the clutches of the Antichrist.

While the discourse of the Jewish Other is obviously not the focus of the present study, the treatment of the Jews in this text, parallel to that of Islam, is nonetheless quite pertinent, for, as Ivan Davidson Kalma and Derek J. Penslar point out: "…the Western image of the Muslim Orient has been formed, and continues to be formed in inextricable conjunction with Western perceptions of the Jewish people."[29] Here, the ideological convenience in the conversion of Muslims to Christianity without the necessity of Christian militancy or missionizing is taken yet a step further in the treatment of the Jews in the play. There is in fact more attention to the Jews in the play than to any other identified group, focused especially on the Antichrist's dealing with them, which—rather astonishingly—takes up almost a quarter of the play's length (301–402). The Jews are duped by the Antichrist, praised by the minions of the Antichrist (317–18), accused of the Crucifixion of Christ,[30] converted *en masse* to Christianity (post-359), and are all killed by the order of the Antichrist (*tunc ministri educunt eos et occidunt* [then the ministers take them out and kill them; post-400]. All other Christians—including, as noted above, presumably, the converted *rex babilonię* and *gentilitas*, that is, the converted Muslims—"return" to the faith, welcomed by *ecclesia* (post-417), as the play ends.

The two ultimate goals of the already long tradition of Christian antisemitism—the complete extinction of Jewish culture by means of conversion to Christianity, and the complete extinction of Jews by means of extermination—are thus *both* efficiently accomplished in this text. Each of the acts is accomplished quite calmly and, it seems, almost casually, in a single line of stage directions. The responsible parties are, for the conversion, the formerly Jewish and now Christian prophets, Elijah and Enoch, and for the extermination, the Antichrist. Christendom in general is thus absolved of all responsibility, while the preextermination conversion of the Jews even enables the macabre interpretation that their deaths make them *Christian* martyrs. The text is a chilling example of perfected antisemitic propaganda.[31]

Christian treatment of the Other consists in this play of cultural extinction via conversion by third-party agency—of both Muslims and Jews, and total annihilation via extermination, again by third-party

agency—of the former Jews. This eschatologically transformative and ecclesiastically enacted elimination of the ethnic and religious Other is then twofold: conversion or death (or both). These two modes of dealing with the Muslim Other are well known from other contemporaneous genres. While extermination is statistically the most common mode of transforming and thus coping with the Muslim Other in medieval narrative, conversion is generally practiced on only a select and individualized few. In the *Ludus*, the two modes then function rather differently, perhaps due indeed to the cosmic scale of action. As a more complex model of Muslim metamorphosis developed in medieval Christian epic, as the next chapter explores in some detail, these two modes of transformation are integrated into it as essential components. Intriguingly—one might say, chillingly—both in the *Ludus de Antichristo* and in medieval Christian epic, cultural annhiliation and physical extermination have been construed by scholars as modes of Christian tolerance. This notion of tolerance, however bizarre it may seem, will thus continue to resurface in later chapters to haunt the analysis of the Christian representation of Muslims.

CHAPTER 4

MANDATORY MUSLIM METAMORPHOSIS IN
MIDDLE HIGH GERMAN EPIC

At the most general level of abstraction, this chapter offers an inter-
pretation of medieval Christian epic, but in a series of telescoping
focal projections, the topic is made more specific: medieval Christian
epic > the discourse of the Other in such texts > Muslims as that Other >
the Muslim Other in medieval German epic > the Muslim Other in
Wolfram von Eschenbach's two early thirteenth-century epics, *Parzival*
and *Willehalm*. It approaches this telescoping range of issues and contexts
through the controlling motif of *metamorphosis* as a mandatory opera-
tion performed on Muslims who appear in such texts. Issues in the texts
prompt tactically focused "digressions" that often veer momentarily away
from the texts in order to lead via a richer contextualization back to
them. As a mode of literary analysis, it is nonstandard in *Germanistik*; but
it is, I hope, appropriate and effective here.

Before proceeding further, it might be useful to provide a basic sum-
mary of those aspects of the plots of *Willehalm* and *Parzival* that are relevant
to the problems at issue. *Willehalm* is based on the Old French *Aliscans*,
which was itself part of a cycle of poems based on the life of the historical
figure William de Gellone / Guillaume d'Orange (eighth–ninth centu-
ries), who is called Willehalm (Count of Provence) in the Middle High
German epic.[1] The narrative action focuses on two battles fought by
the Christian Guillaume/Willehalm against Muslim forces in southern
France. The narrative trajectory (the genre) of the tale is neither that of
heroic epic, nor courtly romance, but for lack of a better term, Crusader
epic, whose narrative motor is a generalized European Christian impulse
toward conquest of the territories under Muslim control at the time of the
epic's composition: in the plot's unnarrated prehistory, as becomes clear
from various allusions in the course of the epic, Willehalm had earlier

invaded Muslim territory, been captured and imprisoned, and then had escaped and abducted the married daughter (Arabel) of his captor, and returned with her to France, where she converted to Christianity (whereupon she was christened Gyburc) and married Willehalm, who then in the narrative itself fights to retain her when an army led by her Muslim relatives (father, husband, and son) pursues them to Europe in order to regain their daughter/wife/mother/queen. The Muslim army wins the first battle in which the entire Christian army, with the exception of eight soldiers including Willehalm himself, is killed. A replenished Christian army in turn wins the second battle, leaving only a handful of Muslim survivors who are allowed to return to their homeland to bury Arabel/Gyburc's dead relatives and some other dead Muslim royalty.

The courtly romance of *Parzival*, whose source text was Chrétien de Troyes' *Perceval: Le conte du Graal*, traces the Arthurian quest for the grail, which is ultimately accomplished by Parzival, bringing about a redemptive transformation of the world. As prehistory to Parzival's life and quest, the first two *aventiuren* of the epic are devoted to the adventures of Parzival's father, Gahmuret. In the first, this property-less younger son of a royal house travels abroad and gains renown in battle throughout the Muslim world, finally rescuing the black and Muslim queen of Zazamanc, Belakâne, who is besieged in her castle by multiple armies. He subsequently marries, impregnates, and then abandons her in order to return to Europe, where, in the second *aventiure*, he demonstrates such prowess on the eve of a grand tournament that the tournament itself is cancelled and he is by default awarded the grand prize, which is the hand of Herzeloyde, Queen of Waleis, whom he marries, impregnates, and then abandons in order to return to Muslim territory, where he dies in combat. Belakâne bears him a son in his absence, named Feirefîz, who has black-and-white striped or spotted skin, an indicator, according to Wolfram, of his mixed-race parentage, while Herzeloyde bears Gahmuret a son after his death, named Parzival.

Despite the much-needed adjustments to the picture of Wolfram's long-praised "tolerance" (about which more in the next chapter) that has been lavishly painted in the past few decades, it is necessary at the outset to reassert, lest it seem that the present essay is a belated attack on the long-dead poet, that Wolfram did indeed express less virulently bigoted views of Muslims than did many of his predecessors and contemporaries. As will be argued here, however, his representation of Islam and Muslims and the Christian treatment of Muslims in his texts is hardly tolerant in any sense of that term. The common suggestion that the earlier norm in the literary treatment of Muslims, namely the inevitability of death in battle, progressed first to include a second option—convert or

die—and then, in Wolfram's works, to a more tolerant set of options, is, as the following analysis demonstrates, hardly supported by the evidence. For already in the earliest example of the *chanson de geste* dealing with the Christian-Muslim confrontation, the *Chanson de Roland*, where the overwhelming majority of Muslims who appear are slaughtered in battle, it is possible for an initially devout Muslim to convert and avoid death (Bramimonde), while in Wolfram's later and allegedly tolerant *Willehalm*, almost all Muslims are slaughtered, while permission is granted for the eponymous hero's Muslim in-laws, although also killed in battle, to be returned to their homeland for burial. Wolfram's treatment of defeated Muslims thus differs in fact only ever so slightly from that of the Christian epic and courtly romance of his contemporaries and earlier generations. The specifics of that difference are analyzed here in some detail. In any case, however, the point here is neither to praise nor condemn but to analyze and reset contemporary scholarly perspectives.

Studies focused specifically on the representation of Muslims in Middle High German texts have begun to dispel many of the persistant apologetic myths about that representation that have developed in the field of Germanistic in the course of the past century-and-a-half. Wolfgang Spiewok has pointedly demonstrated the large-scale political dimensions of Crusader mentality and praxis, as represented in literary texts;[2] Jean-Marc Pastre has recontextualized the entire problem in the texts of Wolfram von Eschenbach;[3] Alfred Ebenbauer has documented what can hardly be termed anything other than racism in the representation of Muslims in *Parzival* and a variety of other Middle High German texts;[4] and Carl Lofmark has begun to disassemble the myth of Wolfram's/ Gyburc's "tolerance" in the *Willehalm*.[5] The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to this growing body of work by offering an interpretive metaphor that expresses with revealing clarity the variety of "operations" carried out on fictional Muslims in Middle High German literary—especially epic—texts (and the metaphor in fact functions in a far broader range of texts than just those of German-speaking lands): namely, compulsory or mandatory metamorphosis. As noted, this analysis focuses on Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Willehalm* and *Parzival*, the former of which treats a figure and issue of international interest during the period of its composition, while the latter has remained a text of surprisingly enduring significance in the history of European literature and culture.

Cultural work in recent decades has taught us much about the complexities of interaction among religions, cultures, and ethnicities, and about the social construction and representation of the Other. In the European evidence of the past two-and-a-half millennia, one of the simpler modes of defining the Other is by constructing him/her as the

opposite or negation of the Self: if, on the one hand, to take a famous instance from the early Greek tradition, "our" women marry, keep the home, bear and rear children, "theirs" on the other hand are hunters and warriors who associate with men only temporarily and according to their own will and for the purposes of female pleasure and reproduction of daughters. I refer here, obviously, to the ancient Greek Amazon myth, constructed by and (especially) for the political and social benefit of Athenian male citizens, effecting a definition of the role of the ideal Greek male, as well as the role of the ideal Greek female, vis-à-vis the Amazon as, in differing ways, the opposite of each.[6] A recurring, if not inevitable, feature of such definition is that if and when the Other enters the home territory, however defined and for whatever reason, she/he must be rendered nonthreatening, neutralized, and integrated into categories allowable to insiders—to the extent possible turned into Self, so that she/he may be controlled by the same political instances that govern the lives of insiders. Integration may not occur without transformation of those characteristics that define the Other as such. To continue with the example just introduced, the Amazon queen is forcibly brought from her home territory to Greece by the victorious Greek warrior as his slave concubine, to live out her life weaving in the isolated women's quarters of the house and servicing the domestic caretaking and sexual needs of her master, instead of carrying out in her home culture precisely the activities defined by Greeks as those of the independent citizen (who is by definition male). An Amazon per se, living independently of male control, *within* Athenian society is intolerable, in fact simply inconceivable, except as a disastrous nightmare to which all instances of female insubordination, however insignificant, may be referred in order to legitimize strict male control of the mundane existence of actual, historical Athenian female citizens. Amazons living *beyond* Greek territory may exist only as targets of inevitable Greek conquest and subordination.

In returning to the topic of the representation of Muslims in Middle High German epic, we recall once again that there is no fundamental template for the representation of Muslims in the genre. While Muslims are literally monstrous devils incarnate in the Old French *Chanson de Roland* and even moreso in its Middle High German adaptation, the *Rolandslied*,[7] they appear elsewhere, as noted in chapter two, quite often as courtly, noble, royal, intelligent, cultured, and sophisticated. As Joachim Bumke observes, "In their courtly appearance heathens are not only equal to Christians, but indeed surpass them in the splendor of their chivalric furnishings and their courtly disposition."[8] We might note, however, that all *positive* aspects of represented Muslim culture appear as approximations of Christian European culture, thus more than merely implying

that Muslims are noble, sophisticated, and so on, precisely insofar as their own culture is erased and they assume or imitate European customs as a norm of all human behavior.[9]

Even so, like Amazons per se (i.e., those *un*subordinated to Greek authority) in the ancient Greek cultural imaginary, Muslims per se do not and may not exist in Middle High German epic, that is, Muslims unencumbered by the imposed necessity of metamorphosis—Muslims not converted to Christianity, not about to convert, not subject to a Christian will toward future conquest and subsequent conversion or execution because of nonconversion, that is, Muslims simply living their lives as independent *subjects* without becoming the *objects* of Christian authority, whether missionizing or otherwise.[10] Even those living beyond the bounds of all contact with European cultures are as a rule taken as an affront to Christianity, and they may literarily exist (i.e., be represented) only insofar as they are constructed as members of the class of *potential converts to Christianity.* When Muslims come into contact with Christian Europeans, whether in European territory or elsewhere, they are subject to a variety of immediate and inevitable Christian actions and reactions: they are converted, married, killed, or expelled from the territory conceived as Christian European (whether in Europe, Africa, or the Near East). In other words, Muslims who enter into contact with Christian culture are inevitably transformed through Christian European control, ecclesiastical, military, or otherwise, whether that entails submission to the dominant religion, to the control of ecclesiastically sanctioned marriage, or to military might via death or defeat and expulsion. In any case, they may not exist *as Muslims* in literarily conceived Christian territory.[11] Metamorphosis is mandatory and thus inevitable, even when, as in the case of Malory's Palomides, it may take some time to accomplish the final transformation.

Four types of metamorphosis can be identified in the texts: (1) the traditional racio-ethnic identity of a character or characters is transformed before the narrative begins, leaving behind only fragmentary but still discernible traces; (2) in the course of the narrative the Muslim character is culturally transformed through religious conversion, marriage, and so on; (3) characters resistant to the second type of metamorphosis are killed; (4) at some point in the narrative racio-cultural identity is suddenly and arbitrarily transformed in a physical sense.[12]

One aspect of the first type of metamorphosis conditions the entire narrative field. As was already treated briefly in chapter two, by the time medieval epic began to participate in the discourse of the Islamic Other, several fundamental characteristics of that Other had appeared. Muslims were often represented as having non-normative anatomical

(monstrous) characteristics, thus entering into participation in the long-standing European tradition of Otherizing that came to be known as the "Marvels/Wonders of the East." A special feature of this tradition with respect to Muslim participants was that they were also most often represented as having black skin (certainly non-normative—although not necessarily monstrous—from the Christian European perspective). In medieval European literary texts, Muslims were in fact so generally represented as black that non-black Muslims are rather exceptional. One might conveniently imagine that the European literary representations of Muslims as black simply identified as "black" those Mediterranean ethnicities whose pigmentation was generally and relatively darker than many northern European ethnic groups. But in fact representative texts (Middle High German texts among them) are quite specific on this point: they delight in describing the skin of the Muslim opponent, which is not beige, tan, brown, or anything else but black—black as soot, black as night, black as pitch, black as sin, black as hell: in the Middle High German *Kudrun*, Seÿfrid's skin is the color of *salbe* [dirt] (*Kudrun* 583, 3); in *Parzival*, Muslims are *liute vinster sô diu naht* [people as dark as the night] (*Parzival* 17, 24), *die nâch der helle wârn gevar* [who were the color of Hell] (*Parzival* 51, 24).[13]

By the thirteenth century many cultures of African blacks had in fact converted to Islam, but numerically relatively few black Muslims would have ever made contact with Christian Europeans during the Crusades, and outside of Spain and Sicily few would have done so under any other circumstances. Muslims of Spain and North Africa were not predominantly black, and those of Asia Minor, Palestine, the Arabian peninsula, and Egypt were so only in relatively rare cases. In fact, as Sharon Kinoshita points out, Christians of the period were keenly aware of their general inability to distinguish between Muslims and Christians based on physical appearance, for which reason the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 stipulated that Jews and Muslims living under Christian rule had to wear distinctive clothing, to prevent, among other consequences, "accidental" sexual relations between Christians and non-Christians.[14] As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen notes, "Although Christians were aware of the wide differences in dermal pigmentation among Muslims, fantasies of the Saracen body generally imagined flesh as dark as the classical Ethiopian."[15] Secondary (in this context) racial features are (less frequently) also mentioned: tightly curled hair, thick lips, broad noses. Could it be simply that the Other, the non-Christian, the (often) non-European, the Muslim, was, to the extent possible, constructed and represented in as alien a manner as possible, and thus since black skin was considered more alien to Christian Europeans than brown skin, and since

some Muslims were black, Muslims in medieval European literary texts were, with few exceptions, constructed as black?[16] In any case, the literary situation is clear: such Muslim characters as a category are pre-compositionally and ideologically transformed racially in order further to emphasize their otherness.

Before proceeding to the analysis of the focal issue of the chapter, in would be useful to establish at least the outlines of a larger Middle High German context in which to construe Wolfram's practice through a brief and selective survey of the breadth of the representation of Muslims and the inextricably racial otherizing of them in Middle High German literature. As noted earlier, in the Middle High German *Rolandslied* (as also its original in the *Chanson de Roland*), the essence of Christian-Muslim relations is conceived quite simply as Holy War, in which Muslims are devils incarnate.[17] In Reinmar von Zweter's poems, Johann von Würzburg's *Wilhelm von Österreich*, and Konrad von Megenberg's *Buch der Natur*, black skin signifies evil and the devil.[18] In the *Millstätter Exodus*, Pharoah and the Egyptian army are black, which, anachronistically, to be sure, is assumed as directly relevant to the contemporary medieval Muslim enemy in Egypt.[19] The savage shepherd in Chrétien's *Yvain* and Hartmann's *Iwein* is horrendously ugly and, as Hartmann specifies, black as a *mor* [moor].[20] In Albrecht von Scharfenberg's *Jüngerer Titurel*, one of Parzival's relatives is attacked in the East by opponents who are black as Hell, as the battle-cry *kampf den weisen* [battle the whites] is raised.[21] There are beautiful black queens in Ulrich von dem Türlin's *Willehalm* and Heinrich von Neustadt's *Apollonius von Tyrlant*, while Der Stricker's black *Königin von Mohrenland* [queen of moorland] puts a fine point on the common function of such exotic beauty in her deployment of hundreds of beautiful black seductresses as quasi-secret agents whose mission is to lure Christian knights to abandon their faith. In Hermann von Sachsenheim's *Die Mörin*, Brunhilt is a bloodthirsty, sexually depraved black queen.[22]

There were, however, also ostensibly positive images of blacks in the characters Balthasar, the black Magus, and St. Maurice, the North African saint.[23] Thomas Hahn points out, however, how those images function in the context of otherwise quite uniformly negative images of blacks and the unmarked positive assumptions concerning non-blacks: "Maurice remains a stand-alone African, a single black face within a tableau of European, white countenances; his token presence is an appropriation of the Other that affirms the universality of the Same."[24]

One of the most intriguing occurrences of black skin in early Christian contexts was the seemingly straightforward text of the Song of Songs 1:5: שְׁחוֹרָה אֲנִי וְנָאוָה [black am I, and beautiful], which was interpretively overconstrued—or perhaps we should simply say skewed

and mistranslated—already in the Vulgate as *nigra sum sed formonsa* [I am black but beautiful], at least implying that a black-skinned woman could be beautiful only as an exception to the norm of beauty. Interestingly, the Septuagint translates the Hebrew accurately: μέλαινά εἰμι καὶ καλή *mélainá eimi kaì kalé*, as does the Codex Amiatinus of the Vulgate (Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana), with *et* instead of *sed* for the Hebrew copulative. Not surprisingly, this text prompted a great deal of attention on the part of Christian commentators over the course of the centuries, including the query by Gregory of Elvira, who puts his finger directly on the pulse of the issue: "Aut quomodo fusca si decora uel quomodo decora si fusca?" [But how can she be black if beautiful or beautiful if black?].[25]

As is already clear from such remarks, the issue of a moral valuation of skin color arises early in the Christian tradition.[26] The immensely influential Origen (ca. 185–284) is steadfast in his claim that, for instance, Ethiopians are black not just in skin tone but also in spirit.[27] While an extensive analysis of that *early* tradition of Christian racism is obviously beyond the scope of the current analysis, it is necessary to treat briefly the issue as it pertains to the period under investigation. It is a complex issue and one that necessarily depends on local conditions; but at the same time, it is clear that the existing discourse of the racialized Other played an important and almost ubiquitous role by the time the confrontation between Christianity and Islam arose. As Geraldine Heng points out, such conceptions of race are never without moral implications:

The late medieval European discourse on color is, of course, unstable and riven with contradictions; however, the point to be made is that black-ness is *not neutral*, but negatively valenced, in the epistemic formation I describe. That a racializing discourse exists in which color is positioned instrumentally, from the thirteenth century onward, is inescapable: the attention given to blackness and variations on blackness, in cultural texts ranging from romances like the *King of Tars, Moriaen*, and *Parzival*, to the statuary of St. Maurice, and visual representations of Lady Fortune (in which characters are black, piebald, mottled, split into black-and-white halves, etc.) suggest a discursive system in place to guide responses to char-acters and fictions from cues supplied by color. Nonetheless, the prime role of religion in the medieval period means that certain essentialism can be trumped in appropriate contexts: in literature, for instance, bap-tism often whitens the skin color of blacks and partial blacks, indicating that the spiritual essence conferred by religion can have priority over the genetic essence conferred by the biologism of color. A black St. Maurice, moreover, is also patently acceptable. That religion might be understood to impart an essence is a special feature of the medieval moment in the transformational grammar of race: a grammar yet to be fully plotted,

since cultural theory currently overconcentrates on postmedieval racial discourses. But to grasp that religion locates an essence is to grasp only partially the specificities of the medieval racializing apparatus.[28]

While Heng's comments are directly pertinent to the problems here at issue, her assumption of a necessary connection—in the medieval conception—between skin color and the "genetic essence" and "biologism of color" seems to go rather too far, especially since the medieval literary practice so readily incorporates the metamorphosis of skin color, as "trumped" by religious conversion. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's more complicated view of the entangled issues then seems more on track: "Yet skin color is never a mere fact, but is, from the moment a difference in pigmentation is imputed, already caught in the imbricated discriminations that make race inextricable from religion, location, class, language, bodily appearance and comportment, anatomy, physiology, and other medical/scientific discourses of somatic functioning."[29]

Heng is nonetheless certainly correct in insisting that the European development of the notion that Muslims were black depended always on a *moral* valuation of anatomical difference in general and skin color in particular *and* that that valuation was negative. It seems to have derived historically in the first instance from the early Christian identification of demons, devils, and diabolical creatures with blackness, and the transference of that identification to other constructs of "evil," such as (much later) Muslims, Hun(garian)s, Vikings, and Slavs.[30] As Thomas Hahn observes, the terminology of skin color in late antique and medieval usage, even lacking modern conceptions of biological racism, are never

"innocent," neutral, or without cross-cultural evaluative meaning. While skin pigment (and physiognomy) in the ancient world did not at all signify racial difference in the same way as in nineteenth-century America, or within eighteenth-century European-African relations, it nonetheless signaled conscious and conventionalized distinctions based upon appearance, territorial and geopolitical diversity, and power relations.[31]

Hahn notes further on the distinction between the medieval and modern discourses of race:

The disconnect between dominant medieval racial discourses—dynamic, effective, even pernicious systems of identity in their own terms—and the common assumption that *color* constitutes the default category of difference no doubt explains on the one hand the lack of interest in, or palpable resistence to, race studies on the part of professional medievalists, and, on the other, the general absence of attention to the Middle Ages, among

those engaged with racial identities as mechanisms or tropes of difference. Yet in this peculiar feature—the insignifance of color as a crucial marker—these structures of identity and difference in the Middle Ages directly correspond to some historical and contemporary practices of race.[32]

Thus even in those relationships that ostensibly have little to do with skin color per se, a conception of race may well play an important role.

While in the citations of Heng and Cohen introduced here the word *race* appears, the word *racist* does not. However ticklish the issue is, and however much it requires pointed, tactical definition and historical contextualization, perhaps it is time to go ahead and use that term here in relation to medieval texts and provide the necessary justification. While the term has its own multitude of twenty-first century significations, none of which may automatically be projected back onto medieval social relations, the term can in fact be tactically and legitimately employed in the study of medieval European cultures, as long as one recognizes the strictly delineated sense of the term in such application.[33] Medieval Europeans were quite obviously not racist in the strict sense of modern pseudo-biological justifications, since they had no conception of genetics such that race-based biological difference could be posited, as racists of the past two centuries have made their practice. As both Heng and Cohen indicate, however, medieval Europeans did both assume and actively develop conceptions of essential value-based ontological differences that, they presumed, were innate, that is, created as integral aspects of their function in *Heilsgeschichte* [redemptive history]. As Lisa Lampert suggests, "using nineteenth- and twentieth-century biological models as the standard for determining whether one can make connections between ideological formations … hinders inverstigations into how [premodern] concepts, particularly theological ones, may have shaped later ones in ways about which we are still unaware."[34] In his examination of the contemporary distinction between the terms *race* and *ethnicity* as they might be relevant in medieval European studies, Robert Bartlett observes that the former term now "suggests a distinction based on an inherited biological feature, skin color, while the latter points to cultural differences between groups."[35] As suggested in chapter two, perhaps it is then most useful to think of medieval conceptions of race not as (pseudo-)biological categories but as theologico-ontological categories: the state of being as "White and Christian" thus differs in an absolute sense from the state of being as "black and Muslim." As Joseph Ziegler indicates, "racism can emerge in a purely religious context without any scientific or biological input."[36] There is no doubt that such ontological racism permeated

European cultures.[37] As David Goldenberg points out, already in antiquity, Greeks and Romans held Syrians, and Phoenicians, for instance, to be inferior because of what they *did*, while they held blacks to be inferior (e.g., innately cowardly) because of what they *were*, that is, their Othered bodies: hair, lips, nose, and especially skin color, which strongly marked their somatic otherness, the specific components of which—especially black color—had negative symbolic value in both the European pre-Christian and Christian traditions, associated with death, the demonic, sin, and impurity.[38] As Steven Epstein has demonstrated, prejudice based on skin color had by the Middle Ages already become a way to justify oppression.[39]

Scholarly attention to such an issue as racism in medieval literature thus requires subtlety and a highly developed sense of nuance, as Thomas Hahn notes:

> "[R]acing" the Middle Ages smacks of "presentism," empowering the preoccupations and concerns of the early twenty-first century to distort the self-contained truth of the past. A robust engagement that takes "medieval race"—as constituted by religion, geopolitics, physiognomy, color—as at once parallel *and* discontinuous with more recent racial discourses will insure that the Middle Ages does not become (remain ?) an excluded Other. Whatever the pitfalls of such a hybrid enterprise, it offers the promise of placing medieval studies at a rich and contested convergence point within modern intellectual and academic cultures, of making it a productive source for both models and minute particulars in the analysis of difference, and of creating a venue in which the shaping of identities and the motives of scholarship claim urgent notice.[40]

In the collection of essays *The Origins of Racism in the West*, the issue of the existence and variant definitions of ancient and medieval racism is examined at length. The editors, Benjamin Isaac, Joseph Ziegler, and Miriam Eliav-Feldon, indicate in their introduction "that racism essentially is a form of rationalization and systematization of the irrational, an attempt to justify prejudice and discrimination through an apparently rational analysis of presumed empirical facts."[41] While biologism is often held to be an essential component of racism, and Isaac himself held this principle in his study of the phenomenon in the ancient European world, using the term "proto-racism" to designate it in that period, he has come to reject that term in favor of the simple term "racism," based especially on scholarly reactions to his book.[42] Albert Memmi further defines racism as "the valuation, generalized and definitive, of differences, real or imagined, to the advantage of the accuser and the detriment of his victim, in order to legitimize agression or privilege."[43]

Wolfram's representation of Muslims and/as blacks participates directly and actively in this economy of race and Otherizing. In his attempt to absolve Wolfram of any taint of the modern conception of racism, Eberhard Funcke nonetheless directly imputes anachronism to those who would see "an approach of the poet to the problem of race" in, for instance, his representation of the disgust felt by Parzival's father Gahmuret toward blacks in Muslim Zazamanc in the first *aventiure* of *Parzival*.[44] Conventionally, scholarship has indeed executed some rather intricate dance steps to circumvent the issue of Wolfram's position on race. On the opening episodes of *Parzival*, Marion Gibbs suggests: "It is as though Wolfram wishes to stress the difference in colour from the beginning, precisely to make it clear that it is not important to Gahmuret."[45] Susann T. Sample suggests: "[t]he black skin color, however, had no moral status for Wolfram; that is, it did not connote intellectual inferiority and moral deficiency. Therefore racism…is absent in Wolfram's *Parzival*."[46] Ebenbauer posits that Wolfram makes a distinction between skin color and religion, since religion may always be changed by baptism, and thus "the Moors of *Parzival* are indeed *nach der helle gevar*, but they are not as Moors but as heathens companions of Hell."[47] This seems, however, perhaps an empty distinction since in the whole of the text no non-blacks are Hell-bound and no blacks are not Hell-bound (Parzival's mixed-race half-brother Feirefîz is striped and Hell-bound until he explicitly converts). The possibility of conversion and baptism opens a *theoretical* avenue to salvation for literary Muslims, which nonetheless remains *narratively* closed for the majority, since only a chosen few take that route to cultural extinction. It is, one might say, an ideologically "convenient" solution to the problem.

Like Ebenbauer, Funcke seeks to impose a less clearly theorized distinction between modern racism and medieval ethnic otherizing, and since he thus represents the widespread "common sense" position, it would be useful to unpack the set of assumptions underlying this position. He suggests, for instance, that in *Parzival*, Gawan's complimenting the mixed-race, and, in Wolfram's representation, thus black-and-white striped Feirefîz does not indicate Wolfram's favor, nor does Gahmuret's lack of enjoyment in the kiss of the black wife of Zazamanc's marshal indicate his disfavor: "Blacks (presumably the poet had never set eyes on one) were people like everyone else, only black, no more and no less. By contrast, the essential difference, and the one to be discussed here, lay in their heathenism."[48] He thus claims that *Andersfarbene* [otherly coloreds] are not to be considered in terms of their being *fremdrassig* [of a different race] but rather in terms of their being *heidnisch* [heathen] and *exotisch* [exotic], which he claims is *ein grundlegender Unterschied* [a fundamental

distinction], with their skin color no more than an element of their *fremdartige Herkunft* [alien origin], while the essential difference between Parzival and his half-brother Feirefîz consists in the difference of their religious identity. What Funcke then constructs, in terms of practical political considerations, is a classic example of a distinction without a difference: Wolfram (as a representative of putatively progressive European culture of the thirteenth century) recognizes that Muslims differ from Christians in (at least) skin color and religion; the latter, Funcke suggests, is important, while the former is not. It is a convenient position for a defender of Wolfram's reputed progressiveness, but it hardly stands up to scrutiny, since skin color, or rather, let us go ahead and use the proper modern analytical term, race—since in this literary context racial difference is directly tied to religious difference and cultural identity (as Heng, Cohen, and Hahn, among others, have pointed out, noted above)—is inextricably intertwined with the issue of the valuation of the Other. It is impossible to claim that, for instance, Gahmuret is repulsed by the kiss of the marshal's wife because she is Muslim (the text explicitly identifies the cause as her blackness) or that he abandons his Muslim wife only because of her black skin (the text explicity identifies the cause as her being non-Christian). The two characteristics are, for Wolfram, combined. Just as it is illegitimate to project the praxis of twenty-first century U.S. racism onto Wolfram's fiction, it is no less so to attempt to distinguish—through twentieth and twenty-first century valuations—between categories of Otherizing that Wolfram consistently expresses as two sides of the same coin.

A second issue, related to conceptions of race and racialized valuation, must be treated here, as well: the recurring scholarly concern for a supposed empirical foundation for the representation of the Other that Said rejected as definitive of that representation and thus of the otherizing discourse. Statistically few Western Europeans outside of Spain and southern Italy/Sicily had any direct contact with Muslims during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Crusaders were a statistically small group, compared with the population as a whole), and even a smaller percentage of Christian European epic poets had such contact. Beyond the realm of personal experience, there was also little aid to be found in the learned literature of the period that could provide even a linguistically enabled interested party with accurate information about *realexistierenden Islam*. There were, of course, some exceptions, particularly, as noted, in the contact zones in Iberia, southern Italy/Sicily, and along the edges of the Byzantine world, but in Central Europe one can generally proceed from the assumption that—with a handful of exceptions—individuals of all classes were ignorant of *all* aspects of Islam and Muslim

cultures, whether by conscious choice or not. The masterful older studies by Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West,* and R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, continue to be of value on such issues. While not yet using the term *discourse*, Daniel seems to be pointing to precisely that phenomenon when he observes: "The poets show no interest at all in Saracens, that is, in Muslim Arabs and Moors, as they actually were; they chose to see them as an extension of Western Christian society as they understood it."[49] The ideas they express are not those of official Christian theology or politics, but rather of an attitude designed to please audiences for the genres of popular literature that they composed. Daniel thus concludes: "Our poets were making up historical fiction, and we should perhaps judge them as we judge writers of historical fiction of modern times."[50] R.W. Southern likewise indicates the limitations on the knowledge base of the poets:

> To turn first to the ignorance of confined space. This is the kind of ignorance of a man in prison who hears rumors of outside events and attempts to give a shape to what he hears, with the help of his preconceived ideas. Western writers before 1100 were in this situation with regard to Islam. They knew virtually nothing of Islam as a religion. For them Islam was only one of a large number of enemies threatening Christendom from every direction.[51]

Significantly, however, as Daniel and Southern make clear, this ignorance was primarily a matter of choice, not strictly a matter of a lack of information, for as Southern notes concerning ninth-century Christians in Islamic Spain, "If they saw and understood little of what went on around them, and if they knew nothing of Islam as a religion, it was because they wished to know nothing."[52] Even where Christians had daily contact with Muslims, there prevailed a profound ignorance of Islamic culture, particularly high culture—religion, literature, philosophy, and architecture.

Two points need to be made here, the first merely a reminder of Said's basic principle: ultimately, the poets' knowledge or ignorance concerning Islam is of little relevance, since they engage in a discursive not an empirical tradition. Thus, while, we may well be curious about, for instance, Wolfram's potential knowledge of Islam, any evaluation of that knowledge base is fraught with difficulty, since we have at our disposal, as direct witnesses, only his literary texts, which are, obviously, participants in the discursive tradition. Second, at issue with respect to Wolfram is not Hrotsvit's tenth century or the beginning of the twelfth century, but the early thirteenth century, and precisely that difference in period

is of paramount significance, for, as is treated in more detail in chapter seven, in recent years a number of scholars have posited a transformation of the Christian representation of Islam in the course of the twelfth century—primarily based on Latin and vernacular French evidence. As is demonstrated here, there is indeed evidence of interesting modifications in this regard, but—to anticipate—there is no compelling evidence of a fundamental transformation in the German texts—and in fact, I would suggest, little if any evidence of it in the Latin and vernacular French texts. But let the focus for now remain on Wolfram.

To illustrate the problems with trying to extrapolate evidence concerning Wolfram's knowledge of Islam from his literary texts, one might look to the series of articles by Paul Kunitzsch, who has explored in some depth precisely this period to determine the concrete historical possibilities for Wolfram's empirical knowledge of Islam.[53] He observes that a century-and-a-half of scholarly study of the "Oriental" elements in Wolfram's works, especially intensive since 1945, has yielded results that are at best rather modest.[54] He then points out that not a single one of the 290 personal names in *Parzival* is directly "Oriental," while only 10 of the 260 geographical names are authentic geographical names from the period. In *Willehalm* Wolfram makes slightly more use of actual names and titles from the East, but even that usage has nothing to do with any functional knowledge of the East, since those names were simply culled from a list of geographical names stripped of all historical and cultural context. For Wolfram such names were then "no more than a verbal tinkling with no specific geographical or historical point of contact."[55] Kunitzsch thus concludes about the all but fruitless scholarly search for Wolfram's "Oriental mysticism":

> Where the knowledge of easily accessible and widely disseminated facts and names is so poorly represented, one will once and for all have to give up the search for closer connections with the arcane subtleties of that most distant Oriental mysticism, philosophy and theology.

Instead of searching for Wolfram's knowledge of an actual Orient, one can at best search for Wolfram's imagined "Orient," that is, his use of the discursive tradition:

> In the elucidation of Wolfram's Oriental elements, one must proceed strictly from the European knowledge of the Orient *in his time and place*. After all he lived in central Germany and had no direct personal contact with oriental things. Everything that he knew about the Orient had to come to him through *Western* sources that were available at the time.

Thus in general we must be quite careful about taking anything Wolfram says about non-Christians as evidence for what his thirteenth-century contemporaries took as empirical, historical fact. First, as scholarship has made abundantly clear, Wolfram himself had no direct access to the (still very sparse) Latin learning that could have provided him with any insight into specifically Muslim culture.[56] Second, he was, to state the obvious (and pick up on a comment by Daniel), writing a fictional text of a genre in which there was already a developed discourse of the Muslim Other that made empirical knowledge superfluous if not altogether irrelevant. Whether Wolfram "actually thought" that Muslims were polytheistic idolators and—with a handful of exceptions in the world—black, and that mixed-race children were striped, we can never know.[57] While we generally and legitimately look to texts to provide us with evidence for the availability of such knowledge (and they fail us here), we might momentarily in Wolfram's case (and other such cases) speculate beyond the pages of books, for in the course of his life at various royal courts he must have met not a few Crusaders who had returned from years of various types of contact with Muslims in various locales in and along the borders of territories inhabited by majority Muslim populations. While, as noted in chapter two, prejudice often heroically resists empirical refutation, that is not necessarily always the case, and Wolfram, we might speculate, could well have been disabused of the standard anti-Muslim prejudices by an enlightened soldier/administrator returned from a Crusade. But we cannot know such things, nor ultimately would that information be of more than passing interest, since in the literary texts he left us, Wolfram presents us with rather a different picture: as Karl Bertau points out, for Wolfram all non-Christians beyond the familiar borders were polytheistic idolators.[58]

After this detour into the conception of race that permeates the manifestions of the first type of metamophosis of Muslim characters in the works of Wolfram, the argument may now finally circle back to a second, inverted manifestation of the first type of metamophosis that appears in European narrative of the period, which might be deemed precompositional transformation. In some few narratives, traditionally black queens of traditionally black kingdoms appear in epic as white queens of those still black nations. In the Middle High German *Herzog Ernst*, the beautiful princess of the black Christians in India is white; in Ulrich von Etzenbach's *Alexander*, Kandake, the legendary black queen of Meroe (famous in a long series of texts beginning with Pseudo-Kallisthenes' Alexander-romance), is a white queen of a black nation, who presents a hundred of her black subjects to Alexander.[59] Jacqueline de Weever analyzes an intriguing subset of such evidence that seems a classic example of precompositional metamorphosis *as* tactical exceptionalism: in Old French romance of the period 1150–1300, *formerly* Muslim heroines,

even those born of black parents, are very often white: in seventy-four Old French narrative poems, de Weever finds, twenty-one such princesses appear as central characters, of whom seventeen are white and four are black.[60] On the Middle High German evidence, Ebenbauer astutely notes: "While Moors may well be noble, knightly, even Christian, a primary heroine and belovéd is, however, white. She is—contrary to traditional ethnographic realities—'repainted.' "[61] A precompositional, ideological motive is clearly at the root of such transformations, for just as the majority of medieval literary Muslims are precompositionally "blackened," some few select (female) *former* Muslims among them are then "rewhitened," so that the practicalities of their marriage to European Christians are simplified.

In turning to the second category of transformation, that of cultural metamorphosis during the course of the narrative, we note that the primary forms it takes are of religious conversion to Christianity and of the usually concomitant marriage of a Muslim woman to a Christian knight. Generally the conversion of a Muslim character is not an isolated instance of the cultural metamorphosis of an individual, but rather one of a series of linked modes of transformation. In Wolfram's *Willehalm*, the kidnapped Arabel,[62] who is taken from her Muslim homeland by the text's eponymous hero, must, for instance, be transformed in multiple ways before she can be integrated into the epic's fictional France.[63] As Wolfgang Spiewok suggests, this mentality also blended with a *Brautraubmotif*, so that the suitor is Christian, while the father of the bride is often depicted as a barbarous Muslim, such that the bride's kidnapping may be construed as rescuing her from the depravity of a life that could otherwise only end in her soul's condemnation to Hell.[64] The bride's conversion to Christianity, which is immediate, automatic, and represented as natural, would not in itself suffice as transformation, for she is—as was her paradigmatic predecessor, the Amazon—also sexually dangerous: despite the fact that generally she is already married (to a Muslim) with (Muslim) children, she is automatically construed as maritally and sexually accessible (and welcoming) to the "superior" Christian European male, and thus she must submit her potentially dangerous sexuality to (European) male control.[65]

It might be useful for a moment to step back from this recurring *literary* cliché of the all but ubiquitous Muslim princess/queen who yearns for nothing more desperately than to be rescued by a handsome Christian knight from her apparently depraved Muslim existence so that she can be removed to Europe and become Christian. There are two points to be considered. First, as Norman Daniel suggests,

> The basic motive of nearly all conversions is, in one form or another, a
> desire to enter European society, and there seems no explanation of why

they want to do that other than that quite simply it is the best. It is natural that poets singing to please an audience, whether aristocratic or popular, should found themselves on that very simple conviction.[66]

There is thus an underlying ideological principle at work in such narratives that makes it impossible for Islamic culture to be constructed as anything other than a transitional phase in world culture, which—in an almost Hegelian sense—will necessarily "progress" toward Christianity and the culminating state of European culture (perhaps we need not insist on Hegel's Prussian and protestant monarchy). While it is rare, that transition *may* then be enacted in the lives of individual literary Muslims (among the hundreds of thousands who do not convert). Second, while there is no question that it is a common motif in the discourse of the Muslim Other in medieval German and indeed more broadly conceived Christian epic, it has, as Amy Remensnyder has recently demonstrated, no connection to medieval reality, for, in the extremely rare cases in which Muslim women fled to Christian Europe and converted to Christianity, the situation was different indeed from that which is represented in Christian epic:

> In Muslim Spain and Muslim North Africa, voluntary conversion to Christianity by high-ranking Muslim women was extremely unusual. To be sure, in the late sixteenth century some women married to powerful Muslim men in North Africa did eventually flee their husbands and go to live as Christians in Christian kingdoms. But these women were renegades—Christian captives who converted to Islam and then were married off to male renegades or to natural-born Muslims. By escaping to Christendom, they were not converting, as *la buena Christiana* and Cervantes' Zahara and Zoraida were supposed to have done, but rather returning to their original religious identity.[67]

For, as Sharon Kinoshita notes, medieval Muslims who encountered European Christianity, unlike, for instance, still pagan Europeans (e.g., Swedes or Lithuanians) who did so, had culturally "nothing to gain from conversion," for their cultures were almost without exception far in advance of anything to which they might gain access through closer ties to Christianity. Thus "they could be seduced only in the imagination, in the figure of a bold princess ready to exchange a royal Saracen husband for an intrepid Christian count."[68]

In his Muslim queens, Arabel/Gyburc in *Willehalm* and Belakâne in *Parzival*, Wolfram presents two rather blatant examples of the availability, natural seductiveness, and undisguised lust and sexual accessibility of non-Christian women that is the cliché of modern Western representations of

the colonized woman.[69] It is clearly already present as a cliché known to Wolfram and his audience. In *Parzival*, Belakâne, the Muslim Queen, and especially Gahmuret the European prince enthralled of her are depicted as under the sway of strong passion:

> aldâ wart undr in beiden
> ein vil getriulîchiu ger:
> si sach dar, und er sah her. (29, 6–8)

> [At that moment arose in both / a very constant lust: / she look at him and he at her.]

While such words indeed indicate the passion of the two lovers, there is nothing necessarily untoward in the standard clichés used. Gahmuret's derangement is, however, made quite explicit soon afterwards:

> … den helt verdrôz
> daz sô lanc was diu naht.
> in brâhte dicke in unmaht
> diu swarze Mœreinne,
> des landes küneginne.
> er want sich dicke alsam ein wit,
> daz im krachten diu lit.
> strît und minne was sîn ger:
> nu wünschet daz mans in gewer.
> sîn herze gap von stôzen schal,
> wand es nâch rîterschefte swal.
> Daz begunde dem recken
> sîne brust bêde erstrecken,
> sô die senwen tuot daz armbrust.
> dâ was ze dræte sîn gelust. (35, 18–36, 2)

> [It plagued the hero / that the night was so long. / He frequently fell into a faint / because of the black Mooress / queen of the land. / He tossed and turned like a willow, / so that all his joints cracked. / His desire was for battle and love: / Now wish that it be granted him. / The beating of his heart was audible, / because it swelled for knightly battle. / Both his breasts swelled, / as does the crossbow's sinews. / So hasty was his lust.]

Although there are additional verbal hints of the queen's passion, it is through her actions rather than the narrator's words that it is most clearly expressed: after having long resisted the attentions of her devoted Muslim suitor Isenhart, she behaves rather differently with the European Christian, Gahmuret: after a single conversation with the stranger and after he has been in her castle only a single night, she takes him to her

bed (44, 27–30, where the narrator does not fail to mention as an adjunct to his confirming the consummation of the relationship, that their skin colors are different) and announces the following morning *mîn lîp und mîn lant / ist disem rîter undertân* [my body and my land are subject to/belong to this knight] (45, 26–27).

Gahmuret is both repulsed by the black skin and religion of the inhabitants of Zazamanc, and drawn by the beauty of their queen. Joachim Bumke, for instance, notes that it is Belakâne's black skin that is the primary cause for Gahmuret's sexual attraction to her and the one that robs him of sleep.[70] This simultaneous disgust and desire, in each instance directly because she is black, Muslim, alien, exotic, and thus erotic, is a cliché of modern colonialist literature: she is, for the Christian European, of the medieval, just as the modern, period, an "adventure." As claimed by Albertus Magnus in a rather different but not irrelevant context, "quia nigrae sunt calidiores et maxime fuscae, quae sunt dulcisimae ad supponendum, ut dicunt leccatores" [because black women are hotter and extremely dark, they are sweetest for lying on, as the lecherous say].[71] Indeed Abelard writes to Heloise also noting the dual "nature" of the flesh of black women:

> Et frequenter accidit ut nigrarum caro feminarum quanto est in aspectu deformior, tanto sit in tactu suavior; atque ideo earum voluptas secretis gaudiis quam publicis gratior sit et convenientior, et earum viri, ut illis oblectentur, magis eas in cubiculum introducunt quam ad publicum educunt.

> [Moreover it often happens that the less attractive the flesh of black women is in appearance, all the sweeter it is to the touch, and thus the desire of them might be more pleasing in and more suitable for private than for public enjoyment, and, in order to enjoy them, their husbands lead them into the bedroom rather than out into public.][72]

As Thomas Hahn points out, "Abelard here fetishizes blackness as a decisive ingredient of desire, he fantasizes about its role in asymmetrical power relations between women and men, and he sexualizes knowledge as the outcome not of study or office but as intimate contact within a secret, private space."[73] He could just as well be writing of Gahmuret and Belakâne: the Christian European male hero assumes sovereignty over the queen's body and land, as she specifies, within a day of his arrival in the castle, drawn by both body and land, each of which is defined by blackness that signifies both their seductiveness and their, as it were, ontological position construed as necessarily subordinate to him. Similarly, in the next generation, Feirefîz, the black-and-white striped

son of Gahmuret and Belakâne, is attractive to the Christian European ladies precisely due to his exotic—although since partially white, likewise partially "tamed"—nature.

The theme of the excessively sexual Other and the eroticized and sexually accessible orientalized female is likewise manifested in *Willehalm* even in so seemingly trivial a gesture as Arabel/Gyburc's leaving her garment unfastened at table so that the knights could see more of her bosom than proper; whoever so peeked: *der sach den blic von pardîs* [he caught a glimpse of Paradise] (249, 16).[74] In addressing the issue of the marriage of Gahmuret and Belakâne, Ebenbauer speaks of the topos of the *Sinnlichkeit des Andersartigen* [sensuality of Otherness] and suggests that Muslim men and women are distinguished by the fact that *das Andersartige* [the Otherness] of the latter is expressed as *sinnlicher Reiz* [sensual allure], a topic on which he expands:

> The cliché of the erotic activity of black-skinned people thus has a long tradition. In medieval German literature there is a distinction made between the seductive female Muslim and the sexually aggressive male Muslim. It is to be assumed that this distinction is related to the patriarchal structure of medieval society. At the same time, it is to be noted that the prejudice that men of color are accused of extreme sexually potency while women of color are accused of shamelessness is not (only)—as has often been assumed—to be explained by social tensions and racial constraints: the fantasies of desire and anxiety expressed here seem not to derive from structures of domination and oppression. In medieval Europe there was to be sure no black social problem. Wherever the roots of this problem lie, they are "deeper." And clichés are so changeless . . .[75]

While the notion that there is no problem of race in medieval Europe and especially in its representation of Muslims has already been problematized above, Ebenbauer is on the right track when he acknowledges that the problem is deep and that clichés are long-lived, even definitive. It is in fact Arabel's adulterous sexual availability that enables her metamorphosis, which proceeds in several steps. As noted above, she has white skin and thus has already been precompositionally predisposed to metamorphosis. Her transformations include most external aspects of her identity: she exchanges countries of residence, families, languages, husbands, religions, cultures, and names.

The second such marriage between a Christian knight and a Muslim woman in Wolfram's epics illustrates the necessary linkage of female conversion with marriage from the opposite perspective: marriage without

conversion does not suffice to transform the Muslim woman's alterity and ultimately leads to arbitrary annulment and abandonment. The prefatory episode of *Parzival*, in which Gahmuret and Belakâne figure as the focal characters is, from a twenty-first-century postcolonial perspective, almost a cliché: a black queen of a "heathen" land is sensual, seductive, and astonishingly quick to marry and bed—as long as the male lover is white, Christian, and European; a white, Christian, European king on a mission in the "Orient" is quick to (marry and) bed as long as the woman is black, Muslim, and thus both imminently erotic and abandonable; a black/Muslim queen is immediately willing to abandon her faith, if she can thereby be quasi-European-ized; a white/Christian king prefers to abandon his wife, if she is black/Muslim, rather than compromise his long-term cultural identity.[76] We might note here that Christian men in epic not infrequently dally with Muslim women, but if they presume and pretend to "marry" outside the Church, that is, without the conversion of the Muslim woman, the marriage is deemed illegitimate and thus not binding. On the other hand, while Muslim men may kidnap Christian women in medieval European epic, they virtually never dally with them, and they, like Muslim women, cannot be legitimate party to marriage with Christians unless and until they convert to Christianity and erase their former Muslim identity.[77]

Muslim identity can thus logically be supplanted by conversion to Christianity, which is a key component of the metamorphosis experienced by most such literary Muslims. In *Parzival*, Gahmuret's Muslim wife, Belakâne, is never given the chance to comply with her husband's alleged wish that she convert, since it is expressed only in the note that he leaves for her as he abandons her. By that point, the narrator has already played a clever trick of sham lay theology on the reader, however, for he juxtaposes an acknowledgment that Belakâne is non-Christian with a suggestion that her womanly modesty in itself functions as a "pure baptism," which is then pleonastically followed by a "baptism of tears":

> Gahmureten dûhte sân,
> swie si wære ein heidenin,
> mit triwen wîplicher sin
> in wîbes herze nie geslouf.
> ir kiusche was ein reiner touf,
> und ouch der regen der sie begôz,
> der wâc der von ir ougen flôz
> ûf ir zobel und an ir brust. (28, 14–17)

[Thus it seemed to Gahmuret / that although she was a heathen, / no truer spirit of womanliness / had ever slipped into a woman's heart. / Her

modesty was a pure baptism, / as was also the rain that fell on her, / the flood that flowed down from her eyes / onto her sable and her breast.]

Of course, it is all a ruse. While two of the components of baptism, that is, the spiritual state that enables a believer to accept baptism and the ritual act itself, are counterfeited here by Belakâne's "true spirit of womanliness" and by the flow of tears, neither constitutes the actual components required by legitimate baptism, and there is, in addition, no officer of the Church presiding.[78] It is then indeed a counterfeit, and one that will not suffice to save either her soul or her marriage, which is clearly demonstrated when reenacted later in the text by the sham baptism of her black-and-white striped Muslim son, Feirefîz, also via tears, when he discovers that his father is dead and that he has been fighting against his half-brother, Parzival (752, 24–30). This sprinkling of tears, like that which was experienced by his mother, however, suffices neither to signal his conversion nor to make him eligible for a Christian wife, as the necessity of his later actual conversion and baptism as the prerequisite for his marriage to the grail bearer, Repanse de Schoye, demonstrate. Unlike in the case of his mother, whose pseudo-baptism led to her abandonment and death (and presumably her direct transport to Hell, as customary for dead Muslims in Christian epic), his pseudo-baptism was displaced and supplanted by the authentic ritual and conversion that enabled his (problematically truncated) integration into European society *and* the community of the Heaven-bound. This doubled, powerful poetic image of the pseudo-baptism by tears is thus theologically and ultimately also narratively ineffective, but intriguingly may function to represent one of the dominant Christian conceptions of the distinction between Islam and Christianity: that is, that the former is simply a counterfeit form of the latter.[79]

In contrast to this doubled baptismal motif in relation to the Muslim characters, at the end of *Parzival* II, when the Christian queen Herzeloyde is crushed by the news of her husband Gahmuret's death, just prior to the birth of Parzival, she apostrophizes her breast milk as potential baptismal liquid, but *only*, she makes explicit, if she had not already been baptized. That is, it might be viewed as poetically supplemental to actual baptism, unlike in the cases of the unbaptized Muslims, for whom tears and beauty are not poetically supplemental but simply deceptions:

het ich des toufes niht genomn,
du wærest wol mîns toufes zil.
ich sol mich begiezen vil
mit dir und mit den ougen (111, 8–11)

[if I had not already been baptized, / you would be the means of my bap-
tism. / I should sprinkle myself often with you and the eyes (= tears)]

Beyond the issue of the transformations of Muslim brides, however, there
are other indications that while the issue of race in *Parzival* comes in and out
of focus, it is never far from the foreground. Few are the pages of the text
of these first two *aventiuren* on which there is no explicit claim or oblique
implication that sin and ugliness are black (as Moors or as Hell), while
virtue and beauty are bright, white, and shining: fair hair, white hands,
bright eyes, shining faces. The fact that such images are stock components
of the courtly tradition does not disqualify their relevance to the matter of
race but rather makes them all the more significant as components of the
larger discourse integrated into the society's system of valuation. Especially
in these first two *aventiuren* of the epic, the first of which begins with the
morally laden image of the magpie whose plumage is black-and-white and
ends with the birth of the black-and-white striped Feirefîz as the offspring
of a Christian-Muslim pseudo-marriage, which two images frame a con-
stant play of dark images that reflect the setting in and around a palace in
a Muslim kingdom where the Christian European hero is present, while
in the second *aventiure*, which takes place in Europe (and without Muslims
except for the few in Gahmuret's retinue), all is bright and shining. When
virtually all positive traits are bright, white and shining, the pre- and non-
verbal, immediate reaction to non-Christian blacks is already conditioned.
The poem's usage is distilled in the narrator's clever problematization of the
motif of the representation of the lady's beauty: how can Belakâne's beauty
be expressed through the conventional discourse of feminine beauty, since
the conventions are by definition inapplicable. Almost as in Shakespeare's
Sonnet 130 "My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun,"[80] Belakâne's beauty
is described in terms of how it does *not* conform to the norm:

> ist iht liehters denne der tac,
> dem glîchet niht diu künegin.
> si hete wîplîchen sin,
> und was abr anders rîterlich,
> der touwegen rôsen ungelîch.
> nâch swarzer varwe was ir schîn (24, 6–11)

[If anything is brighter than the day, / the queen does not resemble it. /
She had a woman's heart, / and was otherwise courtly, / but unlike the
dewy rose. / Her splendor was of black color.][81]

While mere statistics may mislead, it seems not without significance that
in the course of the first *aventiure*, race and religion are mentioned in

connection with Belakâne and her people (often merely as stock epithets) forty-five times in some twenty-five pages of text, while in the second *aventiure* there are thirty references to brightness, light, and whiteness in twenty-four pages. Likewise images of light are practically absent from the first *aventiure*, as are images of darkness from the second (except where they refer to Belakâne). None of these phrases is unusual or remarkable in any way; indeed they are common to the style of courtly romance. What is significant is the sheer number of such images and the sharp geographical, cultural, racial, and religious boundary that separates them. The insistence on the contrast between black and white is driven home time and again: in the initial metaphor of the black-and-white plumage of the magpie with its superimposed moral message; in the anti-"dewy rose" description of Belakâne's beauty; in the battle pennants of Zazamanc (Belakâne's black image on a ground of white silk); in the contrasting skin color of Belakâne and Gahmuret mentioned in the same sentence that confirms the satisfaction of their sexual desire; in the stripes of Feirefîz's skin.

This contrast of light and dark emphasizes even more clearly that Belakâne's metamorphosis remains incomplete, as she contrasts with Gahmuret's Christian homeland and Christian wife of the second *aventiure*. While in a significant sense she becomes a character in a conventional *Brautwerbungsepos*, she can never be fully integrated as long as she remains without metamorphosis. The situation that Gahmuret finds when he arrives in Zazamanc (somewhere in Islamic territory after his traversal of Baghdad, Morocco, Persia, Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandria, Seville, and Toledo)[82] is one that parallels in some senses situations of initial narrative conflict commonly found elsewhere in medieval (courtly and/or minstrel) epic literature: a castle in which a queen, who is unwilling to marry, is besieged by suitors. This particular situation, however, takes on another valance because of the issue of race/religion: a black and Muslim queen has refused to marry a black and Muslim knight (Isenhart), than whom none could be nobler; he has died in battle and his vassals and allies now beseige the castle; among those predominantly black and Muslim allies are also some white, Christian, Europeans. No warrior of her own culture and race is, apparently, equal to the task of defending her and her honor. Only when Gahmuret, the white, Christian, European, suddenly appears on the scene can the massive black, Muslim armies and their white allies be defeated. The queen, who has rejected the noblest of the noble black suitors now leads the white non-suitor to her bed within twenty-four hours, narrated in a relatively few lines, during which he has rescued her singlehandedly from the besiegers and both the queen and her rescuer have become quite discombobulated by their blatantly depicted sexual

passion;[83] within a few more couplets he is coupling with her (ostensibly as her husband and king of her lands), and within a few dozen more couplets he is gone, having abandoned her because, as he explicitly states in a letter to her, she is not Christian (56, 23–24). Despite the clarity of that admission, there has been some substantial scholarly discomfort and denial surrounding Gahmuret's reasons for leaving Belakâne. Joachim Bumke, for instance, claims: "What drives him away is the desire for knight errantry (54, 19f.) . . . . He leaves his wife a letter in which he *lies* that he has abandoned her because she is a heathen."[84] He lies, according to Bumke, for two reasons:

> First, the theme of the prologue—black-white = Hell-Heaven—which forms a frame around the plot of *Parzival* and does not find resolution until the end in Feirefîz's baptism, is thus again picked up. Second, the argument is quite convenient for Gahmuret: according to the medieval conception, a marriage with a heathen woman was invalid and could be dissolved and ended without further formalities.[85]

If nothing else, it is an intriguing mode of argument that Bumke advances: the literary character's justification for abandoning his wife is said to be a lie because (1) that justification is an integral component of the narrative theme that governs the entire epic, and (2) because it conforms to standard medieval practice. By contrast, in his attempt to deal with the evidence of the text, Ebenbauer suggests that Gahmuret's abandonment of Belakâne stems in large part from *rassistische Vorurteile* [racist prejudices] and *rassisches Ressentiment* [racial resentment] and notes that in Gahmuret's later excuses for abandoning her, where he claims that it was not because of her black skin, he reveals "the true motivation for his actions, in that he unnecessarily rejects it."[86] Eva Parra Membrives similarly argues that ultimately it is the foreignness (race, skin color, religion) of the Muslim queen Belakâne that makes it impossible to integrate her into the European courtly system despite her otherwise normative courtliness.[87]

That entire situation contrasts with the second *aventiure* of *Parzival*, where a wiving scenario occurs that in some senses doubles that of the first *aventiure*, albeit with differences that are of primary importance in this context. This doubling of the wiving episodes in the Gahmuret-prelude to *Parzival* has been long recognized, and they demonstrate very clearly by their distinguishing features and long-term implications the conceptual and ideological differences of the two marriages in the adjoining episodes. Gahmuret abandons each of his wives, first Belakâne, then Herzeloyde, and returns in each case to the standard activity of medieval literary knights—jousting and battle. In the first case, he abandons both

wife and marriage, while in the second, he abandons—only temporarily (one might imagine)—only the wife, for he thereafter neither marries again nor displays the actively aggressive wiving behavior that he does immediately upon his return to Europe following his abandonment of Belakâne. The second, white, Christian, European wife is obviously met, won, married, impregnated, and abandoned after the first, black, Muslim, Asian or African wife was met, won, married, impregnated, and abandoned. But neither in the epic nor in the scholarship devoted to the epic has bigamy or adultery ever been a central issue.[88] The issue of the second marriage is Parzival himself. Obviously the first marriage was illegitimate for Wolfram (as also for the Catholic Church), for much the same reason as the Trojan and proto-Roman hero Aeneas's marriage to the Semitic Dido in Virgil's *Aeneid* was routinely deemed illegitimate (by both Virgil and, with few exceptions, two millennia of Virgil commentators), despite having been presided over by Juno in her role as goddess of marriage: it was a legitimate marriage only as long as it was convenient for Aeneas's libido and his divinely appointed *fatum*, before his abandonment of his Asian African bride and his move on to Europe and his destined Italic bride.[89]

The passion-driven twenty-four-hour courtship of Gahmuret and Belakâne may be contrasted both with Gahmuret's later marriage to Herzeloyde, where there is no depiction of excessive passion, but rather an almost excessive rationality, such that they take their case for and against marriage (Gahmuret opposes it) to an arbiter (95, 27–96, 6), and still moreso both before and after the marriage of their son Parzival and Condwiramurs, who share a chaste premarital night in bed (192, 21–196, 8), followed by his championing, consequent rescue of, and subsequent marriage to the queen, after which the two persist in their chastity through two further nights in bed until the marriage is finally consummated on the third night after their wedding (201, 19–203, 11).

In addition to the contrasting behavior of Gahmuret and Belakâne, Wolfram provides another instructive example: Belakâne's son Feirefîz, at the conclusion of *Parzival*, marries Repanse de Schoye, the grail bearer, but only after he converts to Christianity, which he does without a second thought, as his mother would apparently have done, *had she been given the chance*.[90] From the point of his reintroduction into the tale in the last two *aventiuren* of the epic, Feirefîz is rarely identifed by name, but rather repetitively simply called *der heide* [the heathen]: and thus he functions as a type whose personal identity is not deemed important enough to be individualized (e.g., *Parzival* 786, 20; 793, 15), or perhaps instead: whose racial–religious identity is so definitive that his individual identity is elided by it. He is as lustful as his mother, as his conversation with

Anfortas and Parzival concerning both the necessity of and the desired marital reward for baptism clearly demonstrates: he is willing to abandon his religion and be baptized, if and only if he can thereby have as his reward Repanse de Schoye (*Parzival* 814–18). His dire physical state resulting from his rampaging passion is recognized by Anfortas in his pallor—only on his skin's white stripes, of course, as the narrator makes a point of noting (811, 19). Immediately following his baptism, his crassly expressed "payment" is delivered: *der magt man in bereite: man gab im Frimutelles kint* [they equipped/supplied him with the maiden, gave him Frimutel's child/ daughter] (818, 18–19).[91]

Feirefîz's lewd shallowness and Wolfram's blatant manipulation of religious matters for the sake of carnal ones have long troubled scholars. It seems, however, of a piece with the characterization of Feirefîz in particular and with one of the dominant modes of the representation of blacks/Muslims in medieval Christian epic: these Christian-conceived, literary Muslims will fight ferociously and brutally in Holy War for their religion, but are simultaneously prepared to abandon it at a moment's notice, if it seems likely to obstruct the satisfaction of their excessive sexual appetites for the idealized Christian European as mate. Joachim Bumke comments: "his comic eroto-mania and farcical baptism almost let one forget that these motifs also have a serious side."[92] In reviewing several scholars' evaluations of Feirefîz's baptism as shallow, external, flippant, and motivated strictly by lust, thinly disguised as (if) *Minne*, Henry Kratz comments: "When Feirefiz is baptized, he treats the whole thing as a joke."[93] Hans-Joachim Koppitz also imputes humor to this construction of naive and shallow blacks/Muslims: "[Wolfram] obviously has fun with the figure of Feirefiz, just as he depicts Rennewart with pleasure and humor."[94] Hilda Swinburn gauges the issue more sensitively, noting that except for the remarks in 49, 13–17 and 55, 5 ("words which seem to show a trace of the white man's feeling of superiority"), "[w]hat is found is a tendency to see in the colour question a source of humour."[95] We might note that such humor depends on condescension toward the object of the humor by those who are amused, here defined by the racioreligious identities on both sides. It is, we might agree, a touchy—and in many circumstances a dangerous—kind of humor.

This second mode of the metamorphosis of Muslim characters, that is, via cultural transformation, might profitably be viewed in terms of the "liminal" as theorized by Victor Turner (treated in chapter two, above), who posits in some social rites of passage a series of three states on the part of the initiate, that is, obviously those preceding and following the ritual, but also including that in-between state in which the initiate belongs to neither of those "permanent" social groups, but rather is temporarily

excluded from all "normal" social affiliations and is functionally part of no social structure at all. Such liminal persons—the boy about to become a man, the betrothed bride-to-be, the dead but still unburied—escape the classificatory system that positions them in cultural spaces that are defined by law, custom, or convention. In the final stage, termed "reaggregation" or "incorporation," the liminars return to society in a position distinct from the one they occupied in stage one, and in most cases that final position is construed as somehow an improvement on or enhancement of their preliminal social position.[96] While there are compulsory aspects to the second mode of metamorphosis of Muslims in medieval epic, the narrative ideology presents it in large part as voluntary. This "middle passage" of the Muslim through, for instance, the second mode of metamorphosis outlined above—the abandonment of homeland, parents, spouse, children, community, religion, language, name, material culture, and so on in exchange for the new life in which all of those emptied categories have been refilled by signs of Christian European life—marks the liminal state of the metamorphosis from Muslim to Christian life, which from the perspective of the Christian author/audience is necessarily a transformative ameliorization (with overt and profound moral implications) of the subject's life directly dependent on that transformation.[97] Ties to the former social identity are severed; the convert proceeds from this nonaligned status toward fuller integration into the new geographical, religious, familial, community identity haltingly and over the course of time, gradually making that cultural transition, until in most cases no outwardly discernible signs of the previous identity remain. It constitutes a total cultural effacement or annihilation. Lynn Ramey points out the particulars of this skewed "amelioration" of (formerly) Muslim characters:

> A new alliance between Christian and Saracen is possible if the Infidel will listen to reason. Unlike the *Chanson de Roland* and *Gormont et Isembart*, destruction is no longer the ultimate goal of the encounter with the Saracen. Ideally, conversion and integration would replace physical confrontation and death. The Infidel is seen to have a rational mind and a natural propensity toward truth.[98]

While in the course of human history conversion has been preferable to extermination for many who have been forced to confront that choice, this second mode of metamorphosis—represented as simply a matter of "a rational mind and a natural propensity toward truth" leading inevitably to conversion—constitutes, quite simply, cultural extinction.

Statistically the third type of metamorphosis—death—is the most common mode found in Crusader epic, insofar as one might reckon

casualty statistics, which are rarely specified in the texts, not surprisingly in a narrative tradition in which episodes of Holy War are all but ubiquitous.[99] In the medieval Christian construction, death in Holy War, of both Christians and Muslims, has a specific nuance not generally found elsewhere, for in this context it may be (and generally is) specified that the dead Christian knight is, due directly to his participation in Holy War, transported to Heaven immediately upon his death, while his Muslim counterpart finds himself just as automatically and just as immediately in Hell.[100] The occasional choice offered to defeated and/or captive Muslim soldiers in Crusader literature (for instance, in the *Rolandslied*, the *Kaiserchronik*, and the *Münchner Oswald*) of conversion to Christianity or death is thus of a double metamorphosis. Whichever form of metamorphosis the Muslims "choose," their salient characteristic as Other, that is, their religion, is effectively neutralized. While it has often been noted that there is never any attempt in Wolfram's narratives to convert Muslims by force,[101] it should likewise be admitted there is in fact no need to do so, for Wolfram so constructs the narrative situation that with one exception (to be dealt with below), each of the Muslims who actually gains some individuality of character (e.g., Gyburc, Feirefîz, Belakâne) is quite willing to convert, if given the opportunity.

While not particularly frequent, the fourth type of metamorphosis is of especial significance, if for no other reason than its graphic and radical nature. It combines elements of both the narrative and the precompositional modes of metamorphosis discussed above. One of its manifestations is in the character of Feirefîz, Belakâne's son and Parzival's half brother, who is born and described in the last lines of the first *aventiure* of *Parzival*. According to the logic of the narrative's racial ideology, since he is born of a white father and a black mother, there occurs an intergenerational metamorphosis of racial identity: as already frequently noted, Feirefîz is black–and–white spotted, checkered, or striped (depending on how one interprets the text):

> diu frouwe an rehter zît genas
> eins suns, der zweier varwe was,
> wîz und swarzer varwe er schein
> Als ein agelster wart gevar
> sîn hâr und och sîn vel vil gar [*Parzival* 57, 15–28]

> [when her time came the lady delivered / a son, who was bi-colored / … / for he was both white and black / … / like a magpie were colored / his hair and also his skin.]

Lest one imagine that the striped Feirefîz is an isolated aberration in Wolfram's works, however, it should be recalled that in *Willehalm*,

Wolfram introduces yet another warrior, Josweiz, who is the son of a mixed-race/faith couple, and he, like Feirefîz, is black-and-white striped or spotted (386, 11–21).[102] Indeed Joachim Bumke suggests that the motif is the key to the epic's meaning, which, he remarks, assumes that there are three types of humans: the completely white type, which will go to Heaven, the completely black, which will go to Hell, and the black-and-white checkered, half of which belongs in Hell but which can still be saved.[103] In thus opening a third possibility, Wolfram's ambiguous, contradictory, magpie-colored human becomes the focus of the *Parzival* epic, Bumke suggests: while Feirefîz's exterior is so checkered or striped, it is in Parzival's inner life that the struggle between sin and redemption takes place.[104] His suggestion is intriguing and indeed relevant to some aspects of the narrative, but in the end is quite problematic. For after his appearance in the first *aventiure*, Feirefîz after all disappears until almost the end of the narrative. It would likewise be a difficult argument (and Bumke does not attempt it) to construct Parzival as a sinful character in any other than the generic sense that, according to Christian doctrine, includes all humans. His providentially granted beauty, nobility, and goodness are clear even in his early period of *divina simplicitas* and hardly less so during his rebellious period that inevitably leads to his repentance and reintegration into the community of believers. While there is to be sure a didactically useful cycle of sin, penance, and redemption involved, it would be all but impossible to characterize Parzival as *evil* at any point in his life, and to acknowledge that he is sinful is—from the text's necessarily Christian perspective—merely to identify him as human.

In any case, to return to the birth of Feirefîz, Belakâne, the black, Asian or African, Muslim queen, abandoned by and longing for her white, European, Christian husband, kisses the white stripes of her son and, the narrator makes a point of specifying, *not* the black ones (57, 19–20). Several hundred lines earlier, at the opening of the same *aventiure*, in the narrative's prologue, appears the famous *Elstergleichnis* [magpie allegory], in which the clashing forces of good and evil—the text specifies: Heaven and Hell—are represented as the conflict of *stæte* [constancy] and *unstæte/zwîvel* [inconstancy/doubt] in a single person, the image being the mixed black and white of the magpie's plumage. While scholars have often suggested that this magpie image need not be interpreted in connection with any moral judgment passed on the magpie-colored Feirefîz (to which bird he is, however, twice explicitly compared),[105] he appears as a direct consequence of the action of this first episode of the tale, only a few pages after the magpie image that opened the narrative and the *aventiure*, and in conjunction with a pointed repetition of that image that symmetrically closes the *aventiure*.[106]

Were Wolfram's further characterization and treatment of Feirefîz uniformly negative, then the dismissal of the obvious interpretation of the magpie image would certainly not have been so ubiquitous. But Feirefîz is in fact neither the caricatured raving, monstrous "heathen" of the *Chanson de Roland* nor even a figure troubled by *zwîvel* in any sense essential to his inner being, as would then—by medieval standards—logically be reflected in his external appearance. While, as noted above, some scholars have suggested that Feirefîz embodies the Christian European construct of the *edler Heide* [noble heathen], that status does not alter his essential character, for in the end he is, typically for Christian-conceived literary Muslims, far too shallow both intellectually and morally, to be rent by any deep internal conflict. And certainly at the conclusion of the text, whatever ambiguity might remain about the newly converted Feirefîz's worth in the process of *Heilsgeschichte* is sublated in the description of his conversion of India qua Asia and fathering of Prester John,[107] the mythical Christian king of Asia "beyond" Muslim territories and including the Mongol lands, whose legend was introduced into the literature of German-speaking Europe by Otto von Freising in 1145.[108] While there was no evidence that there was ever a Prester John in India, Ethiopia, Central Asia or in any other of his putative kingdoms, that fact did not prevent pranksters, poseurs, forgers, and/or imposters from petitioning the Pope or writing a letter in Prester John's name to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Comnenus in 1165, nor did it obstruct the invention of legends concerning him over the course of more than half a millennium. Marco Polo claimed to have met him (or rather one of his like-named descendents) in Central Asia;[109] and sixteenth-century European explorers searched for him in Asia and the Americas.[110] He was ever the great hope of Christendom against "the heathen," however defined, for he might open a second front against Islam from behind, or provide protection for Asian trade caravans, or guide explorers to fame and the fabulous wealth of his own territories.

One might nonetheless cast a skeptical eye on Feirefîz's siring of Prester John as the means to incorporate him into redemptive history and integrate him into the *communitas* of European Christendom. Certainly his life is transformed into an imperialistic Christian mission to conquer and convert Asia, but it also becomes a life lived beyond the borders of Europe in what, especially if he were in fact a European or a fully integrated alien, would have to be considered exile from Europe and its culture, that is, a precise reversal of the trajectory of, among others, Arabel who leaves the realm of the Other to be integrated into European life. His otherized existence—black-and-white striped, oversexed, shallow-minded, half-black/Muslim by parentage—while significant in the

context of Eurocentric missionizing, is safely and conveniently banished not just to the metaphorical margin of European society but in fact altogether beyond its geographical borders to the depths of the Marvelous East. That being the case, his striped skin is in context perhaps precisely the appropriate sign:[111] just as he is of mixed parentage, he is also only partially integrated—converted and baptized, married to a saintly wife, but conveniently sent "back where he came from," that is, somewhere, anywhere, outside Europe, so that full integration, which is in any case not desired from the conventional Christian European perspective, need not be confronted and acknowledged as an *internal* problem. Furthermore, the conditions of his conversion are almost an embarrassment, if he is to be taken seriously as a hero, and they function in any case as a cliché of Eurocentric depictions of blacks as irrational creatures of uncontrolled and excessive sexual passion.

However perverse we might find the example of Feirefîz as Wolfram's model construction of a racial category, there is a still more extreme example of the model elsewhere in the Middle High German tradition, which may serve to open up the larger context of the radical fourth type of metamorphosis of literary Muslims. That example occurs with the character Seÿfrid in the anonymous *Kudrun* epic, who is introduced early in the narrative as a black king of a black populace with all the conventionally constructed behavioral features associated with that identity: irrationality, violence, and excessive sexuality.[112] That characterization persists until the conclusion of the narrative, when, during the series of forced marriages imposed on all royal characters as part of the peace settlement and the general resolution of conflict, Seÿfrid, too, necessarily participates. At that point, however, after several hundred pages of being black as dirt (*salbe* 583, 3), he is suddenly identified as the son of a mixed marriage, but unlike Feirefîz he is not striped, but has flowing blond hair and skin of—as the text expresses it—*varbe cristenliche* [Christian-color] (1664, 2).[113] His instantaneous narrative metamorphosis via tacit textual *fiat* is complete; his race, religion, and the constructed identity imposed on him by those aspects of his existence have simply and suddenly been elided and their now empty slots refilled with different content that rupture the character as thus far constructed; that is, the audience can hardly imagine the Christian-colored and thus marriageable Seÿfrid of the epic's conclusion as the same character as the dirt-colored and aggressively over-sexed Muslim suitor of the early episodes. In the Middle English *King of Tars*, mentioned above, this motif also appears, and is even more graphically blatant: the black Muslim king, upon seeing his child—deformed apparently as a direct result of miscegenation—transformed by baptism into a healthy child, also undergoes baptism and is immediately racially

transformed, becoming white. Thus the metamorphosis in both texts is ideologically motivated, but only in the Middle English text is that motivation acknowledged and incorporated into the narrative proper. In any case, at the conclusion of the Middle High German *Kudrun*, Seÿfrid is eligible for integration into society and is so inducted via his marriage to the virtually abducted, unnamed sister of Herwig (the political and military overlord at the epic's conclusion). On the other hand, the striped Feirefîz of *Parzival* seems momentarily assimilable and even marries the grail bearer, but is then effectively exiled from Europe and the possibility of social integration.

Perhaps the most intriguing evidence for the thesis of mandatory Muslim metamorphosis here suggested appears as an argumentum ex silentio, but one that is perversely quite eloquent. In Wolfram's *Willehalm* there is an apparent exception to the pattern I have here outlined: Rennewart, the long-lost Muslim brother of Arabel/Gyburc, who offers his animalistic powers to Willehalm in his second battle against the Muslim army, in which the young man proceeds to slaughter untold numbers of his relatives and acknowledged coreligionists. It might then be expected, according to ideologico-narratological principles, that in the conclusion of the epic Rennewart would convert and marry a renowned princess, following the model of both heroic and courtly epic denouements, in a festive baptismal-wedding ceremony, as his parallel character in fact does in the Old French source text, *Aliscans*.[114] And indeed everything does seem prepared for that conclusion, for Rennewart has already expressed his disenchantment with Islam (st. 193) and has a budding proto-*minne*-relationship with the Christian princess, Alyze (esp. st. 213). But he also explicitly voices his reservations about baptism (193, 19), and in the end he does not convert, marry, participate in the joyous finale, nor even, it seems, still exist in Willehalm's realm as a Muslim per se. Instead he simply disappears from the narrative. Thus it seems that if the Muslim per se is not susceptible to integrating metamorphosis via anatomical transformation (categories one/four), conversion and marriage (category two), she/he must die (category three), or, apparently, simply disappear from the narrative (as Rennewart), however personally sympathetic and ideologically "promising" that character might otherwise be.[115] Thus is the issue of dealing with a potentially "positive" Muslim per se simply elided.[116] Gabriele Strauch perceptively suggests that in so presenting the Muslim knight in *Willehalm* as a mere reflection of the Christian knight in values and culture, "Wolfram is required to silence, perhaps even to erase the 'real other.'"[117] This is perhaps the most intrusive narrative intervention of any of the modes of metamorphosis, including anatomical transformation, for this mode changes, disrupts, and disconnects the narrative itself

by abruptly denying the continued participation of an established charac-
ter. Such silencing of Muslims is then

> not simply a denial of their importance in this historic period but a reflec-
> tion of the West's consistent narcissistic preoccupation with itself. The
> Christian authors use the Saracen figure to make statements of their own
> ideological and religious positions. The literary images of the Muslims
> serve a single function, which is "not so much to represent [the Saracen
> enemy] as to represent [him] for the medieval Christian."[118]

This compulsion toward metamorphosis—of religion, skin color, and,
in general, of cultural identity—seems key to the representation of non-
Christian/non-Europeans in early thirteenth-century German epic nar-
rative and perhaps more generally in medieval Christian epic narrative of
this period. The un-transformed non-European/non-Christian is marked
(often physically) by and with his/her "deficiency" (e.g., skin color). Most
such characters obviously exist beyond the borders of European culture,
and most of those who do confront Europeans (generally within, but
also outside the borders of Christian European culture),[119] whether via
the incursion of individual Christian Europeans into this Outland (e.g.,
Gahmuret's mercenary adventures in the East, or Willehalm's invasion of
Muslim territory, his own capture and imprisonment, and his ultimate
kidnapping of Arabel) or Muslim invasion of the European homeland,
undergo metamorphosis.[120] The majority of the Muslims are transformed
by death, some few by conversion, and fewer still (mostly women) by
conversion and marriage, and only a bare handful by physical transforma-
tions. In any case and under whatever conditions they make contact with
Christian Europeans, they are presumed to be ripe for metamorphosis,
whether by the sword, the cross, or, it seems, the pen itself. They are
represented almost as empty vessels, waiting to be filled. Their abandon-
ment of religion, family, homeland, spouse, and culture is spontaneous,
immediate, and seemingly without regret.

Centuries later and on a different but eerily related Eurocentric stage,
when Cristóbal Colón (Columbus) says of the Arawaks whom he encoun-
tered on his first voyage to the Caribbean, or when Cabeza de Vaca three
decades thereafter says of the Zuñis in what is now the Southwest of
the United States, that they would be easy and enthusiastic converts to
Catholicism, they are not inventing the notion of a non-European predis-
position to (cultural) metamorphosis as a means of neutralizing or normal-
izing the Other.[121] Nor were the authors of the Middle High German texts
the inventors of this discourse. Rather they all are participants in a larger
and longer-term history of a discourse on the non-European/non-Christian

Other of which this motif is simply a single distinct manifestation adapted to local conditions. From the Christian European perspective, in order to exist in contact with literary Europeans, literary non-Europeans/non-Christians had to be transformed so that they become quasi-Europeans, for only in this state could they be tolerated and controlled. Before the appearance of European tolerance of the un-transformed non-European, for instance, of the literary Muslim per se, there would still be a delay of several centuries.

★   ★   ★

As is treated in more detail in this study's conclusion, there has been some speculation in recent years concerning the ideological shift that occurred in the course of the twelfth century in the Christian conception of Islam and how that shift might be represented in genres such as courtly epic at the beginning of the subsequent century. Based on the examination of Wolfram's *Parzival* and *Willehalm* in the larger context of Middle High German epic, and including some texts from beyond those linguistic bounds, some preliminary conclusions may already be drawn at this point. While one of the primary discursive modes in the tenth and eleventh centuries represents Muslims primarily as monstrous barbarians fit only for slaughter in battle, with some few exceptional individuals eligible for conversion and integration into Christian European society (e.g., Bramimonde in the *Chanson de Roland*), by the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, an expansion of the modes of metamorphosis and cultural effacement that accompanied conversion is found in Middle High German epic: while it remained a literary rarity that an entire people converted to Christianity, the number of Muslims of, as it were, royal class who underwent cultural metamorphosis increased slightly. Generally those individuals were women who married the Christian, European hero of the narrative, although some few Muslim men also converted. While one might pretend that the noble and chivalric Muslim enemy in romance differs from the Christian knight "only in religion"—as is claimed with some frequency by the medieval authors—and further claim that if only they would convert, then they would be the noblest of all, the fact remains that if they remain Muslim, their putative nobility is without value, since at the moment of their deaths they are carried directly to Hell. Furthermore, since conversion is open only to a handful of Muslims in any given narrative, then the essential and ultimately signficant difference between Muslims and Christians (as constructed by medieval Christianity) is maintained.

The recent scholarly proposal of proto-enlightened twelfth- and thirteenth-century tolerance in specific texts (especially beyond the German literary tradition) must be taken seriously and investigated more broadly. On the basis of the present examination of Wolfram's *Parzival* and *Willehalm*, however, it is clear that there may well be slightly fewer Muslim corpses left on the battlefield than is the case in the *Chanson de Roland*, but the fundamental mode of interaction between Christian and Muslim has been only very slightly adjusted between the mid-twelfth century and early thirteenth century. While it would be patently inaccurate to deny that there were changes—both in history and in literature—in Christian-Muslim relations between 1096 and 1215, it is vitally important to realize how subtle were these changes in terms of the *literary representation* of Muslims and Muslim culture, and what implications such representations had: while the starkly condemnatory images of Muslims were no longer ubiquitous, they had by no means disappeared, and were in fact still quite common, as Wolfram's semi- and subhuman Muslim hordes amply illustrate; some subtlety and nuance in the characterization of some few Muslim figures had now appeared, but in the end those subtleties did not mitigate, dilute, or relativize the fundamental principles of the case against Islam as represented in the Middle High German epic, but indeed strengthened the case by means of the more complex representation. A slightly more expansive codification of difference had been articulated, such that the bigotry could be better justified and applied to slightly less two-dimensionally represented Others. The discourse of the Muslim Other had thus assimilated new details and nuance, but, on the basis of German evidence here examined, the observable change was not a matter of a paradigm shift or progress toward anything that we might designate tolerance, equality or justice. It is, however, precisely Wolfram's Crusader epic, *Willehalm*, that scholars have recurringly suggested as an exemplar of tolerance almost in a modern sense. To that issue we must now turn.

CHAPTER 5

WOLFRAM VON ESCHENBACH, GYBURC, AND TOLERANCE

Important aspects of Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Willehalm* have already been treated in some detail in chapter four. After the catastrophic first battle, Willehalm fetches reinforcements to replace his annihilated Christian army in order to offer battle a second time to the invading Muslim force. At a war council preceding that second battle, his wife, Gyburc, the former Muslim queen and now Christian countess of Provence, makes a speech to the Christian troops that will be the primary analytical focus of the present chapter.[1] Her medial or liminal position as a hybrid liaison between the two cultures, while not having full membership in either, focuses attention on this speech and her role in the narrative's prevailing political discourse in a way that a speech by any other countess in crusader epic might otherwise not have done. It is in fact Gyburc's interculturally liminal position in the narrative that is the focus of the defining tension and narrative interest in the text, for one of her character's obvious narrative purposes is to function as a mediatrix between the representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities in the text. Claudia Brinker-von der Heyde thus provides her with a conventional characterization as

> female, motherly, tender, affectionate and simultaneously strong, courageous, brave, and combat-ready; she loves and suffers, is burdened with guilt and redeemable; in short: she is *officina omnium* [source of all things], a human being in the broadest sense: a *homo medietas* [mediating human].[2]

Ultimately, however, such mediation proves on principle impossible, and whatever potential she might have as a liminar in Victor Turner's sense, or a hybrid inhabitant of the creative interstices in Bhabha's sense, fails utterly in Gyburc's inability to influence the events through which she lives.[3]

The content of her famous speech may be summarized as follows: she acknowledges that both armies resent her as the cause of a multitude of deaths. She counsels the Christian troops that if they win the coming battle, then they should act such that their own salvation is not compromised (306, 25). She posits that Adam, Noah, Job, and the three magi, among other biblical figures, were all non-Christians (she uses the standard Middle High German term of opprobrium *heiden* [heathens]), but, she emphasizes through repetition, they were not marked for perdition (307, 11 and 14–15). All infants are also "heathens" before baptism, she contends, even those of baptized mothers (307, 17–19). She concretizes her point: *wir wârn doch alle heidnisch ê* [we were all "heathens" once] (307, 25). Then comes the most enigmatic passage (to be treated in greater detail below), concerning a father's attitude toward and mercy for his children who are marked for perdition (307, 26–30), after which she claims that both the European Christians of her current place of residence and the Muslims of her former place of residence believe that she left Araby for the sake of human love and hate her for it, while in truth she left for the sake of divine love. She lists what she gave up: love, wealth, fair children,

> … ein[ ] man,
> an dem ich nicht geprüeven kan
> daz er kein untât ie begienc,
> sîd ich krôn von im enpfienc.
> Tybalt von Arâbî
> ist vor aller untæte vrî (310, 11–16)
>
> [a husband / of whom I cannot claim / that he ever committed a wrong / since I received the crown from him. / Tybalt of Arabi is guiltless of any misdeed.]

She then laments the deaths (in the first battle) of her own kinsmen and of those of the assembled Christian troops.

In the course of the past half-century, one of the most frequently discussed topics among scholars in Wolfram studies is the poet's alleged humanitarian or humanistic tolerance, especially as it is allegedly manifested in this speech of Gyburc's to the Christian troops before the final battle. The speech has generally been designated her *Toleranzrede* [speech of tolerance]. This conception of the *interpretandum* is obviously situated in the larger context of that (in Europe and its Europeanized [former] colonies worldwide) ubiquitous and fascinating, Enlightenment-based idea of inevitable and teleological human progress, specifically, that in spite of any and all local and temporary setbacks, civilization (usually

tacitly assumed to be European civilization) progressively advances, and that each generation or each century of human civilization is, taken as a whole, more progressive, more enlightened, more humane and "humanistic" than its forebears. The early, comprehensive, and perhaps most influential expression of this view was, as noted in chapter two, of course, in Hegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte*, which traces the history of significant human consciousness qua history from its beginnings to its ultimate culmination, as Hegel imagined, in the Lutheran, Prussian monarchy of his own homeland. In the course of the twentieth and now twenty-first century, advocates of the concept of human/humane progress have generally been devotees either of liberal capitalism or socialism (especially in its Stalinist perversion) as both guarantors and barometers of progress qua democracy.

The concept of progress has since its appearance had its dissenters, however, and in recent decades they have, in addition to offering systematic theoretical critiques of the entire notion of progress as a social construct arising out of specific historical conditions, also pointed, for instance, to Stalin's gulags, to Guernica, Hiroshima, Auschwitz, My Lai, Ulster, Srebrenica, Sabra and Shatila, Soweto, and more recently the highway to Basra and the prison at Abu Ghraib as concrete examples of why the notion of the inevitability of humanistic and humanitarian progress of European civilizations is suspect, particularly if "we" have now reached the End of History, as Francis Fukuyama, one of the champions of western capitalism's triumph over Soviet pseudo-socialism deemed it at the close of the Cold War.[4]

While this is not the place to attempt a systematic engagement with the fetishization of the concept of progress (either in general or in medieval studies) and the scholarly construction of a teleological model that connects posited poles of tolerant praxis in the modern world with "national" forbears in the Middle Ages, the examination of the specific issue of Wolfram von Eschenbach's alleged advocacy of tolerance, especially as it functions to bridge cultures and breach borders and to enable liminal transitions, provides some insight into the program of apologetics that is integral to that larger project.[5] Advocates of the concept of progress typically include among their tactical moves a comparison of two cultural sites, one of which then logically demonstrates progress over the other.[6] But such comparisons are almost always problematic and self-serving, and thus advocates of this notion of a general and undifferentiated cultural progress are inevitably condemned to the role of apologist. Who, for instance, could not find examples of ancient, medieval, Renaissance, or nineteenth-century European barbarism in contrast with which the early twentieth-first century would look progressive? But as the partial list of

twentieth- and twenty-first-century massacre and torture sites just noted illustrates, the reversed position is no less possible.

Less obvious than such attempts at actual comparison is the all but ubiquitous assumption of progress that underlies a wide range of analytical moves. The notion of the harbinger is one common such move in cultural history, and that is arguably precisely the issue that one confronts in the construction of Wolfram's "tolerance." Wolfram is portrayed as ahead of his time and thus demonstrating clear progress over most of his contemporaries and his literary peers of preceding generations. The further implications—for both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—of such a thirteenth-century beacon of German tolerance are clear, for in the context of German cultural history (and by extension, German Studies) there are, for obvious reasons, in the contemporary world many motives for the assumption of progress and for the desire for an authentic German humanist in the distant past: if there was such a stalwart German champion of cultural and especially racial tolerance eight centuries ago, then German culture must both be tolerant in its core and have made progress since that time to a far higher level of tolerance; any recent deviations from such tolerance would then have to be seen as aberrations from the norm and not the norm itself.[7]

To return to the issue as typically imposed on Wolfram's *Willehalm*, Joachim Bumke expresses the principle that grounds the conventional scholarly position:

> What is innovative in the image of the heathen in *Willehalm* is the renunciation of the usual black-and-white representation. For the first time, the world of those of a different faith is not simply demonized but considered and recognized as a domain of independent justice and an independent system beyond Christianity.[8]

He thus attributes to Wolfram the granting of the status as *subjects* to Muslims in *Willehalm*. This issue is of primary importance to the entire discussion.

Likewise in defending the principle that even in the Middle Ages, the occasional precursor of European humanism can be found, Wolfgang Mohr clearly expresses the faith of defenders of the thesis of Wolfram as harbinger:

> The concepts of "humanity" and "tolerance," as applied to Wolfram's poem, are occasionally provided with "No Trespassing" signs.... Such "No Trespassing" signs adorn the paths of German literary history somewhat too profusely and do not exactly simplify transit from one place to

another. That a person from the Middle Ages had not quite achieved the level of consciousness of the Enlightenment should surely need no special emphasis. It is likewise obvious that the term "humanity" is used and understood in quite different senses even by contemporaries. Nonetheless, even a card-carrying German literary scholar should be able to recognize and be permitted to talk about how close Wolfram, in his stories of Parzival and Willehalm and Giburc, approached the insights with which Lessing also struggled.[9]

Here, again, Wolfram's representation of Muslims is deemed comparable to, for instance, Lessing's explicitly providing the (in his case, Jewish) Other with subjective agency.

Joachim Heinzle specifies the parameters of Wolfram's participation in this process:

> Wolfram is no modern thinker, but he participated in the "long process through which modern thought developed," and of which "the constitutive impulses had already been preformed in the Middle Ages."[10]

While lacking the enthusiasm of many scholars for Wolfram as tolerant humanist, Carl Lofmark nonetheless finds that "If Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Willehalm* was commissioned to promote enthusiasm for the Fifth Crusade, then Wolfram's open sympathy for the heathens and his distaste for attacking and killing them cannot have made his poem an effective weapon of crusading propaganda."[11]

Even at this point one might note that there are two distinct impulses in the arguments for Wolfram's tolerance: first, a Christian European tolerance of Islam might well still privilege only the Self as subject, while the Muslim Other, however tolerated, remains the object of Christian European tolerant *treatment*. Second, should that tolerance include the conception of Muslims as, in the ad hoc phrase employed in the previous chapter, "Muslims per se," that is, Muslims living their lives without necessary relation to the projected needs or desires of Christian Europeans, then they would have gained agency as subjects in and not remained merely objects of the narrative. It seems to me that neither impulse is realized in Wolfram's *Willehalm*. Especially the recurring proposal of Wolfram's Muslim Other as *subject* will have to be addressed as the argument progresses.

There are two fundamental assumptions underlying the advocacy of Wolfram as champion of tolerance in *Willehalm*: first, that Gyburc functions as Wolfram's mouthpiece in her speech, which is generally tacitly assumed, but not infrequently stated directly and in phrases that seem

almost catechistically repeated: in the words of Werner Schröder, for instance, "Gyburc, too, is simply the mouthpiece of the poet"; Walter Haug comments likewise: "the so-called tolerance speech of Gyburc expresses—about this there is general consensus—the position of the poet."[12] The second assumption is that what Gyburc advocates in her speech is in fact religious and/or racio-ethnic tolerance. Among dozens of such examples, David O. Neville simply assumes without examination that tolerance is expressed by the text, while Helmut de Boor characteristically speaks of Gyburc's speech as a great *Humanitätsrede* [speech of humanitarianism].[13] Kurt Schellenberg makes the more general claim quite explicitly and in some detail:

> The spiritual/intellectual tendency in *Willehalm* is the same as in *Parzival*. Here, too, chivalrous humanism and the idea of tolerance constitute the guiding view of life; in fact it is even more strongly marked, since it forms a basic element both of the plot as a whole and also of the inner life [of the characters]. For here everything is built around the battle between Heathenism and Christianity, between Faith and the Infidel. The two worlds confront each other directly in their dualism, but this dualism is moderated, is resolved, insofar as Heathenism is not a rejected mass, but is fully valid. *Humanitas*, human dignity, is recognized in every type of human nature; mercy is practiced toward those of other cultures and faiths; the human is recognized in humans. *Humanitas* is thus here the expression of true, natural humanity…. This image had already been picked up by Wolfram in *Parzival*; with greater emphasis than anyone before him, he stressed the equality of the heathens, who could even make up for their lack of faith through their inner worth.[14]

This view of Wolfram's tolerance has indeed become the unreflected orthodoxy among general medievalist readers, particularly in *Germanistik*. In recent years there has been some scattered dissent from the *opinio communis* but no single argument that either brings together these local expressions of dissent or includes them in the necessarily larger argument concerning the entire problematic. Among those probing deeper are Carl Lofmark in his examination of "the problem of disbelief/unbelief in *Willehalm*."[15] In his comprehensive study, Jean-Marc Pastre comments: "We are far from a notion of tolerance, which some have at times wished to propose as definitive of Wolfram's attitude."[16] Alois Haas remarks: "The idea of medieval "tolerance," which is recurringly applied to this German *chanson de geste*, muddies rather than clarifies the situation"; he also responds to the text's claim that killing Muslims like animals is a great sin: "But neither is that tolerance, but rather a "theological" reflection of a layman of the knightly class…."[17] Even H.B. Willson's arch-Christian

interpretation denies this particular tenet of the conventional interpreta-
tion: "The whole portrayal of Gyburc proves that these utterances are
anything but a defence of heathendom, nor can this be called tolerance,
in the humanistic sense."[18]

In attempting to provide a synthesis of this focal issue and its larger
ideological context here, I propose to demonstrate that both of the basic
assumptions—that is, that Gyburc is Wolfram's mouthpiece and that what
she advocates is tolerance—of the advocates of tolerance by Wolfram
are flawed and represent less plausible interpretations of the text than
modern scholarly instances of a politically charged apologia for European
humanitarian progress.

First, concerning Gyburc as Wolfram's mouthpiece: since there exists
no biographical information about Wolfram, there is no evidence that
would enable the outside corroboration as the author's own of any ideas
or attitudes expressed by the fictional characters in his texts or by their
likewise literary narrators. Thus any given opinion expressed by the nar-
rator or a character in one of the texts could only be—albeit still quite
problematically—proposed as the author's own, if there were compel-
ling *internal* evidence that made such identification plausible. But what,
realistically, could constitute such internal and compelling evidence?
To rehearse several rather basic ideas of the outmoded practice of bio-
graphical criticism, recurring expression of the idea by the narrator might
be suggestive, especially since narrators of medieval texts are generally
not given to the constructed ignorance and/or dissimulations common
among modern and especially postmodern narrators (although the enig-
matic pilgrim-narrators of Chaucer and Dante, for instance, do give one
pause here, and they are not the only examples of this type). The nar-
rator's (as opposed to any given character's) expression of the idea might
be of particular significance if a positive valuation by the narrator were
consistently part of that expression. Of similar significance would be the
recurring expression of the idea by a character or characters whose opin-
ions and/or behavioral patterns were constructed as positive, even didac-
tic, models in the narrative. Beyond the mere expression of the idea, its
actual enactment by such positively valued characters, especially if that
enactment were then somehow central to the plot of the narrative or a
significant episode of it, could be still more important.

But ultimately such arguments are never conclusive because, in the
strict terms of logical argument, they cannot be, since even if a text
presented all of these types of evidence, it still would not be certain that
they demonstrated that the *author*, as opposed to some one or more of
the characters, a class (social or otherwise conceived) *as* character, or the
depicted narrator, was responsible for the opinion, which in context

then served to characterize that figure. Finally, to address the specific pitfalls of the already long disreputable "intentional fallacy": even if the author's culture is our own and known to us through all the informational media access of the modern world, we can never know for certain that her/his "intention" is uniform, stable over the course of a career or even the years required to compose an epic, seamless, self-identical, and thus epistemologically accessible to us as readers. Far less certain can we be about an author dead for more than seven centuries and known to us by name only, who wrote in a language native to no one now alive, and whose material culture and intellectual world so starkly differ from our own. Let us nonetheless briefly review the argument in the present case.[19]

It should be immediately noted that the specific content of Gyburc's speech deemed by scholars to be indicative of Wolfram's tolerance is expressed nowhere else in his extant texts. In what has long been recognized as an overt reference to the praxis of the *Rolandslied*, the narrator of *Willehalm* maintains that to slaughter the Muslims *alsam ein vihe* "like animals" (450, 16) is sinful, since they are *gotes hantgetât* [god's creations].[20] The precise implications of this sin are unclear, however, since the narrator voices this concern only *after* the catastrophic slaughter of the Muslim army, and in the same stanza refers yet again to the Christian knights who died in the battle as automatically already present in Heaven and without sorrow or cares. On the issue of the destination of the souls of dead Christian and Muslim soldiers, then, and thus the theological implications of their actions, Wolfram's narrative practice is quite in keeping with both the theological norm and the literary refraction of that norm during his time. To posit the narrator's statement here as a corroboration of an argument for Wolfram's tolerance, as has often been done, does little to support the case, however, for here, too, there is far less said than imputed by scholars: it is after all only slaughtering Muslims *alsam ein vihe* that is claimed to be a sin; presumably slaughtering them otherwise—for instance, in the manner here represented in graphic and lavish detail—is *not* sinful.

The historical issue of the deaths of Christians and Muslims in battle during the Crusades became in effect a theological one. Pope Leo IV (847–55) had already stated that all who fall in a war of defense of the Church receive the reward of Heaven. In his call for the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II declared that participation in the Crusade in itself constituted complete penance for any and all of a given soldier's committed and confessed sins, thus essentially instituting the practice of granting plenary indulgence (*pro remissione omnium peccatorum* [for the remission of all sins]).[21] In his Crusader sermons that elicited

support for the Second Crusade, Bernard of Clairvaux extends the issue and makes its terms quite concrete:

> at vero Christi milites securi praeliantur praelia Domini sui, nequaquam metuentes aut de hostis caede peccatum aut de sua nece periculum: quandoquidem mors pro Christo vel ferenda, vel inferenda et nihil habeat criminis, et plurimum gloriae mereatur… miles, inquam, Christi securus interimit interit securior. Sibi praestat cum interit, Christo cum interimit.[22]

> [The soldiers of Christ, however, safely fight the battles of the Lord by no means fearing either sin in killing the enemy or danger in their own deaths. For it is by no means a crime to kill or be killed for Christ; it is even extremely glorious…. The soldier of Christ, I say, kills with safety but dies with still more safety. For him it is good when he dies; for Christ, on the other hand, when he kills.]

In 1215 Innocent III extended plenary indulgence to include those who financed the participation in a Crusade by another party, that is, those who bought their way out of not just actual combat but the lengthy intercontinental travel and exposure to disease that statistically constituted the most dangerous aspect of crusading. Thus women, the aged, and the ill could, from the point of view of the cynic, now buy their way into Heaven, which contributed to a loss of Crusader zeal among the masses who saw this happening and were excluded from it by their own poverty. On this issue Cathrynke Dijkstra and Martin Gosman comment: "A very salient feature of vernacular texts (epics, romances, chronicles or lyrical texts) that deal with material related to the crusades, is the rather free interpretation of official ecclesiastical doctrine or propaganda," which leads, among other things, to the fact "that the rewards for future martyrs are much more generous in vernacular literature than in official Church propaganda."[23]

In actual practice, perhaps due to the "flexibility" in the concept as it developed, the plenary indulgence was quite problematic, especially since many Crusaders treated the Crusade as a quasi-pilgrimage that they viewed as completed when their journey to the holy sites had been accomplished, which inevitably led to instability in the military presence in Crusade territory, since soldiers often remained in Palestine very briefly, leading Pope Alexander III to stipulate that plenary indulgence would be granted only to those *qui … ibi duobus annis pugnaverint* [who fought there for two years].[24] The Middle High German poet, Heinrich von Rügge, makes explicit the promise of plenary indulgence: *Nu nement daz crûce und varent dâ hin / daz wirt iu ein vil grôz gewin, / und fürhtent nieht den tôt* [Now take the cross and journey there; that will bring you

a great reward, and fear not death].[25] Albrecht von Johannsdorf remarks similarly: *got hât iu beide sêle und lîp gegeben: / gebt ime des lîbes tôt; daz wirt der sêle ein iemerleben* [God has given you both soul and body; give him the death of the body; that will be an eternal life for the soul].[26] In his "Ahi, Amors, com dure departie" (ca. 1188), Conon de Béthune also claims that Crusaders are guaranteed Heaven: *ke cele mors est douce et savereuse / dont on conquiert le Resne presïeus* [this death is sweet and lovely, for thus one gains the precious Kingdom].[27] Elias Cairel leaves *las grans honors, las riquessas* [the great honors and riches] to be won by Crusaders tantaliz-ingly metaphorical.[28]

Relevant to any discussion of the issue of slaughtering Muslims *alsam ein vihe* is the Arofel episode in *Willehalm* (following the Muslim defeat of the French army in the epic's first battle), and especially the scholarly attempt to employ that episode to buttress the argument in favor of Wolfram's tolerance. The knight, Arofel, is finally defeated by Willehalm after long and arduous combat: Willehalm cuts off his leg and, while the defeated opponent begs for his life, decapitates him and despoils the body explicitly in vengeance for Willehalm's prior loss of a relative in the battle (77, 23–81, 29). The lack of mercy shown by Willehalm in this scene has generally been adamantly condemned by scholars: Werner Schröder bluntly calls it a *Hinrichtung* [execution]—although perhaps so that the contrast between this act and Willehalm's putatively more progressive idea and practice following the final battle later in the narrative can be more starkly highlighted as an expression of Gyburc's and/or Wolfram's tolerance.[29] As James A. Rushing, Jr. astutely remarks, however, all instances of authority in the poem—the narrator, the King and Queen of France, the abbot, and Willehalm himself—approve the killing of Arofel, and Willehalm at no point expresses any guilt or regret.[30] As is argued here, the narrative move-ment from this early act of brutal vengeance to Willehalm's later prac-tice of mass annihilation demonstrates no development of tolerant practice.

To return to Gyburc and the possibilities for evaluating the import of her speech, it must be acknowledged that she is generally represented as a positive character: roughly in order of importance according to the values of the courtly society that she inhabits, she is aristocratic, beauti-ful, the wife of the text's eponymous hero, and a Christian.[31] But she is also a former Muslim, an adulteress, depicted in the typically Orientalist mode as both exotic and erotic. As noted in the previous chapter, the text specifies in one situation that she coquettishly allows the upper reaches of her gown occasionally to open so far that it provides an erotic peepshow for the officers at table (249, 16).

The content of her speech itself is, of course, of primary importance to both the conventional argument and my own counterargument. There she strays more than once from strict theological orthodoxy into border-line heresy: first, in claiming that the patriarchs of the Hebrew Bible, newborn and thus unbaptized infants of Christian parents, and Muslims are all "heathen" in, apparently, the same sense; second—if indeed she actually makes this claim—that Muslims are not just *gotes hantgetât* [God's creatures], but also—so claim some scholars—*gotes kint* [children of God]. She pleads with the Christian troops that each one *schônt der gotes hantgetât* (306, 28), usually understood as "spare God's creatures" (to be further explored below). The expression of these ideas occurs in a complex narrative context, however, for Gyburc is after all a recent Muslim convert to Christianity, the daughter of one of the invading Muslim kings, the undivorced wife of another, and the mother of a third, whose armies also include many other relatives.[32] Under these conditions, it is not particularly reasonable to expect the aristocratic former Muslim queen to be strictly dispassionate or objective. To expect the speech that Wolfram places in her mouth to stand up to scholarly analysis to determine its consistency with, or innovation on, thirteenth-century theologico-political policies may well be to expect too much. As David Wells notes, "Given the exotic interest of these more far-fetched scraps of theological knowledge, which is shared with the outlandish-sounding pieces of knowledge from other disciplines, it is easy to suppose that Wolfram's theology in general is more sophisticated than it in fact is."[33]

Gyburc's speech must be seen rather in the *narrative* context, which may well participate in, but by no means defines, thirteenth-century discussion of theologico-political policies. She sees the massed Christian armies and has just heard her Christian husband deliver an astonishingly propagandistic speech that has succeeded in whipping the troops into a veritable anti-Muslim frenzy.[34] That frenzy, as she immediately recognizes, is directed not at nameless, faceless Muslims, but rather at her own family—father, son, and her still revered Muslim husband—and her speech attempts to calm the Christian troops and limit the desecration of the Muslims' bodies *after*—as she makes *very* explicit—the impending and inevitable slaughter. The response to her plea on the part of her addressees is predictable in the context of Middle High German epic narrative: just as is the case of Kriemhild's warning speech to Siegfried before he dashes out to the hunt and his death, Uote's warning speech just before the Burgundians set out for Etzel's court and their own annihilation, and Gerlind's warning speech just before Hartmuot's disastrous tactical military error in *Kudrun*, the men here also quite simply ignore a woman's advice—even a woman whose position confers apparent prestige on

her—about what they consider men's affairs.[35] While still identifying "tolerance" as the point of her plea, Klaus Kirchert nonetheless notes the automatic diminution of significance that accompanies the placing of the plea in the mouth of a female character. Christopher Young comments: "Once again, the female is muffled, subdued and reduced to her given role within patriarchy." Martin Przybilski suggests that the reason that Gyburc's speech is so strictly ignored that it might as well not have been delivered is that as a woman, she has no right to speak at a war council.[36] The actual response to Gyburc is anti-climactic: her brother-in-law condescendingly embraces her (just as Siegfried kissed Kriemhild after her reasoned plea), but not a single word is uttered in response, and the men, *strîts si luste* [battle-hungry] (312, 29), go off to dine before the battle that is nothing if not a slaughter, for the Christian troops nowhere spare their Muslim enemies, but mercilessly slaughter them at every opportunity, even after the battle has been won and the Muslims are in full flight.

Thus, to recapitulate, the plea for "tolerance" is expressed a single time by a single character, who is depicted as a positive character—but problematically so, especially with respect to her right to speak with authority on theological, political, and military issues—whose obvious conflict of interest compromises any objectivity that might be attributed to her as a supposed mouthpiece for the poet's putative general advocacy of tolerance. The plea itself is strictly ignored at the moment of its expression and, depending on one's conception of the precise content of her plea, at every moment thereafter (see below). In addition, as Klaus Kirchert notes, following this speech, Gyburc simply disappears from the narrative and thus takes no overt part in any further defining elements of the larger narrative (even as conventional female spectator of male battle prowess), especially those that have to do with what conventional scholarship construes as the enactment of Wolfram's "tolerance."[37] Thus not only is there no enactment of the course of action imputed to Gyburc's plea, but rather a systematic realization of precisely that course of action which the conventional scholarly construction suggests it sought to prevent. The narrator casts no opprobrium thereby on the Christian perpetrators for their actions, however, nor does any other character do so. There is thus not only no concrete evidence that Gyburc might function here as Wolfram's mouthpiece, but not even any indirect or suggestive evidence to that effect. Lacking such evidence then, the entire issue of tolerance as constructed by scholars is reduced simply to an issue of *Gyburc's* characterization and not of the narrator's or indeed author's political program.

Logically, the issue of *Wolfram*'s tolerance, as expressed in Gyburc's *Toleranzrede,* is thereby eliminated. But since this distinction in categories has not been part of earlier scholarly investigations, a more general

examination of tolerance in *Willehalm* is necessary here, to determine if there is in fact a larger pattern of religious and racio-ethnic tolerance, in which Gyburc's—not Wolfram's—plea participates. There are several issues to be dealt with: the issue of justice; the identification by Gyburc of the Muslims as *gotes hantgetât* [god's creations] and, allegedly, as *gotes kint* [god's children]; her plea that the Christians *schônen* the Muslims; and the general valuation of Muslim characters in the text. These issues are all much more complex than the simple refutation of Gyburc's speech as an expression of Wolfram's "philosophy," and thus the issues must be examined in some detail. This will require a longer path through the scholarship but will lead directly back to the medieval text, ultimately illuminating both the text and the web of scholarly interpretations of it.

On the first issue, Marion Gibbs's opinion is characteristic of one school of scholarship when she claims that "*Willehalm* is essentially a didactic work, pointing to the futility of war and the injustice of killing the heathens simply because they are heathen," and that Gyburc urges a Christian "reconciliation" with the Muslims.[38] The issue of justice *per se* is, however, never raised in the text, except insofar as the invasion of Europe by the Muslims is construed as legitimate cause for a Christian *bellum iustum*, according to the ubiquitously cited classic argument by Augustine that a war of defense is by definition a just war.[39] Thus James Rushing comments that "neither [Wolfram's] narrator nor Gyburc expresses any doubt that the war is necessary and just." J.A. Hunter goes beyond the conventional view on just war: "In so far as they fight in defense of their faith and of Christendom, they fight a war which is not only just but holy.... For nowhere do the Christians fight—or kill—the heathens simply because they are heathens. They fight them because they have no choice."[40] One might respond that it is precisely the religious faith of the Muslims that constructs them as enemies of Christian Europe, and that the Christians—outside the ideology of Crusader epic—quite obviously did have a choice both *whether* to fight and *how* to fight.

Claims such as those just cited on *bellum iustum* have, not surprisingly, been broadly accepted by modern scholarship, although they bracket the larger narrative context of this particular Muslim invasion and thus all issues of actual justice, for in fact this Muslim incursion into European home territory is a direct result of Willehalm's prior invasion of Muslim territory, his adulterous wooing of Queen Arabel while he was a prisoner of war at the court of King Tybalt von Arâbî and his eventual abduction of the queen—although the precise conditions of Arabel/Gyburc's leaving her homeland remain somewhat vague in the narrative: Gyburc herself makes two very brief references to the situation, once in her quasi-sermon to her father about her Christian faith and what she posits

as his need to convert (215–18), and again in her speech to the troops (310), where she praises Tybalt's exemplary virtue and claims to have left him and her former life, as noted above, more for the sake of conversion (i.e., divine love) than for *minne* "courtly love" for Willehalm.[41] Willehalm himself also comments on the conditions of her removal from her homeland, and his comments transform the whole into a typical case of patriarchal appropriation: in revenge for Tybalt's adulterous relation with Willehalm's sister, the queen of France, Willehalm claims that he deliberately seduced and abducted (*enpfuort* 153, 27) Arabel, so that *Swaz Tybalt hin geborget hât, / Gyburc daz minnen gelt mir lât* [whatever Tybalt thence [*sc.* from France] borrowed, Gyburc paid me back in love-money] (153, 29–30).[42] He, too, notes that she went away with him more for the sake of baptism than love (298, 16–23). In any event, however, neither the text nor the scholarship problematizes this tension in Gyburc/Arabel's desires—whether to be married to Tybalt, to be Muslim, to convert to Christianity, to marry Willehalm, and so on, or even acknowledges that her desires might exist independent of those of the men who fight intercontinental wars to maintain their control over her life, soul, and body. In any case, the Muslim army under the command of Gyburc's father, Terramêr, and including her husband, Tybalt von Arâbî, and their son, Ehmereiz, attempts to rescue the queen who—both from their point of view and that of the text's Christian hero/abductor—has been kidnapped. In terms of gender issues it is then interesting that the female kidnapping victim does not so characterize her abduction, while for the men who are, or have in the past been, in complete control of her whereabouts, marital status, indeed her entire life, there is no doubt that she is stolen property. Here, as so often elsewhere, issues of imperialism, gender, and religious and ethnic identity become an inextricable tangle.

The issues of religion, holy war, the conversion of Arabel to Christianity and marriage to the hero Willehalm effectively bracket the issue of justice, for in this narrative context the presence of Gyburc in Europe as Christian bride of Willehalm is by (Euro-Christian) definition just and good. In addition, as Karl Bertau notes, "It seems valid also for Wolfram: outside the true faith there is no law/justice."[43] The Christian God is viewed as a feudal lord who is the guarantor of right, and since Muslims are depicted as polytheists whose gods are frauds, they are judged to have no rights and no sense of law.

The argument for tolerance conventionally also makes reference to Gyburc's claim that Muslims are *gotes hantgetât*, which is likewise problematic, since in its inescapably Christian context, the claim does no more than acknowledge the existence of Muslims, for, one should keep in mind, in the Christian view all things extant, large or small, good or

evil, living or not, are the result of the act of the creator God of the initial
chapters of the book of Genesis. While Gyburc herself may or may not
have imagined more significance in her claim than merely positing the
existence of Muslims, interpreters of the text must see this claim precisely
in such terms.

Of particular interest in this context is Gyburc's implied claim that
just as Muslims are non-Christian, so too were the biblical figures she
names, as well as all newborns, whether of Christian or non-Christian
parents. Perhaps it is part of Wolfram's characterization of her imperfect
knowledge of Christian theology as a lay Christian or as a recent convert,
or simply intellectual sleight-of-hand that prevents her acknowledging
that, with the exception of the three magi who brought gifts to Jesus at
his birth, all the biblical characters whom she names are from the *Hebrew*
Bible, the Christian *Old*, not New Testament (Elijah, Enoch, Noah, Job;
307, 1–5), and thus by definition non-Christians who were, according
to postbiblical, early Christian legend, redeemed by Christ during the
Harrowing of Hell, which is not incidentally mentioned three times in
the course of *Willehalm*.[44] It is, of course, not by accident that she men-
tions no post-Harrowing non-Christians—such as, for instance, her con-
temporary Muslims—as redeemed.

The entire problem of whether Muslims are not just *gotes hantgetât*
[God's creations], as Gyburc identifies the Muslim soldiers, but—as has
often been suggested in the scholarship—also *gotes kint* [children of God]
(which would indeed significantly raise the theological stakes), depends
on a passage that is fraught with semantic difficulties. Before allowing
this scholarly vortex to engulf the discussion, however, it is important
to recall that this expression, *gotes kint*, which is perhaps the key point of
focus in the entire long and broad scholarly debate concerning Wolfram's
tolerance, *does not occur in Wolfram's text*: neither in Gyburc's speech nor
anywhere else. Perhaps the phrase was initially used by scholars as a kind
of shorthand to designate the larger issue, but in time it became the reified
issue itself. The fact that the phrase does not appear in the text makes
rather clear that this is a modern scholarly invention that ultimately has
nothing to do with either Gyburc or Wolfram.

But whether an actual intepretive issue in Wolfram's epic or not, it has
become one in the scholarship and must thus be examined here. The text's
narrator has already expressed the orthodox opinion that it is *Christians*
who are the chosen of God (1, 16–28). Carl Lofmark points out that there
is "in fact no other passage that speaks in favor of heathens as the children
of God, and also none according to which anyone who has refused bap-
tism can be saved."[45] To be fair, it must be admitted that in this section
of her speech, Gyburc is anything but clear. I render the text here in an

intentionally stiff, literal translation (and omitting all editorial punctua-
tion), so as not to predetermine any specifics of the polysemic original:

> dem sældehaften tuot vil wê
> ob von dem vater sîniu kint
> hin zer flust benennet sint:
> er mac sih erbarmen über sie,
> der rehte erbarmekeit truoc ie. (307, 26–30)

> [It causes the blessed one great pain
> if of/from/by the father his child
> is called forth to destruction
> he may have mercy on them
> who ever has had true mercy]

The opacity of the text is such that its interpreters have been able to
make of it more or less what they will. Joachim Bumke comments: "In
Willehalm the heathens, too, are integrated into the children of god: it is
that which is new."[46] Both Bumke and Bodo Mergell have proposed that
Gyburc's identification of Muslims as *gotes hantgetât* (306, 28) is in effect
equivalent to identifying them as the Christian god's children (*gotes
kint*).[47] Joachim Heinzle does not specify precisely what the term means
to him, but assumes more than a trivial significance, since he claims
that the identification of Muslims as *gotes kint* "contradicts church doc-
trine." In the course of his systematic refutation of this notion, Lofmark
notes: "here it is not a matter of a universal category, 'children of god.'"
Knapp observes succinctly: "The burden of proof must be born alone by
anyone who wishes to disagree with Lofmark on this question."[48]

It seems that Wolfgang Spiewok, in his otherwise measured evaluation
of the text and its sociological context, goes even beyond the extreme
position of Bumke and others to move toward the upper end of the range
of interpretations of the passage adumbrated above, by claiming that
Wolfram here proposes that not all practicing Muslims are doomed to
Hell.[49] It might be useful here to remember that whatever may finally be
determined concerning Wolfram's tolerance, his texts never question the
fundamental Christian tenet of his time (and the cliché of Crusader epics,
varied and frequently repeated during the battle scenes of *Willehalm*) that
Muslims are by definition doomed to Hell, and are at the moment of
death immediately present there, just as Crusaders are by definition guar-
anteed Heaven and at the moment of death immediately present there.
Jean-Marc Pastre, for instance, comments:

> Even raised to the rank of the civilized prince, the Saracens lack Christian
> stature: despite the wishes of Gyburc, they for the most part come to

know the fires of Hell, those who fight and die exclusively for the love of ladies, and who, not having been born on the right side, cannot, as do the Crusaders, obtain through their deaths the salvation of their souls.[50]

According to Wolfram's *Willehalm*, Muslims who die in battle are, rather surprisingly, in fact immediately taken to Hell *by their own gods* (e.g., *Willehalm* 14, 10f.; 20, 12, and 38, 25ff.).[51] See also Lofmark's insightful evaluation of the situation:

> Wolfram's contemporaries did not know him as a humane representative of enlightenment who tolerated heathenism, but as a pious Christian.... Wolfram does not think that baptism is superfluous and that God will also save the unbaptized. He well knows that the unbaptized are doomed to Hell; it is for this reason that he is concerned for them and would like to dissuade them from their disbelief.[52]

Heinzle maintains that there is no *precise* precedent for granting *Gotteskindschaft* to Muslims, although similar claims do occur elsewhere.[53] But the fact is that there is no explicit claim here either. The passage is, let us acknowledge, obscure, even for the frequently obscurantist Wolfram. The conventional scholarly interpretation of the passage is that the *vater* [father] mentioned is the Christian god, that the *kint* [children] who would otherwise be sent to Hell are Muslims, and that thus Muslims are *gotes kint* [God's children]. Lofmark, on the other hand, has suggested that the father at issue is simply a Christian father who is saddened by the loss of any of his children to Hell; for instance, if they die as infants before baptism.[54] Since Gyburc's speech has claimed that the children of Christians are "heathens" before baptism, the context would support such an interpretation. Knapp's proposal that *vater* be understood as a non-Christian father is likewise plausible, for the speech as a whole has to do with non-Christians and their relation to the Christian process of salvation.[55] Since Gyburc had at this point in the narrative recently addressed an unsuccessful missionary sermon to her own Muslim father, and her narrative role is focused on the problematics of her relationship with her Muslim relatives and with her own new Christian faith, then this identification of the otherwise obscure *vater* with a non-Christian father who regrets seeing his children damned to Hell is also a conceivably plausible interpretation, although it would seem to require that the Muslim father adopt the Christian assumption of the inevitability of Hell for Muslims, thus participating in his own Otherization.

In Timothy McFarland's attempt to summarize the scholarly debate, he notes that the council of war in which Gyburc's speech is set follows

a series of conversations about family ties in which Gyburc is the domi-
nant figure, which necessarily involves the intepretation of her speech
in that context of an "extensive narrative discourse of kinship"—that
is, her own conversations with her father, father-in-law, and brother,
but also Willehalm's speech to his council (i.e., his own relatives, and
concerning relatives already dead)—and not in an explicitly theolog-
ical context. He notes that there are at least three interpretations of
the problematic father-child passage that are grammatically acceptable
(i.e., those of Lofmark, Bertau, and Heinzle), before rejecting them all
and suggesting his own likewise daring interpretive paraphrase of the
passage:

> It must pain the person in a state of grace (and assured of salvation through
> baptism, secure in knowing himself to be a child of God) if he sees God
> the father condemning his own children (whether Christian or heathen)
> to perdition, in the way that I have been painfully forced to hear my own
> father Terramer rejecting me and attempting to destroy my happiness and
> to make me renounce my Christian faith and thereby send me to Hell.
> God who has always shown perfect compassion has the ability to find a
> way of showing mercy to his children, unlike Terramer who has brought
> this cruel war upon us.[56]

One of the problems with the various scholarly interpretations of the
passage as a proposal of Muslims as *gotes kint* is that the issue must then be
followed through to its logical conclusion, which thus far no defenders of
this position have undertaken or even acknowledged as necessary. Even
if, according to Wolfram's Gyburc, Muslims are granted the status of *gotes
kint*, the fact is that absolutely nothing in their lives, deaths, or the eter-
nal fate of their souls changes either in theory or in practice. As the text
maintains with bludgeoning consistency, dead Muslims go directly to
Hell. Logically, then, we must assume that if Gyburc here proposes that
(1) Muslims are *gotes kint* and (2) *gotes kint* spend eternity in Heaven, then,
on the evidence of the practice of the narrative in which she participates,
she is simply mistaken.

If, as some scholars advocate, we refuse that interpretive course, fur-
ther interpretive problems proliferate. For since the text otherwise never
questions the automatic, orthodox damnation to Hell of dead Muslims,
then their being *gotes kint* clearly has nothing directly to do with their sal-
vation; and since any and all non-Christians may convert to Christianity,
whether or not their contemporary Christians grant them the theologi-
cally enigmatic status of *gotes kint*, then it is only the signifier and not the
signified that has changed—a matter of nomenclature—for Muslims who

were doomed to Hell before being identified as *gotes kint* are still doomed to Hell after having been granted that status.

These murky issues are well illustrated by Wentzlaff-Eggebert, who claims that the recurring designation of Christians as *die getouften* [the baptised] throughout the poem indicates that the distinction between Christians and Muslims is not "in their human perfection..., but solely in the fact that baptism has included these (the baptized) in a community with God that predetermines their conflict and outlasts death, while the others (the unbaptized), despite all their earthly virtues are abandoned to death and Hell."[57] Thus he simultaneously claims that in Wolfram's conception there is no essential difference between the humanity of Christians and Muslims, that difference being strictly spiritual, which nonetheless assures Christians of Heaven and Muslims of Hell. That difference, some readers might stubbornly imagine, is, however, not altogether irrelevant for the "humanity" of Muslim life.

To step back for a moment, it is difficult to imagine how this labyrinthine but convenient distinction can really ground a serious claim for Wolfram's *tolerance*. It seems rather to be no more than yet another victory for hegemonic ideology: while allegedly open to progressive relations with Muslims and purporting to grant theological concessions to them, nothing actually changes but the names that momentarily deflect attention from the Muslims' inevitable damnation to Hell.

Not surprisingly, another more extreme path through the Middle High German thicket has been hacked. Although it might initially seem a satirical invention, in his attempt to save the phenomenon, W.J. Schröder actually proposes that there are two classes of *gotes kint*: one, designated *natürlich* [natural], consisting of all beings divinely created, and the other, designated *übernatürlich* [supernatural], consisting exclusively of baptized Christians.[58] By this means it is possible to pretend that Muslims are *gotes kint* and thus that great progress has been made toward a modern conception of tolerance, while still maintaining the unassailed belief that dead Muslims automatically go to Hell.

Perhaps it would ultimately be more effective for advocates of Muslims as *gotes kint* to leave Wolfram out of the entire affair and simply revert to Gyburc as the party responsible for the reputed identification of Muslims as *gotes kint*. For in that case, Gyburc, the former Muslim and self-designated *tumbes wîp* [simpleminded woman] (306, 27), would simply be mistaken in her theological claims.

In the end, the entire line of argument concerning *gotes kint* seems to me to miss the point, or perhaps deliberately to obscure the point: Gyburc's position has little if anything to do with the theological issue of whether non-Christians are in fact the Christian "god's children," or

with the more extreme position of whether or not non-Christians can enter a Christian-conceived Heaven. As already suggested, it has everything to do with Gyburc's being an advocate for her family and countrymen, almost all of whom (except for father, husband, and son) are to die within a few hours of her speech. And it is on this key issue in her speech that one must focus, leaving behind the scholarly invention of the issue of *gotes kint*.

In her plea to the Christian knights, *schônt gotes hantgetât*, one might consider what specific action Gyburc proposes: not reconciliation (as Gibbs suggests), not peace, not recognition of Islam as a legitimate religion or even an acknowledgment of it as a monotheistic religion or of Muslims as geopolitical neighbors worthy of respect, not the cessation of hostilities, in fact not tolerance in any sense whatsoever. For as James Rushing remarks, Gyburc's speech is not "a pacifist plea for the abandonment of the war." Christine Ortmann comments further: "In any case, the intent is not to spare the enemy, and by no means 'tolerance.'" Indeed, the point is, as Gibbs rightly suggests, mercy, which "implies the attitude of the strong towards the weak." For after all, the text explicitly specifies that it is *only after the Christians have defeated and killed the Muslims* (306, 20–28) that *schônen* should play a role. Thus as J.A. Hunter notes, the "plea for compassion is made dependent on a Christian victory; it relates to the treatment of the heathens not during but after the fighting."[59] Gyburc does not urge the Christians *not* to fight, defeat, or kill the Muslims, but rather specifically only not to treat them like animals *after having killed them*. As Lofmark demonstrates by means of examples of the usage of both terms in the text, when Gyburc here proposes that the Christian warrior *schônt gotes hantgetât*, she does not mean "spare God's creatures"—for which, he suggests, she would most likely have used the Middle High German word *sparen*—but rather "to treat *schône*, to take care of."[60] That is precisely the sense of *schônen* = "take honorable care of" employed in the passages of the text that detail Matribleiz' instructions on how to treat the bodies of the dead Muslim kings in order to prevent them from being desecrated by ravens and wolves.[61] There the word cannot mean "spare the lives of," since the kings are already dead.

Thus in his suggestion that the point of the term *schônen* has to do with the honorable treatment of the dead, Lofmark almost goes so far as to suggest what is quite often in fact the case with "ethical" arguments about Christian-Muslim relations: the Christian slaughter of Muslims is never considered a matter of significance for the slaughtered Muslims, but rather only for the Christian slaughterers: the suffering and death of the Muslim victims is irrelevant, while the state of sin, punishment, and grace of the Christian instruments of this "divine punishment" is the

focal issue: the slaughter of the Other is never about the slaughter of the Other, but rather about the effect of that slaughter on the Self as slaughterer. Thus one is reminded of Alois Haas's remark that one of the primary effects of the "ennobling" of the Muslim enemy in texts like *Willehalm*, as opposed to the demonic Muslims of the *Rolandslied*, is that herewith the Christian knights have "einen adäquaten Gegner" [an appropriate enemy] whose defeat could be celebrated as a Christian victory of some significance.[62] The "ennobling" of the Muslim enemy thus functions primarily to elevate the significance of the deeds of the Christian. Therefore, the Muslim, no matter how noble and worthy, constitutes—in the terms of postcolonial studies—not a subject but merely an object in the narrative of the only worthy subjects, the Christians. Haas continues: "But, and that is decisive, the worthiness/honor (*werdekeit*) of the heathen heroes is in no way called into question; on the contrary, it is specially noted and celebrated at every opportunity."[63] The celebration of their "worthiness/honor" thus presupposes the inevitability of their slaughter on the battlefield and condemnation to the eternal fires of Hell?

In any case, *schônen* is in fact precisely what Willehalm partially and very selectively does—after the battle. But here again, we must be very precise in recognizing and defining the narrow parameters of his *schônen*. For it is often suggested that "at the end of the poem the heathens are allowed to return home to bury their dead according to their own rites."[64] But that is precisely what does *not* happen in Wolfram's text. It is instead the case that after Willehalm and his army have annihilated the entire, massive Muslim army, with the exception of a mere handful of survivors, he gathers up those survivors—as Matribleiz explains, these hostages were captured in flight at the very ships (461, 20–22), that is, at the culmination of possible flight, which logically suggests that the depicted slaughter has left *only* these few survivors—and allows them to seek out, embalm, and take home for burial specifically and exclusively *those relatives of Gyburc's who lie dead on the battlefield* (462, 26ff.). Her relatives—and no others—are explicitly identified as the ones to be so prepared at this point, while the bodies of the twenty-three kings that had earlier been found by Willehalm (and now already embalmed and prepared for shipment—not by Christians) are also to be included in the shipment. The remaining tens of thousands of corpses are, apparently, simply to be left on the battlefield—whether to be despoiled, to become prey to scavengers, or to rot is not specified—they are worthy neither of *schônen* nor of further narrative attention. On the bodies of a few dozen of the elite, defined by class status or kinship, Willehalm practices *schônen*, while the others who were slaughtered seemingly *alsam ein vihe* are left without such care.

Willehalm's treatment of the Muslim survivors and the Muslim dead at the narrative's conclusion is often adduced as evidence of his respect for Muslims and acknowledgment of the legitimacy of their culture and their value *without* conversion to Christianity. Kirchert goes so far as to suggest that this passage offers the possibility of a coexistence of Christians and Muslims.[65] As already indicated, however, here Willehalm is dealing very pointedly with the corpses of his wife's relatives and royalty already embalmed for burial. His behavior does not signify a general acceptance of the legitimacy of Islam or a possibility for the peaceful coexistence of Christian and Islamic cultures, but very simply with the "polite" behavior expected toward one's in-laws—albeit after one has slaughtered them on the battlefield.[66] In fact even at the moment of his granting the handful of Muslim survivors the limited freedom necessary for them to prepare his dead in-laws for burial, Willehalm is incapable of demonstrating any respect for them, their religion, or their culture, but rather makes a point of explicitly proselytizing them concerning the possibility of their own future conversion (462, 14).

Marion Gibbs suggests that Willehalm's gesture here—to allow burial of the Muslims according to Muslim rite—is the complement to the Baruc's Christian burial of Gahmuret in *Parzival*. The two acts are, however, diametrically opposed: in *Parzival* it is the Muslim pope-like emperor who demonstrates respect for the Christian knight and thus buries him in his own Muslim land according to Christian rite, while in *Willehalm*, of course, a strict turnabout—that Willehalm *himself* would have the Muslim dead buried in Christian Europe *and* according to Muslim custom—would be unthinkable, and certainly no such thing occurs in the narrative. Had Willehalm performed such an act and thereby enjoyed the support and assistance of his Christian peers, then perhaps it would be appropriate to begin to discuss "peaceful coexistence" in *Willehalm*. As it is, however, there is merely a victor who does not slaughter *all* survivors of the battle and preserves from desecration the handful among the slaughtered who are relatives of his wife or of royal class, whose corpses he allows the surviving Muslims to take home to their Muslim land for burial. No such rite is to be performed or even contemplated in Christian territory.

In the final lines of the poem, Willehalm makes explicitly clear to Matribleiz, as the surviving representative of the Muslim enemy, the current state of Christian-Muslim relations as exemplified by the parties involved, by carefully listing the conditions point for point (466). He does not propose anything like "peaceful coexistence," but rather dictates the victor's terms of peace to the vanquished: he grants Matribleiz and the other hostages their lives not out of fear, but from a position of strength;

the invasion and the wholesale slaughter were not his fault, he claims, but rather solely that of the Muslims; he seeks the Muslim king Terramêr's favor, but without any conditions relating to Willehalm's possible conversion to Islam or a relinquishment of Gyburc; his sending the kings home for burial is due strictly to his respect for the family of his wife, he specifies. Finally, and it is of the utmost significance that it is the final act in the narrative, Matribleiz leaves Provence and Christian Europe, so that "peaceful coexistence," conveniently, never has to become an actual issue (467, 8).[67]

On the final problem of this complex of interpretive issues—Wolfram's putative general positive valuation of Muslims—it need be acknowledged that Wolfram was neither a theologian nor a diplomat with expertise in dealing with international Christian-Muslim relations. His extant texts, which participate exclusively in the discursive modes of the Muslim Other available among European Christians of his time, provide no evidence that he knew anything about Islam and Muslims. Thus he includes in his representation that Muslims were polytheists, worshipping Muḥammad and Jupiter, among other "gods," by means of idols (before the final battle in *Willehalm*, the Muslim idols are pulled to the battlefield on a wagon drawn by water buffalo, 360, 24–8); that only in exceptional cases were Muslims not black;[68] that the offspring of mixed-race unions (Feirefiz in *Parzival* and Josweiz in *Willehalm*, 386, 11–21) were, literally, black-and-white striped, spotted, or checkered; Muslims are also often characterized as primitives because of their weaponry: they often fight equipped with clubs and cudgels rather than the knightly and courtly swords and armor (20, 24–2); see also, especially, the "wild man" figure of Rennewart, who fights with a club (if and when he manages not to forget it and leave it behind), drinks to excess since ignorant of the effects of alcohol,[69] and brutally murders an impolite cook by burying him in the coals of the cooking fire.

There are problematic imprecisions or inconsistencies in the representation of Muslims as Other, however. As Karl Bertau has suggested, Wolfram represents them as equal to the Christian Europeans in knighthood: a central tenet of their courtliness is the cult of courtly love/*minne*, which almost becomes a religion for them; they fight *durch die gote und durch die minne* [for the gods and for courtly love] (338, 15). Furthermore, Bertau claims, Wolfram shows respect for their religion, since the dead kings are carried from the first battle under the direction of a *heidnischen Priesters* [heathen priest]. In *Parzival* the Baruc is the pope of the "heathen" religion, and in *Willehalm* Terramêr is characterized as a ruler equal to a Christian emperor.[70] While the medieval discourse of the Muslim Other may include Islamic priests or

popes, Islam has neither, and Bertau's construction of Wolfram's representation of such institutions as if an expression of tolerance masks Wolfram's practice, which takes the form of tolerating the Other to the extent that his/her alterity can be erased and replaced by characteristics of the Self: they are good insofar as they are like "us," with priests, popes, and "benevolent" emperors, with *minne* and knighthood like "ours," and so on. Counter to the conventional scholarly claim that the elegance and nobility of the Muslim knights demonstrate Christian tolerance or humanity, Wolfgang Spiewok indeed suggests that this characterization has far more to do with interethnic *class* identification and loyalty than with ethnic tolerance.[71] As remarked in chapter four, Gabrielle Strauch notes on this issue that the Muslim knight is acknowledged as cultured and noble precisely to the extent that he is constructed as an imitation of the Christian knight: in order to achieve any level of nobility as a literary character, the Muslim knight's own culture must be elided.[72]

★   ★   ★

The point of the larger argument of this chapter is not to pretend that twenty-first century "progressive" political sensibilities constitute a universal norm and that Wolfram's representation of the Muslim Other is thus deplorable because he was not as enlightened as "we" are, but rather indeed to acknowledge that such cultural values are always culture-bound, that is, period-specific and locally defined, and to insist that modern scholarly projections of "tolerance" and "humanism" onto Wolfram are not only inaccurate, but politically and historically suspect. It is also not the purpose here to equate Wolfram's particular mode of representation of Muslims with the more virulent modes characteristic of many of his predecessors and contemporaries. Rather, it is to point out that the tendency among modern scholars to attribute to him racial, religious, humanitarian or humanistic tolerance, is no less illegitimate. While the *Rolandslied, Ezzolied,* and *Münchner Oswald* conceived of the options for treating Muslims as simply "convert or die." with a general preference for the latter option,[73] Wolfram's narratives offer indeed a broader spectrum of options, but only slightly so and under extremely restrictive conditions: convert, die, or (if the Muslim happens to have survived the slaughter *and* happens to be a royal in-law such as Terramêr) forcible expulsion from European territory. There are *no exceptions* in Wolfram's texts.[74] Thus for Wolfram the only good Muslim is a former, forcibly distanced, or dead one. While they are

not specifically identified as "children of the devil." as opposed to the Christian "children of god," in *Willehalm* the narrator still remarks that the devil rejoices at the receipt of each and every Muslim soul and identifies the devil as "a wretched landlord" who is taking in many "guests" (i.e., the Muslim dead; 38, 6). While the narrator at one point regrets that dead Muslims must go to Hell, the fact remains that the narrator *accepts without question* the premise that dead Muslims do go to Hell, *and* that it is their own "god" Tervigant who is responsible for their going there. Those who wish to view Wolfram as enlightened would then do well to dissociate him from his narrator, since it is difficult to imagine such a narrator as anything other than a religious bigot, no matter what century he inhabits.

In any case, in Wolfram's texts Muslim *subjects*—nonconverted, nonmonstrous, and nonaggressive Muslim neighbors—are simply inconceivable. There is no reason necessarily to expect a more progressive practice in Europe of the High Middle Ages in general or of Wolfram in particular. At issue here is primarily the false construction of Wolfram as a champion of tolerance as conceived in more or less twentieth- and now twenty-first-century terms. His offering the carrot of extra-baptismal, tearful, ersatz-redemption to Belakâne and Feirefîz in *Parzival* is prelude to his wielding the stick of actual conversion and cultural erasure.[75] Wolfram's Gyburc's apparent advocacy of peace and tolerance is prelude to a scene of vengeful slaughter precisely on a par with its precedents in the most virulently anti-Muslim texts of medieval European literature; the plea by a single character in *Willehalm* for humane treatment of her relatives' corpses after death in battle does not address inherited patterns of ethnic and religious bigotry, while serving only to cover ineffectively and temporarily with a thin veneer the text's ultimate reenactment and reinforcement of those patterns.

One further stroke needs to be added to the characterization of Gyburc's plea, however. If one jettisons the construct of Gyburc's speech as an appeal for humanitarian tolerance, one might then indeed acknowledge that she was not altogether ignored, as was provisionally suggested above: while precisely the opposite of her *purported* humanistic/humanitarian plea was executed in the wholesale slaughter of the Muslim army, her *actual* plea, as here elucidated, that is, to treat her relatives' corpses with honor, was in fact dutifully carried out by Willehalm. That is rather different from a global plea for and realization of cross-cultural, international, and interracial tolerance conventionally ascribed to Gyburc as Wolfram's mouthpiece. Rather than construing Wolfram's narrator's acknowledgment that Muslims are *gotes hantgetât* as evidence that Wolfram

is a liberal, progressive, tolerant humanitarian *avant la lettre* and thus an early participant in a long tradition of European humanistic tolerance, it would be both historically more accurate and politically more responsible to articulate his nuanced—and indeed differentiated—position in the well-established tradition of the discourses of the Muslim Other.

CHAPTER 6

WALTHER VON DER VOGELWEIDE, CRUSADER LYRIC, AND THE DISCOURSE OF THE MUSLIM OTHER

In considering the genre of courtly lyric, the point to be made seems rather a simple one, which can provide a guide through a convoluted morass of evidence: although Crusader lyric, that is, the subgenre of courtly lyric that makes pointed use of the Crusades, rarely deals directly with issues of geopolitics, the discursive modes of the Muslim Other already established in other contemporaneous genres are ever present (as the relatively rare, brief, and oblique Crusade-related references make clear); the power and reach of those discourses are displayed even where one least expects them and is even tempted not to look for them or recognize them when they do appear. This discourse is—not surprisingly—not what one finds in Hrotsvit's "Pelagius," the *Ludus de Antichristo*, or Wolfram's epics, but it does display identifying features directly dependent on genre (lyric) and the conditions of reception (e.g., royal patrons and their knightly vassals who were themselves Crusaders). This last feature is of primary significance, for despite the fact that lyric generally makes less overt extra-textual reference, the situation of political Crusader lyric is obviously quite concrete indeed, much moreso than, for instance, the fictions of Wolfram's pseudo-Muslim Zazamanc. While there is no need to interpret Crusader lyric as autobiographical, the genre's engagement with the Crusades does nonetheless presuppose the presence of actual Christian knights in actual Muslim territories. That alone gives it a radically different geopolitical resonance than, for instance, the *rex babylonię* of the *Ludus de Antichristo* or Wolfram's Gahmuret in the service of the Baruc.

While lyric, like epic, is a genre that was produced for and largely by the Crusading classes, it focuses on different literary issues altogether.

While there are some fundamental similarities in the discourse of the Muslim Other as found in Middle High German epic *and* lyric, there is, not surprisingly, much that is quite different, for instance, in Walther von der Vogelweide's poetic realization of that discourse. Even so, when, for example, Walther mentions Muslims, Crusades, or Palestine, he says nothing geopolitically unexpected (since his perspective is grounded in his culture's already established discourses of the Muslim Other), but his referents are very concrete and transparently applicable to the political situation on the ground at the time: that land (Palestine) is "ours." Thus despite courtly lyric's ostensive nonreferential mode, it is, as will be argued below, not unconnected to the geopolitical project of the Crusades.

This specific "narrative situation" of courtly lyric will need some unpacking, however, for readerly expectations often include the notion that lyric is by the terms of its genre generally nonreferential. In courtly lyric, one might thus well expect that the representation of Muslims found in the (always potentially) propagandistic genres of epic, chronicle, and Crusade sermon would be significantly diminished. The immediate relevance of extra-textual reference to historical situations beyond the generally narrative discourse that characterizes chronicle and even propagandistic sermon is generally lacking in lyric, and even the refracted historical reference of epic is all but irrelevant and thus generally absent. Lyric, which tends to focus on issues of intellectual, spiritual, or emotional immediacy, does not generally make explicit reference to extra-textual historical data, but rather, as Dijkstra and Gosman point out, "the highly formalized individual image evoked by the (purely grammatical) first person is always presented in a closed situation characterized by a circular structure."[1] Lyric is most often inward-facing and centripetal in reference. Indeed Paul Zumthor has characterized medieval French *trouvère* poetry as "discours achronique, circulaire, centripète" [ahistorical, self-referential discourse].[2] While Dijkstra and Gosman further note Jan Mukařovský's claim that lyrics are "autonomous," one must recognize that Crusade lyrics are by definition explicitly linked to an extra-textual situation, for which reason they suggest that

> any interpretation of Crusade lyrics should concentrate on the tensions between text-internal and text-external elements, between Poetic Language and Communication Language, because Crusade lyrics very often seem to be more than a mere distraction.[3]

The referentiality of Crusade lyric is, however, not that which is characteristic of some later lyric traditions, and certainly not that of narrative, for, as Zumthor has pointed out, older European literature

is not governed by mimesis, but rather merely settles for a kind of plausibility.[4]

Such generalizations are strategically useful in coming to terms with lyric's literary function, of course, but based on considerations of genre alone, lyric may not be denied the possibility of voicing overt political concerns with respect to contemporaneous geopolitical realities. And in fact it is not the case that courtly lyric as a genre lacks overt political reference, for a sizable portion of the extant corpus of, for instance, both Occitan *sirventés* and Middle High German *Minnesang* is famously and overtly political in its conception and content. Little of that political focus has ostensibly much to do either with Christian–Muslim geopolitics or theological debate and certainly not with the kind of ethnically, theologically, or culturally based propagandizing found in epic. Even so, within this subgenre of political lyric, there is an important subcategory of vernacular courtly lyric that has specifically to do with the Crusades. In the Crusade poems, unlike in the erotic lyric that defines the general conception of courtly lyric, there is a very concrete external reference, even though it is often difficult to identify which specific Crusade is at issue in any given poem. In the end, Elizabeth Siberry clearly identifies the historical relevance of courtly lyric concerning the Crusades:

> The majority of the troubadours regarded it as the duty of the faithful to avenge the Muslim victories in the East and like the crusade preachers they used feudal, military and even mercantile terminology which would be easily understood by their audience.... Although they regarded participation in the crusade as a duty, the troubadours are also an important source for the reaction in the West after Muslim victories and it is significant that whilst they recorded some doubts about the advisability of crusading, at the same time they exhorted knights to hasten to the East.... In short, the works of the Provençal troubadours, Northern French trouvères and German minnesingers deserve to be quoted and discussed alongside other historical or documentary sources for the crusades such as papal letters and ecclesiastical chronicles.[5]

In claiming the existence of such poems as a "subcategory of a subgenre," however, I have not quite acknowledged the theoretical difficulties inherent in the concept "Crusade lyric," since it is not a category of lyric explicitly so identified by the poets or their contemporaries, and not one about whose definition modern scholars have managed to reach any kind of consensus. Even so, Dijkstra and Gosman note that while Crusade lyrics "were never collected as such in special manuscripts, something we know did happen to love lyrics," they do "seem to have been regarded by

medieval authors as a distinct *modus dicendi* within the lyrical 'genre.'"[6]
In general it is quite difficult to define the subgenre of Crusade lyric, as
becomes clear in reviewing the attempts by several scholars. For Peter
Hölzle, *Kreuzlieder* are

> Poems … that in the majority of their stanzas or lines (often directly par-
> allel to Crusade sermon) make a direct or indirect appeal to an identifiable
> group of potential soldiers and/or to individual rulers to take the cross,
> in part even via the example of one or more rulers' or a poet's taking the
> cross.[7]

The strictures of his definition exclude almost all relevant Crusade
poems, just as they would, *mutatis mutandis*, exclude almost all relevant
love poems from the category of love poetry.[8] Silvia Ranawake rejects
Hölzle's definition simply because its purely quantitative criterion is inap-
propriate to the material.[9] Friedrich Oeding, on the other hand, divides
the extant corpus into two groupings: "actual" Crusade poems (i.e.,
Aufruflieder "poetic calls to arms" and poems sung during the journey
to the Crusade's destination) and those that merely mention Crusade.[10]
Dijkstra and Gosman see little functionality in this definition, but sug-
gest that an effective interpretation must somehow deal with the relation
of the text and external historical reality, since it is this relationship that
defines the Crusade lyric. Their own definition seems plausible in that it
casts a broad net:

> The corpus of crusader lyrics should contain every text that, somehow
> or other, shows textual links between the reference to the affairs of the
> crusades and the main items of the text embodying the *intentio*. In other
> words: it must be evident that the presence of the references to the cru-
> sade matters forces the interpretation in a certain direction…. [W]hat is
> typical of the crusade lyrics is the interaction of three different factors.
> The first is the outside historical reality of the crusade conditioning, at
> least during the initial stage of crusading activities, the behaviors of both
> the masses and the authorities (ecclesiastical and secular). The second—
> and here the immense distances between the Holy Land and Europe play
> a significant part—is the deformation of that reality in all kinds of dog-
> matic treatises and literary artefacts: fictionality is the inevitable result.
> The last one is the literary level of the poems itself, where the distorted,
> that is to say, now fictive, outside reality meets the fiction of the poetic
> world.[11]

"Distance" may, however, be far less important as a conditioner of "defor-
mation" than is ideology and the interconnections among military goals,

religious propaganda, and the potential ideological advantages gained via the dissemination of Crusade discourse.

As Oeding divides the corpus of Crusade lyric into two categories, Dijkstra divides it into three, according to content: *Aufruflieder, poésies de circonstance* (based on a particular historical event), and songs of departure.[12] In fact the most common appearance of the Crusades in courtly lyric is in this last type, in the context of the leave-taking of the poetic persona (*qua* Crusader) from his beloved and in his protestations of duty and loyalty to both lord and Lord; often the Crusade is here constructed indeed not as a military, political, or theological duty but rather as a task imposed by the service of courtly love (Crusade as *Minnedienst*), as a passage from Ulrich von Lichtenstein's "Frauendienst" illustrates: a messenger tells the knight of the task assigned him by his lady: *ir müezet durch sî noch varn ein vart.... / Die vart sol wesen über mer* [you have to make a journey for her sake; ... the journey should be across the sea] (1320, 5 and 1321, 1).[13] If and when he returns from Crusade, she will reward him with *ir werden lîp* [her worthy self/body] (1321, 6). The messenger is anything but pleased by his message and voices his complaint to the knight:

> diu vart gevellet mir nicht.
> nu wizet für wâr, daz iu geschiht
> vil ofte hertzenlîchen wê;
> und welt ir varen über sê,
> ir mügt dâ wol geligen tôt.
> so ist daz diu aller græste nôt,
> daz iu diu sêle ist immer vlorn:
> sô sît unsælic ir geborn. (1324, 1–8)

> [The journey does not please me; / now know in truth that to you occurs / very often heartfelt pain; / and if you travel across the sea, / you might well die there: / that is thus the greatest of all miseries / – that your soul is lost forever; / you were thus born to misfortune.]

He points out that crusading is carried out for the love of God *not* of woman, which false motivation would place the knight in danger of losing his soul (1325); the knight counters that *minne* is dear to God, and the service of a lover participates in God's will (1326).

Such examples of the poet's turning the historical reality of the Crusades into a source of innovative conceits in the game of courtly love dialectic could be multiplied.[14] But the point at issue here is a different one, for my concern is not with poems that in general acknowledge the existence of the Crusades, but rather, within this important subgenre of

Crusader lyric that makes explicit reference to the Crusades, with what seems at first glance the almost total lack of political engagement by lyric poets with the ultimate purpose of crusading and with its concrete realities (beyond the lover's inconvenience in having to leave his beloved, etc.), including, of course, the almost complete absence of overt engagement with the period's modes of representing Islam. That is, my interest is not in the occasional almost accidental mention of the Crusades nor with their tactical engagement with the dialectic of eros, but rather in what the informing discourses of the Muslim Other underlying those discrete usages might be and how those discourses would then enable, order, and render politically significant any and all references to the Crusades.

By the time the Crusade lyric comes into its own in the early- to mid-twelfth century, the historical circumstances that enabled its existence as propagandistically "neutral" (at least on the surface)—that is, the broad ideological and practical support among the potentially crusading classes—were already in decline. In fact, there is much evidence that by the late twelfth century there was a dire need for a broad propagandistic front—not in lyric, of course, but generally in Western Christendom—to support the Crusades as a long-term military project, for there had developed a general groundswell of opposition to the Crusades. This opposition was *not*, one must immediately note, due to any questioning of the legitimacy of the cause, but rather to two other clearly distinguishable motivations: logistical issues and personal considerations. The logistical complexities of Crusade in the twelfth century were all but insurmountable, entailing the maintenance and supply of the massive combat force required at a distance of several thousand miles from the troops' multiple homelands. Transporting the troops to the combat zone was *the* most difficult problem of the wars. The lack of a guaranteed term of service also made strategic military planning all but impossible: in mid-campaign, half of the troops might suddenly leave for home, having fulfilled, in their own eyes, their duty. Thus logistics alone made the ultimate defeat of the long-term project all but inevitable. This state of affairs was probably already clear after the initial successes of the First Crusade and the almost immediately consequent difficulties of maintaining the territories gained militarily. Ferdinand Urbanek briefly discusses "the general disinclination of northern European, especially German princes and knights toward the risky, time-consuming, and costly enterprise. During the [12]20s a general Crusade-fatigue obtained."[15] After the annihilation of the Crusaders at the Horns of Hattin in 1187 (Third Crusade), after which the Christian project of the Crusades never again objectively seemed likely to succeed, and again after the catastrophic setback in the Seventh Crusade with Louis IX in Egypt in 1270, his death

in Tunisia, and the subsequent Christian loss of all remaining territory in Syro-Palestine (following the fall of Acre in 1291 which ended the Kingdom of Jerusalem) and surrounding areas, this so-called opposition to the Crusades had grown even stronger, and the Crusade lyric significantly itself all but disappeared.[16]

Peter Hölzle argues that German Crusade lyric is not so clearly to be construed as pro-Crusade propaganda as had earlier been thought by scholars. William E. Jackson goes farther still and claims that most German Crusade lyrics are in fact clearly anti-Crusade: "In all groups one easily finds both in the texts and the interpretations in Hölzle clear signs of a "problematization of the Crusades, if not indeed a latent critique of the the Crusades," which altogether rules out [pro-Crusade] propagandizing."[17] Thus, while Ursula Schulze claims that the *Überwindung der Kreuzzugsideologie* [overcoming/transcending of the Crusade ideology] appears in the poems of Neidhart von Reuenthal, Jackson suggests that it is already present much earlier, in the work of Reinmar von Hagenau, for instance; he maintains that it is also hard to find evidence in the texts of what Schulze calls the "comprehensive character of the zeal/ enthusiasm for Crusade" in the twelfth century.[18] Indeed the twelfth-century discomfort with the Crusade especially after the Battle of Hattin, even among clerics, led some, as Elizabeth Siberry points out, to denounce preachers of Crusade as "false prophets and slaves of the Devil."[19] James A. Brundage concurs that by the end of the twelfth century there was "considerable dissatisfaction with the miscellaneous expeditions that had made up the twelfth-century crusades."[20]

With such a broad range of disciplinary agreement on this point, however, perhaps some clarification of what, precisely, the object of this opposition might have been, is in order, for as already intimated above, there is in the waning years of the twelfth century no hint of anti-war, anti-imperialist sentiment, or moral resistance to imperial/colonial enterprise as we know it, for instance, from peace movements of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. And that is precisely why I make a point of it here, for when contemporary scholars vaguely speak of "Wolfram's tolerance," as was treated in or an "opposition to the Crusades," anachronistic and inapplicable modern notions of tolerance or antiwar sentiment may resonate for (at least) some of their readers. In any case then, there is in courtly lyric's "opposition to Crusade" no recognition, for instance, of Muslim claims on territories in the eastern Mediterranean or of Muslims' right to practice their religion and culture without threat of military conquest, forced conversion or death, or the imposition of European political rule and cultural norms. The extent to which such modern notions are anachronistic becomes

clear, for instance, in Rutebeuf's poem from the 1260s, "Disputaison du croisé et du décroisé," where two knights, one of whom has taken the Cross, while the other has not, debate the reasons to go on Crusade. The latter comments:

> Dites le soudant vostre meistre
> Que je pris pou son menacier:
> S'il vient desa, mal me vit neistre,
> Mais lai ne l'irai pas chacier.
> Se Diex est nule part el monde,
> Il est en France, c'est san doute.
> Ne cuidiez pas qu'il se reponde
> Entre gent qui ne l'ainment goute.[21]

> [Tell the sultan, your master, / that his threats do not concern me very much: / if he comes to us, it would seem bad, / but I will not pursue him there. / ... If God is anywhere in the world, / then he is in France, without doubt. / Do not think that he will respond / to people who do not love him.]

The non-Crusader claims that God can be worshipped in Paris just as well as in Jerusalem, and there is no need to plunder the treasures of *Outremer* in order to enter Paradise. At first glance, his attitude, however self-serving, seems quite modern, even borderline enlightened, but in fact it is simply a single component of the straw man constructed in the poem so that any and all opposition to the Crusade can in the end be systematically refuted, for by the end of the poem the recalcitrant knight predictably changes his mind and also joins his comrade on Crusade.[22]

The poet Salimbene also seems to reverse the commonplace of the medieval Crusader epic tradition in which Muslims abandon their idols as useless after defeat on the battlefield, by claiming now that their "god," *Mahomet*, is apparently stronger than Christ, since the Muslims are systematically defeating Christians in battle.[23] The key notion here is, of course, that this superiority is only *apparent*. Ricaut Bonomel's argument in "Ir'e dolors s'es e mon cor asseza" is, however, adamant. First he voices an idea similar to Salimbene's: "Anz es semblans, en so c'om pot vezer, / C'al dan de nos los vol Dieus mantener" [According to everything that one can see, / God seems to support them against us]; but then he turns a sharp corner on the issue:

> Doncs, ben es fols qui a Turcs mou conteza,
> Pois Ihesu Crist non lor contrasta ges;
> Qu'il an vencut e venzon, de quem peza,
> Francs e Tartres, Armenis e Perses;

E nos venzon sai chascun dia,
Car Dieus dorm qui veillar solia,
E Bafometz obra de son poder
E fai obrar lo Melicadefer.

[Thus he is a great fool who takes the field against the Turks, / since
not even Jesus Christ fights against them: / thus they were and are vic-
torious, to my pain, / over Franks, Tatars, Armeniens, and Persians; /
and they beat us daily, / for God, who otherwise is ever on guard, now
sleeps, / and Bafomet is at work with his power / and spurs on Melicadefer
(*Baibars*)].[24]

Such sentiment seems no longer simply to flirt with defeatism but confi-
dently crosses that line into borderline political heresy. One might, how-
ever, temper this viewpoint with the observation that Ricaut's assessment
(ca. 1265) was rather a realistic view of the political/military situation on
the ground in Egypt and Syro-Palestine. Its purpose was one commonly
expressed in a range of similar poems across linguistic boundaries in the
tradition, which functioned both as a call to moral reform (such that God
would again champion the Christian cause) and a plea to the knightly
class to fulfil its Christian duty of Crusade.

The second of the noted causes for opposition to Crusade is perhaps
best—although admittedly ungenerously—identified as one of personal
inconvenience: a lack of enthusiasm particularly by potential participants,
who simply did not want to travel abroad to fight, since in a very practi-
cal sense, it meant death for a large percentage of them (mostly from dis-
ease, but also from shipwreck, starvation, and even, occasionally, combat);
many survivors were left in abject poverty for the remainder of their lives.
At best, participation in a Crusade meant years away from family and
estate, which could wreak havoc with the foundations of one's life. Such
personal opposition grew particularly strong when it became clear that the
Muslim opponents were not a disorganized band of marauders that could
be easily defeated, but rather a formidable military force largely recruited
from the native populace that had been Muslim for centuries and was
certainly not about to convert to Christianity and become docile subjects
of European colonial rule. Neither the theological arguments in favor of
Crusade nor the potential geopolitical gains of conquest were compelling
enough to motivate a *sufficient number* of European noblemen — genera-
tion after generation—to face the high probability that they would die
before returning home or before establishing a new home across the sea.

Thus Carl Lofmark points out that in the poems of Conon de Béthune,
Friedrich von Hausen, Hartmann von Aue, and Albrecht von Johansdorf
there is a clear "sense of moral duty" to go on Crusade and similarly clear

evidence that they all "support the Crusade in principle"; even so, how-ever, "they are not eager and impatient to go."[25] This is a key distinction for the present argument, for their unquestioned support is the factor that determines their basic attitude toward and representation of the histori-cal and cultural project that was the Crusades. Similarly Reinmar von Hagenau expresses his famous doubts about Crusade, when his speaker knight simply does not want to leave lady and homeland. The knight explains why he looks so sad—his joyous life has been interrupted by his duty to go on Crusade.[26] In Neidhart von Reuenthal's "Ez gruonet wol diu heide," the situation recurs: a knight already overseas sends a messen-ger home to assure the ladies that he can still sing of love; his yearnings and interests—his "intentions"—are clearly directed toward home and the courtly life and not at all toward the presumed duties of a Crusader who is *already on Crusade*. The Crusade is viewed as a mere interruption of one's *real* life that must simply be endured in order that one might return home and resume that life.[27]

In order to put this opposition to the Crusades in perspective, it might be useful to recall who these poets of courtly lyric—the *trouvères*, *troba-dors*, and *Minnesänger*—were and what stake they had in the political sta-tus quo that included the Crusades as an essential component. On the one hand, they in fact never directly and explicitly address the hazards and consequences of the bloody—and, from the Christian perspective, almost without exception strategically catastrophic—wars of the Crusades. On the other hand, however, they remain by no means aloof, objective and coolly distant, untouched by this grand intercontinental military venture. As is evident concerning these poets, by virtue of their belonging to, or, in their literary works, representing the interests of the aristocratic classes that organized and fought the Crusades, they were integrally complicit in the Crusade project. Moreover, some of them were themselves Crusaders: the first Crusading *trobador* was Guilhem IX, Count of Poitou and Duke of Acquitaine; among the troops (of the Third Crusade) of Philipp of France and Friedrich Barbarossa were the poets Albrecht von Johansdorf, Guiot de Provins, Conon de Béthune, and Friedrich von Hausen (the last of whom died on this Crusade); Raimbaut died on the Fourth Crusade.[28] Many others among the poets have at various times been identified by scholars as Crusaders (usually based on the very unstable ground of bio-graphical interpretation of the poems): Nui, chatelain of Couci, *may* have been one of the first to join the First Crusade; Jaufré Rudel *may* have participated in the Second Crusade, and Baucelm Faidit in the Third or Fourth Crusade. Among the German lyricists who created poetic per-sonas who speak as Crusaders (and have thus themselves at times been identified as Crusaders) are Reinmar von Hagenau, Hartmann von

Aue, Otto von Botenlauten, Hiltbolt von Schwangau, the Burggraf von Lienz, Neidhart von Reuenthal, Rubin, Tannhäuser, Bruder Werner, and Walther von der Vogelweide.[29] It is fundamentally important here to keep in mind, as Dijkstra points out, that even though the biographical interpretation of such a highly rhetorical and *nonconfessional* genre as courtly lyric is thankfully no longer (widely) practiced, there is no reason to exclude "the possibility of a personal subjectivity,"[30] that is: whether they ever actually went on Crusade or not, these poets shared or in their poetry created speakers who shared the ideological conceptions of the crusading class(es), and thus it was not implausible for most of them to assume in their poetic works the persona of a crusading knight.

Having said that, perhaps I should nonetheless acknowledge the obvious: writing about an intercontinental military campaign is not at all the same thing as participating in such an endeavor. The better informed we could be about the poets' actual participation in Crusade, the better interpretive basis there would be for understanding the genre and its relation to history. It is clear, for instance, that some of the poets were themselves Crusaders, while others were almost certainly not Crusaders, but no list of the two groups can be drawn up with any degree of certainty. Furthermore, most of the poets, in assuming the persona of a Crusader in their poems, contributed to the collective creation of a lyric discourse of Crusade in which all their poems participate no matter what their own biographies.[31] They are thus not outside observers, not theoreticians of an aestheticized Crusade ideology: they either themselves became combatants who were somehow so moved—whether by fervor, by feudal obligations, by the demands of penance, or other reasons—that they bloodied themselves and others for their ideals, or, they constructed narrative situations and speaking personae in their lyrics that represent that fervor, those obligations, and those ideals that led to that combat. I do not wish to suggest that it is irrelevant whether, for instance, Walther von der Vogelweide was *actually* a combat-experienced Crusader or not, but rather that that experience is most likely no longer either verifiable or ultimately *altogether* relevant for the point at issue here.

Thus while some of these courtly lyricists certainly *did* travel the hazardous roads and sea-ways to the eastern Mediterranean to fight in the Crusades, the "crusading personae" of all of them did so, fictionally. These poets create speakers in their poems who embody the role of Crusader in what for their contemporaries was a perfectly plausible conception of the experience of a member of the aristocratic or ministerial class to which most of the poets belonged. Their poems resonate for us with a different tone, once we consider their authors' participation in the military project not merely a guarantor of some notion of the authenticity

of their credentials as Crusader poets and recognize that there are more than aesthetic considerations at issue: the composition of Crusade lyric is necessarily a political act and participates in the larger project of this intercontinental, centuries-long imperial and colonial project. The *troba-dors*, *trouvères*, and *Minnesänger* participate in it and are in some sense necessarily implicated in the responsibility for the enterprise.

The significance of the discourse of Crusade becomes more important when it is acknowledged that no overarching "Crusade policy" per se, against which that discourse could be measured, existed. As Dijkstra and Gosman note, the status of the Crusades was never clearly formulated even in medieval European theological and legal documents.[32] So their status was all the murkier in texts of other genres, since no writer of any genre could refer to such a definitive policy as an authority. Praxis, even after the First Crusade, provided precedent, but it was not possible to legitimize or authorize any given action or tactical policy by referring to a generally recognized set of "Crusade principles." And, ultimately, in medieval Crusade lyric, as in medieval Crusade epic, the developed discourse itself becomes the standard that defines *literary* praxis. As Said insists concerning Orientalism, the discourse itself becomes independent of empirical verification.

Instead of being satisfied that the general absence of Crusader epic's Muslim caricatures and propagandistic slogans from medieval courtly lyric somehow leaves them untainted by the international military and cultural aggression that was the Crusades, perhaps the function of lyric could be more clearly understood by seeing it in this larger discursive context. Crusade lyric does not in fact deny, refute, or suppress any of the basic assumptions, theological or military, of the broad range of historical Crusader praxis or the literary construct of Crusader ideology of epic. It simply need not reiterate those discursive principles in order to benefit from their existence and thus participate even obliquely in that discourse by articulating its own alternate discursive mode of the Muslim Other.

The significance of this recognition may become clearer from a brief consideration of a Latin lyric that seems to mediate between the modal variants of Crusader discourse. However else that discourse is differentially constructed and whatever else Muslims signify in epic, chronicle, and sermon, they are almost always and almost everywhere conceived as the military, religious, and even personal enemy of Christendom and its representatives. And that is precisely the role assigned them most blatantly in the Latin "Heu, voce flebili cogor enarrare" from the *Carmina burana* manuscript (early thirteenth-century), where one finds eloquent expression of a number of components of the discourse of the Muslim Other known from elsewhere.[33] Here Saladin (صلاح الدين يوسف ابن اَيوب) *Salaḥ*

ud-dīn Yūsufu bnu aɣɣūbi; 1138–1193), the Kurdish military and political leader, feared and sometimes respected opponent in the Second Crusade (especially in the confrontation with Richard the Lionhearted), who led the victorious Muslim armies at the Horns of Hattin in July 1187 that became a turning point in the entire history of the Crusades, is here so characterized:[34]

> III. Malus comes Tripolis, mentem ferens ream,
> magna cum tyrannide, tenens Tiberiam,
> Turcos suis fraudibus ducit in Iudeam
> atque primum occupat totam Galileam.
> IV. Saladinus convocat barbaros per gyrum …
>
> [The evil count of Tripoli, of criminal intent, / with great despotism, occupying Tiberius, / leads the Turks with his deceptions into Judaea / and first occupies all of Galilee. / Saladin assembles the barbarians round about…]

Compared with the screed of some contemporary epics, this rhetoric seems rather tame, but the significance for the vernacular traditions is that the poem and the characterization of Saladin and his actions here and in subsequent stanzas of the poem are situated in a larger historical context that adumbrates the "fortress Europe" mentality characteristic of the more propagandistic genres. Here the Crusaders' enemy is constructed as a integral participant in an amalgamated, accumulative tradition of the successive enemies of an ad hoc hybrid construct of Greco-Hebraeo-Christian civilization dating from the time of the Israelites and continuing up through the Greco-Persian wars of the fifth century B.C.E and into the centuries of the Christian confrontation with Islam: Arabs, Turks, Moors, Scythians, Moabites, Amonites, Ishmaelites, Amalechites, Massagetae, Tatars, Sarmatians, Vandals, Medes, and Persians (IV–VI). The most recent such enemy, Muslims who have invaded the *terram…inclitam* [renowned land], are *sanguinem amantes* [lovers of blood] who slaughter the aged and infants alike (*senes et infantes*), cut the throats of young boys and slit open pregnant women (VII); they are *barbaros armatos* [armed barbarians] (X), a *popul[us] crudeli[s]* [cruel people] (XXIII), led by *ferox Saladinus*, // *Latro ille pessimus, terre devastator, / per quam suis pedibus transiit Salvator* [wild Saladin, / that worst of brigands, devastator of the land / through which the Savior's own feet trod] (XIV–XV).[35]

This appeal to historical precedent as the interpretive frame in which the Muslim occupiers of Palestine can be understood is found only rarely in epic, resembles in part the connection with eschatological imagery and referents in the *Ludus de Antichristo*, and in fact is to be found later in

Walther's lyrics, especially in his use of apocalyptic imagery. Striking as this poem is in its variation on the modes of discourse discussed in this study in genres beyond lyric,[36] it is no less striking that with the exception of a few other poems in which Saladin is named, Muslims themselves—whether historical, fictional, or simply generic—are all but absent from lyric, especially in the French and German courtly traditions. Even in lyrics with a Crusade setting, battles against raging Muslim hordes, as known from epic, do not occur; there are no Muslim monsters—although *ferox Saladinus* may come close—in lyric. There is no need for such trappings, however, for such images have already become integral components of several varieties of the cultural discourse of the Muslim Other that can be assumed by the lyric poet so that his own articulation of that discourse can be rather different; the Crusade lyric simply operates within the parameters of that larger field of discourses without the need to reiterate their terms for an audience already conversant with them. If and when those discursive components are relevant, they are "available," and when they are not, they may be ignored or indeed countered, as is described below. Thus the few extra-textual references to the Crusades that do occur in lyric are easily integrated into an underlying conception of Crusader imperialism.

Perhaps the best example of this situation in courtly lyric is to be found in the poems of the Middle High German *Minnesänger*, Walther von der Vogelweide (ca. 1170–1230), in a number of whose lyrics references to the Crusades occur. While the scholarly suggestion that Walther himself was a Crusader is based exclusively on the biographical interpretation of a single stanza of one of his poems, there is no question that almost all the princes whom Walther served during his long career went on Crusade. His own personal participation is then perhaps not of essential relevance, since Walther's ubiquitous engagement with politics on various levels is one of the most defining features of his poetic œuvre (particularly having to do with imperial succession and imperial-papal conflicts, in addition to Crusade lyric). Indeed during Walther's adult life, there were few periods in which the Crusades were *not* at issue: the Third Crusade (1187–1192, in which Friedrich Barbarossa participated); the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204, in which western Crusaders were distracted from their ostensive goals and instead conquered and devastated the Christian city of Constantinople); the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221, in which Crusaders attempted to conquer Egypt as a preliminary to the conquest of Palestine, but were annihilated while still in Egypt); and finally the Sixth Crusade (1228–1229, during which Frankish control of Jerusalem was peacefully—and temporarily—restored). Whether Walther himself ever went on Crusade or not, the entirety of his adult

life was spent in the milieu of Crusaders and the Crusades, which were *the* dominant issue in international politics of the era, manifested in policies, finances, self-valuation, and so on, at the courts of individual rulers throughout Europe. Wentzlaff-Eggebert remarks that indeed "the breath of the time is ubiquitously perceptible in his Crusader stanzas."[37]

Two of his poems combine a call to Crusade with a lament of moral decline: the so-called "Aufforderung zum Kreuzzug" ("Owê, waz êren sich ellendet von tiutschen landen" C5/L13, 5) and the so-called "Elegie" ("Owê, war sint verswunden alliu mîniu jâr!" C97/L 124, 1).[38] In the former, Walther refers to the shirkers among knights who do not take the cross. In addition, stanzas in the "Ottenton" ("Herre bâbest, ich mac wol genesen" C4/L11, 6) and the "König Friedrichston" ("Von Rôme voget, von Pülle künic, lât iuch erbarmen" C11, VII/L28, 1; "Ir fürsten, die des küniges gerne wæren âne" C11, XI/L29, 15) include calls to Crusade that clearly assume an underlying discourse of the Muslim Other. The stanzas in the "Bogenerton" (C59, IV/L79, 9) address the archangels Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael as shirkers of their [!] Crusade responsibility who are told: *welt ir mîn lop, sô sit bescheiden / un schadet allerêrst den heiden* [if you want my praise, then understand it well: / first of all you must harm the heathens].[39]

Two of Walther's poems are especially relevant to the present argument and deserve lengthier comment: the "Kreuzlied" ("Vil süeze wære minne" C53/L76, 22),[40] and the "Palästinalied" ("Nû alrêst lebe ich mir werde" C7/L14, 38), probably from 1227—1228 after Pope Gregory IX's call to the Sixth Crusade under Friedrich II and perhaps even in oblique support of Friedrich's quasi-negotiations with the Sultan, ملك الكامل ناصر الدين ابو المعالى محمد, Malik ul-Kāmil Nāṣr ud-dīn abu l-Maʾāli Muḥammad (1180–1238; nephew of Saladin).

In the "Kreuzlied" the audience (which is not specifically identified) is exhorted: *nû læset unverdrozzen / daz hêrebernde lant* [now liberate tirelessly / the land that bore the Lord] (ll. 15–16), a task in which God will help: *got sol uns helfe erzeigen / ûf den der manegen veigen / der sêle hât gepfant* [God will grant us aid against that one who has stolen the souls of many doomed to die] (ll. 18–20); another exhortation is also voiced: *erlœsen wir daz grap!* [let us liberate the tomb!] (II, 20). The image of the helpless, pure, and sacred land, held by unbelievers and in desperate need of armed liberation, is repeated in stanza four:

> Ierusalêm, nu weine:
> wie dîn vergezzen ist!
> der heiden überhêre
> hât dich verschelket sêre. (IV 11–14)

[Now weep, Jerusalem. / How you are forgotten! / The heathen's haughtiness / has grievously enslaved you.]

As Franz Viktor Spechtler points out, the central argument of the "Palästinalied" is that Christians have "the right/title to the Holy Land."[41] Indeed, as Spechtler has noted, the persona of poem seems cast almost in the role of attorney for the Christian plaintiff. One might add that the case is concerned with the redemption of the world, on the one hand, and a simple real estate dispute, on the other, but in both instances, the issue is who should own Palestine. The case is based on extensive evidence, all of which, not surprisingly, derives directly from the Bible or from Christian tradition and has significance only within the discourse of that tradition: Palestine is the site of the virgin birth (II,5), Christ's baptism (IV,1), and the redemption via crucifixion (IV,3–4; V,1–4; according to the poem, Christ's baptism and Crucifixion serve directly to redeem Christians and curse Muslims), the resurrection (which demonstrates the weakness of the Jews, who could not even effectively guard [*huote*] the tomb; VII,3; VIII,1–2), while the Harrowing of Hell, which sets up a contrast with the divine image of Jews and Muslims, proceeded from the tomb itself (VI,1–2), and the Last Judgment is also expected to take place there (XII). In fact—in a strategic instance of geographical amnesia—it is maintained that all of the Christian God's important deeds in the world from creation to the present took place there (*daz huob sich dort und endet hie* [that began there and ends here] XI,7). The poem closes with the notion that Jews, Muslims, and Christians all claim the land for themselves, which conflict must allegedly be decided by God alone (*Got sol uns ze reht bescheiden* [God must decide it for us/must judge us rightly/justly/legally] XII,3), but in fact, of course, the lyric's persona decides it and simply attributes the decision to his God: *reht ist, daz er uns gewer* [right/just/legal it is that He support us] (XII,7), as he has already hinted at earlier in the poem, in pointing out that *heilic ist daz selbe lant* [that same land is holy] (VIII,6), and *wê dir, heiden, daz ist dir zorn* [woe to you, heathens, that it angers you] (IV,7).[42] It is by means of this brief recapitulation of redemptive history—indeed almost in the list-like form found in Crusader sermon as outlined by Wentzlaff-Eggebert—that the proof of Christ's championing the Crusader cause is demonstrated, which then also is to prove both the illegitimacy of the Muslim claim and the guilt of the Jews, who, the poet claims, killed Christ: *. . . hêrre . . . den ir hant sluoc unde stach* [the Lord . . . whom their hands beat and stabbed] (VIII,5–7), conveniently forgetting the New Testament's specification of Roman jurisdiction over and execution of capital sentences in general and of this case in particular. Since the poem was written during the time that the

emperor was not fighting with Muslims from a position of strength, but rather negotiating with them from a position of weakness (1228–1229), then it is clear, according to Spechtler that "religion and politics, or rather religion in the service of imperial politics, speak forth from the text."[43]

The ultimate point made in Walther's "Kreuzlied" and "Palästinalied" is that the reconquest of the Holy Land is the duty of Christians, since that land is quite simply the property of Christians by right, indeed by inheritance.[44] Rather surprisingly perhaps, the tacit assumption here seems very much in line with the sentiment explicitly expressed by the poet of the *Chanson de Roland*: *Paien unt tort e chrestïens unt dreit* [pagans are wrong and Christians are right],[45] the clear implication being that God is on "our" side; that land belongs to "us" (albeit without the massive slaughter, narratively enacted, of both Christians and Muslims attendant on that pronouncement in the Old French poem). More importantly, the general scenario in Walther's poem cannot but recall the content of the most famous Crusade sermon of all, by Bernard of Clairvaux, who comments:

> Commota est et contremuit terra, quia Rex caeli perdidit terram suam, terram ubi steterunt pedes eius, inimici crucis eius unanimiter simul adversus eum testamentum disposuerunt, et qui oderunt eum extulerunt caput. Dixerunt in corde suo cognatio eorum simul: Haeriditate possideamus sanctuarium eius. Officines redemptionis nostrae evertere moliuntur, et loca Christi sanguine dedicata profanare contendunt.[46]

> [The earth quakes and trembles, because the King of Heaven has lost His land, the land on which His feet stood. The enemies of the Cross namely have unanimously rebelled against Him and those who hate Him say together with them with upraised head: "We want to take possession of our inheritance, His sanctuary." They want to lay waste the sites of our redemption, and desecrate the places sanctified by the blood of Christ.]

Despite this verbal echo of one the most vehement traditions of anti-Muslim discourse, the word "tolerance" continues to haunt scholarship on Walther, just as it did the scholarship on Wolfram's epics. Perhaps in Walther's case, it is largely a matter of his association with Friedrich II's dealings with Sultan Al–Kāmil. Spechtler, for instance, comments, similarly to many other scholars:

> At a time, however, in which an emperor does not conquer but rather negotiates with Jews and "heathens" (Muslims) [*sic*]. With his concept of tolerance, the emperor was far ahead of his time, as well as the poet and his European audience.[47]

Significant as Friedrich's negotiations were, a reminder of their context might be useful: having finally set out on Crusade in 1228, long after having (again) lost the favor of Pope Gregory IX and having thus been excommunicated (for the second time) by him, and having seen his troops first decimated by an epidemic and then reduced to an insignificant and quite ineffective force by attrition, Friedrich was in no position to do anything but "negotiate" with the sultan, since combat would have simply been suicidal. Moreover, it should be pointed out, that those negotiations were not the result of any tactically brilliant innovation on Friedrich's part, and in fact hardly merit the designation "negotiations," since essentially all he did was accept the sultan's standing offer first made some years earlier to cede Christian access to Jerusalem in exchange for the withdrawal of Christian troops. At that time it had been rejected by the Crusaders who were confident in military victory; now Friedrich merely accepted the (diminished) offer from a position of abject weakness. "Negotiation" is a charitable term under the circumstances, and "tolerance," however it might be conceived, played no role at all.

There is, however, more to the notion of tolerance in Walther's poems than any direct or indirect relation with Friedrich's complex multicultural associations. While one must view them in the larger ideological context of Walter's poetic works—with which they in general stand in direct and stark contradiction—there are two lines in Walther's "Wiener Hofton," "Swer âne vorhte, hêrre got" (C10, V/L22, 3, ll. 14–15) that are quite explosive and perhaps gesture toward a notion of "tolerance" more than anything yet considered in this study: *Im dienent kristen, juden unde heiden, / der elliu lebenden wunder nert* [Christians, Jews, and heathens serve him, / who nourishes the miracle of all life]. These lines will require some unpacking, for they could potentially imply an inclusive religious *oikumene* that would have profound consequences for the speaking persona's entire conception of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. One step at a time.

As suggested earlier in this chapter, while the multiple discourses of the Muslim Other "available" outside the bounds of *Minnesang* provide a constant ideological hum for both lyric poets and their audience, the mode of that discourse specific to lyric is indeed distinct, and Walther's poem here puts its stamp on one primary aspect of that distinctiveness, at least in his oeuvre. Unlike the polytheistic and idolatrous literary Muslims inhabiting a multitude of medieval Christian texts (from Germany and elsewhere) in a variety of genres before, during, *and long after* Walther's life, here, in a two-line rather matter-of-fact statement, the poem's persona takes for granted that Jews, Muslims, and Christians worship the same God. One would be tempted then to extrapolate that non-Christian

worshippers of that God must themselves necessarily be rational human beings (and not, for instance, raving blood-thirsty beasts), that they must be ruled by at least similar if not the same moral laws as Christians, and so on. But the reader should be careful here, since it would be difficult to imagine that the shared deity posited by the poem's speaker here for Jews, Muslims, and Christians is anything other than the Christian God as conceived in early thirteenth-century central Europe. To put a fine point on it, the shared deity posited here is neither השם *ha-shem*, the Jewish conception of the deity developed over the course of—up to that time—some two millennia of biblical and postbiblical textual tradition, nor الله *allah*, the Muslim deity defined in the Qur'ān and five centuries of post-Qur'ānic traditions. No attributes of the contemporaneous Jewish or Islamic deity would have been incorporated into the poem's speaker's conception of shared deity. So, while the poem's speaker does indeed herewith acknowledge that Muslims are both monotheists and worshippers of a deity that can be recognized and acknowledged as a deity by Christians (as opposed, for instance, to the contemporaneous Christian notion that Muslims worshipped, for instance, Jupiter and Muḥammad as deities)—and this acknowledgment is indeed of profound significance—the deity that he imputes to Jews and Muslims is after all his own God. In a certain sense, there is here a parallel to the image of the "noble heathen" of courtly romance who is noble precisely to the extent that his own culture is eradicated and replaced by European cultural attributes in, for instance, dress, speech, style of warfare, chivalry, and the practice of courtly love. Here one simply adds "deity" to that list of shared cultural goods—insofar as the item in question is defined in a European sense. Thus, while Walther's statement does go far beyond the norm of Christian discourse of the Muslim Other of the period, it is necessary to be precise about just how far it goes: it still does not, for instance, open the possibility of Islamic subjectivity: Muslims are still to be positively valued only insofar as they can be defined in Christian terms.

Furthermore, the paucity of historical reference in *Minnesang* in general and Walther's works in particular fail us, for, with the exception of these two lines, evidence from Walther's texts is nowhere inconsistent with a variety of extant contemporaneous bigoted modes of discourse of the Muslim Other. Indeed, except for these two lines, one might conclude that Walther's lyric participated—in a perhaps reticent but committed manner—with a generally bigoted mode of the early thirteenth-century discourses of the Muslim Other. These two lines nonetheless make that facile pigeon-holing of Walther impossible and thus complicate the picture appreciably, without, however, enabling any final clarification of the issue. I happen to find such complication—without ultimate

resolution—not a bad thing. Life is not simple and there is no reason for us to insist on simplicity in medieval life, culture, texts, and authors.

Before proceeding to further contextualization of these two important lines, yet another brief detour through the tangle of biographical criticism might be salutary, for it will point up yet another complicating issue in understanding how these lines might signify. As noted above, the "Palästinalied" presents scholars who favor biographical interpretations with the only possible suggestion that Walther himself might have taken part in a Crusade: when, in the first stanza, the persona speaks of the transformative experience of having seen Palestine with his own eyes for the first time. In his astute expression of the general scholarly skepticism on biographical interpretations of Walther's first-person speaker, Gerhard Hahn puts his finger on precisely the signficant issue: "It is nowadays no longer necessary to address biographically based misunderstandings. The *persona* has in the first instance the status of a literary role."[48] In a similar vein, as George F. Jones suggests, our caution with biographical interpretation should also extend to the attribution of particular political views expressed in the poems: since the poems were certainly written for patrons and perhaps even had their very content commissioned, there is little evidence for attribution of any of those particular views to Walther personally.[49] Thus quite distinct from the reader's responsibility to consider, for instance, the multiple and potentially contradictory ideological positions of a single character in an epic, which would insist on some critical processing on the reader's part in order to come to an understanding of the complexities of the character, there is no necessary compulsion for the reader to construct a unified field theory of, for instance, Walther's discourse of *Minne*, imperial politics, or indeed the Muslim Other. While such unified interpretive theories might indeed be possible, the range of subgenres, patrons, and often indeterminant dates and places of composition of the poems in his oeuvre would seem almost to deny the likelihood of success. With the further fragmentation of any supposed unity of the poet's voice as a result of the system of patronage, it might well be time to reconsider the scholar's task in treating such poems.

In any case, while the content of these two lines is of paramount importance in the context of the present study—and I return to their significance in the final chapter—one must retain some contextual perspective on them and guard against the teleological impulse that seems always ready clandestinely to guide scholarly examinations of such issues. One might, for instance, point out, that while Walther's statement is not unique in the thirteenth century, it is unique in the range of texts analyzed in the present study and is likewise not plottable on any graph of, as it were, progressive steps toward enlightened ecumenical liberalism.

It is in an epidemiological sense an "isolate," or in geological terms an "erratic"—an intrusive alien element in a patterned matrix of otherwise predictably similar objects—in the discourses of the Muslim Other in medieval Germany. But rarely is an erratic in fact unique, and thus it is also with the statement in Walther's poem. William of Tyre, for instance, like the speaker of Walther's poem, claims that Muslims worship the same God as do Christians, which he intimates, might indeed enable them to attain Heaven by means of lives of sufficient piety, a radical view for both his time and indeed our own.[50] Walther's speaker does not venture so far; nor need he do so to get our attention and to make his mark on the discourse of the Muslim Other in the tradition of *Minnesang.*

George F. Jones cautions readers against identifying ideas found in Walther's poems as his own personally held beliefs, but then he nonetheless himself praises Walther explicitly for his tolerance—with specific reference to these lines—which he attributes to Christian Europeans' direct experience of Muslims via Crusade:

> Of interest in this song is the tolerant attitude shown to the Jews and heathens and the acknowledgment that they too worship God. A century earlier, during the First Crusade, Europeans had believed that the Mohammedans were polytheistic idolaters who worshiped Mohammed, Apollo, and Termagant....[51]

Jones goes on to suggest that Walther's conception resulted from the experience of the Crusaders in Palestine, which had given them "an opportunity to notice the splendor of the Saracens' culture and to observe their actual religious practices."[52] This notion—that discourse can be modified by empirical experience—is one that has already arisen numerous times in the scholarship cited in this study, and here, too, it initially might seem a reasonable inference. Its growing deployment in recent scholarship without any interrogation of the sociological and indeed psychological mechanisms of such a putative transformation or is a topic to be addressed in the following, concluding chapter.

★   ★   ★

The conception of tolerance identified by modern scholars in thirteenth-century lyric texts is troubled. To take one not particularly extreme example, Wentzlaff-Eggebert acknowledges that tolerance as such is a modern idea and practice not legitimately to be imputed to the European Middle Ages, but interestingly he nonetheless suggests that Crusader lyric contributed to the development of such a practice.

His suggestion of the origin of this practice may give us pause, how-ever: he posits "the decisive turn toward tolerance"[53] in the advocacy of Muslim conversion (expressed in Bernard of Clairvaux's *De consid-eratione*[54] and the sermons of Francis of Assisi), as opposed to the mass slaughter of Muslims in combat (such as one generally attributes to the *Kaiserchronik* or the *Chanson de Roland*). That is, he proposes necessary conversion, that is, cultural extinction, in place of physical annihilation, as a step toward tolerance—unsteady ground indeed.[55]

Although there is a tendency in thirteenth-century courtly litera-ture, including courtly lyric, toward a more than occasional depiction of one of the Muslim leaders (e.g., Saladin) as "noble heathens," that con-struction of nobility is not ubiquitous (as, for instance, demonstrated in the calumny directed toward *ferox Saladinus* in "Heu, voce flebili cogor enarrare" from the *Carmina Burana*, discussed above), and the remaining Muslim populace remains in large part similar to the nonindividuated Hell-bound mass found on the battlefields of Crusader epic. As at the conclusion of the discussion of Wolfram's epics, here, again, one might wonder what actual, concrete difference the posited move toward "tol-erance" signals or causes in the behavior of Christians toward Muslims? Does it bring about a Christian recognition of the legitimacy of Islam as a religion? Or of Muslims, as individuals and as a group, currently practic-ing Islam, as equals before God and humans? While the bold statement in Walther's lyric that Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship a single God complicates all these questions, it does not render them irrelevant. Indeed one might still ask whether Muslims are there not still viewed—whether as bestial barbarians or noble exotics—as Hell-bound heretics (according to John Tolan, the newly rising conception of Islam) deserv-ing either of conversion to Christianity and subordination to Christian political control or of death so that Christians may possess their land?—an issue, for instance, on which Walther poems demonstrate *no* accom-modation toward tolerance in any sense. Just as Wolfram's Gyburc's supposed "tolerance" effects no change in the anti-Muslim behavior of any of the Christian characters (including the hero) of *Willehalm*, neither does Walther's posited "tolerance" admit the possibility that the Christian claim of the right to possess Palestine might be called into question. Or if Judaism's and Islam's worshipping of the same God as Christians some-how made them legitimate sister religions of Christianity, would that suspend or eliminate entirely the Christian move toward the militantly missionizing "tolerance" suggested by Wentzlaff-Eggebert? While again bearing in mind the radical nature of Walther's speaker's position on the shared deity of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, one should nonethe-less remember that the acknowledgment of a shared deity—even among

Christians—was (and is) no guarantor of religious tolerance or even the sanctity of the life of the believer, as the massive slaughters during the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries across the face of Europe demonstrate. And indeed Walther's poems seem to posit both a shared deity with Muslims *and* the inevitability of Muslims' condemnation to Hell.

It would be possible to adduce a few dozen other pieces of evidence from other poems like the several that occur in Walther's "Palästinalied" and "Swer âne vorhte, hêrre got," but nothing more illustrative than these two poems. In terms of the kind of problematization that I have suggested here, however, there is no need for the mass of evidence available, for instance, in Crusader *epic*. While fragmentary and oblique articulation of a discourse of the Muslim Other in courtly lyric leaves much open to debate, I suggest that this lyric reticence—not to say silence—on the political issues of the Crusades speaks rather loudly, in fact. In its infrequent but consistent referents to more broadly documented modes of the discourse on the Muslim Other, it effectively constructs its own variant discourse.

CHAPTER 7

A TWELFTH-CENTURY PARADIGM SHIFT?

Recent scholarship has begun to revise many of the prevailing scholarly conceptions concerning the modes of interaction between Christians and Muslims in medieval Europe. Generally these revisions posit a change that arises following the First Crusade, developing and spreading in the course of the twelfth century. This tendency in the scholarship is salutary, and as the range of studies demonstrates, the deep corpus of evidence is complex and contradictory, growing out of detailed studies of local texts, traditions, and conditions in scores of sites around the continent and over the course of time. It will obviously take some time to come to terms with the full implications of these studies. This is particularly the case with respect to developments in discursive traditions, which move all but glacially. In order to contextualize the conclusions to be drawn from the present study, it will be necessary here to come to terms with this recent trend in scholarship.

Based on a variety of kinds of evidence, however, a number of scholars have for some time been proposing a radical change in the dominant *mentalité* of medieval Western European culture in the course of the twelfth century. Vladimir Goss suggests that the opening of the *materia orientalis*, the developing intellectual interest in the West for Islam that arose in the course of the twelfth century, and which was a part of what Charles Homer Haskins, in his landmark book, designated the "renaissance of the twelfth century," may ultimately be at the root of such a transformation.[1] In his insightful study of Christian-Islamic relations in the period, John Tolan suggests that the twelfth-century Christian intellectual engagement with Islam at the time constituted "study" of Islam, one reason for which was "the profound cultural and intellectual influence the Muslim world was exercising on Latin Europe in the twelfth century: notably through trade and through the translations of scientific and philosophical works from Arabic to Latin."[2]

It would be useful here to take a moment to unpack what such a "study" of Islam might mean in the twelfth century, for while I fully concur with Tolan's suggestion, I would nonetheless like to push his interrogation of the term somewhat farther. For there is no question of the transformative significance of the twelfth- and especially thirteenth-century Latin translations from Arabic, particularly in Spain, that quite remade the curriculum of advanced studies in Latin Christendom and contributed indeed to the development of nascent universities. But one must take some care in understanding the broader implications of those translations for the focal issues of the present analysis (and beyond). While there was certainly expanded Western interest in Islamic intellectual culture, and while there is no question that in some contact zones, such as Iberia and Sicily, there was a level of cultural and intellectual engagement that had long-term "trickle down" consequences far from those zones and in both Latin and vernacular culture, the identification of the mechanics of that interest as the "study" of Islam requires some qualification.

The veritable explosion of Christian intellectual interest in Islamic science drew hundreds of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Christian scholars to the contact zones, especially Iberia and Sicily, whose works—primarily translations—have been, are now being, and will long continue to be identified, integrated into larger cultural contexts, and evaluated by scholars. The work of these translators was, however—to be very precise—not broadly and voraciously inclusive, but rather was quite narrowly focused on, indeed rabidly obsessed with, ancient *Greek* philosophy and science, especially the works of Aristotle.[3] Almost as by-products of this obsession, much other Greek knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and other sciences, transmitted through Arabic mediation, made its way into Latin.

It is, however, difficult to construe the intellectual interest that motivated these translation projects in any way as the *study* of Islam, that is, of Arabic (or Persian or Turkic) culture itself. In fact, the specifically Arabic work on these ancient Greek texts was most often viewed by the Christian translators as accreted commentary at best and was often simply omitted from the translations. Furthermore, and most significantly, among the scores of texts translated into Latin that literally transformed the landscape of medieval Christian scholarship, there was—beyond the Latin paraphrase of and polemical, refutational commentary on the Qur'ān—not a single specifically *Islamic* text translated from Arabic into any language of Christian Europe. Non-Iberian Christian scholars did not, as Haskins points out, generally know any Arabic upon their arrival in Spain, and, even after living and working there sometimes for many years, many of them had had little enough contact with Muslim culture

that they had still not managed to learn Arabic.[4] Their "translations" from Arabic depended directly on local interpreters, especially (converted) Jews, who translated the Arabic texts into the local Romance vernacular, which the Christian translator then rendered into Latin. This was, for instance, the case even for the great twelfth- and thirteenth-century "translators" Gerard of Cremona, Michael Scot, and Hermann the German, whose actual Arabic interpreters have been identified.

The obsessive Christian interest in Arabic learning was thus actually an interest in *Greek* learning that was, so they thought, only temporarily and unproblematically "disguised" by its Arabic language, which was to be stripped off and discarded as quickly and completely as possible. While there were, of course, some exceptions, as a rule the culture of the Muslim contact zone either did not interest the Christian translators, or their interest in it rarely or never impinged on their intellectual work. Thus the massive and multicultural library of—just to name three realms of all but untapped Islamic learning—poetry, jurisprudence, and philosophically informed religious commentary remained for Christian Europe quite literally, closed books. While it was not particularly easy, logistically and otherwise, for twelfth- and thirteenth-century Christian scholars to gain the competence necessary to translate Arabic learning into Latin, it certainly was possible. In order to point out just how distant the activities of Christian scholars were from a "study" of Muslim culture, an anachronistic notion (and certainly not intended by Tolan), might be useful here: there was, for instance, no real possibility for European Christians to immerse themselves in "Islamic studies"—for example, Qur'ānic commentary, Persian lyric, Turkish epic, Mamluk architecture, or the like—or at least they made no such possibilities for themselves.

Because of the groundswell of recent scholarly interest in working through the myriad bits and pieces of evidence of cultural exchange between Islamic and Christian cultures particularly in the contact zones in order to construct a more nuanced interpretational mosaic, it seems to me necessary to draw our attention to this point: while tens of thousands of Christians had a broad range of daily relations with Muslims over the course of centuries in the shifting contact zones, especially in Iberia, Sicily, and Palestine, long-term and transformative intellectual exchange on specifically Christian-Muslim issues only very rarely took place— even if we maintain our frame of reference as *several centuries*. While many Christian scholars in the contact zones may well have learned something or even a great deal about Islam and Muslim lifeways, and even (rarely) conveyed something about Islamic culture via their Latin translations of (Arabo-)Greek science, for the most part Islamic culture remained

astonishingly invisible in the intellectual culture even of this period of intensive Christian interest in Arabic-language texts.

With respect to another of the primary zones of contact between Christianity and Islam—the Crusades themselves—Haskins pointed out long ago: the Crusades motivated little if any significant intellectual exchange, for "[t]he Crusaders were men of action, not men of learning."[5] Nikita Elisséeff concurs that the Crusades played no important role in transferring Muslim science to Christian Europe.[6] Joshua Prawer subtly expresses the same idea in his study of the cultural contact between Western Christians and their Christian and Muslim subjects in the Crusader kingdoms: "On the whole it would not be wrong to speak of a basic Crusader non-receptiveness to Oriental culture."[7] In their Crusader kingdoms, they constructed adamantly noninteractive administrations that did not even show any interest in converting their Muslim subjects (until the waning days of Christian rule in the late thirteenth century). Prawer comments: after two hundred years of "co-existence, the Crusaders, with few exceptions, neither spoke nor knew Arabic." He identifies only thirty-six borrowed Arabic words in Crusader documents, including such words as *mosque, Muḥammad,* and *caliph*.[8] There were, of course, some exceptional cases of Christian Europeans in Crusader contact zones who knew Arabic (such as William of Tyre), but they *were* stark exceptions (mostly missionaries and administrators), whose bona fides were as a direct result of their learning Arabic immediately suspect to other Crusaders. There was absolutely no knowledge or use made of Arabic geography, philosophy, astronomy, math, or literature in the Crusader territories, and nowhere in the Crusader states was there a nexus of cultural exchange as later developed, for instance, in Toledo or Palermo. Prawer observes that "the Crusaders knew little and wanted to know even less about the population they ruled" and characterizes the colonial practice:

> The guiding principle in living and in administering the conquered territories was that to be practiced later in all major European colonial enterprises; it is not incorrect to classify it as a system of apartheid. Variant legal status, statutory distinctive dress, different forms of taxation, let alone the economic distinction of exploiters and exploited, kept up the barriers between conquerors and conquered for almost two hundred years of Crusader domination.[9]

The entire native population (Eastern Christians, Muslims, Jews) were, under Christian rule, subject to this system of apartheid. Nor was there any Latin or vernacular production of literature or cultural documents

in Crusader territories. The social values in the Crusader kingdoms were exclusively European and aristocratic; all clergy (with a single exception in the entire period) were European; there was no locally developed spiritual leadership at all, even in the strictly European community: there were no cathedral schools of note nor any (proto-)universities.[10] Intellectually, the Crusader states were effectively sterile.

It is thus in this context that the ongoing reevaluation of the modes of Christian-Muslim intellectual (and other kinds of) contact may best be carried out. One of the most important of these recent reevaluations has been Sharon Kinoshita's *Medieval Boundaries*, where it is suggested that the transformation in the modalities of Christian-Muslim contact in precisely this period constituted an "epistemic rupture"—which, with respect to the issues relevant in the present study, had the effect of changing the way that Western European Christians viewed and represented Islam and its adherents.[11] She says of her project: "*Medieval Boundaries* explicitly casts the early thirteenth century as a moment of epistemic rupture, in which several key twelfth-century institutions, practices, and mentalities were, in relatively short order, reorganized, challenged, or abolished." Those paradigmatic changes are manifested, she suggests, in the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), which resulted in the Crusader conquest of Constantinople, and the Albigensian crusade (1209–1229), both of which she characterizes as a turning inward of the violence unleashed in the First Crusade, and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which made significant changes in the regulation of internal Others (Jews, heretics, lepers). She further suggests that "[w]hatever the causes of this epistemic shift, medievalists working in a wide range of specializations agree on its effects," mentioning R.R. Davies' work on Anglo-Norman colonization in Wales, Geraldine Heng's on policing of internal and external borders, and David Abulafia on the "hardening of the external boundaries" between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in the "late Middle Ages." While Kinoshita provides several instructive readings of both texts and objects of material Muslim-Christian exchange, there is little offered as a chronological analysis of evidence that would illustrate the necessary "before" and "after" states that radical transformation or "epistemic rupture" presupposes.

There are, additionally, quite serious conceptual problems in the argument: the Crusader conquest of Constantinople and the Albigensian Crusade can only be construed as "internal violence" via a profoundly presentist perspective, as if the modern conception of a culturally unified Christendom, on the one hand, and of a French state and French nation, on the other, already obtained for the twelfth century, when in fact it was impossible for the culturally quite foreign Provence (the focus of

the Albigensian campaign) to be imagined as *internal* territory by the northern French political, military, and ecclesiastical authorities of the period, while the Western European, and especially the logistically essential Venetian, authorities viewed the Byzantine East and its capital city, Constantinople, as sufficiently foreign indeed to be the object of Crusader conquest, brutal destruction, pillaging, and exploitative rule.[12] This was not an inward turning of the violence legitimized in the First Crusade, but rather a concretization of the flexible and pragmatic practice of identifying the enemy Other, whether in Islam, Byzantine Christianity, or Albigensian heresy.

Moreover, while Kinoshita's suggestion of a less confrontational and culturally more permeable Christian–Muslim engagement along the trans-Pyrenean border is both timely and salutary, the evidence that she offers hardly supports the broad-ranging and far-reaching thesis concerning "epistemic rupture." While there is no question but that during the seven centuries of Muslim presence in Iberia there was far more at stake than the often posited poles of militaristic *reconquista* and utopian cultural melting pot, the analysis of several French literary texts and several objects of material culture can hardly redefine pan-European Christian–Muslim relations in general as one characterized not by military conflict but by "peaceful contact and accomodation, of 'business as usual.'"[13] Indeed as Michael Frassetto has demonstrated, it was precisely in the twelfth century that the belligerence that had long characterized the Christian–Muslim relations in the Byzantine East *began* to characterize those relations in Western Europe.[14] Benjamin Isaac, Joseph Ziegler, and Miriam Eliav-Feldon likewise identify precisely the period between 1190 and 1300 as the one in which "something did happen…to enable a proto-racist shift in Latin Europe."[15] Indeed it was at the beginning of this period that

> Europeans began to meet new ethnic groups, and not only on the battle-field, whether in Southwestern Asia or on the streets of Mediterranean cities, in missionary and commercial contexts. It was then that the language describing such foreign groups seemed to change, becoming more biological and stressing the inherent physical and mental characteristics of these peoples.[16]

That attitude did not weaken but rather strengthened over the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

John Tolan also proposes a change, albeit a far subtler one than would be encompassed by the designator "epistemic rupture," in the Western perception of Islam in the course of the twelfth century, when interest

in Islam grew in the Christian West, resulting in "polemical lives of Muhammad, in response to the successes of Crusade and *reconquista*; celebrations of crusader victories over the idols of a supposed Saracen paganism; the translation and adaptation of the Mozarabic anti-Islamic polemical traditions into Latin."[17] One should note, however, that Crusade in the twelfth century was not in fact very successful,[18] and the rising interest in Islam itself (as opposed to Greek learning mediated by Arabic texts), as noted above, did not actually include an interest in Islam for the sake of understanding the religion or culture, but rather in spreading distorted propaganda for political purposes. Nonetheless as Tolan argues, it was not a result of any simple change of heart based on Christian empirical acquaintance, that is, practical experience, with Muslims acquired through Crusader warfare or the political administration of Crusader kingdoms, but rather a strictly intellectual movement based on textual knowledge that led ultimately not to any greater familiarity with *realexistierender* Islam, but in any case resulted in a slight shift from the standard representation of Islam as polytheistically idolatrous to one of Islam as heresy:

> While the image of the pagan Saracen lives on in the *Chanson de geste*, liturgical drama, and saints lives until the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries (and in village fiestas until the twentieth), assuring the Christian readers of the truth of their own religion, it dies quickly among those who have closer contact with Islam. Among the chronicles of the Crusades, only those dealing with the first Crusade portray Saracens as idolaters. Spanish Christians from the eighth century on had known enough of Islam not to present it as idolatry; other Western writers, using knowledge of Islam gleaned from Spanish and Eastern sources, will increasingly portray it as a variant, heretical version of Christianity. These Latin authors, like their earlier Eastern and Spanish counterparts, will make sense of Islam by painting its prophet in the familiar hues of a diabolically inspired heresiarch.[19]

In time, Tolan suggests, the image of Islam as a heresy propagated by Muḥammad supplanted that of the Muslim as "heathen" (e.g., polytheistic idolator)—at least among intellectuals, while the image of the Muslim as "heathen" remained standard in popular culture (136). Indeed the two images coexisted in the West, serving the needs of complementary audiences:

> From the twelfth century onward, Muhammad the heresiarch inhabited the European imagination alongside Muhammad the golden idol: an equally powerful (if equally inaccurate) intellectual weapon with which

to inculcate contempt, inspire hatred, justify conquest. In the thirteenth century, as conquest of formerly Muslim lands accelerated in Spain and as Christian princes from Lisbon to Acre affirmed their right to rule over Muslim subjects, this view of Saracen heresy became an important part of Latin Europe's ideology of power.[20]

Tolan grounds his argument for a shift in Christian perceptions of Islam on a selective but pointed overview of the conceptual history of Western attitudes toward Arabs:[21] the Christian reaction to and characterization of Arabs/Muslims was even from the beginning based not on an empirical knowledge of Arabs, but rather on texts by Christian *auctores*, that is, the biblical book of Genesis, and the works of Jerome, Augustine, and especially Isidor, none of whom had any experience of Arabs or the—during their lives (except for Isidor)—not yet existent Islam, and all of whom constructed Arabs as descendents of Ishmael, characterized via the normative tradition of biblical exegesis as an idolater, magician, and wild man (Gen. 16:12). After the founding of Islam, it became an established Christian notion, as noted above, that to attempt to understand Islam on its own terms through a knowledge of its own sacred texts and thus of the Arabic language would have exposed one to the seduction of the Devil. Tolan traces the trajectory of the Christian construction of the image of Islam:

> From the eighth century to the twelfth, Eastern Christian polemical views of Islam were imported to Spain, where they were reworked and brought to northern Europe. At the same time, the constrasting image of Islam as pagan idolatry was created by European chroniclers and poets. By the end of the twelfth century, European writers had created the essential portrayals of Islam that would be elaborated upon, reworked, and deployed for different purposes for centuries to come.[22]

While Iberian and Eastern Christians were generally hostile to Islam, they had, through centuries of close daily contact, certainly gained more than a mere passing acquaintance with their Muslim neighbors. In the twelfth century, as a result of increased contact between Western Christians outside of Iberia with Muslims, Tolan suggests, the learned image of Islam gradually shifted.[23] At the behest of Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, the Qur'ān was paraphrased into Latin (accompanied by polemical commentary for the purpose of refutation). This intellectual image was, however, again not based on direct and long-term daily contact with Islamic culture, but primarily on the Iberian anti-Muslim polemical tradition that had itself developed directly from the earlier Byzantine anti-Muslim polemical tradition. It is precisely that tradition

that formed the foundation of the twelfth-century modification of the intellectual image of Islam north of the Pyrenees, the primary goal of which was theological refutation of Islam as heresy: "an illegitimate deviation of the true religion. The culprit was Muhammad, portrayed as a scoundrel and trickster."[24]

It is interesting to juxtapose Tolan's thesis and conclusions with Kinoshita's: "A fundamental thesis of this book is that medieval French speakers had a much greater degree of involvement in and knowledge of the cultures of the Iberian peninsula and the Mediterranean than modern readers generally credit."[25] Both Tolan and Kinoshita posit ideological shifts based on concrete mechanisms of intercultural exchange. The problem with this aspect of Kinoshita's thesis arises directly from the plausibility of the logistics and mechanisms of the sudden and transformative shift that she posits. Obviously there was no new, sudden, and broad-based twelfth-century contact between the French-speaking populace (carpenters? village priests? laundresses? countesses?) and their counterparts south of the Christian-Muslim border. While Kinoshita's suggestion that we must revise our ideas of trans-Pyrenean contact during the period is to be welcomed, that is quite a different issue from the claim that contact between "medieval French speakers" and Iberian Muslim culture was a matter of everyday "business as usual," since after all in the thirteenth century French speakers did not inhabit any territories adjacent to Muslim territory. It is in one sense a simple matter of geo-linguistico-politics. While we should acknowledge that the Pyrenees, lying between modern France from modern Spain, did not by any means block north-south trade and other types of exchange, those mountains likewise neither separated nor conjoined "medieval French speakers" and Muslim territory. In order to find French speakers, one had at that time to journey far to the north of the Pyrenees, across the broad linguistic territory of *langue d'oc* to arrive in French-speaking territory. Likewise, to imagine that the territory of *langue d'oc* was "medieval France" is once again to project modern geopolitics onto a earlier period where that projection distorts all evidence. But even if we were to do just that, and imagine all medieval France as if modern France, then, at the period with which Kinoshita is concerned, there was no still no French-Muslim frontier, for there was no Muslim territory abutting the Pyrenees on the south: as a result of the ongoing *reconquista* slightly less than half of Iberia (exclusively in the south) remained under Muslim control at the key period in question. No frontier—permeable or otherwise—existed between "French speakers" and Islam at the time, and there had not been one for generations. While the suggestion that we look beyond military action as definitive of Christian-Muslim relations is salutary, the everyday exchange that

Kinoshita posits as the cause of the "epistemic rupture" simply could not have taken place as she imagines it.

When we turn from this shaky geopolitical foundation to the other types of evidence suggested by Kinoshita, the argument does not gain in clarity: first, it is difficult to impute cultural change drastic enough to warrant the designation "epistemic rupture" to the luxury objects of Islamic material culture that crossed the Pyrenees and made their way into royal or aristocratic possession: the image and representation of Islam there changed very little as a result of such a transfer. Second, in two of the texts that she takes as key to her argument, *Aucassin et Nicolette* and *Floire et Blancheflor*, there occurs an erotic relationship between two Christian characters (one of whom in each case was at some previous point in his/her life Muslim).[26] While by the time of twelfth- and thirteenth-century romance narratives, there may well have been statistically more sympathetic Christian characters, especially female characters, who had in the unnarrated past converted from Islam and at the time of the narrative action participated in erotic relationships with native-born (i.e., nonconverted) Christians, it should be noted that even in the starkly bigoted foundational text of crusader epic, the *Chanson de Roland*, the initially staunchly Muslim Queen Bramimonde voluntarily converts to Christianity at the poem's conclusion, takes the baptismal name Juliana and is integrated into Frankish Christian society.[27] While romance texts such as *Floire et Blancheflor* and *Aucassin et Nicolette* are indeed very differently conceived than was the *Chanson de Roland*, an argument for "epistemic rupture" based on them is quite problematic. In *Floire et Blancheflor* no interfaith romance—as is often claimed—occurs, for Blancheflor, a captive Christian woman, marries Floire only after he and his entire people have converted to Christianity, which is the inverse of the situation in *Aucassin et Nicolette*, where a Christian slave woman (formerly Muslim) marries a Christian count.

This situation differs paradigmatically very little from that which is found in the characters Willehalm and Gyburc/Arabel in Wolfram's *Willehalm*. Indeed in none of these texts does an interfaith relationship take place, as it does, for instance, in Wolfram's *Parzival*, where there is a brief interfaith romance, which is definitively terminated explicitly because of religious difference. As presented in chapter four, Wolfram makes very clear through characters' words and deeds, and indeed by means of his own structural antithesis of the Gahmuret-Belakâne romance with the Gahmuret-Herzeloyde romance, that that religiously inflected cultural difference is unbridgeable except by means of the cultural effacement designated by the term "metamorphosis" in the present study.

The scholarly proposal of the regularization or routinization of Christian-Muslim relations, particularly through romance and marriage, is taken a step further by William Wistar Comfort and Lynn Ramey, both of whom initially seem to suggest that interfaith Muslim–Christian marriage occurred and was sanctioned by the Catholic Church during this period. Ramey comments:

> By the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the West had come to know a great deal more about Islam. Crusades had brought the two cultures into contact and trading and political relationships were formed. As a result, literary depictions allowed contact beyond conflict between Christian and Muslim. The bedroom replaced the battlefield as the site of interaction, as the Saracen princess became the wife of choice for the crusading French literary hero. Canon law reflected new cultural mores, dictating how interreligious and interethnic relationships were to be conducted. Travel to the otherworld, the East, dominated the literary scene.[28]

Comfort simply states that Muslim-Christian intermarriage was allowed in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.[29] Significantly, however, neither Comfort nor Ramey cites any evidence in support of their suggestions, for the stark fact remains that the Catholic Church did *not* allow an inter-faith couple to marry. The extensive, subtle, detailed, and very significant research of Benjamin Kedar is often cited in connection with this issue. Tellingly he does *not* mention the possibility of a Muslim and a Christian marrying. Indeed in his examination of canon law's regulation of Muslim conversion, especially as it treats married couples and conversion, he notes the single condition under which Christian-Muslim marriage was tolerated: if one member of an *already married Muslim couple* converted to Christianity, the marriage was allowed to continue as long as the Muslim partner did not hinder the Christian's religious practice. Such continued unions were then, not surprisingly, carefully regulated.[30]

Likewise, while interfaith romance certainly does appear in courtly romance, there are no permanent interfaith marriages, that is, marriage of Muslim and Christian partners who (1) maintain their individual faiths and (2) remain married for more than, for instance, the time that it takes Gahmuret to realize his "mistake" and flee the country.[31] While one might initially imagine this as a picayune distinction, if in fact the issue is whether historical and/or literary weddings of a Christian and a Muslim occurred as a legitimate and recognized institution, then precision is after all necessary. And indeed we find that neither in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Western European literature nor in life were interfaith weddings acceptable. And ultimately both Comfort and Ramey admit as much concerning the texts that they analyze. Comfort's claim of the legality

of interfaith marriages is, for instance, *immediately* coupled with a condi-
tional clause that stipulates that such marriages are possible only if one of
the parties converts, which effectively delegitimizes his claim that inter-
faith marriage was legal. Ramey also acknowledges "the absolute insis-
tence on…conversion" for marriage to be possible.[32] That is, Christians
may marry only Christians (including former Muslims), and interfaith
marriage is possible only if it is not in fact an interfaith marriage.

Thus a number of scholars have suggested developments or transfor-
mations, whether subtle or extreme, in the representation of Muslims
from the derogatory caricatures of Muslims in the earlier periods to
a more enlightened view in the course of the twelfth century, that is,
to concretize in terms of literary history: from the eleventh-century
Chanson de Roland, for instance, to Wolfram von Eschenbach's early
thirteenth-century *Parzival* and *Willehalm* epics. This transformation is
often attributed to the empirical experience of Christian Europeans with
actual Muslims—whom they had not known or not known well before
in the flesh—whether via the Crusades or, as Kinoshita suggests, the
daily routine of contact in Iberia, as opposed—north of the Pyrenees—to
the bigoted literary representations with which they had been exclusively
acquainted before the beginning of the era of Crusades in the late elev-
enth century. In this context, Wentzlaff-Eggebert touches on a recur-
ring scholarly motif: "the more exact knowledge of heathen ways of life
and culture, especially the ideal of the knightly Saladin, which derived
from the reality of the Crusades, enabled the unified courtly level [that
functioned] as the foundation of the conflict between Christians and
heathens."[33] Wolfgang Spiewok expresses this large-scale ideological
position succinctly:

> The experience of Arabic culture produced the realization that the
> allegedly wild and depraved heathens were, as feudal lords, in culture,
> demeanor, and way of life, altogether equal, indeed superior to their class
> counterparts in the West; and that they had in this respect, due to the
> advanced state of development of Oriental feudalism, already attained a
> level to which the Western European feudal lords still aspired. Finally the
> Crusaders discovered that the maligned heathens adhered to a faith that
> constituted a purer state of monotheism than did Christianity, and that
> this faith—as was quite natural due to its Christian roots—did not funda-
> mentally differ from Christianity as the papacy taught.[34]

According to Spiewok then, Christians came to recognize Muslims as
not so different from themselves but rather indeed as quasi- or pseudo-
Europeans who actually "out-Europed" Europeans in some impor-
tant respects, including political organization and religious spirituality.

Admittedly in his claims concerning the lack of theological difference between Islam and Christianity, Spiewok goes farther than his companions in such arguments, but in general he represents this trend well.

There is no denying that much changed in the intellectual life of twelfth-century *Latinitas* (Western European Christendom),[35] one salient manifestation of which was the appearance of the vernacular (!) genres of courtly epic and courtly lyric that refracted the values of the new social forces that effected most of the important political and cultural changes in the period. Likewise the extra-martial contact between soldiers of Christianity and Islam in Iberia and the eastern Mediterranean littoral of what was in antiquity called Asia (minor), Syro-Palestine, and Egypt may well have contributed to some aspects of that changed cultural content. It is, however, not altogether clear how much significance to attribute to that contact, since Western Europeans had already had three centuries of multiple modes of substantial contact with Muslims before the First Crusade (1096–1099), including economic, intellectual, and literary exchange via Venetian mercantile networks in the eastern Mediterranean, between Sicily/southern Italy and the North, and between Muslims and Christians in Iberia, and between Iberian Muslims and northern European Christians, much of which has only recently begun to be studied in the depth that it requires (as Kinoshita, among others, quite rightly observes). Second, the changes brought about by military and other modes of contact as a result of the Crusades were perhaps more complex than the model suggested by Spiewok and others. Furthermore, as is familiar from other periods and arenas of ethnic prejudice, gaining familiarity with an individual Other often does little to dispel deep-seated prejudices against his/her group but rather simply separates the single (now known) Other from the class of Others whose image remains intact in the bigot's conception, thus reinforcing rather than destroying or even reducing prejudice. R.W. Southern's careful study of medieval Western conceptions of Islam is still quite perceptive on this issue. While he, too, posits a change in the relationship between Christendom and the Islamic world as a result of the First Crusade, his conception of the parameters of that change is quite different from Spiewok's:

> The relationship between Christendom and Islam changed abruptly with the First Crusade. This event did not bring knowledge. Quite the contrary. The first Crusaders and those who immediately followed them to Palestine saw and understood extraordinarily little of the Eastern scene. The early success discouraged any immediate reactions other than those of triumph and contempt. But they also made the religion and founder of Islam for the first time familiar concepts in the West. Before 1100 I have

found only one mention of the name of Mahomet in medieval literature outside Spain and Southern Italy. But from about the year 1120 everyone in the West had some picture of what Islam meant, and who Mahomet was. The picture was brilliantly clear, but it was not knowledge, and its details were only accidentally true. Its authors luxuriated in the ignorance of triumphant imagination.[36]

Debra Strickland likewise proposes a significant change in the representation of Muslims as a result of contact: while the reports from the First Crusade were quite negative, due to influence from the *chanson de geste*, she suggests, reports from the Second and Third Crusades were much less so. At the same time, however, Strickland rejects any necessary causal connection between cultural contact and a diminution of ethnic bigotry, pointing, as a counterexample, to both the presence of Jews in Europe and ubiquitous and rabid anti-Semitism: "However, the case of the Jews clearly shows that pejorative portrayals do not occur in inverse relationship to direct contact."[37] Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz also points out the discrepancy between empirical data and ubiquitous image: while more informed voices existed concerning Islam—for example, Anastasius the Librarian, Landulf Sagax, and John of Damascus, who, while not particularly sympathetic to Islam, presented in many respects reasonably accurate information about the religion and its practice— such representations were not taken as a new paradigm but were rather then distorted, such that Muḥammad was identified as one of the multiple Muslim gods, and Muslims themselves were represented as fools.[38] Benjamin Kedar summarizes his decades of work on this issue:

> These responses to the Anastasian stimulus demonstrate that confrontation with relatively accurate information did not necessarily lead to its absorption. Time and again, the new data failed to modify the writers' preconceptions; on the contrary, the preconceptions dictated the extent to which the data were absorbed. Nor did the availability of correct information guarantee its acceptance by all the learned, to say nothing of the unlearned of that time.[39]

On the basis of a variety of types of evidence, drawn from a broad range of cultures, it seems that there is a scholarly consensus on the subject of an alteration in Christian-Muslim relations in the course of the twelfth century. The exact causes, constitution, and manifestations of that alteration are, however, still difficult to define comprehensively. Perhaps that lack of precision is inevitable, given the broad corpus of evidence from different periods, locales, languages, and genres. In any case, the evidence analyzed in the previous chapters from late tenth- through

early thirteenth-century German-speaking territory contributes to this growing body of scholarship and above all sets the accents rather differently from the studies by, for instance, Kinoshita and Tolan, Spiewok and Wentzlaff-Eggebert, whose specific evidence from traditions within and beyond contemporaneous Germany leads them to rather different conclusions.

In the analysis of hagiography, drama, epic, and lyric in the present study, one might initially be misled into imagining a gesture toward some kind of comprehensive "coverage" of the major genres of European literature, as conceived on the model of Aristotelian conceptions of genre, but that classificatory system is, of course, all but irrelevant for medieval literature, where such genre definitions are all but unknown, and the palette of literary genres is both broader and less easy to categorize. Thus instead of comprehensive coverage, there is here an attempt at tactical intervention, perhaps with strategic implications. The choice of texts was thus not made for the sake of generic coverage, but rather in order to illustrate the presence of the discourse of the Muslim Other already in tenth-century texts—and already in forms recognizable as discursive variants of known models—and the permeation of the literature of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (which constitute the focal period of Crusader literature in Europe). It almost seems that wherever one looks in the literature of medieval Germany, one finds the Muslim Other, even where one least expects that discourse: in hagiographical legend, eschatological drama, crusader epic, grail romance, and even in courtly lyric.

This ubiquity of that Other should ultimately be no surprise, for European Christendom is in this period coming to define its culture—while certainly not uniform or unitary—as at least identifiably distinct from those Outside. With the Arabo-Berber state still ensconced in Iberia in the southwest, the Turks steadily moving farther into the Balkans in the southeast, and the Tatars dominating the emerging Russian states in the east, the conventionalized construction of Islam as the quintessential Other that enabled the definition of Self may from our perspective now seem only "natural." But such a presentist conception of Europe is obviously not legitimate for tenth- through thirteenth-century conceptions. As adumbrated in chapter two, above, while the term "Eurocentric" can—if sufficiently localized and specified (as in Edith Hall's work)—already be tactically and legitimately employed in discussions of cultural phenomena as far back as Aeschylus' Πέρσαι, and certainly also with respect to developing medieval notions of *christianitas* versus Islam, neither Aeschylus' nor Hrotsvit's or Wolfram's conception of Europe would remotely resemble our own: not ethnically, politically, ideologically,

doctrinally, or even geographically. At the same time, however, as work from a broad range of disciplines has made clear in recent decades, there are aspects of a definition of Self shared by Hrotsvit, Wolfram, Walther, Dante, Chaucer, and indeed Aeschylus, and even more significantly in the present context—some shared aspects of a definition of the Other, as manifested in their texts.

The clichés of the medieval discourse of the Muslim Other (black skin, disfiguring lust, sporadic religious fanaticism, and idolatry) recur in subtle variation in a broad range of texts—*not* all—here examined, but the Otherizing modes of interactions and the possibilities imagined for Muslim life in contact with Christians in Hrotsvit's imagined Iberia serve to characterize her *literary* conception of the (*historically* noble and tolerant) caliph of Córdoba as immoral, even before the plot depicts him as a vicious and sexually depraved murderer. Her mode of discourse of the Muslim depends on both the (hagiographical mediations of the) concrete historical event of Pelagius' death and particularly on the likewise hagiographical genre of her composition, obviously still without the later development of any sembance of a Crusader *mentalité*. That historical event is concretized in the interaction of the caliph and his young victim against the background of the complex multiplicities of religion, ethnicity, political and other affiliations of tenth-century Iberia. In the context of the present study's discussion of discursive formations of the Muslim Other, it is of particular interest that we witness in Hrotsvit's text an "immediacy" of access to the historical foundation. While we cannot get at any better empirical data concerning the case than the three extant early narratives of Pelagius' martyrdom, we can, as it were, witness the textualization, the rendering into discourse, of those events, even in Hrotsvit's legend based on the recounting of those events by alleged eyewitness. That discourse is already recognizable as an exponent of a known pattern of the discourse of the Muslim Other. As such, it functioned effectively in the further propagation of that discursive mode within territories of Ottonian imperial culture, perhaps even moreso than would have a vernacular text.

The *Ludus de Antichristo* projects a somewhat differently conceived issue onto a cosmic and apocalyptic stage where allegory abandons subtlety for propagandistic pomp and grandeur. The role of Islam in the play, however ancillary it might initially seem, nonetheless participates integrally in the eschatologically conceived extinction of all cultures besides normative Christianity, specifically Judaism and Islam, both of which are here conveniently exterminated by the Antichrist, precluding both the necessity of direct Christian versus non-Christian conflict and any assumption by Christendom of responsibility for the forced disappearance of all Jews and Muslims in the world. Two of the primary modes of

metamorphosis known later from Christian epic are here already opera-
tive in cultural extermination via conversion and annihiliation via mass
execution.

The broad palette of crusader epic and courtly romance, here repre-
sented by Wolfram's *Willehalm* and *Parzival*, provides a broad and deep
characterization of the Muslim Other through several key extensively
characterized and humanized figures—Belakâne, Feirefiz, Arabel/Gyburc,
and Rennewart—rarely seen previously in courtly literature, especially in
German-speaking lands, although one must be precise here in noting that
two of the four Muslim characters undergo metamorphosis and convert
to Christianity, thus becoming "former Muslims": one would have con-
verted had she been given the opportunity; one converts in the course
of the narrative as soon as the opportunity arises; one converts as soon as
that opportunity arose in the back-story before the narrative begins; and
one disappears instead of being forced to confront such an opportunity to
convert). Wolfram's conception of these characters is by no means inci-
dental, accidental, or idiosyncratic (nor is it straitjacketed and uniform,
although patterns do exist), since in their characterization and ideological
integration into the plots of the two narratives, he brings together multiple
strands of the discourse of the Muslim Other known from a broad range of
genres and national traditions. At the same time, however, it is important
to recognize just how little has actually changed in Wolfram's represen-
tation of Islam. Just as no Muslim per se was permitted to endure in the
territory of Christian Europe in, for instance, the *Chanson de Roland*, none
is permitted in Wolfram's epics, even the otherwise positively depicted
Rennewart, who is simply "disappeared" from *Willehalm*'s conclusion, just
as was Belakâne from *Parzival* (albeit without her ever entering Christian
European territory). Some few Muslim and formerly Muslim characters
receive a fuller narrative treatment than was the case in earlier Christian
epic, but their ultimate fates do not differ from those of their epic predeces-
sors: conversion, death, or transfaith or transracial metamorphosis before
or during the narrative. The tolerance imputed to Wolfram by scholars is
scarcely based on evidence from his texts.

Initially one might imagine that attention to Walther von der
Vogelweide's Crusader lyric in the context of this study would be mis-
placed, since the Muslim Other appears only fleetingly and seemingly
incidentally in a very few of his poems. But it is in fact precisely the,
as it were, incidental nature of that appearance that is so very signifi-
cant. There is an interesting duality in Walther's discourse of the Muslim
Other: his poems avoid the specificity of, for instance, Wolfram's individ-
uated characters in favor of more abstract and quasi-theological principles
very conservatively (for his period) based in biblical precedent, while also

assuming a broad understanding of existing modes of the discourse of the Muslim Other on the part of his audience. While his conception of the Muslim Other differs substantially from, for instance, Wolfram's, Walther need explain nothing about that Muslim Other, not the history or anatomy of the conflict with Christendom or indeed the anatomy of Muslims themselves. While we may well doubt that horned and cara-paced Muslims inhabit the subtextual foundation of Walther's poems, they are only a single step removed from that foundation, and they and the other aspects of that particular discourse of the Muslim Other may be taken for granted by Walther and his audience. The poet can simply deploy a few key terms (in fact primarily from the noncourtly literary realm of Crusader sermon, *not* courtly epic) to call up that whole world of reference in his readers and evoke a broad range of available discourses of the Muslim Other. Even in his seemingly fragmentary deployment of that discourse, it is clear that Walther's Bible-based, sermon-inflected mode differs from all others examined in this study. It is then all the more significant that even in the context of his reenacting the condemna-tion of Muslims as illegitimate pretenders to the possession of the "Holy Land," as expressed through a rehearsal of key aspects of the Christian conception of redemptive history, Walther's persona also conceives of the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian deity as one and the same. Herewith, he joined a rare few others, such as Guibert of Nogent, the only chronicler of the first Crusade who acknowledged that Muslims were monotheists and did not worship Muḥammad, and insistently adds a distinct stroke to the picture of the discourse of the Muslim Other in the literature of medieval Germany. The two lines in which the statement occurs do not constitute an ideological revolution or a paradigm shift, or indeed an epistemic rup-ture, for they do not constitute an elaborated revolutionary program on Walther's part, nor did it spawn ideologico-literary disciples among his contemporaries or poets who followed him. It is, I would argue, impos-sible to see this ideological moment as either "progress" from a bleaker past or a harbinger of a consequently reformed future. It is an "erratic" isolate—not unique in the period, but certainly quite rare and quite with-out a larger context of similar expressions that would integrate it into a pattern that would enable a comprehensively conceived program.

★   ★   ★

Ultimately one of the primary political functions of Orientalism, Eurocentrism, and other such ideological *-isms* is to cross that boundary between discourse and lived experience (both sides of which have been addressed at a number of points in this study, but which I have likewise

attempted to maintain as distinct in those segments where discourse itself is the focal issue) and propagandistically justify the oppression of one group by another. As Tolan bluntly points out concerning the historical instance that is of concern in this volume, "This image of Saracen idolatry provided a useful caricature with which the Christian author could justify and glorify the killing of Muslims and the conquest of Muslim territories."[40] In another context Strickland concurs:

> Well before the Mandeville author's time, the Christian war against their non-Christian enemies was no longer merely exegetical or theoretical, although theory and exegesis provided a powerful ideological arsenal that worked in tandem with the military one. This, I believe is largely why the period of increased interest in the Monstrous Races, pejorative renderings of Jews, and the application of the pictorial code of rejection to other non-Christian political enemies corresponds with that of the crusades, which acted as a powerful stimulus for these ideas.[41]

The images of Muslims that seem almost comically implausible to the modern audience—Muslims with horned heads and carapaced bodies, black-and-white striped mixed race offspring, uncontrollably oversexed but otherwise chivalric Muslim knights—are, of course, only comic to the reader who accidentally or willfully ignores their context,[42] for they participate in larger cultural, military, and geopolitical movements that ultimately brought about the conquest, displacement, subjugation, conversion, and long-term Otherizing of massive populations. As John Tolan notes, "The European colonial enterprise of the modern era began in many respects in the Middle Ages.... [W]hile the colonial empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are unprecedented in scope, conquerors since the Sumerians have forged ideologies that justified and celebrated their subjection of other peoples, while the conquered have constructed their own ideologies of resistance."[43] Those processes have not yet ceased, and those representations have not yet disappeared. As David Blanks and Michael Frassetto make clear, it is not until the fifteenth century that the "well worn stereotypes of Muhammad and Islam were overlaid with fresh impressions. In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries more informed and, on occasion, more tolerant attitudes began to appear."[44] Remnants of their medieval forms nonetheless continued to resonate for centuries and many still haunt us even today, whether in contemporary readings of medieval literature or in the press, popular culture, film, political propaganda, indeed in the general public discourse of the Muslim Other in the twenty-first century and in the movements, deployments and actions of its armed forces.

NOTES

1 *Ludus* as Prelude

1. Sweet, as a black man, is inevitably the first of the squad to die violently, as has become the norm in such "melting-pot cameraderie" war films ever since the point at which black actors could be included as members of such cinematically integrated combat units. He is the most ecumenical in his use of ethnicity and race as essentialist identifiers: he thus calls Iraqis "rag-heads," "hajjis," and "shit-birds," addresses Flake as "my motherfuckin' Caucasian" and Salazar as "my motherfuckin' *ese*." Only one other racial epithet is targeted at a non-Iraqi in the film: after Salazar's death, Flake calls him "a generous spic."

2. In Arabic, a traditional term of respect that designates a Muslim who has fulfilled the Islamic obligation to make a pilgrimage (الحج *al-ḥajj*) to Mecca, or more generally an elder of the community. The term has been co-opted by the U.S military as a derogatory term designating all Iraqis or indeed all Muslims.

3. See Darko Suvin, "Can People be (Re)Presented in Fiction?: Toward a Theory of Narrative Agents and a Materialist Critique beyond Technocracy or Reductionism," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 667 [663–96].

4. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye (Paris: Payot, 1916).

5. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978).

6. Cf. especially Michel Foucault, *L'ordre du discours: leçon inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) and *Les mots et les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).

7. All examples from the entry مدرسة *madrasa* in the standard mid-sized Anglophone dictionary of Arabic: Hans Wehr, *Arabic-English Dictionary*, ed. J.M. Cowan, 4th ed. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1979), p. 321. This dictionary is, not incidentally, itself a translation of a German original: *Arabisches Wörterbuch für die Schriftsprache der Gegenwart* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1952).

8. Cf. a leaked memo written by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2003: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics

are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"; quoted by Samantha Power, "The Democrats and National Security," *The New York Review of Books* 55/13 (14 August 2008): 68.

2   Discourses of the Muslim Other

1. Unless we countenance the historicity of the Old Norse *Groenlendinga þáttr* and its inclusion in the crew that sailed to Vínland (by scholarly consensus now identified as Newfoundland) of Tyrkir, the *suðmaðr* [German], who participated in the confrontation with Native Americans in the tenth century; text edited by Halldór Hermannsson, *The Vinland Sagas*, Islandica 30 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1944). See Jerold C. Frakes, "Vikings, Vínland and the Discourse of Eurocentrism," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 100 (2001): 157–99. Needless to say, that encounter had no effect on the development of a *German* representation of the non-European Other.

2. On the political motivations (papal and otherwise) for the Crusades as the primary military expression of this conflict, see, especially for his focus on the German literary tradition, Wolfgang Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung des Kreuzzugserlebnisses für die Entwicklung der feudalhöfischen Ideologie und die Ausformung der mittelalterlichen deutschen Literatur: Vom Dogma zur Toleranz," *Weimarer Beiträge* 9 (1963): 669–83.

3. In general on this topic, see Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960); and R.W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). The most important work on this specific topic is in the field of art history, the monumental *The Image of the Black in Western Art*, ed. Ladislas Bugner (New York: William Morrow, 1976–199), especially vol. 2: *From the Early Christian Era to the "Age of Discovery"* (New York: William Morrow, 1979); and the likewise exhaustive P. Bancourt, *Les muselmans dans les chansons de geste du cycle du roi*, 2 vols. (Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence, 1982). More recently, see also Debra Higgs Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Jürgen Brummack, *Die Darstellung des Orients in den deutschen Alexandergeschichten des Mittelalters* (Berlin: Schmidt, 1966); John Block Friedman, *The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

4. This tripartite definition is based on Lucy K. Pick, "Edward Said, *Orientalism* and the Middle Ages," *Medieval Encounters* 5 (1999): 265–6.

5. Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 4–5.

6. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 21; see also p. 14.

7. Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 20–21.

8. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 94.

9. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 21.

10. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 22.

11. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 32.

12. Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 67 and 79.

13. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 71.

14. Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 129.

15. Kathleen Davis, "Time Behind the Veil: The Media, The Middle Ages, and Orientalism Now," in *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 113 [105–22].

16. Suzanne Conklin Akbari, "Alexander in the Orient: Bodies and Boundaries in the *Roman de toute chevalerie*," in *Postcolonial Approaches to the European Middle Ages: Translating Cultures*, ed. Ananya Jahanara Kabir and Deanne Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 105 [105–26]. She suggests that both Bhabha's concept of "colonial mimicry" and Spivak's "subalternity" were founded on Said's reductivist conception of Orientalism.

17. John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 280–81.

18. James Clifford, "On *Orientalism*," in *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 262 [255–76]. He nonetheless notes: "Though Said's work frequently relapses into the essentializing modes it attacks and is ambivalently enmeshed in the totalizing habits of Western humanism, it still succeeds in questioning a number of important anthropological categories...." (271).

19. Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz, "Popular Attitudes towards Islam in Medieval Europe," in *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, ed. David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 55–6 [55–81]. She also remarks: "On the other hand, it is also the case that many of the most ill-informed views of Islam in the Middle Ages were precisely those that gave rise to legendary and long-lived images and prejudices that have continued to inform European attitudes." Thus while medieval attitudes were not monolithic, modern attitudes have often developed directly from the least informed medieval ones.

20. Dennis Porter, "*Orientalism* and its Problems," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 160 [150–61].

21. Kabir/Williams, *Postcolonial Approaches* , p.1.

22. Thomas Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes: Color and Race before the Modern World," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31 (2001): 1–37; on which see, in particular, Kathleen Biddick, *The Shock of Medievalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 83–9.

23. Except for a very brief tactical sortie later in this chapter, the reader will notice that I avoid direct engagement with any medieval European

self-conception as "European," and thus also with a modern conception of a medieval Eurocentrism, since a justification of that conception would itself require a monographic treatment.

24. Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), pp. 10–11.

25. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), especially chapter one, "Medieval Prelude," pp. 14–63.

26. Amin, *Eurocentrism*, p. 75.

27. See *Eurocentrism*, pp. 74–7. It is, however, strange to find that Sharon Kinoshita approvingly cites Amin's denial of the legitimacy of Said's comments on Dante, since she is engaged in a literary analysis quite unconcerned with economic analysis. Concerning Said's comment, she claims that such "an assertion of intrinsic European superiority...becomes imaginable only in the long sixteenth century, with the global expansion of European commercial capitalism"; see her "The Romance of MiscegeNation," p. 126.

28. Referring to Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 22–5; Kathleen Biddick, "Coming out of Exile: Dante on the Orient Express," in *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 36 [35–52].

29. Cohen, "Introduction. Midcolonial," in *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, p. 3.

30. See Kathleen Biddick's useful rebuttal: "The ABC of Ptolomy: Mapping the World with the Alphabet," in *Text and Territory: Geographical Imagination in the European Middle Ages*, ed. Sylvia Tomasch and Sealy Gilles (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 291 [268–93]; and also Kathleen Davis, "National Writing in the Ninth Century: A Reminder for Postcolonial Thinking about the Nation," in *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 28 (1998): 611–37.

31. Cohen, "Introduction. Midcolonial," in *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, p. 4.

32. Suzanne Conklin Akbari, "From Due East to True North: Orientalism and Orientation," in *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, p. 31 [19–34].

33. There are, of course, other more pertinent reasons for a guarded use of the terms "Eurocentric/Eurocentrism" in premodern studies since they presuppose an understanding of European culture as somehow conceptually unified or unifiable. As intimated above, while I think that this argument can ultimately be made, it is not my purpose here to do so, since the terms are not central to my argument and will thus not be used here except when quoting or discussing the work of other scholars.

34. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 21.

35. Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*: *Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Aeschylus' Πέρσαι is edited by Martin L. West, *Aeschylus, Persae* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1991). See also Thomas Harrison, *The Emptiness of Asia. Aeschylus' Persians and the History*

of the Fifth Century (London: Duckworth, 2000), and Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

36. Aeschylus would have conceived of himself and his culture as Athenian, and, in terms of the specific conflict with Persia, perhaps as Greek, but not in the sense of a citizen of a Greek *nation* or a unified and shared culture, but rather as an Athenian participant in a primarily Greek-speaking coalition of forces opposing Persia.

37. On the economic, geographical, and cultural issues that problematize clear distinctions between the Middle Ages and the modern periods, see James Muldoon, ed., *The Expansion of Europe: The First Phase* (n.p.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

38. J.R.S. Phillips, *The Medieval Expansion of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

39. The Byzantine emperor Alexius I actually prompted the idea of Crusade by requesting the aid of the West in recovering his own territories newly lost to the invading Turks who had swept through the Middle East displacing the primarily Arabic rulers, during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

40. "Abenteuerlust, Kampf- und Ruhmsucht sowie Beutegier": Wolfgang Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung des Kreuzzugserlebnisses für die Entwicklung der feudalhöfischen Ideologie und die Ausformung der mittelalterlichen deutschen Literatur: Vom Dogma zur Toleranz," *Weimarer Beiträge* 9 (1963): 671; *Reinfried von Braunschweig*, 14, 616ff.

41. Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung des Kreuzzugserlebnisses," p. 672.

42. Muldoon insightfully notes that the same process is discernible in England after the end of the conquest of Ireland in the sixteenth century, and in the United States after the War of Independence and then in part also following the Civil War. In all cases such external ventures lead to (state) profit from abroad and peace at home.

43. See especially the "Einleitung" to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, 2nd ed., vol. 9 of *Werke*, ed. Karl Hegel (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1840), pp. 3–135.

44. Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 9–10.

45. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 122.

46. In Isidor Pacensis' report of Charles Martel's defeat of a Muslim raiding party near Poitiers: "[P]rospiciunt europeenses arabum tentoria ordinata" [the Europeans saw in the distance the organized tents of the Arabs], *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 96, col. 827.

47. See especially Rudolf Wittkower, "Marvels of the East: A Study in the History of Monsters," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 5 (1942): 159–97, and Roy A. Wisbey, "Marvels of the East in the *Wiener Genesis* and in Wolfram's *Parzival*," in *Essays in German and Dutch Literature*, ed. W.D. Robson-Scott (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 1973), pp. 1–41.

48. Isaac, Ziegler, and Eliav-Feldon remark: "The supposition that the prejudices and ideas of one period influence those of another is not fanciful

and cannot be dismissed as a form of essentialist naivety"; Benjamin
Isaac, Joseph Ziegler, and Miriam Eliav-Feldon, "Introduction," in *The
Origins of Racism in the West*, ed. Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac,
and Joseph Ziegler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.
14 [1–31].

49. Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. xix and 275.
50. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. xviii.
51. Pick, "Edward Said, *Orientalism* and the Middle Ages," p. 268.
52. Lynn Tarte Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre in Medieval French Literature*
    (New York: Routledge 2001), pp. 35 and 38.
53. Cf. *La Chanson de Roland,* ed. Cesare Segre (Geneva: Droz, 2003); *Poema
    de mio Cid*, ed. Ian Michael (Madrid: Castalia, 1976); and the Armenian
    epic, *David of Sassoun* (extant only in nineteenth-century retellings of
    the medieval epic tradition); *David of Sassoun: The Armenian Folk Epic in
    Four Cycles*, trans. Artin K. Shalian (Athens: Ohio State University Press,
    1965), especially the lengthy tale of Ismil Khatoun (Muslim) who seduces
    Medz Mher (Christian) despite his resistance because of her religion; she
    bears two sons who are the primary heroes (and rivals) of the third cycle:
    Msrah Melik who is raised Muslim and David who is raised Christian.
54. David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto, *Western Views of Islam in Medieval
    and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other* (New York: St. Martin's,
    1999), p. 3.
55. See Southern, *Western Views*, p. 32, on the representation of Muslims as
    polytheistic idolators. Examples are widespread: before the final battle in
    Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Willehalm*, for instance, the Muslims idols are
    pulled to the battleground on a wagon (360, 24–8); on the thirteenth-
    century Hereford map, the Israelites worship a golden calf (during the
    Exodus) identified as a "Mahom"; the Council of Vienne (1311) refers
    to Muslims worshipping Muḥammad; in English plays of the fourteenth
    century, Alexander the Great, Caesar, and Pontius Pilate all worship
    "Mahound." Tolan points out (*Saracens*, p. 133) that as late as the twenti-
    eth century in some small towns in Spain, there were annual rituals reen-
    acting the *reconquista*, in which costumed "moros" capture a mock citadel
    and set up a "Mahoma"—a costumed effigy of Muḥammad; a Christian
    "siege" takes the citadel and destroys the "Mahoma," which is sometimes
    filled with fireworks and explodes. After Vatican II, many of the towns
    eliminated the "Mahoma" from the celebration.
56. Cf. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 59. Tolan suggests that in the course of the
    twelfth century the dominant European Christian discourse of Islam
    changed at the learned level from Islam as polytheistic idolatry to Islam as
    heresy (*Saracens*, pp. 133–69, *passim*). Carl Lofmark's attempt to account
    for the hybridization of this representation of Islam deflects its politi-
    cal implications: "The oriental heathens of Wolfram von Eschenbach
    are polytheists, who worship such gods as Jupiter and Juno and make
    images of them; clearly, Wolfram's picture of the heathens had not come

from Islam, but from the idealised antiquity depicted by Heinrich von Veldeke"; in "Anti-Crusade Feeling in German Minnesang," *Trivium* 22 (1987): 24 [19–35]. The fact that Wolfram collapsed two categories of non-Christians (ancient "pagan" and medieval Muslim) is clear; the political implications of that act of cultural effacement and representation do not, however, disappear, simply because the resulting portrayal is "fictive." It has, rather, overlaid a new layer of cultural representation on the dominant discourse.

57. Cf., for instance, the character Rôaz von Glois in Wirnt von Grafenberg's Middle High German *Wigalois*, designated more often than not simply as *der heide* "the heathen"; *Wigalois*, ed. J.M.N. Kapteyn, trans. Sabine Seelbach and Ulrich Seelbach (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005).

58. Wirnt von Grafenberg, *Wigalois*, ll. 7755–6.

59. See especially Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 14–36. There is also a growing body of work specifically on the eroticization of the colonial woman; see especially the essays in the section "Theorizing Gender," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 196–267.

60. In general this mode of metamorphosis, as is discussed in chapter four, parallels the conventional early Christian conception of conversion, which transfered the convert from one identity and ontological state to another, breaking former familial, civic, ethnic, and religious ties and creating new ones in their place; on the conversion imagery, see Denise Kimber Buell, "Early Christian Universalism and Modern Forms of Racism," in *The Origins of Racism*, pp. 111–12 and 116 [109–31]. The imagery associated with such transformation is familiar: the old becomes new, the dead is reborn, the blackness of sin is replaced by the whiteness of purity, and so on.

61. Wirnt von Grafenburg, *Wigalois*, l. 8219.

62. Franz H. Bäuml, ed., *Kudrun: Die Handschrift* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), here st. 583, 3. See below in chapter four and especially the examples analyzed by Alfred Ebenbauer, "Es gibt ain mörynne vil dick susse mynne: Belakanes Landsleute in der deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters," *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum* 113 (1984): 16–42.

63. Geraldine Heng, "The Romance of England," in Cohen, *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, p. 163, n. 7. The issue of race and racism is addressed in more detail in chapter four, where it becomes a focal issue.

64. Cf. especially Danielle Buschinger, "L'image du Musulman dans le *Rolandslied*," p. 73. One should remember, incidentally, that skin color is a definitional component of racism in only some, not all periods and sites of racism in human history; see Benjamin Isaac, "Racism: A Rationalization of Prejudice in Greece and Rome," in *The Origins of Racism*, p. 49 [32–56].

65. Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews*, p. 159.

66. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, pp. 3–4.
67. Representations of Christian warriors knights in courtly epic are, for instance, no more realistic representations of thirteenth-century Christian knights than are representations of Muslims realistic portrayals of thirteenth-century Muslims.
68. Cohen continues: "That stereotypes can be performed, that dominant representations and the bodies grouped beneath them do not necessarily coincide, is dangerous knowledge that can topple whole epistemological systems"; in "Hybrids, Monsters, Borderlands: The Bodies of Gerald of Wales," in Cohen, ed., *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, p. 88 [85–104]. David Goldenberg likewise seems to imagine that "Stereotype disappears with familiarity; in "Racism, Color Symbolism, and Color Prejudice," in *The Origins of Racism*, p. 106 [88–108]. While that might well be true in particular cases, I know of no evidence from medieval literature, and little from the contemporary world, where the direct confrontation with the artifice of racial stereotypes de-programs the intrained bigotry of racists. The black-face tradition in which light-skinned African Americans performed as white-conceived caricatures of blacks did nothing to undermine either that genre of racist entertainment or U.S. racism in general. The inherent racism of such systems may become obvious to *us*, and perhaps even to *them*, but such realizations rarely suffice to undo systems of thought and practice that codify and ensure cultural codes of privilege and profit.
69. See, for instance, Buschinger, "L'image du Musulman," p. 73.
70. Genre is, of course, of central importance in determining the parameters of the discourse: just as one finds distinct modes in the representation of Islam in twenty-first-century war film, popular love ballads, *Fox News* or *New York Times* editorials, and الجزيرة *Al-Jazeera* documentaries, so also in medieval genres such as sermons, courtly lyric, Crusader epic, or chronicle, as becomes clear in the present study.
71. Norman Daniel, *Heroes and Saracens: An Interpretation of the Chansons de Geste* (Edinburg: Edinbugh University Press, 1984), pp. 9–10.
72. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 8. A far more nuanced analysis of the multiplicity of cultures involved and the lack of monolithic culture or a simple binary of Christian-Muslim opposition, is offered by Oleg Grabar, "Patterns and Ways of Cultural Exchange," in *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, ed. Vladimir P. Goss (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1986), pp. 441–5: neither in the "Christian East" was there a monolithic block, since the churches there were very different and did not imagine themselves as a block distinct from the "Christian West," but rather conceived of themselves as individually distinct: Byzantine, Armenian, Georgian, Syriac monophysites, and Coptic monophysites. Likewise the Castilians of the *reconquista*, the Normans of Sicily, the Crusaders, and the merchants of Venice and Genoa were not united by any common venture. The same kind of diversity existed in Islamic communities

among Fatimids, Zenguids, Ayyubids, Zirids, Hammadids, Almoravids, Almohads, Hafsids. The Muslim military leaders were mostly Kurds, Turks, and Berbers, while the urban populace was Arabicized, and the rural areas were "a mosaic of peoples from many origins." Thus, the East-West conflict was not really a "meeting of two worlds," but a clashing of multiple, distinct regions, and ethnic identities.

73. Cohen, "Hybrids, Monsters, Borderlands," p. 88.

74. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, "On Saracen Enjoyment: Some Fantasies of Race in Late Medieval France and England," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31 (2001): 119 and 136, n. 3.

75. See, for instance, Roswitha Wisniewski, *Kreuzzugsdichtung: Idealität in der Wirklichkeit* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), p. 130.

76. For example, "the crusading poets themselves have little to say of heathen atrocities"; Carl Lofmark, "Anti-Crusade Feeling," p. 21.

77. See also most recently, Suzanne Conklin Akbari, whose first use of the term is in quotation marks, indicating her distance from the term; her second use is without such marks; her usage continues to vacillate throughout the book; see Suzanne Conklin Akbari, *Idols in the East: European Representations of Islam and the Orient, 1100–1450* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 2–3, and *passim* (e.g., pp. 17, 281).

78. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 71, quoting Philippe Sénac, *L'image de l'autre: L'occident médiéval face à Islam* (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), p. 86.

79. The stimulus for Turner's theorization was Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, trans. Monika B. Vizedon and Gabrielle L. Caffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 10–24 and 65–8. Turner's subsequent work over the course of several decades is documented in a wealth of publications, including *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), and *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: Performing Arts Journal, 1982).

80. Homi Bhabha, "Frontlines/Borderposts," in *Displacements: Cultural Identities in Questions*, ed. Angelika Bammer (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1994), p. 271 [269–72].

81. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1–2.

82. Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, p. 1.

83. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 83.

84. On the Hereford map, see especially: Daniel J. Birkholz. *The King's Two Maps: Cartography and Culture in Thirteenth-Century England* (New York: Routledge, 2004); P.D.A. Harvey, *Mappa mundi: The Hereford World Map* (London: Hereford Cathedral and the British Library, 1996); and Naomi Reed Kline, *Maps of Medieval Thought: The Hereford Paradigm* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2001). On the Ebstorf map, particularly pertinent to the larger context of the issues analyzed in the present study, see David F. Tinsley, "Mapping the Muslims: The Geopolitics

of Islam in Texts and Images of Middle High German Literature at the Beginning of the Thirteenth Century," in *Contextualizing the Muslim Other in Medieval Judeo-Christian Discourse*, ed. Jerold C. Frakes (New York: Palgrave, forthcoming); and also Hartmut Kugler, "Die Ebstorfer Weltkarte. Ein europäisches Weltbild im deutschen Mittelalter," *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 116 (1987): 13–14; Jörg-Geerd Arentzen, *Imago mundi cartographica: Studien zur Bildlichkeit mittelalterlicher Welt- und Ökumenekarten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zusammenwirkens von Text und Bild*, Münstersche Mittelalter-Schriften 53 (München: W. Fink, 1984); and Rudolf Simek, *Erde und Kosmos im Mittelalter: Das Weltbild vor Kolumbus* (München: C.H. Beck, 1992).

85. In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 271–313.

86. Chava Turniansky, ed. and trans., 1719–1691 זיכרונות :גליקל (Jerusalem: Merkaz Shazar le-toldot Yisrael, 2006); Elisheva' Baumgarten, אמהות וילדים בחברה היהודית בימי הביניים, Diss. Jerusalem 2000; revised and translated as *Mothers and Children: Jewish Family Life in Medieval Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

87. Amin Maalouf, *Les croisades vues par les Arabes* (Paris: Lattès, 1983); Eng. trans.: *The Crusades Through Arabic Eyes*, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: Al-Saqi Books, 1984).

88. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

89. Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987) and *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002).

90. The exceptional status of Sicily under Friedrich II provides a terribly interesting problem here, but one that is beyond the geographical and political scope of medieval Germany, despite its rule by a Hohenstaufen and nominally German sovereign.

91. A valiant attempt in this vein has recently been made in Old French studies by Sharon Kinoshita, but, as becomes clear through my comments on her argument in the course of the present study, even she—whose objects of analysis originated only a few hundred miles distant from Muslim territory—has very little concrete evidence with which to work: her examples of would-be *Muslim* cultural agency in fact consist of *Christian* literary characters who converted from Islam before the narrative begins or for precisely the conversion motives characteristic of the period's most blatantly bigoted depictions of Muslims. Through such clichéd characters, whose purported Muslim agency would have to be ventriloquized by a Christian author, the argument becomes problematic indeed. See her *Medieval Boundaries: Rethinking Difference in Old French Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

3   Muslims in Hrotsvit's "Pelagius" and the
Ludus de Antichristo

1. See Fidel Rädle, "Hrotsvit von Gandersheim," in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, 2nd ed., ed. Burghart Wachinger et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1983), 4:205; citing Friedrich Neumann, "Der Denkstil Hrotsvits von Gandersheim," in *Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag am 19. September 197l* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), p. 10: "Es handelt sich bei ihren Texten weniger um Dramen als um dialogisierte Legenden in Reimprosa."

2. The text is extant in two medieval manuscripts: a late tenth or early eleventh century manuscript (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 14485) and a twelfth-century copy of that same manuscript. Cf. Rädle, p. 199. The text is cited from Walter Berschin, ed., *Hrotsvit. Opera omnia*, Bibliotheca Tevbneriana (Munich: Saur, 2001), pp. 63–77; also consulted: Helene Homeyer, ed., *Hrotsvithae opera* (Munich: Schöningh, 1970), pp. 130–46.

3. Maud Burnett McInerney, *Eloquent Virgins from Thecla to Joan of Arc* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 146.

4. Mahmoud Makki, "The Political History of Al-Andalus," in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. Salma Khadra Jayyusi (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 38.

5. McInerney, *Eloquent Virgins*, p. 147. She there also notes the logical and chronological problems with Recemundus' alleged claim that he was a direct witness of Pelagius' martyrdom. On Recemundus, see especially Enrico Cerulli "Le calife 'Abd ar-Raḥmān III de Cordoue et le martyr Pélage dans un poème die Hrotsvitha," *Studia Islamica* 32 (1970): 69–76.

6. Cf. the *praefatio* and *prologus ad Gerbergam abbatissam* (Berschin 1–3); see Fidel Rädle "Hrotsvit von Gandersheim," p. 198 and Sandro Sticca, "Hrotswith von Gandersheim," in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph Strayer (New York: Scribner's, 1985), 6:313–16.

7. Cerulli "Le calife," p. 76.

8. Marla Carlson significantly calls to our attention that, despite Hrotsvit's literary depiction of Roman emperors (Diocletian in "Dulcitius" and Hadrian in "Sapientia") and Muslim caliphs ('Abd ur-Raḥmān in "Pelagius") who attempt forced conversion, historically it was medieval Christian emperors who offered their non-Christian captives the option of conversion or death, while historical Roman emperors and Muslim caliphs did not; see Marla Carlson, "Impassive Bodies: Hrotsvit Stages Martyrdom," *Theatre Journal* 50 (1998): 483 [473–87].

9. Cerulli details the differences between Hrotsvit's and Raguel's versions of the story ("Le calife," p. 73).

10. Homeyer comments on this line (*ad loc.*): "The accounts in the martyrs' legends, distorted by ignorance and hatred, contributed to the identification of Islam with pagan idolatry; there Muḥammad is called the Antichrist and an impure dog, and his teachings are called perverse; his

followers are denounced as a sect of the devil and ministers of demons" ["Zur Gleichsetzung des Islams mit dem heidnischen Götzendienst haben die von Unwissenheit und Haß entstellten Darstellungen in den Märtyrerberichten beigetragen; dort wird Muhammed als Antichrist und canis impurus und seine Lehre als pervers bezeichnet, seine Anhänger werden als secta diaboli und ministri daemoniorum angeprangert"].

11. John Boswell denies that Hrotsvit's focus is here on homosexuality as sinful: "Hroswitha does not suggest that homosexual acts are either praiseworthy or especially despicable"; instead the perversity allegedly lies in the sexual union of a Muslim with a Christian; see *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 199–200. As McInerney astutely points out, however, Boswell "is invested in imagining a world in which" male homosexuality was not viewed as unnatural, which ignores Hrotsvit's claim that both the caliph's sexuality and religion are "perverse and profane" ("Pelagius" l. 33); thus while Pelagius himself may not recognize the caliph's sexual intent (which seems unlikely), the narrator does and in addition identifies it as depraved (McInerney, *Eloquent Virgins*, p. 236, n. 19). Boswell thus masks Hrotsvit's obsession with sexuality as the enemy of virginity. Mark D. Jordan remarks interestingly that "the story of the martyrdom is, through Pelagius's eyes, the story of a passionate triangle in which all the parties are male. He does not deny same-sex love so much as he redefines it by choosing Christ as his lover"; see "Saint Pelagius, Ephebe and Martyr," in *Queer Iberia: Sexualities, Cultures, and Crossings from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, ed. Josiah Blackmore and Gregory S. Hutcheson (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 29 [23–7]. Stephen L. Wailes acknowledges that Hrotsvit depicts homosexuality as depraved: "When she refers to the caliph's polluted flesh, the immediate reference may be to his pederasty (as also in v. 239), and this sin stands behind his personal dealings with Pelagius when he meets and lusts for him"; but he also cites and agrees with Boswell's denial of Hrotsvit's depiction of homosexuality as depraved: "Hrotsvit's characterization does not point directly to homosexuality, it does not even designate sexuality as the particular evil of Abdrahemen"; *Spirituality and Politics in the Works of Hrotsvit of Gandersheim* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2006), pp. 69, 73, and 75.

12. McInerney, *Eloquent Virgins*, p. 149.

13. See especially, Jessica A. Cope, *The Martyrs of Cordoba 850–59: A Study of the Sources* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1962), pp. 41–5.

14. While Linda A. McMillin gives a reasonably complete list of Hrotsvit's caricatures of Islam, and at one point even terms the text "the best of 'cold war' propaganda" against a "real contemporary Islamic figure," she

does not provide a situated political critique, instead simply comment-
ing that Hrotsvit "constructs a surprisingly nuanced portrait of both the
general history of Islamic Spain and the life of Christians living there.
She conveys to her audience the real political and military threat of Islam
to the Christian community.... Hrotsvit's Muslims—in particular al-
Rahman—emerge as a combination of verity and political caricature, an
enemy both fearsome and ridiculous who can ultimately be conquered by
Christians of strong faith"; in "'Weighed Down with a Thousand Evils':
Images of Muslims in Hrotsvit's *Pelagius*," in *Hrotsvit of Gandersheim:
Contexts, Identities, Affinities, and Performances*, ed. Phyllis R. Brown, et al.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), pp. 54 and 40–41 [40–55].
In viewing this practice as politically neutral, even while noting that
Hrotsvit makes use of "popular but misguided stereotypes," she face-
tiously entitles a subchapter [!] of her article "Muslims and Pagans and
Bears, Oh My!" (42).

15. McMillin is of two minds about the geographical relations, designat-
ing ʿAbd ur-Raḥmân's court in Córdoba as both the "southern Islamic
neighbors" of Hrotsvit's north German monastic audience (and similarly:
"Muslim neighbors"), but, on the other hand, a "rather distant enemy"
(see McMillin, "Weighed Down," pp. 54 and 42).

16. McMillin, "Weighed Down," p. 46.

17. Ronald Stottlemyer offers the same interpretation of the *viri primi*; see
Ronald Stottlemyer, "The Construction of the Desiring Subject in
Hrotsvit's *Pelagius* and *Agnes*," in the same volume in which McMillin's
essay appeared: Brown, ed., *Hrotsvit of Gandersheim*, p. 112 [98–124].

18. Stottlemyer, "The Construction of the Desiring Subject," p. 115. Despite
recognizing that Hrotsvit is correct in maintaining that Muslim Spain
has a mixed population (l. 39), McMillin misses this connection in the
narrative itself.

19. Katharina Wilson, *Hrotsvit of Gandersheim: A Florilegium of her Works*
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1998), p. 38; Sister M. Gonsalva Wiegand,
The Non-Dramatic Works of Hrosvitha: Text, Translation, and Commentary
(Diss. St. Louis University 1936), p. 149.

20. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 108.

21. Jordan, "Saint Pelagius, Ephebe and Martyr," p. 35.

22. For a basic orientation, see Wolfgang Hempel, "Ludus de Antichristo,"
in *German Writers and Works of the Early Middle Ages: 800–1170*, ed. Will
Hasty, *Dictionary of Literary Biography 148* (Detroit: Gale, 1995), p. 208
[208–15]. The text survives in a single manuscript that was copied in that
monastery (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 19411).

23. Probably here, as conventionally in European literature of the period,
Babylon = Fustat (Cairo).

24. Text cited from Karl Young, ed., *The Drama of the Medieval Church*, vol. 2,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, n.d. [1962]), pp. 369–96. The
spoken text of the play, in verse, is cited here according to the numbered

lines of Young's edition; the often extensive prose stage directions that occur in the text, inserted between speeches, are unnumbered in the edition; they are here cited according to the numbered lines that precede them (e.g., "post-32" for a prose passage following verse line 32). See also the edition by Gisela Vollmann-Profe, ed., *Ludus de Antichristo*, 2 vols. (Lauterburg: Kümmerle, 1981).

25. "Die staufische Reichsidee"; see Friedrich-Wilhelm Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung des Mittelalter. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und dichterischen Wirklichkeit* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960), p. 76.

26. "[der Kreuzzugsgedanke] gehört als selbstverständliche Voraussetzung zu dem politischen Zeitbild, von dem der Ludus ausgeht"; *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 76.

27. Vollmann-Profe, "Tegernseer Ludus de Antichristo," in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, 2nd ed. Burghart Wachinger et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995), vol. 9, col. 676 [673–9]; Klaus Aichele, "Ludus de Antichristo," in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph Strayer (New York: Scribner's, 1986), 7:677–9.

28. Hempel, "Ludus de Antichristo," p. 212.

29. Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, "Orientalism and the Jews: An Introduction," *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham MA: Brandeis University Press, 2005), p. xiii.

30. That is, the old antisemitic distortion of the narrative of the New Testament, where it is in fact the Romans who crucify Christ; here the accusation is voiced by the ostensibly Jewish prophets, Enoch and Elijah, who have in fact here become Christian missionaries (340).

31. Some scholars have nonetheless rather astonishingly suggested that Jews are sympathetically portrayed in the *Ludus*. Gisela Vollmann-Profe, for instance, comments that the play demonstrates "an astoundingly extensive tolerance with respect to the Jews" ("erstaunlich weitreichende Toleranz gegenüber den Juden," *Ludus*, p. viii). John Wright goes further and adds a brief separate chapter on "[t]he sympathetic role played by Synagoga and the Jews" in the introduction to his translation of the text; *The Play of Antichrist* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), p. 57. He enigmatically suggests that "Jewish doctrine, though of course attacked by a Christian author, is presented with solemnity and respect" (pp. 58–9). It is implied that that respect is expressed via the medieval author's refraining from "comic" or "vicious" comment on *sinagoga*'s explicit rejection of the trinity and divine incarnation (p. 59). Wright then suggests that the Jews' "exile and theological position" are depicted with "sympathy and dignity," even while acknowledging that those who express such notions in the play are not representatives of Christianity but rather the messengers of the Antichrist. Given the succession of events involving the Jews in the play, this construal of their portrayal as tolerant, sympathetic, and respectful seems rather more than macabre.

4   Mandatory Muslim Metamorphosis in
Middle High German Epic

1. According to Friedrich-Wilhelm Wentzlaff-Eggebert, while the date of *Willehalm*'s composition is undetermined, it must have been written sometime during the years of preparation for Friedrich II's Crusade and the discussions thereof at the Thuringian court; see his *Kreuzzugsdichtung des Mittelalter*, p. 247.

2. Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung des Kreuzzugserlebnisses."

3. Jean-Marc Pastre, "L'image du Sarrasin dans le *Willehalm* de Wolfram von Eschenbach," in *Images et signes de l'Orient dans l'Occident medieval: Litterature et civilisation* (Aix-en-Provence: Centre Universitaire d'Etudes et de Reserches Médiévales d'Aix, Univ. de Provence, 1982), pp. 253–65; "Etranges Sarrasins: Le luxe et l'exotisme dans le *Willehalm* de Wolfram: En hommage à Marguerite Rossi et Paul Bancourt," in *De l'etranger à l'etrange ou la conjointure de la merveille* (Aix-en-Provence: Centre Universitaire d'Etudes et de Reserches Médiévales d'Aix, Univ. de Provence, 1988), pp. 329–39; "Les Marques de la filiation dans le *Parzival* de Wolfram von Eschenbach," in *Les Relations de parente dans le monde medieval* (Aix-en-Provence: Centre Universitaire d'Etudes et de Reserches Médiévales d'Aix, Univ. de Provence, 1989), pp. 233–45.

4. Alfred Ebenbauer, "Es gibt ain mörynne," pp. 16–42.

5. Carl Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens in *Willehalm*," in *Studien zu Wolfram von Eschenbach: Festschrift für Werner Schröder zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Kurt Gärtner and Joachim Heinzle (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989), pp. 399–414, especially 410–13. See below, chapter five in this volume.

6. Numerous comprehensive studies of the Amazon myth in the Greek traditions exist; among the most pertinent analyses of political and gender issues: Wm. Blake Tyrrell, *Amazons: A Study in Athenian Mythmaking* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) and Page duBois, *Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Prehistory of the Great Chain of Being* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982). Sheila Rowbotham remarks: "Even the myths of tribes and races of strong women, the golden age of matriarchy, are the creations of male culture. The only means we have of even fantasizing free women is through the projection of male fears"; in "Through the Looking Glass," in *Women's Consciousness, Man's World*, anthologized in *An Anthology of Western Marxism: From Lukacs and Gramsci to Socialist Feminism*, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 286 [279–95].

7. Cf. especially Danielle Buschinger, "L'image du Musulman," p. 73, and most recently Tinsley, "Mapping the Muslims" (forthcoming).

8. "In ihrem höfischen Erscheinungsbild sind die Heiden den Christen nicht nur ebenbürtig, sondern übertreffen diese noch durch den Prunk ihrer ritterlichen Ausstattung und durch ihre höfischen Gesinnung"; Joachim Bumke, *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, 6th ed. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1991), p. 249.

9. Thus can we also view Feirefîz, the most noble of the non-Christians in *Parzival*, as a manifestation of the European construct of the "noble heathen," see Helmut Loiskandl, *Edle Wilde, Heiden und Barbaren. Fremdheit als Bewertungskriterium zwischen Kulturen* (Mödlingen bei Wien: St. Gabriel Verlag, 1966), pp. 104–05 on Feirefîz as *edler Heide* [noble heathen] and *Musterbild allen höfischen Rittertums* [model of all courtly chivalry].

10. There are a few medieval European literary characters of note that initially give one pause here, but upon closer examination, their putative resistance to Christian hegemony breaks down and evaporates: in Thomas Malory's *Le Morte D'Arthur*, for instance, the existence of the Muslim knight, Sir Palomides, is indeed "tolerated" for several hundred pages as he initally courts La Beale Isode (before her entanglements with Tristram) and was to be christened for her sake [ed. Eugène Vinaver, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), VIII.9); he later vows to complete seven true battles (X.47) before his christening finally takes place (XII.14). Thus even in this character whose narrative existence as a Muslim is surprisingly long-lived, his "will to conversion" is thus both the "personal" and the narrative motor of his character's existence. On the conversion phenomenon, see Marianne Ailes, "Chivalry and Conversion: The Chivalrous Saracen in the Old French Epics *Fierebras* and *Otinel*," *Al-Masāq: Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean* 9 (1996–1997): 1–21.

11. This tenet obviously does not hold for *historical* European territory, whether in the Near Eastern Crusader states or even Europe itself—in the Balkans and within the gradually expanding Christian territories in Spain—for in those places Muslims did live under Christian rule, as long as Christians maintained territory in the Near East, on the one hand, and until the Muslims (and Jews) were forcibly converted or expelled from Spain in 1492 and thereafter, on the other.

12. Two of the three categories of the neutralization of Muslim women in *chanson de geste* identified by Jacqueline de Weever resemble, at least on the surface, categories of metamorphosis proposed in my analysis (her third category is simply a subset of the first category): the alterity of the Other is erased by making the Muslim daughter of black parents white (as in precompositional metamorphosis), who then marries the French hero; the alterity is "inscribed" and annihilated in that the Muslim princess is identified as black and then killed (i.e., the category of metamorphosis through death); see Jacqueline de Weever, *Sheba's Daughters: Whitening and Demonizing the Saracen Woman in Medieval French Epic* (New York: Garland, 1998).

13. Alfred Ebenbauer cites several Middle High German examples of this broad and lengthy tradition, in "Es gibt ain mörynne," p. 25. Interestingly, in the medieval Welsh *Mabinogion*, there are no black characters in the earlier insular texts; only in the Arthurian tales most likely borrowed from continental sources at a late date do black characters appear, and they are without exception evil. Wolfram's works are cited from the edition by Karl Lachmann, *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, 6th ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1926).

14. See Sharon Kinoshita, "The Romance of MiscegeNation," pp. 118–19.

15. Cohen, "On Saracen Enjoyment," p. 119. The ancient Greeks had held that Africans were black because the sun burned them; Albertus Magnus adopted the idea from the Greeks, but then added the idea that if Africans moved to a more temperate zone they would gradually turn white. Interestingly, ابو زيد عبد الرحمن بن محمد بن خلدون Abū Zayd 'Abd ur-Raḥmān bin Muḥammad bin Khaldūn (1332–1406) held the same belief, but also believed that black Africans living in a temperate zone would not only themselves gradually whiten, but would also produce white children; cf. Geoffrey J. Martin and Preston E. James, *All Possible Worlds: A History of Geographical Ideas*, 3rd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1993), pp. 42 and 53. While a curious bit of information in the archive of racialist thinking, it at the same time suggests the possibility that lurking behind it is the idea that if skin color is strictly caused by the effects of the sun, then there is no essential moral value inherent in it, a notion whose time, as other evidence makes quite clear, had not yet come.

16. Robert Bartlett points out that it is "in parts of Europe where Europeans were least likely to meet actual black Africans, namely in Germany and Central Europe" that the depiction of black Africans was most exaggerated; see "Illustrating Ethnicity in the Middle Ages," in *The Origins of Racism*, p. 134 [132–56].

17. *Das Rolandslied des Pfaffen Konrad*, ed. C. Wesle, 2nd ed. Peter Wapnewski (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1967), see especially ll. 8047 and 8054.

18. *Die Gedichte Reinmars von Zweter*, ed. Gustav Roethe (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1887), No. 130, p. 477; 113, 117; Johann von Würzburg, *Wilhelm von Österreich*, ed. Ernst Regel (Berlin: Weidmann, 1906), l. 8698; Konrad von Megenberg, *Das Buch der Natur*, ed. Franz Pfeiffer (Stuttgart 1861; rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1994), cap. 49, p. 43.

19. *Die altdeutsche Exodus*, ed. Ernst Kossmann (Strasbourg: Trübner, 1886), ll. 3043, 3060, 3198, 3256.

20. Chrétien de Troyes, *Yvain, ou, Le chevalier au lion*, ed. Michel Rousse (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1990), l. 288; Hartmann von Aue, *Iwein*, ed. G.F. Benecke and Karl Lachmann, 7th ed. Ludwig Wolff (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), ll. 427–8.

21. Ed. Werner Wolf (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1955–1968), ll. 2597ff. and 2636.

22. Ulrich von dem Türlin, *Willehalm*, ed. Samuel Singer (Prague: Verlag des Vereins für Geschichte der Deutschen in Boehmen, 1893; rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1990), LXXV.14; Heinrich von Neustadt's *Apollonius von Tyrlant*, ed. Samuel Singer (Berlin: Weidmann, 1906), ll. 14,010; Der Stricker, *Die Kleindichtung des Strickers*, ed. Wolfgang Wilfried Moelleken, G. Agler, Robert E. Lewis (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1973–1978), II, no. 30, pp. 236; Hermann von Sachsenheim, *Die Mörin*, ed. Horst Dieter Schlosser (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1974), cf. especially ll. 5763. See also Andreas Mielke, *Nigra sum et formosa: Afrikanerinnen in der deutschen*

Literatur des Mittelalters (Stuttgart: Helfant, 1992), who attempts to cata-logue all appearances of black females in medieval German literature.

23. Maurice was first depicted as black in the thirteenth-century sculpture in Magdeburg cathedral; see Robert Bartlett, "Illustrating Ethnicity in the Middle Ages," in *The Origins of Racism*, ed. Eliav-Feldon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 134–6 [132–56]; and Gay L. Byron, *Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

24. Thomas Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes," p. 5. See also Paul H.D. Kaplan, *The Rise of the Black Magus in Western Art* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research, 1985).

25. Gregory of Elvira, *Commentum in canticum canticorum*, I.23. See also de Weever, *Sheba's Daughters*, p. xi. Even more interestingly, Bernard of Clairvaux and later Thomas the Cistercian suggested that Christ him-self was black—*Ipse Christus niger fuit* [Christ himself was black]—not so clearly in the sense of posited skin color, but rather through the stain of human sin that he assumed; see Thomas Cisterciensis, *Cantica Canticorum*, Migne, PL, vol. 206, col. 73. As Hahn comments, "Christ bears 'the stigma of blackness' as a result of human sin, but also because of his humility and abjections, which furnish the model and incentive for all believers to acknowledge their blackness" (Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes," p. 20).

26. As David Goldenberg points out, this negative moral valuation was also present in the post-biblical Jewish tradition, in the Talmud and midrash; see "Racism, Color Symbolism, and Color Prejudice," pp. 94–5, and his earlier *The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

27. See Isaac, Ziegler, Eliav-Feldon, *Origins of Racism*, p. 16.

28. Geraldine Heng, "The Romance of England," p. 163 n. 7.

29. Cohen, "On Saracen Enjoyment," p. 116.

30. To be recommended here as initial orientations are several articles that accompany *The Image of the Black in Western Art*: Jehan Desanges, "The Iconography of the Black in North Africa," in *From the Pharoahs to the Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), 2:246–68; and "Mediterranean Christians in Contact with Blacks and Muslims," in *From the Early Christian Era to the "Age of Discovery"* (1979), 2:84–119. And more specifically on medieval literature and the evolving construction of the idea of Muslims as generically black: Brummack, *Die Darstellung des Orients*, pp. 155–63 and Friedman, *The Monstrous Races*, p. 64.

31. Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes," p. 6. He notes further: "Though color seems never to have been a prime term of abuse among Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, Gypsies (Romany), and Jews, these diverse groups clearly thought of themselves as enmeshed in racial conflicts, and race remains an essential tool in exploring the warfare and the identity politics that lay behind the hostilities" (p. 9).

32. Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes," p. 9.

33. In an appendix to his study of the legal relations between Christians and non-Christians in the late Middle Ages, for instance, James Muldoon noted that no comprehensive study of medieval racism had yet been carried out and cautioned against the assumption of the existence of *modern* racism in the Middle Ages; *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 159–60. The collection of essays edited by Eliav-Feldon, Isaac, and Ziegler, *The Origins of Racism in the West*, on premodern European racism provides a model of investigative rigor for the issue.

34. Lisa Lampert, "Race, Periodicity, and the (New-)Middle Ages," *Modern Language Quarterly* 65 (2004): 396 [391–421].

35. Robert Bartlett, "Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31 (2001): 39 [39–56].

36. Joseph Ziegler, "Physiognomy, Science, and Proto-Racism 1200–1500," in *The Origins of Racism*, p. 198 [200–216].

37. See Benjamin Isaac, "Racism: A Rationalization of Prejudice," *passim* on the "logical and presumed scientific grounds" (p. 56) of ancient racism.

38. Goldenberg, "Racism, Color Symbolism, and Color Prejudice," pp. 4–5.

39. Steven A. Epstein, *Purity Lost: Transgressing Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1000–1400* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), especially p. 183.

40. Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes," p. 26.

41. Benjamin Isaac, Joseph Ziegler, and Miriam Eliav-Feldon, "Introduction," in *The Origins of Racism*, p. 4 [1–31].

42. See, especially his "Racism: A Rationalization of Prejudice," pp. 32–4.

43. "[L]a valorisation, généralisée et définitive, de différences, réelle ou imaginaires, au profit de l'accusateur et au détriment de sa victime, afin de légitimer une aggression ou un privilège"; Albert Memmi, *Le Racisme*, rev. ed (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 193.

44. "eine Annäherung des Dichters an das Rassenproblem"; Eberhard W. Funcke, "Agelstern Mal (Parz. 748, 7): Zur Begegnung Parzivals mit dem heidnischen Bruder," *Acta Germanica* 17 (1984): 13 [11–19].

45. Marion E. Gibbs, *Wîplîchez wîbes reht: A Study of the Women Characters in the Works of Wolfram von Eschenbach* (N.P.: Duquesne University Press, 1972), p. 88.

46. Susann T. Samples, "Belacane: Other as Another in Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parzival*," in *On Arthurian Women: Essays in Memory of Maureen Fries*, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and Fiona Tolhurst (Dallas: Scriptorium, 2001), pp. 187–8 [187–98].

47. Ebenbauer, "Es gibt ain mörynne," p. 26, and "die Mohren des 'Parzival' sind zwar *nach der helle gevar*, aber sie sind nicht als Mohren, sondern als Heiden Gefährten der Hölle" (p. 27).

48. "Neger (vermutlich hat der Dichter nie einen zu Gesicht bekommen) waren Menschen wie alle, nur eben schwarz, nicht mehr und nicht

weniger. Die entscheidende und hier zu besprechende Differenz lag dagegen in ihrem Heidentum"; Funcke, "Agelstern Mal," p. 14.

49. Daniel, *Heroes and Saracens*, p. 263.

50. Daniel, *Heroes and Saracens*, p. 272.

51. Southern, *Western Views*, p. 14.

52. Southern, *Western Views*, p. 25.

53. Paul Kunitzsch, "Die Arabica im 'Parzival' Wolframs von Eschenbach," in *Wolfram-Studien II*, ed. Werner Schröder (Berlin: Schmidt, 1974), pp. 9–35; Paul Kunitzsch, "Die orientalischen Ländernamen bei Wolfram (Wh 74, 3ff.), in *Wolfram-Studien II*, ed. Werner Schröder (Berlin: Schmidt, 1974), pp. 152–73; Paul Kunitzsch, "Erneut: Der Orient in Wolframs 'Parzival,'" *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 113 (1984): 79–111.

54. The reason for which, he suggests, is that such research has in large part been conducted by non-Orientalists who themselves have no more access to Arabic and Persian sources than did Wolfram, or on the other hand by trained Orientalists who have little understanding of the mechanisms by means of which Oriental knowledge was transmitted to Europe in the Middle Ages and the use of that knowledge by Europeans; Kunitzsch, "Die Arabica," pp. 9 and 11.

55. Kunitzsch, "Die Arabica," pp. 13 and 19; "ein bloßes Wortgeklingel ohne jeden näheren geographischen oder historischen Anknüpfungspunkt" ("Die orientalischen Ländernamen," p. 173); the subsequent citations in the text are "Wo die Kenntnis gut zugänglicher, weit verbreiteter Fakten und Namen so schwach repräsentiert ist, wird man ein für allemal davon Abstand nehmen müssen, nach intimeren Zusammenhängen mit verborgenen Subtilitäten fernster orientalischer Mystik, Philosophie oder Glaubenslehre zu suchen" ("Die Arabica," p. 35); "Bei der Aufklärung von Wolframs Orientelementen hat man strikt von den europäischen Orientkenntnissen *in seiner Zeit und Gegend* auszugehen. Er lebte ja in Mitteldeutschland und hatte keine eigene direkte Berührung mit orientalischen Dingen. Alles, was er über den Orient weiß, mußte ihm also aus *westlichen* Quellen, die bis zu seiner Zeit vorlagen, zugeflossen sein" ("Erneut," p. 79).

56. As opposed, for instance, to the Latin translations of Arabic translations of ancient *Greek* learning.

57. In *Parzival*, the narrator mentions that Belakâne, whose subjects in Zazamanc are black and Muslim (17, 25), has seen white Muslims (*liehte*[ ] *heiden* 29, 5).

58. Bertau, *Wolfram*, p. 243.

59. Ed., Karl Bartsch (Vienna: Braumüller, 1869; rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1969). Ulrich von Eschenbach [*sic*], *Alexander*, ed. Wendelin Toischer (Tübingen: Literarischer Verein Stuttgart, 1888; rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1974), ll. 19,944; 19,147; 20,022. This same motif—the presentation of blacks as a gift—also appears in the *Kaiserchronik*, ed. Edward Schröder,

MGH, Deutsche Chroniken, vol. 1 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1895; rpt. Dublin: Weidmann, 1969), ll. 14,056 and 14,232.

60. de Weever, *Sheba's Daughters*, p. xvii.

61. "Die Mohren mögen zwar edel, ritterlich, sogar christlich sein, eine exponierte weibliche Heldin und Liebende ist aber doch weiß. Sie wird— gegen traditionelle ethnographische Gegebenheiten—'umgefärbt'"; Ebenbauer, "Es gibt ain mörynne," p. 29.

62. While the (probably Romance-language) etymology of the name is not clear, for the southern German Wolfram, the name would have resonated as "little Arab."

63. See Annette Gerok-Reiter on the dual secular-religious nature of the Muslim Arabel's transformation into the Christian Gyburc; "Die Hölle auf Erden: Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Weltlichem und Geistlichem in Wolframs 'Willehalm,'" in *Geistliches in weltlicher und Weltliches in geistlicher Literatur des Mittelalters*, ed. Christoph Huber, Burghart Wachinger and Hans-Joachim Ziegeler (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000), pp. 173–4 [171–94].

64. Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung," p. 676.

65. On the Christian conception of Muslims as necessarily sexual depraved, see Daniel, *Islam and the West*, pp. 135–61. Rana Kabbani places this ungoverned sexuality in the larger context of imperialistic conquest: "In order to justify such servitude forced upon a people, this kind of narrative stressed the conspicuous cruelty, the lechery, or the perversity of the natives.... The forging of racial stereotypes and the confirmation of the notions of savagery were vital to the colonialist world view"; in *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 4.

66. *Heroes and Saracens*, p. 211. Daniel there also observes: "The converted Saracen is not disloyal, because his god has freed him of all obligation in failing him."

67. Amy G. Remensnyder, "Christian Captives, Muslim Maidens, and Mary," *Speculum* 82 (2007): 662 [642–77].

68. Sharon Kinoshita, "'Pagans are Wrong and Christians are Right': Alterity, Gender, and Nation in the *Chanson de Roland*," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31 (2001): 92 [80–111]. Benjamin Z. Kedar finds clear evidence for multidirectional conversion in the Crusader kingdoms of the eastern Mediterranean, although the numbers involved are quite small: in the Frankish Levant, "on the fringes of Frankish society there was some interfaith mobility, which we cannot measure accurately by the sources at our disposal, but the existence of which cannot be questioned"; see "Multidirectional Conversion in the Frankish Levant," in *Varieties of Religious Conversion in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Muldoon (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 196 [pp. 190–9]; repr. [with the same pagination] in *Franks, Muslims and Oriental Christians in the Latin Levant: Studies in Frontier Acculturation* (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 2006).

69. Among the large and growing body work on the topic of the eroticization of the colonized woman, see the anthologized essays in the section "Theorizing Gender," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), which are to be recommended for their own merits and for their excellent bibliographies enabling access to pertinent publications: Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse," pp. 196–220; Jenny Sharpe, "The Unspeakable Limits of Rape: Colonial Violence and Counter-Insurgency," pp. 221–43; Sara Suleri, "Woman Skin Deep: Feminism and the Postcolonial Condition," pp. 244–56; Mae Gwendolyn Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues: Dialogics, Dialectics and the Black Woman Writer's Literary Tradition," pp. 257–67.

70. Bumke, *Wolfram*, p. 53.

71. *Quaestiones super "De animalibus*," ed. Ephrem Filthaut, *Opera Omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1955), 12.271.

72. Letter four, to Heloise, J.T. Muckle, ed., "The Personal Letters Between Abelard and Heloise," *Mediaeval Studies* 15 (1953): 85 [47–94].

73. Hahn, "The Difference the Middle Ages Makes," pp. 23–4.

74. See also Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens," p. 407. On the constructed sensuality of Muslims, see Rana Kabbani's chapter "Lewd Saracens," in *Europe's Myths of Orient*, pp. 14–36. Lynn Ramey points out other moral issues in the character of Orable/Guibourc in the French Guillaume romance tradition: while she is positive in some texts, in others her image is far less so: she marries Guillaume although he tortures and kills her two children by Thibaut, her Muslim husband; in another texts she is said to have thrown one of her sons by Thibaut from the ramparts. Such elements were eventually excised from the central narrative tradition (Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 42).

75. "Das Klischee von der erotischen Aktivität schwarzhäutiger Menschen hat also eine lange Tradition. In der mittelalterlichen deutschen Literatur wird es differenziert: die verführerische Mohrin und der sexualagressive Mohr. Daß diese Differenzierung mit der patriarchalen Struktur der mittelalterlichen Gesellschaft zusammenhängt, wird man annehmen dürfen. Zugleich aber läßt sich festhalten: Das Vorurteil, das "die farbigen Männer einer extremen sexuellen Potenz und die farbigen Frauen der Schamlosigkeit" zeiht, ist nicht (nur)—wie oft vermutet wurde— durch soziale Spannungen und Rassenschranken zu erklären, die Wunsch- und Angstphantasien, die sich hier ausdrücken, scheinen nicht aus Herrschafts- und Unterdrückungsstrukturen ableitbar. Ein soziales Negerproblem hat es im mittelalterlichen Europa wohl nicht gegeben. Wo immer die Wurzeln für dieses Vorurteil liegen mögen, sie liegen "tiefer." Und die Klischees sind so konstant…"; Ebenbauer, p. 41. See recently, Peter Biller, "Black Women in Medieval Scientific Thought," *Micrologus* 13 (2005): 477–92.

76. On the "foreign-ness" of Belakâne, see David F. Tinsley, "The Face of the Foreigner in Medieval German Courtly Literature," in *Meeting the Foreign in the Middle Ages* (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 45–70.

77. As with Feirefîz, conversion, and thus erasure of the primary aspect of Muslim cultural identity, must precede marriage. As Bertau points out, "Es scheint auch für Wolfram zu gelten: Außerhalb des richtigen Glaubens gibt es kein Recht" [It seems valid also for Wolfram: outside the true faith there is no law/justice]; *Wolfram*, p. 244.

78. On the function of tears in medieval epic, see Lydia Miklautsch, "Waz touc helden säh geschrei? Tränen als Gesten der Trauer in Wolframs Willehalm," *Zeitschrift für Germanistik* 10 (2000): 245–57.

79. See here Lofmark: "mere poetic baptism does not suffice" ("eine nur poetische Taufe genügt nicht"; "Das Problem des Unglaubens," p. 400), and Bumke's more traditional view of the significance of this pseudo-baptism (*Wolfram von Eschenbach*, p. 52): "that her purity of virtue makes her inwardly a Christian (28, 14) is the highest praise for a heathen woman" ("Daß ihre Tugendreinheit sie innerlich zur Christin macht (28, 14), ist das höchste Lob für eine Heidin"). Muslims can thus apparently be conceived as virtuous only insofar as that virtue is expressed as a counterfeit approximation of an idealized Christian behavior.

80. Where race does not, incidentally, appear as an issue.

81. Furthermore, as noted above, Gahmuret actively dislikes bestowing a kiss of greeting on the black wife of Belakâne's marshal (20, 24–26); Belakâne fears that Gahmuret may be put off by her color (22, 8–9); the unmistakeable physical desire of both Belakâne and Gahmuret already noted is inscribed in the tradition of the sensuality of the Other.

82. Attempts to identify the actual historico-geographical sites of action in Wolfram's fictions can, for obvious reasons, hardly be successful; cf. Hermann Goetz's attempt to identify Wolfram's fictionalia on the basis of historical realia: "Der Orient der Kreuzzüge in Wolframs 'Parzival,'" *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 49 (1967): 1–42. See nonetheless Marianne Kalinke's astute extrapolation that Gahmuret traverses the entire Muslim world from Spain to Persia "apparently without benefit of languages other than his native tongue, to judge by Wolfram von Eschenbach's silence in this matter"; "The Foreign Language Requirement in Medieval Icelandic Romance," *Modern Language Review* 78 (1983): 850 [850–61]; see also Kathryn Starkey, "Traversing the Boundaries of Language: Multilingualism and Linguistic Difference in Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Willehalm*," *German Quarterly* 75 (2002): 20–34.

83. Funcke notes that behind the narrator's fascination with the exotic beauty of Belakâne's black skin there constantly lurks *die barbarische Zote* [the barbaric dirty joke]; "Agelstern Mal," p. 15.

84. "Was ihn wegtreibt, ist das Verlangen nach Ritterschaft (54, 19f.). . . . Er hinterläßt seiner Frau einen Brief, in dem er ihr *vorlügt*, daß er sie verlassen habe, weil sie eine Heidin sei" (*Wolfram*, p. 53, italics mine).

85. "Zum einen wird dadurch das Prologthema schwarz-weiß = Hölle-Himmel wieder aufgenommen, das wie ein Rahmen um die Parzivalhandlung gelegt ist und erst zum Schluß in Feirefiz' Taufe, eine Lösung findet. Zum anderen ist die Argumentation für Gahmuret sehr bequem: nach mittelalterlicher Auffassung war die Ehe mit einer Heidin ungültig und konnte ohne weitere Formalitäten aufgelöst und beendet werden"; Bumke, *Wolfram*, p. 54.

86. "das wahre Motiv seines Handelns, indem er es ohne Notwendigkeit ablehnt" ("Es gibt ain mörynne," pp. 21–3).

87. Eva Parra Membrives, "Alternative Frauenfiguren in Wolframs *Parzival*: Zur Bestimmung des Höfischen anhand differenzierter Verhaltensmuster," *German Studies Review* 25 (2002): 40, 44 [35–55].

88. In fact the terms themselves are infrequently mentioned by scholars. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship has generally accepted the medieval tenet noted above, governing interfaith marriage, and thus ignored Gahmuret's transgressive bigamy. Spiewok recognizes it as *Doppelehe* [double marriage] ("Die Bedeutung," p. 680). Blake Spahr calls Gahmuret "a cad, a vain show-off, and a profligate spendthrift," in addition to "a womanizer, a liar, and a deceiver," while also enigmatically claiming that he is "within his legal rights in deserting this Heathen" [i.e., Belakâne]; see Blake Lee Spahr, "Gahmuret's Erection: Rising to Adventure," *Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht, deutsche Sprache und Literatur* 83 (1991): 403–13. Eva Parra Membrives and Klaus Kirchert put the name to the deed, the former designating Gahmuret's state as *Bigamie* [bigamy] ("Alternative Frauenfiguren," p. 38), while Kirchert labels the marriage of Willehalm and Gyburc in Wolfram's *Willehalm* (while she is still married to her Muslim husband) as "Gyburg's Ehebruch" [Gyburc's adultery]; "Heidenkrieg und christliche Schonung des Feindes: Widersprüchliches im *Willehalm* Wolframs von Eschenbach," *Archiv* 231 (1994): 268 [258–70].

89. Ebenbauer, "Es gibt ain mörynne," p. 24, notes the similarity in the deaths of Dido and Belakâne as abandoned women. Membrives also astutely characterizes both Belakâne and Dido as effective rulers who welcome, passionately love, and resupply property-less, indigent (but aristocratic) men, before being abandoned by them ("Alternative Frauenfiguren," p. 39). She also notes the utter absurdity of the depicted inferiority complex of Belakâne, the beautiful, wealthy, noble, courtly ruling queen who fears that she may not be good enough for the property-less second-son and homeless knight, Gahmuret (42). Her insecurity can only be understood as a reflection of her own internalization of the Christian valuation of race/religion and participation in her own Otherizing.

90. As she makes explicit after having read Gahmuret's farewell letter: "'frowe, wiltu toufen dich, / du maht ouch noch erwerben mich.' / Des engerte se keinen wandel niht. / 'ôwê wie balde daz geschiht!'" (56, 25–8) ["Lady, if you will be baptized, / you may also still win me." / She did not wish it otherwise. / "Alas, how quickly that would happen!"].

91. Eberhard Funcke employs another revealing metaphor for Repanse de Schoye as the means of drawing Feirefiz to the baptismal font: Wolfram has quite another *Trumpf* [trump]; in "Agelstern Mal," p. 15.

92. "seine komische Liebesraserei und die Burleske um seine Taufe lassen fast vergessen, daß diese Motive auch eine ernste Seite haben"; Joachim Bumke, "Parzival und Feirefiz—Priester Johannes—Loherangrin: Der offene Schluß des *Parzival* von Wolfram von Eschenbach," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 65 (1991): 242 [236–64].

93. Henry Kratz, *Wolfram von Eschenbach's Parzival: An Attempt at a Total Evaluation* (Bern: Francke, 1973), pp. 541 and 572.

94. "An Feirefiz' Gestalt hat [Wolfram] offensichtlich seine Freude, ähnlich wie er Rennewart mit Wohlgefallen und Humor zeichnet"; Hans-Joachim Koppitz, *Wolframs Religiosität: Beobachtungen über das Verhältnis Wolframs von Eschenbach zur religiösen Tradition des Mittelalters* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1959), p. 189.

95. Hilda Swinburn, "Gahmuret and Feirefiz in Wolfram's Parzival," *Modern Language Review* 51 (1956): 196 [195–202].

96. Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre*, pp. 24–6.

97. On the liminality of the Muslim princess abducted to Europe, see de Weever, *Sheba's Daughters*, p. 188; see also Jacob Lassner, *Demonizing the Queen of Sheba: Boundaries of Gender and Culture in Postbiblical Judaism and Medieval Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). In quite a different context, Sharon Kinoshita suggests that converted Saracen queens may function as creative agents of change in literary texts, thus paralleling the liminal function as proposed by Turner's model and elaborated by Bhabha, as outlined in chapter two, above; see her "The Politics of Courtly Love: *La Prise d'Orange* and the Conversion of the Saracen Queen," *Romanic Review* 86 (1995): 275 [265–87].

98. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 63.

99. See Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens," pp. 404–05. The *Kaiserchronik* rarely passes up an opportunity to report the mass slaughter of Muslims: *Si sluogen in ainer luzelstunt / der haiden mêr denne fiunfzech tûsent* [they slaughtered in a short while more than fifty thousand heathens] (16676–7); later a hundred thousand die of thirst (16744), which makes the whole land stink of their corpses (16755–61).

100. Examples in *Willehalm* of Christians as *gotes soldiere* 19, 17 and assured of Heaven (14, 10) and of Muslims assured of Hell (20, 12; 38, 25), which delights Hell itself (38, 29); cf. Bumke, *Wolfram*, pp. 245, 247–8. In general on Holy War in the confrontation between Christendom and Islam, see *The Holy War*, ed. Thomas Patrick Murphy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), in the introduction to which Stanley Kahrl comments: "Certainly the holy war, as that term is now generally understood, appears to have been an invention of the West. Professor [W. Montgomery] Watt's paper ["Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War," pp. 141–56, in that same volume] makes it clear that the

usual image of a horde of rabid Muslims sweeping all civilization before them in a war without quarter, a horde crying "Convert or die," is, like so many faces of the enemy, a caricature. For such warriors one must go instead to the verses of *The Song of Roland* where Roland cries "Nos avom dreit mais cist gloton ont tort" — "We are right but these wretches are wrong" — as he splits a pagan warrior in half. The Jihād succeeded precisely because it was *not* that sort of a war" (p. 4).

101. See, for instance, Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens," p. 409.

102. The same motif is found in Heinrich von Neustadt's *Apollonius von Tyrlant* (ca. 1300), where Garamant, the son of a mixed race/religion union is bi-colored. Nor is the motif without relation to similar situations beyond the German tradition: in the Middle English romance *The King of Tars*, a similar motif occurs, albeit with a significantly different twist: a Christian princess marries under duress a (provisionally) Muslim king in order to save her people from destruction; their child is born deformed, but is transformed into a healthy infant upon baptism; see J. Ritson, ed., *Ancient English Metrical Romances* (London 1802), and Judith Perryman, ed., *The King of Tars* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1980); Rana Kabbani summarizes the transformations in the *King of Tars* (*Imperial Fictions*, p. 16).

103. Bumke, *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, p. 47.

104. Bumke, *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, p. 48.

105. 57, 27 and 748, 7. W.J. Schröder, for instance, suggests that Wolfram's association of the magpie image with Feirefîz has no religio-ethical dimensions*; Der Ritter zwischen Welt und Gott: Idee und Problem des Parzivalromans Wolframs von Eschenbach* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1952), p. 231; and Henry Kratz comments that "it goes completely counter to Wolfram's attitude toward the heathen to have him equate heathenism and sinfulness" (*Wolfram*, p. 572).

106. Sidney M. Johnson comments on the genetic problems with Wolfram's conception; see "Wolfram von Eschenbach and Medieval Genetics," in *Blütezeit: Festschrift für L. Peter Johnson zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Mark Chinca, Joachim Heinzle, Christopher Young (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000), pp. 384–5 [383–94]. Recently Walter Haug has reexamined the long tradition of scholarly interpretations of the magpie image, but without accounting for Wolfram's in-corporation of the image in Feirefîz, except to suggest (as have others before him) that there is humor involved; see Walter Haug, "Das literaturtheoretische Konzept Wolframs von Eschenbach: Eine neue Lektüre des 'Parzival'-Prologs," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 123 (2001): 211–29.

107. See Elisabeth Schmid, "Priester Johann oder die Aneignung des Fremden," in *Germanistik in Erlangen. Hundert Jahre nach der Gründung des Deutschen Seminars*, ed. Dietmar Peschel (Erlangen: Universitätsbund, 1983), pp. 75–93. On Feirefîz's siring of Prester John, Joachim Bumke suggests: "Now it becomes clear that actual redemptive-historical

significance inheres in the baptismal farce in Munsalvæsche, insofar as it initiates the Christianization of the Orient" ("Jetzt wird deutlich, daß der Taufburleske in Munsalvaesche geradezu heilsgeschichtliche Bedeutung zukommt, insofern sie die Christianisierung des Orients einleitet"; Bumke, "Parzival und Feirefiz," p. 244). Far from a positive image of conversions, such a racist and sexualized travesty of baptism *as* an initiator of a significant phase of redemptive history (the conversion of Asia) seems a cultural suture through which one glimpses the ideological hollowness of the entire enterprise.

108. Otto von Freising, *Historia de duabus civitatibus*, 7.33; ed. A. Hofmeister, *MGH Scriptores (SS) rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum* (1912), pp. 365–7. On the Prester John phenomenon in general, see Robert Silverberg, *The Realm of Prester John* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972); Vsevolod Slessarev, *Prester John: The Letter and the Legend* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959); and the text collection in Friedrich Zarncke, ed., *Der Priester Johannes*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1876–1879). Most recently see Bettina Wagner, *Die "Epistola presbiteri Johannis" lateinisch und deutsch* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000).

109. Marco Polo, *Il Milione*, cap. lxiv ff. On Marco Polo's representation of the episode, see John Larner, *Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 86. Polo also represents Kubilai Khan as a potential convert to Christianity, who, as a Christian Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, would likely have outdone all other conceptions of the Prester John legend. Beyond Polo's suggestion, however, there is no evidence that Kubilai Khan ever contemplated conversion.

110. Francis M. Roger, *The Quest for Eastern Christians: Travels and Rumor in the Age of Discovery* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962).

111. Pastre calls it a *marque* or *signe* of the essence of his being, or even the "stigmata of his affiliation/relation" ("stigmates de sa filiation"; "Les Marques," pp. 235–40).

112. The text is edited by Franz H. Bäuml, *Kudrun: Die Handschrift* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), here st. 580–5.

113. Ebenbauer astutely remarks concerning the racial requirements for marriage partners: "Neger mögen alle Vorzüge und Tugenden haben, ein Ehepartner soll aber doch wohl weiß sein" "Blacks may possess all excellent traits and virtues, but a spouse should really be white"; "Es gibt ain mörynne," p. 29. On this issue, see also my *Brides and Doom: Gender, Property and Power in Medieval German Women's Epic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 190.

114. On this motif, see Daniel, *Heroes and Saracens*, pp. 198–9. See also Fritz Peter Knapp, *Rennewart: Studien zu Gehalt und Gestalt des "Willehalm" Wolframs von Eschenbach* (Wien: Notring, 1970), and Carl Lofmark, who suggests that Wolfram would have included Rennewart's marriage in the epic's missing conclusion; in *Rennewart in Wolfram's Willehalm: A*

Study of Wolfram von Eschenbach and his Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

115. Or be expelled, as was Feirefiz, even after conversion and marriage.

116. On Rennewart's absence from the poem's conclusion, which Sylvia Stevens posits as fragmentary, see her *Family in Wolfram von Eschenbach's* Willehalm: mîner mâge triwe ist mir wol kuont (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 161–7.

117. Gabriele L. Strauch, "Incorporating Arab Sources in the Reading of Middle High German Crusade Epics," *Von Otfried von Weißenburg bis zum 15. Jahrhundert* (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1991), p. 18.

118. Strauch, "Incorporating Arab Sources," p. 21; citing Said, *Orientalism*, p. 60.

119. In the present context, I bracket the enormously complex and problematic issues of the territorial (not cultural) integration and representation of European Jews by Christians, that complexity depending not least on the fact that for the millennium before the Holocaust, European Jewish populations were indeed *European*, however marginalized culturally they were by the majority population.

120. Conventionally, scholarship on the texts claims that Willehalm's battles against the Muslims constitute a *bellum iustum* in the Augustinian sense, since he is fighting a defensive war against foreign aggressors and defending the faith and the faithful from annihilation, which quite deemphasizes the fact that it was his own invasion of Muslim territory and kidnapping of the king's daughter that prompted the Muslim *re*-action; see, for instance, J.A. Hunter, "Wolfram's Attitude to Warfare and Killing," *Reading Medieval Studies* 8 (1982): 101 [97–114].

121. With astonishing frequency Colón repeats this claim in the logbook of the first voyage, e.g., 27 November 1492: "And later the benefits will be known and efforts will be made to make all these people Christians, because it will be done easily, for they have no cult nor are they idolaters" ("y despues se sabran los benefiçios y se trabajara de hazer todos estos pueblos christianos porque de ligero se hara: porque ellos no tienen secta ningua ni son Idolatras"); for Saturday 22 December: "these people are disposed to become Christian" ("aquellos pueblos an de ser christianos por la voluntad"); *The Diario of Christopher Columbus's First Voyage to America, 1493–1493*, ed. Oliver Dunn and James E. Kelley, Jr. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), p. 182 (fol. 29v) and 264 (fol. 43v) [abbreviations expanded]. See also the comment by Cabeza de Vaca: "And we told them by signs, so that they would understand us, that in Heaven there is a man whom we call God, who had created Heaven and Earth, and that we worshipped him and held him to be our Lord and did what he commanded us, and that all good things come from his hand, and that if they did likewise, things would go very well for them. And so great did we find their predisposition to this that if there had been a language in which we could have communicated perfectly, we could have converted them

all to Christianity" ("Y dixímosles por las señas, porque nos entendían, que en el cielo avía un hombre que llamávamos Dios, el cual avía criado el cielo y la tierra, y que éste adorávamos nosotros y teníamos por Señor y que hazíamos lo que nos mandava y que de su mano venían todas las cosas buenas, y que si ansí ellos lo hiziessen, les iría muy bien dello. Y tan grande aparejo hallamos en ellos, que si lengua oviera con que perfectamente nos entendiéramos, todos los dexáramos christianos"); in Trinidad Barrera, ed., *Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca: Naufragios* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985), p. 154; cf. also Enrique Pupo-Walker, "Pesquisas para una nueva lectura de *Los Naufragios* de Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca," *Revistas Iberoamericana* 53 (1987): 517–39. The fact that neither Colón nor Cabeza de Vaca could actually communicate with the Americans putatively eager for metamorphosis did not diminish their confidence in the accuracy of their interpretations.

5   Wolfram von Eschenbach, Gyburc, and Tolerance

1. *Willehalm*, in *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, ed. Lachmann, st. 306–10.
2. "[W]eiblich, mütterlich, zärtlich, liebevoll und gleichzeitig auch stark, tapfer, mutig und kampfbereit, sie liebt und leidet, ist schuldbeladen und erlösungsfähig, kurz: sie ist *officina omnium*, ist Mensch im umfaßendsten Sinn, ist—*HOMO MEDIETAS*"; Claudia Brinker-von der Heyde, "Gyburg—*medietas*," in *Homo medietas. Aufsätze zu Religiosität, Literatur und Denkformen des Menschen vom Mittelalter bis in die Neuzeit. Festschrift für Alois Maria Haas zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Claudia Brinker-von der Heyde and Niklaus Largier (Bern: Lang, 1999), p. 351 [337–51].
3. See David O. Neville, "Giburc as Mediatrix: Illuminated Reflections of Tolerance in Hz 1104," *Manuscripta* 40 (1996): 111 [96–114] on the manuscript illumination in Nuremberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Hz 1104. See also Lynn Tarte Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 43, on Muslim women as opposed to Christian women in *chanson de geste*: "She could be a powerful woman in the text precisely because she was in reality already on the margins of society. The link between her liminal status and her power is manifest."
4. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989): 3–18; see also Perry Anderson's examination of the broad range of reaction on the part of Cold Warriors to the end of the Soviet era, in "The Ends of History," in *Zones of Engagement* (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 279–375.
5. Among the many pertinent examinations of these issues in recent decades, there is a variety of interesting contributions in the special issue of the *Monthly Review* devoted to the topic: "In Defense of History: Marxism and the Postmodern Agenda," ed. Ellen Meiksins Wood and John Bellamy Foster, 47/3 (July–August 1995), especially the essays by Wood, "What Is the 'Postmodern' Agenda? An Introduction," pp. 1–12 and Terry Eagleton, "Where do Postmodernists Come From?" pp. 59–70.

6. Generally the progressive site is in fact more recent chronologically, although sometimes a more complex concept of cultural history enables one to view, for instance, the quasi medieval absolutist serf-state of nineteenth-century Russia as a legitimate site of comparison with the proto-capitalist communes of renaissance Northern Italy in the thirteenth century.

7. It should be noted, incidentally, that in my argument *against* the construction of Wolfram's tolerance, I do not by any means assume or argue *for* intolerance as an intrinsic component of historical German culture. Incidentally, in the course of her brief plot summary of *Parzival*, Suzanne Conklin Akbari seems to imply that in my essay "Race, Representation, and Metamorphosis," I, too, advocate Wolfram's "tolerance," suggesting that she has perhaps not actually seen the essay (*Idols in the East*, p. 193n).

8. "Neu ist im Heidenbild des 'Willehalm' der Verzicht auf die übliche Schwarz-Weiß-Malerei. Zum Erstenmal wird die Welt der Andersgläubigen nicht einfach verteufelt, sondern als ein Bereich eigenen Rechts und eigener Ordnungen außerhalb des Christentums gesehen und anerkannt" (*Wolfram*, p. 250).

9. "Die Begriffe 'Humanität' und "Toleranz," auf Wolframs Dichtung angewendet, sind gelegentlich mit Verbotsschildern versehen worden. [...] Solche Verbotsschilder schmücken die Wege der deutschen Literaturgeschichte etwas zu reichlich und erleichtern nicht gerade die Verbindung von einem Ort zum andern. Daß ein Mensch des Mittelalters nicht genau den Bewußtseinsstand der Aufklärung erreicht hat, brauchte doch wohl nicht eigens betont zu werden. Und daß 'Humanität' auch von Zeitgenossen in recht verschiedenem Sinn gebraucht und verstanden wird, sollte man gemerkt haben. Wie nahe aber Wolfram in den Geschichten Parzivals und Willehalms und der Gyburg an Einsichten herangeführt wurde, mit denen u.a. auch Lessing rang, das sollte man sehen und aussprechen dürfen, sogar als bestallter deutscher Literaturhistoriker"; Wolfgang Mohr, "Willehalm," in *Wolfram von Eschenbach* (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1979), pp. 323–4.

10. "Wolfram ist kein moderner Denker, aber er hat mitgewirkt an dem 'langen Prozeß, in dem sich das moderne Denken herausbildete,' dessen, konstitutive Momente schon im Hochmittelalter präformiert wurden'"; Joachim Heinzle, "Die Heiden als Kinder Gottes: Notiz zu 'Willehalm,'" *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum* 123 (1994): 301 [301–08], quoting Günther Mensching, *Das Allgemeine und das Besondere. Der Ursprung des modernen Denkens im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1992), p. 11.

11. Lofmark, "Anti-Crusade Feeling," p. 27.

12. Werner Schröder, "Christliche Paradoxa in Wolframs *Willehalm*," *Euphorion* 55 (1961): 90 [85–90]: "Auch Giburc ist nur Sprachrohr des Dichters"; Walter Haug, "Parzivals *zwivel* und Willehalms *zorn*. Zu Wolframs Wende vom Höfischen Roman zur *Chanson de geste*," *Wolfram-Studien* 3 (1975): 217 [217–31]: "die sogenannte Toleranzrede Gyburgs vermittelt—darüber besteht weitgehend Einigkeit—die Position des

Dichters"; see also Klaus Kirchert, "Heidenkrieg," pp. 258–9. John Greenfield and Lydia Miklautsch provide an overview of the scholarship on Gyburc's speech (as unacknowledged advocates of the tolerance thesis), in *Der "Willehalm" Wolframs von Eschenbach* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 133–7.

13. Neville, "Giburc as Mediatrix," p. 103; Helmut de Boor, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur*, II: *Die höfische Literatur: Vorbereitung, Blüte, Ausklang, 1170–1250* (Munich: Beck, 1979; 1994), p. 120.

14. "Die geistige Richtung des Willehalm ist dieselbe wie im Parzival. Der ritterliche Humanismus und Toleranzgedanke ist auch hier die leitende Lebensansicht, ja, er ist noch stärker ausgeprägt, da er einen wichtigen Grundzug sowohl der gesamten Handlung als auch des inneren Lebens bildet. Denn hier gruppiert sich alles um den Kampf zwischen Heidentum und Christentum, zwischen Glauben und Unglauben. Die zwei Welten treten sich hier unmittelbar in ihrem Dualismus gegenüber, aber dieser Dualismus ist gemildert, wird aufgelöst, indem das Heidentum keine verworfene Masse ist, sondern voll und ganz gültig wird. Humanitas, menschliche Würde, sind in jeglicher Menschennatur anerkannt, Barmherzigkeit wird auch gegen den Andersgearteten und Andersgläubigen geübt, der Mensch wird im Menschen erkannt. So ist Humanität hier der Ausdruck wahrer, ursprünglicher Menschlichkeit.... Dieses Bild greift Wolfram schon im Parzival auf, mit größerem Nachdruck, als es je vorher geschah, betont er die Gleichberechtigung der Heiden, die sogar die Ungläubigkeit jetzt durch ihren inneren Wert wettmachen können"; Kurt Schellenberg, "Humanität und Toleranz bei Wolfram von Eschenbach," *Wolfram Jahrbuch* [ed. Wolfgang Stammler], 1 (1952), pp. 18 and 21 [9–27].

15. Carl Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens in *Willehalm*," pp. 399–414.

16. Jean-Marc Pastre, "L'image du Sarrasin," p. 262: "On est loin de la notion de tolérance qu'on a voulu parfois mettre en avant pour définir l'attitude de Wolfram."

17. Alois Haas, "Aspekte der Kreuzzüge in Geschichte und Geistesleben des mittelalterlichen Deutschlands," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 46 (1964): 200–201 [185–202]: "Die Rede von mittelalterlicher 'Toleranz', die sich immer wieder an diese deutsche Chanson de geste knüpft, verwässert eher den Sachverhalt als daß sie ihn klärt.... Aber auch das ist *nicht* Toleranz, sondern 'theologische' Reflexion eines ritterlichen Laien...."

18. H.B. Willson, "The Symbolism of Belakâne and Feirefîz in Wolfram's *Parzival*," *German Life and Letters* n.s. 13 (1959): 103 [94–105].

19. Were we concerned with a field besides medieval studies, where "theory," even in its pre-post-structuralist mode, has yet to become the standard intellectual equipment of all practicioners, we might simply point to the explication of the "intentional fallacy" several generations ago by various schools of formalist criticism. In his brief, witty and irreverent

history of Anglophone literary studies, Terry Eagleton usefully elucidates formalism's exposition of the "intentional fallacy," as well as situating *that* school's critical ideologies in the larger context of phenomenology and hermeneutics; *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 17–90.

20. As J.A. Hunter notes: "Wolfram may well have Konrad's *Rolandslied* in mind, for the phrase *alsam ein vihe* evokes the world of the *Rolandslied*, where the heathens are slaughtered like cattle precisely because they are heathens. Wolfram clearly knew Konrad's poem and in certain respects he has composed in *Willehalm* an 'anti-*Rolandslied*' "; in "Wolfram's Attitude to Warfare and Killing," p. 113, n. 33.

21. "Orat. in conc. Claramont. hab.," in Migne, PL, 151:565d.

22. "De laude nov. mil.," cap. III, Migne, PL, 182:924a/b. See also Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 23.

23. Cathrynke Dijkstra and Martin Gosman, "Poetic Fiction and Poetic Reality: The Case of the Romance Crusade Lyrics," *Neophilologus* 79 (1995): 20 [13–24]; see also M. Gosman, "La propagande de la croisade et le rôle de la chanson de geste comme porte-partole d'une idéologie non officielle," *Actes du XIe Congrés International de la Société Rencesvals* (Barcelona 1990), 1:291–306; see also Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 4, 10, 215–17.

24. Cf. the bull, *Inter Omnia Quae* in P. Jaffé, ed., *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 2 vols. (Graz 1956), I, no. 11637 (7771).

25. Hugo Moser and Helmut Tervooren, eds., *Des Minnesangs Frühling*, 2 vols., 36th ed. (Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1977), 99, 18–20; hereafter abbreviated references as MF.

26. *MF* 87, 25–8.

27. 5, 3–4; Ulrich Müller, ed., *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1985), p. 34.

28. "Qui saubes dar tant bon conseil denan," pp. 4, 3; Müller, pp. 75–8.

29. Werner Schröder, "Die Hinrichtung Arofels," *Wolfram-Studien* 2 (1974): 219–40.

30. James A. Rushing, Jr., "Arofel's Death and the Question of Willehalm's Guilt," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 94 (1995): 478–80 [469–82].

31. Gerhard Meissburger in fact wishes to characterize Gyburc as a saint; in "Gyburg," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 83 (1964): 64–99. Werner Schröder is also at pains to sanctify her as the suffering *suetiu* "benevolent, gracious, kind, meek," while retaining her status as *liebender und leidender Mensch* [loving and suffering human being]; in "Süeziu Gyburc," *Euphorion* 54 (1960): 39–69.

32. Karl Bertau notes, as have few others: „One should not forget: when Gyburc speaks in favor of protection for the heathens, she is speaking in favor of her relatives" ("Man darf wohl nicht vergessen: Als Gyburg für Schonung der Heiden spricht, spricht sie für ihre Verwandten"); in

Wolfram von Eschenbach: Neun Versuche über Subjektivität und Ursprünglichkeit in der Geschichte (München: Beck, 1983), p. 253.

33. David A. Wells, "Religious Disputation Literature and the Theology of *Willehalm*: An Aspect of Wolfram's Education," in *Wolfram's "Willehalm": Fifteen Essays*, ed. Martin H. Jones and Timothy McFarland (Woodbridge, England: Boydell and Brewer, 2002), p. 148 [145–65].

34. Wentzlaff-Eggebert (*Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 254) points out that Guillaume delivers no Crusader speeches in the Old French source text, *Aliscans*; Willehalm's are all invented by Wolfram.

35. Cf. *Das Nibelungenlied*, ed. Helmut de Boor, 21st ed. (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1979), st. 921–4 and 1509–10; *Kudrun*, expanded 5th ed. Karl Stackmann (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1980), st. 1386, 1–2. On this conventional, gender-based behavior, see my *Brides and Doom*, pp. 109 and 210.

36. Kirchert, "Heidenkrieg," p. 259; Christopher Young, "The Construction of Gender in *Willehalm*," in Jones and McFarland, *Wollfram's "Willehalm*," p. 268 [249–69]; Martin Przybilski, "Giburgs Bitten: Politik und Verwandtschaft," *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 133 (2004): 49–60.

37. Kirchert, "Heidenkrieg," p. 262.

38. Marion Gibbs, *Wîplîchez wîbes reht: A Study of the Women Characters in the Works of Wolfram von Eschenbach* (n.p.: Duquesne University Press, 1972), pp. 61–2.

39. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* 6.10., ed. I. Fraipont and Donatien de Bruyne, Corpus Christianorum, ser. lat. 33 (Turnhout: Brépols, 1958), pp. 318–19.

40. Rushing, "Arofel's Death," p. 480; Hunter, "Wolfram's Attitude to Warfare," p. 101.

41. Indeed Mireille Schnyder suggests that with Willehalm and Gyburg "the religious war becomes a playful battle of love" ("der Glaubenskrieg wird zum spielerischen Liebeskampf"); see her "*manlîch sprach daz wîp*. Die Einsamkeit Gyburcs in Wolframs *Willehalm*," in *Homo medietas*, p. 519 [507–20].

42. Kirchert identifies Arabel's crossing to Europe as an *Entführung* [abduction] ("Heidenkrieg," p. 268).

43. "Es scheint auch für Wolfram zu gelten: Außerhalb des richtigen Glaubens gibt es kein Recht"; *Wolfram*, p. 244.

44. In 218 and 331, 27–30, in addition to the instance in her speech to the troops.

45. "[I]n der Tat keine weitere Stelle, die für die Gotteskindschaft der Heiden spricht, und ebenfalls keine, nach der einer, der die Taufe abgelehnt hat, gerettet werden könnte"; Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens," p. 404. Since Heinzle ("Die Heiden," pp. 304–05) maintains that Gyburc advocates Muslims as *gotes kint*, then one might expect that his acknowledgement of the narrator's opposing opinion would force an admission that the determination of Wolfram's own personal opinion was no longer

transparent. But Heinzle's project in this article is a rear-guard action against the devastating argument of Lofmark and Fritz Peter Knapp's note supplemental to it: "Die Heiden und ihr Vater in den Versen 307, 27f. des 'Willehalm,'" *Zeitschrift fur deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 122 (1993): 202–07. He seeks not to refute their arguments but rather to discredit them professionally, especially by questioning their academic credentials and invoking *die gute alte Philologentradition* [the good old philological tradition]. Christoph Fasbender provides a valuable critique of Heinzle's position; in "*Willehalm* als Programmschrift gegen die 'Kreuzzugsideologie' und 'Dokument der Menschlichkeit,'" *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 116 (1997): 16–31.

46. "In 'Willehalm' werden auch die Heiden in die Gotteskindschaft einbezogen: das ist das Neue" (*Wolfram*, pp. 248–9).

47. Mergell, *Wolfram von Eschenbach und seine französischen Quellen*, p. 1. Teil, *Wolframs Willehalm* (Münster 1936), p. 122; Bumke, *Wolfram*, pp. 248–9.

48. Knapp: "[W]iderspricht kirchlicher Lehre" ("Und noch einmal," p. 301); Lofmark: "Von einer universalen Gotteskindschaft ist hier nicht die Rede" ("Das Problem des Unglaubens," p. 401); Knapp remarks: "Wer Lofmark in dieser Frage grundsätzlich widersprechen will, hat allein die Beweislast zu tragen" and further notes that Bumke's earlier more nuanced treatment of this issue is compressed in the synthesis of the *Sammlung Metzler* volume into the statement just quoted, which, he plausibly conjectures, will be adopted by a generation of students and scholars as the unreflected orthodoxy, as has indeed happened ("Die Heiden," p. 203).

49. Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung des Kreuzzugserlebnisses," p. 681.

50. "Même èlèvés au rang de princes civilisès, il manque aux Sarassin la dimension chrétienne: malgré les voeux de Gyburc, ils connaîtront pour la plupart les flammes de l'Enfer, eux qui se battirent et moururent exclusivement pour l'amour des dames et qui, n'étant pas nés du bon côté, ne pouvaient comme les croisés gagner par leur mort le salut de leur âme"; "L'image," p. 265.

51. This is a phenomenon on which numerous scholars have remarked; cf. for instance, Haas, "Aspekte," p. 200 and Gabrielle Strauch, "Incorporating Arab Sources," p. 21.

52. "Die Zeitgenossen Wolframs kannten ihn nicht als einen humanen Aufklärer, der das Heidentum toleriert hätte, sondern als einen frommen Christen.... Wolfram meint nicht, daß die Taufe überflüssig sei und daß Gott auch Ungetaufte retten wird. Er weiß sehr wohl, daß den Ungetauften die Hölle bestimmt ist; deshalb ist er besorgt um sie und möchte sie von ihrem Unglauben abbringen"; "Das Problem des Unglaubens," p. 412.

53. Heinzle, "Die Heiden," 305. Matthias Lexer lists uses of the phrase in several contemporary texts; *Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch* I: 1576. Fritz Peter Knapp calls attention to the use by the Middle High German

poet Freidank of concepts similar to those here attributed to Gyburc: *Got hat drîer slahte kint, / daz kristen, juden, heiden sint* "God has three types of children, who are Christians, Jews, and heathens" (v. 10, 17–18); in "Und noch einmal: Die Heiden als Kinder Gottes," *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 129 (2000): 296–302. John D. Martin points to other similar passages in Freidank (cf. v. 6, 11ff.), Hugo von Trias, and the *Gesta Romanorum*; in "Christen und Andersgläubige in Wolframs 'Willehalm,'" *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 133 (2004): 45–8. He suggests that Freidank equates the three categories "in a theological sense that has to do with creation but not salvation" ("in einem schöpfungstheologischen … aber nicht in einem soteriologischen … Sinn," 47). On Gyburc's speech, he claims that Muslims are called "children of God" only in the sense that they are God's creations (48). See also Knapp, "Die Heiden und ihr Vater," 209, and Heinzle, "Noch einmal: die Heiden als Kinder Gottes in Wolframs Willehalm," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 117 (1998): 75–80.

54. Lofmark, "Das Problem des Unglaubens," 404; see also on this interpretation, among others, Ralf-Henning Steinmetz, "Die ungetauften Christenkinder in den 'Willehalm'-Versen 307, 26–30," *Zeitschrift fur deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 124 (1995): 151–62.

55. Knapp, "Die Heiden," 206.

56. Timothy McFarland, "Giburc's Dilemma: Parents and Children, Baptism and Salvation," pp. 127, 132, 135, 141 [121–42] in Jones and McFarland, eds., *Wollfram's "Willehalm": Fifteen Essays.*

57. "in ihrer menschlichen Vollkommenheit…, sondern allein in der Tatsache, daß die Taufe die einen in eine Gemeinschaft mit Gott aufgenommen hat, die ihren Kampf bestimmt und ihren Tod überdauert, während die anderen trotz aller irdischen Tugenden dem Tod und der Hölle verfallen sind"; *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 251.

58. W.J. Schröder, "Toleranzgedanke und Gotteskindschaft im Willehalm," in *Festschrift für Karl Bischoff zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Günter Bellmann, Günter Eifler, and Wolfgang Kleiber (Cologne/Vienna: Böhlau, 1975), pp. 405–07.

59. Rushing, "Arofel's Death," 481; Christine Ortmann: "Jedenfalls ist nicht die Schonung des Gegners, schon gar nicht 'Toleranz' gemeint"; in "Der utopische Gehalt der Minne: Strukturelle Bedingungen der Gattungsreflexion in Wolframs *Willehalm*," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 115 (1993): 103 [86–117]; Gibbs, *Wîplîchez wîbes reht*, p. 63; J. A. Hunter, "Wolfram's Attitude," 99.

60. Lofmark, "Das Problem," 410, especially the examples cited in n. 20.

61. In addition to the examples cited by Lofmark, in 462, 21 and 465, 19.

62. Haas, "Aspekte," 200–201.

63. "Aber, und das ist entscheidend, die *werdekeit* der heidnischen Helden wird in keiner Weise in Frage gestellt, im Gegenteil, sie wird bei jeder Gelegenheit eigens vermerkt und gefeiert"; Haas, "Aspekte," 200–201.

64. Hunter, "Wolfram's Attitude," 105.

65. Kirchert, "Heidenkrieg," 270.

66. Cf. Pastre: "This passage, which belongs to the final ones of the epic, provides us with the key to Wolfram's attitude—the respect for Saracens insofar as they are close relatives of Gyburc, Willehalm's wife" ("Ce passage, qui appartient au tous derniers vers du roman, nous fournit le maître mot de l'attitude wolframienne—le respect des sarrasin en ce qu'ils sont proches parents de Gyburc, femme de Willehalm"); "L'image," 263.

67. This move seems structurally parallel to the quasi-banishment of Feirefîz to "Asia" as the agent of Christian missionizing of that continent at the conclusion of *Parzival*, albeit obviously with different *heilsgeschichtliche* [redemptive] consequences.

68. Those exceptions were often green-skinned, horny-skinned, cow-voiced: as found in Wolfram's mustering of the Muslim army at the first battle (35, 3—36, 4); the troops of King Gorhant from the Ganges have horn-instead of skin-covered bodies and have non-human voices like hunting hounds or a mother cow (36). See above, chapter four, on the "noble heathen," who is sometimes not black or anatomically monstrous.

69. This feature may be a reference to Islam's prohibition of alcohol as well as to the common motif of fermented beverages as a sign of culture as opposed to nature; or perhaps it is simply a harbinger of the common later Eurocentric notion that "primitives" are by nature drunkards.

70. Bertau, *Wolfram*, pp. 248–50. A Muslim priest also appears in the pavilion of the embalmed Muslim kings after the second battle (464, 11).

71. Spiewok, "Die Bedeutung des Kreuzzugserlebnisses," 679.

72. Strauch, "Incorporating Arab Sources," 18.

73. See Lofmark on these standard precedents for the treatment of Muslims in Middle High German literature; in "Das Problem des Unglaubens," 404–05.

74. As noted above, the one potential exception, Rennewart, in *Willehalm* significantly *disappears* from the narrative instead of converting, dying or leaving Europe.

75. Kathleen Biddick remarks—concerning Spain—that "[h]istories of tolerance (*convivencia*) among Christians, Muslims, and Jews are…achieved by excluding the ambivalence and hostilities inherent between and across texts and communities"; see her "Coming Out of Exile: Dante on the Orient(alism) Express," *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 1238 [1234–49]; rpt. in Cohen, *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, pp. 35–52.

6　Walther von der Vogelweide, Crusader Lyric, and the Discourse of the Muslim Other

1. Dijkstra and Gosman, "Poetic Fiction," 13.

2. Paul Zumthor, *Parler du Moyen Age* (Paris: Minuit, 1980), p. 44; noted by Cathrynke Th. J. Dijkstra, "Les Chansons de croisade: Tradition versus

subjectivité," in *Literary Aspects of Courtly Culture*, ed. Donald Maddox and Sara Sturm-Maddox (Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 1994), p. 95 [95–103].

3. Dijkstra and Gosman, "Poetic Fiction," 14.

4. Paul Zumthor, *Essai de poétique médiévale* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972), pp. 113–16.

5. Elizabeth Siberry, "Troubadours, Trouvères, Minnesingers and the Crusades," *Studi Medievali* 29 (1988): 43 [19–43].

6. Dijkstra and Gosman, "Poetic Fiction," 14. Several anthologies of crusade lyrics have been collected and published by modern scholars, among them: Joseph Bédier and Pierre Aubry, eds., *Chanson de croisade* (Paris: Champion, 1909); Maurice Colleville, ed., *Les chansons allemandes de croisade en moyen haut allemand* (Paris: Didier, 1931); and Ulrich Müller, ed., *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1985).

7. "Poeme … die in der Mehrzahl ihrer Strophen oder Verse mit direkten und/oder indirekten Appellen an ein Kollektiv der Wehrfähigen und/ oder an einzelne Herrscher, z/T. auch mit dem Exempel der Kreuznahme eines oder mehrerer Herrscher oder eines Dichters oft in Parallele zu Kreuzpredigt zur Kreuzfahrt aufrufen"; Peter Hölzle, *Die Kreuzzüge in der okzitanischen und deutschen Lyrik des 12. Jahrhunderts. Das Gattungsproblem "Kreuzlied" im historischen Kontext* (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1980), 1:101–03.

8. At the other extreme seems the question by Dijkstra and Gosman as to whether lyric, in which extra-textual reference is so limited (as opposed to epic, historiography, and sermons), becomes necessarily propagandistic at the mere mention of the Crusades ("Poetic Fiction," 20).

9. Silvia Ranawake, "Walther von der Vogelweide und die Trobadors: Zu den Liedern mit Kreuzzugsthematik und ihrem literarischen Umfeld," *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen* 236 (1999): 3 [1–32].

10. Friedrich Oeding, *Das altfranzösische Kreuzlied* (Braunschweig: Hans Oeding, 1910), p. 10.

11. Dijkstra and Gosman, "Poetic Fiction," 18 and 22.

12. Dijkstra, "Les Chansons de croisade," p. 96. Dijkstra/Gosman point out that the Crusade lyrics demonstrate the multifunctionality "of medieval formal, stylistic and thematic elements" ("Poetic Fiction," p. 13).

13. Cited from Müller, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 109–11.

14. See, e.g., Rubin's "Ich wil urloup von friuden nemen" (Müller, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 95–6).

15. "die allgemeine Unlust der nordalpinen, besonders der deutschen Fürsten und Ritter an dem riskanten, zeitraubenden, kostspieligen Unternehmen. Es herrschte in den 20er Jahren allenthalben eine große Kreuzzugsmüdigkeit"; Ferdinand Urbanek, "Rhetorischer Disput im Dienste staufischer Kreuzzugspolitik: Zu Walthers Spruch vom 'drîer slahte sanc,'" *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 67 (1993): 243 [221–51]; and Ernst Kantorowicz, *Kaiser*

Friedrich II, 6th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), pp. 128–30. See also Lofmark, "Anti-Crusade Feeling," and P.A. Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade* (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1940), and S. Runciman, "The Decline of the Crusading Idea," in *X. Congreso Internationale di Scienze Storiche, Roma 4–11 Settembre 1955. Relazioni* (Florence 1955), III (*Storia del Medioevo*), pp. 637–52.

16. Lofmark remarks: "Repeated failure, and growing doubts as to divine approval and support of the crusader's cause, now combined with a new respect for a brave enemy that kept defeating him in battle and was acquiring a high reputation for chivalry" ("Anti-Crusade Feeling," p. 23). Dijkstra/Gosman point out that Crusader panegyrics tend to disappear after the death of Louis IX ("Poetic Fiction," p. 14).

17. "In allen Gruppen findet man mit großer Leichtigkeit sowohl in den Texten selber als auch in deren Auslegungen bei Hölzle deutliche Anzeichen von einer "Problematisierung des Kreuzzuges, wenn nicht gar latente Kreuzzugskritik" (Hölzle, *Die Kreuzzüge*, 1:194), die von Propaganda gar nicht die Rede sein läßt"; William E. Jackson, "Das Kreuzzugmotiv in Reinmars Lyrik," *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift* 43 (1993): 145 [144–66]; here also the citation of Hölzle's argument.

18. Jackson, "Das Kreuzzugmotiv," p. 145: "übergreifende[n] Charakter der Kreuzzugsbegeisterung."

19. *Criticism of Crusading 1095–1274* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), p. 199.

20. *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 101.

21. *Œuvres complètes de Rutebeuf*, ed. Edmond Faral and Julia Bastin, 2 vols. (Paris: Picard, 1959), 1:476, ll. 157–60 and 193–6.

22. Even so, we should note, it is possible for the poet to construct such a character and opinion as potentially plausible.

23. See Lofmark, "Anti-Crusade Feeling," p. 31.

24. Müller, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 114–15). *Bafomet(z)* is an Old French corruption of the name Muḥammad. *Melicadefer* = Baibars الملك الظاهر ركن الدين بيبرس البندقداري *al-Malik uẓ-Ẓāhir Rukn ud-dīn Baybars ul-Bunduqdāri* (1223–77) was a Kipchak Turk who rose to be the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt and Syria and defeated Louis IX of France in the Seventh Crusade (1250) and Edward I of England in the Ninth Crusade (1271).

25. Lofmark, "Anti-Crusade Feeling," pp. 29 and 20.

26. William Jackson's essay is particularly useful on such issues: "Das Kreuzzugmotiv," especially p. 163. Another aspect of the oppositional lyrics has to do with complaints voiced by poets about those who find excuses for not keeping their vows to go on Crusade; cf., for instance, Friedrich von Hausen and Heinrich von Rugge; *MF* 53, 31; 98, 38–99, 3; and *MF* 180, 28; cf. Lofmark, "Anti-Crusade Feeling," p. 20.

27. The text in Müller, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 96–9. One is reminded of the common usage of U.S. veterans of the invasion of Vietnam who referred to life in the United States as "the world," as in "When I get back to the world …"

28. See Wentzlaff-Eggerbert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 132.

29. For the biographical interpretation and the identification (on that basis) of which poets were Crusaders, see especially Elizabeth Siberry, "Troubadours, Trouvères, Minnesingers and the Crusades," *Studi Medievali* 29 (1988): 20–36 and Jackson, "Das Kreuzzugmotiv," p. 20.

30. "la possibilité d'une subjectivité personelle," Dijkstra, "Les Chansons de croisade," p. 99.

31. Elizabeth Siberry's observation—"if one accepts certain qualifications, the poems of the troubadours can provide a useful source for lay attitudes towards the crusading movement"—assumes the relevance of this developed discourse ("Troubadours, Trouvères, Minnesingers and the Crusades" p. 42).

32. Dijkstra and Gosman, "Poetic Fiction," p. 20.

33. Müller, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 29–32; Wentzlaff-Eggebert notes that the Crusader songs of the *Carmina Burana* date from the period before the Second Crusade (*Kreuzzugsdicthung*, p. 53).

34. Debra Strickland indicates how Saladin was portrayed negatively as often as positively in contemporary documents: sometimes as a noble, cultured, and worthy enemy, and other times as a "follower of Antichrist"; see her *Saracens, Demons, and Jews*, p. 242.

35. The quasi-theoreticians of the Crusades took the fact that it was in Palestine that Jesus lived as a basic tenet of their argument for the Christian right to possession of the land. Bonizo of Sutri (d. 1090–1091), for instance, claims that since that land was hallowed through Christ's life there, it then legally belonged to the Church, and thus its defense as Church property was justified: *quod qui extra ecclesiam sunt, nullo iure bona ecclesiae possunt possidere* [because those who are outside the Church cannot rightly possess the property of the Church]. Pope Urban II claimed that Muslims' mere presence defiled Christian holy sites *in quo Jesus Christus pro nobis passus est* [where Jesus Christ died for us]; ("Orat. in conc. Claramont. hab.," in Migne, vol. 151, p. 565 d; see Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 4 and 9–10.

36. While Wentzlaff-Eggebert attends briefly to this poem (*Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 161–3), primarily in support of his notion that there is a distinct change in attitude toward Islam in the century following the First Crusade, significantly he does not cite or comment on the lines here quoted, thus effectively eliminating all textual evidence that Muslims were still being construed as the enemies of God and Christianity and thus deserving of annihilation.

37. "überall ist in seinen Kreuzzugsstrophen der Atem der Zeit spürbar"; *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 237.

38. Walther's poems are here cited from the edition by Christoph Cormeau, *Walther von der Vogelweide. Leich, Lieder, Sangsprüche* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), identifed by his numeration (here: C), but for convenience in comparison with older scholarship, I also include the identifying numeration from Karl Lachmann's edition (L): *Die Gedichte Walthers von der Vogelweide*

(Berlin: Reimer, 1827); 13th ed. by Hugo Kuhn (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965). In addition to the Crusade poems named above, see also the "Erster Philippston" C9,IV/L19, 29; and "Unmutston, Zweiter Ottenton" C12,XI/L36, 1. Konrad Burdach also makes a strong case for revising the scholarly conception of Walther's "Elegie" and reclassifying it, too, as a call to Crusade; in "Walthers Aufruf zum Kreuzzug Kaiser Friedrichs II," *Euphorion* 36 (1935): 50–68; rpt. in *Walther von der Vogelweide*, ed. Siegfried Beyschlag (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), pp. 117–39. The dating of the "Aufforderung zum Kreuzzug" is unclear, as is then whether it was written in response to the catastrophe of 1204 or concerning the Crusade of Friedrich II in 1227–8; Volker Ladenthin has shown that there are Romance models for this kind of *Ritterschelte* that also incorporate elements of Crusade sermon; in "Schelte, Vision und Belehrung. Walther von der Vogelweide 13, 5," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 101 (1983): 96–7. It is then not surprising that Walther refers with some frequency to the Crusades in his poems. The textual tradition of these poems, as of much of *Minnesang*, is troubled, with the ordering of stanzas, their grouping into distinctly identifiable poems under individual titles, and even the authenticity of stanzas disputed by various scholars. Among the many discussions of such issues over the course of generations, see, recently, Günther Schweikle, ed., *Walther von der Vogelweide, Werke, Gesamtausgabe* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1998), p. 789; and Manfred Günter Scholz, *Walther von der Vogelweide* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), pp. 160–9. The poems discussed here are quite complex and have been thoroughly studied by successive generations of Germanists from a variety of perspectives. In the brief remarks here I do not intend either to ignore that body of work or to "correct" it. My purpose is quite distinct from that of the majority of scholarly work on Walther's Crusade poems: it is a tactical analysis that focuses strictly on the issue at hand, that is, on what ideological basis does the poems' address of issues pertinent to the Crusades rest? And thus what mode of discourse is employed to address those issues?

39. In the "Kaiser Friedrichston" ("Rich, hêrre, dich und dîne muoter, megde kint" C3, II/L10, 9), again, the assumption surfaces that the Muslims are evil and enemies of Christ. But there the speaker of Walther's poem introduces quite an interesting twist: it is not just Muslims who oppose Christ and do so openly, but some Christians also do so both secretly and in league with Muslims; both deserve Christ's wrath.

40. Ladenthin reads the poem against the background of Crusade sermon even in its argumentative structure of *narratio, exhortatio, privilegia*, but ultimately denies that it paraphrases that genre or offers *politische oder kirchliche Propaganda* [political or ecclesiastical propaganda]; in "Walthers Kreuzlied 76, 22 vor dem Hintergrund mittelalterlicher Kreuzpredigten," *Euphorion* 77 (1983): 71 [40–71]. Wentzlaff-Eggebert lists the ten basic items of content in Crusader sermons: (1) the land that Christ sanctified with his life and passion is in danger; (2) God's omnipotence can also help now; (3)

only the one who takes the Cross now can stand his ground at the final judgment; (4) God is testing Christians now; now Christians have the opportunity to distinguish themselves; (5) Christians owe everything to God; now they must repay his mercy with their service; (6) God let his son suffer death for humans, who must then be true to him even unto death; (7) Crusaders gain for themselves and their dependents eternal bliss; (8) the day of redemption has dawned for all Crusaders; (9) everyone who can and will must take the Cross; (10) all dependents are under the protection of the church; Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 43.

41. "Das Anrecht auf das Heilige Land"; Franz Viktor Spechtler, "Der Leich, Lieder zum Thema Heiliges Land und Kreuzzug, 'Alterslieder,'" in Horst Brunner, Gerhard Hahn, Ulrich Müller, Franz Viktor Spechtler, and Sigrid Neureiter-Lackner, eds., *Walther von der Vogelweide: Epoche-Werk-Wirkung* (Munich: Beck, 1996), p. 212.

42. This line is transmitted in none of the manuscripts in anything like this conventionally reconstructed form; see Cormeau's notes.

43. Spechtler, "Der Leich," p. 212: "Religion und Politik bzw. Religion im Dienste der Reichspolitik sprechen aus dem Text."

44. As Wolfgang Haubrichs pointed out some forty years ago ("Grund und Hintergrund").

45. *Chanson de Roland*, l. 1015. Elizabeth Siberry introduces an interesting notion: that a Crusade to decide possession of Palestine was depicted in Crusade epic as a tournament between Heaven and Hell, in which God called on his friends to help him. Palestine was depicted as Christ's patrimony, the loss of which dishonored God; *Criticism of Crusading*, p. 29.

46. Cited from Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 22.

47. Spechtler, "Der Leich," p. 212: "Allerdings in einer Zeit, in der ein Kaiser nicht eroberte, sondern mit den Juden und "Heiden" (Muslimen) verhandelte. Der Kaiser war mit seinem Toleranzgedanken der Zeit und auch dem Dichter und dessen europäischem Publikum weit voraus."

48. "Gegen biographistische Mißverständnisse braucht man heute nicht mehr anzusprechen. Das *ich* hat zunächst zweifellos den Status einer literarischen Rolle"; in "Zu den *ich*-Aussagen in Walthers Minnesang," in *Walther von der Vogelweide. Hamburger Kolloquium 1988 zum 65. Geburtstag von Karl-Heinz Borck*, ed. Jan-Dirk Müller and Franz Josef Worstbrock (Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1989), p. 95 [95–104]. Wolfgang Haubrichs likewise rejects the biographical interpretation: in "Grund und Hintergrund in der Kreuzzugsdichtung. Argumentationsstruktur und politische Intention in Walthers *Elegie* und *Palästinalied*," in *Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Heinz Rupp (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1977), p. 33 [12–62]. Surprisingly, however, in his pedagogical introduction to the works of Walther, Hermann Reichert rather surprisingly imagines several modes of interpreting the personal vision of the Holy Land by the speaker of the "Palästinalied," all of them involving Walther's actual participation in Crusade; in *Walther von der Vogelweide für Anfänger* (Vienna: WUV-Universitätsverlag, 1992), pp. 173–5.

49. George F. Jones, *Walther von der Vogelweide* (New York: Twayne, 1968), p. 127.

50. See the discussion by Karl Bertau, "Das Recht des Andern," pp. 241–3 and 246–8, who refers here to Rainer Christoph Schwinges, *Kreuzzugsideologie und Toleranz: Studien zu Wilhelm von Tyrus* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1977); and Tinsley, "Mapping the Muslims." Likewise, both Rüdiger Schnell and John D. Martin have identified other texts that suggest the possibility of Muslims attaining Heaven by means of divine grace. See Rüdiger Schnell, "Die Christen und die "Anderen." Mittelalterliche Positionen und germanistische Perspektiven," in *Die Begegnung des Westens mit dem Osten Kongressakten des 4. Symposions des Mediävistenverbandes in Köln 1991 aus Anlass des 1000. Todesjahres der Kaiserin Theophanu*, ed. Peter Schreiner and Odilo Engels (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1993), pp. 185–202; and John D. Martin, "Christen und Andersgläubige," pp. 45–8.

51. Jones, *Walther*, p. 125. Bizarrely, however, in praising Walther's "tolerance," Jones himself chooses to refer to Muslims as "heathens" and "Mohammedans."

52. Jones, *Walther*, p. 125.

53. Wentzlaff-Eggerbert, *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. iv; and: "die entscheidende Wendung zur Toleranz" (p. 218).

54. Lib. III, c. 1, 2 and 1, 4; Migne, *PL*, vols. 182, 759, 760.

55. His arguments become more impressionistic, indeed dithyrambically and dizzyingly propagandizing, as the book progresses; see especially *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, pp. 134–5.

7   A Twelfth-Century Paradigm Shift?

1. Vladimir P. Goss, "Preface," in *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades* (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1986), p. 10; Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927).

2. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 167.

3. As Walter Berschin indicates, "In the twelfth century, Spain was fully oriented toward Arabic science…. The early translators from Arabic in Spain were interested exclusively in the natural sciences"; Walter Berschin, *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages: from Jerome to Nicholas of Cusa*, rev. ed. trans. Jerold C. Frakes (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1988), pp. 236–7.

4. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, pp. 287–8.

5. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, p. 282.

6. Nikita Elisséeff, "Les échanges culturels entre le monde musulman et les croisés à l'époque de Nūr ad-Dīn b. Zankī (m. 1174)," in Goss, *The Meeting of Two Worlds*, p. 43 [39–52].

7. Joshua Prawer, "The Roots of Medieval Colonialism," in Goss, *The Meeting of Two Worlds*, p. 30 [23–38].

8. Prawer, "The Roots," pp. 29 and 32. There was not even any interest in the native Christian population, who were treated as aliens and whose clergy was rejected altogether.

9. Prawer, "The Roots," pp. 32 and 30.

10. See Prawer, "The Roots," p. 35.

11. Sharon Kinoshita, *Medieval Boundaries: Rethinking Difference in Old French Literature* (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), p. 2.

12. The astonishingly destructive consequences of this conquest of Constantinople were determinative of its remaining two-and-a-half centuries of existence as a Christian city: when the troops of Mehmet II breached the Theodosian walls in 1453 and entered the vast intramural and depopulated territory of the city, what they found consisted in large part of farms, orchards, and pastures among the rubble left by the Crusaders.

13. Kinoshita, *Medieval Boundaries*, p. 236.

14. Michael Frassetto, "The Image of the Saracen as Heretic in the Sermons of Ademar of Chabannes," in Blanks, p. 83 [83–96].

15. *Origins of Racism*, p. 22.

16. *Origins of Racism*, p. 23.

17. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 171.

18. In the world of Western European literature, ironically, Christian armies with very few exceptions defeat Muslim armies (even if there are occasional temporary setbacks), unlike in medieval history, where, outside of Spain, Christians armies were almost always defeated by Muslim armies.

19. Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 133–4.

20. Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 168–9. Daniel J. Vitkus also points to the concrete consequences of the discourses of the Muslim Other in European texts: they "are also 'real' in the sense that any such representation has a material and ideological impact as a historical phenomenon: it is a mode of perception that shapes the way people think and therefore the way they act"; see "Early Modern Orientalism: Representations of Islam in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe," in *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, ed. David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 207–08 [207–30].

21. See Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 19–20, 70, 110.

22. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 70.

23. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. xxi.

24. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. xxi.

25. Kinoshita, *Medieval Boundaries*, p. 3.

26. *Aucassin et Nicolette*, ed Jean Dufournet (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1973); *Le Conte de Floire et Blanche-flor*, ed. Jean-Luc Leclanche (Paris: H. Champion, 1983).

27. Philippe Sénac comments on the Muslim Queen Bramimonde in the *Chanson de Roland*: "In changing religion, she transforms: she is assigned a new name. The chasm has been traversed. Bramimonde the Christian

is no longer of interest. Silence can cover her" ("En changeant de religion, elle se métamorphose: un nouveau nom lui et attribué. Le fossé a été franchi. Bramimonde chrétienne n'a plus d'intérêt. Le silence peut la recouvrir"); *L'image de l'autre: histoire de l'occident médiéval face à Islam* (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), p. 92.

28. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen and Genre*, p. 102.

29. Comfort, "The Literary Rôle of the Saracens in the French Epic," *PMLA* 55 (1940): 659 [628–59].

30. Benjamin Z. Kedar, "Muslim Conversion in Canon Law," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of Medieval Canon Law, Berkeley 1980*, ed. S. Kuttner and K. Pennington (Vatican: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1985), pp. 321–32; repr. in *The Franks in the Levant, 11th to 14th Centuries* (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 1993), essay # XIV. See also Muldoon: "This careful arrangement of rights suggests the similar use of hierarchy of rights in marriage law, the so-called Pauline Privilege. By the terms of that privilege, if one of the partners in a marriage converts to Christianity while the other remains an infidel, the marriage ought to remain binding. If, however, the infidel partner interferes with the religious practice of the Christian, the Christian partner can leave the infidel spouse and legitimately remarry, even though the first marriage was a valid one in the eyes of the Church. In both cases, the spiritual welfare of the Christian is superior to the natural-law rights of a ruler or spouse" (*Popes, Lawyers and Infidels*, p. 13).

31. Cf. the marriage depicted in the *King of Tars*, discussed in chapter four, which in fact takes place between the (unconverted) Muslim king and a Christian bride. The necessary trajectory of such a narrative demands that Muslim metamorphosis and thus that the Muslim convert, which he then does in dramatic fashion.

32. Ramey, *Christian, Saracen, and Genre*, p. 56.

33. "Die aus der Wirklichkeit der Kreuzzüge übernommene genauere Kenntnis heidnischer Lebensweise und Kultur, besonders das Vorbild des ritterlichen Saladin, hatte die einheitliche höfische Ebene als Untergrund des Kampfes von Christen und Heiden ermöglicht"; *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, p. 273.

34. "Das Erlebnis der arabischen Kultur zeitigte die Erkenntnis, daß die angeblich wilden und verworfenen Heiden als Feudalherren in Bildung, Haltung und Lebensweise ihren abendländischen Klassengenossen durchaus ebenbürtig, ja sogar überlegen waren, daß sie—auf Grund der fortgeschrittenen Entwicklung des orientalischen Feudalismus—in dieser Hinsicht einen Stand erreicht hatten, den die westeuropäischen Feudalherren erst anstrebten. Schließlich mußten die Kreuzritter entdecken, daß die verlästerten Heiden einem Glauben anhingen, der eine noch reinere Ausprägung des Monotheismus darstellte als selbst das Christentum, und daß sich dieser Glaube vom Christentum—wie infolge seiner christlichen Verwurzelung ganz natürlich—nicht grundsätzlich unterschied, wie es das Papsttum lehrte" ("Die Bedeutung des

Kreuzzugserlebnisses," p. 679). In his assumption that Islam derives from Christianity, Spiewok himself strays rather close to the medieval Christian construction of Islam as a heretical distortion of Christianity.

35. That is, the intellectual culture of what is now, very roughly, Great Britain, France, the Low Countries, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy.

36. Southern, *Western Views*, p. 28.

37. Debra Higgs Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 189.

38. Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz, "Popular Attitudes towards Islam in Medieval Europe," in Blanks, *Western Views*, p. 64 [55–81].

39. Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Appraches toward the Muslims* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 87.

40. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 275. Incidentally, he here also makes clear his insistent distinction between fictive "Saracens" and actual Muslims, which cements that political connection between discourse and its effect on the lives of flesh-and-blood humans.

41. Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews*, pp. 157–8.

42. This same kind of social conditioning of what is comic versus what is offensive is a well-known phenomenon in the long history of racist depictions of blacks as humorous in the United States, in nineteenth- and twentieth-century German racist cartoons of Jews, and in recent years in a particularly destructive instance in the racist and religiously offensive cartoons of Muḥammad, published by the Danish *Jyllands-Posten* (30 September 2005), which led to international controversy, riots, and over a hundred deaths.

43. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 282.

44. Blanks and Frassetto, *Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, p. 2. The essays by Gloria Allaire ("Noble Saracen or Muslim Enemy? The Changing Image of the Saracen in Late Medieval Italian Literature," pp. 173–85) and Nancy Bisaba, Nancy ("'New Barbarian' or Worthy Adversary? Humanist Constructs of the Ottoman Turks in Fifteenth-Century Italy," pp. 185–205) in that same volume provide useful and pertinent examinations of key aspects of the early modern issue.

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